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Artsakh and President Aliyev's Dilemma Revisited
By Michael Mensoian
on August 30, 2014
Azeri incursions along the Line of Contact (LoC) during the past several
weeks have escalated significantly
in frequency and intensity. As would be expected, the Artsakh defenders
have been more than
able to protect their homeland against these blatant violations of the
ceasefire agreement. The escalation occurring just prior to Azerbaijani
President Ilham Aliyev's meeting with Armenian President Serge Sarkisian
and Russian President Vladimir Putin in Sochi, Russia, seemed
counterproductive.
Border violations or not, no worthwhile result for Artsakh and Armenia
could be expected to come out of the Sochi meeting or any subsequent
meetings for obvious reasons. Sarkisian is concerned with the de jure
recognition of Artsakh's independence while Aliyev, ignoring Artsakh's de
facto independence, is determined to brand Armenia as an aggressor
illegally occupying Azeri territory. How can negotiations produce any
meaningful results when there is no agreement on the conflict that must be
resolved? For too long we have allowed Azerbaijan to frame the issue in its
favor. Unfortunately for us, the European Union and the United States have
bought into this fiction, to the detriment of Armenia and Artsakh. The
impossibility of reconciling the Azeri claim of territorial integrity with
Artsakh's rightful claim to independence based on the principle of
self-determination should be obvious. It must be one or the other (see
"Artsakh:
A Zero Sum Solution Weighted in Favor of Azerbaijan
").
Russia, as the third member of the Minsk Group (with the United States and
the European Union) charged with monitoring the negotiations, is pleased
with the present impasse, which facilitates Putin's policy of playing both
sides against the middle. How bizarre, even in the Machiavellian world of
international politics, to have your treaty ally selling up-to-date
military hardware to your enemy. Unfortunately we must suffer an ally who
enjoys playing the alternating role of good friend-bad friend at our
expense. And with respect to Armenia's less than voluntary agreement to
join the Eurasian Economic Union (EEU), President Putin allowed Kazakhstani
President Nursultan Nazarbayev to support Aliyev's claim against Armenia by
chiding Sarkisian that Armenia's accession to the EEU must be based on its
officially recognized borders.
Given the sophisticated intelligence-gathering technology available, the
need for these cross-border violations by Azerbaijan with its loss of life
are unnecessary. By now each side should be well aware of the number, type,
disposition, and preparedness of the troops manning the LoC. If these
cross-border incursions by Azerbaijan are meant to weaken the morale not
only of our soldiers but the civilian population, most of whom live in
rather close proximity to the LoC, they have failed. It should be apparent
to Azerbaijan that these flagrant violations of the ceasefire agreement
have only increased the preparedness and determination of the Artsakh
Armenians to protect their rightful claim to independence.
The second objective that these constant violations seek is to project
Aliyev as being in control of a situation that seems to escape a successful
conclusion. Aliyev is a victim of his own making. He has not hesitated to
proclaim that his military appropriations continually exceed Armenia's
annual national budget. That his purchase of military equipment has created
the largest military force in the south Caucasus more than capable of
retaking Artsakh should negotiations fail. Conveniently overlooked is the
fact that he is squandering the nation's wealth on these military
acquisitions and the self-aggrandizement of a favored few to the detriment
of a socioeconomically impovished population. How much longer can his bellicose
statements ring
true when rhetoric fails to match results? A dictator that is perceived as
a toothless tiger should begin to worry about his ability to remain in
power.
No doubt Aliyev is fully cognizant of this dilemma as well as the
constraints on his oft-repeated threat to use military force, if necessary,
to retake Artsakh if negotiations fail. Whether or not there is support by
the three co-chairs of the Minsk Group for Armenia and Artsakh's
independence, all nations (with the questionable exception of Turkey) that
have an interest in the south Caucasus abhor the thought of renewed
hostilities. Russia, Iran, the European Union, the United States, Georgia,
and the United Nations would immediately pressure Azerbaijan to enter into
renewed negotiations or mediation at the first sign that it was preparing
for a resumption of hostilities. International economic interests would
raise cautionary flags. Any disruption in the flow of energy resources
would have global ramifications. However, the more worrisome development
would be the range of unintended political consequences that might unfold.
Can it be anticipated what the response by Russia and Iran might be if
Ankara decided to augment its forces along the Armenian frontier or to a
friendly occupation of Nakhitchevan on behalf of Azerbaijan? Or just as
ominous are the possible repercussions if worried Georgian officials
decided to refuse, restrict, or delay the urgent need by Russia to increase
its garrison in Gyumri. Russia cannot afford to lose its only anchor in the
south Caucasus or be unprepared to respond to any likely Turkish
provocation against Armenia. Any weakening of this vital foothold would not
only push historic Russian interests back to the northern slopes of the
Caucasus, but likely reawaken anti-Russian movements within the region's
already restive Muslim population. It would facilitate Turkish economic and
political domination of the south Caucasus and its long-sought expansion
across the Caspian Sea that would compete with Russian interests in Central
Asia. Multi-ethnic Shi'ite Iran neither needs nor wants a strong Sunni
Turkish-Azeri alliance along its northern and northwestern borders that
would accompany a weakened Armenia if it lost Artsakh.
We do have our limitations. However, when we factor in our strategic
location (Armenia-Artsakh) that politically benefits Russian interests and
economically benefits Iranian interests, we are not without some leverage.
We do play an important role in limiting Turkish expansion in the southern
Caucasus. Knowing this, we cannot allow our efforts to be circumscribed
either by the uncertainty of success or the possibility of failure.
The unthinkable loss of Artsakh would be a catastrophic blow not only to
Armenia, but to *Hai Tahd*and the morale of those of the younger generation
who must continue to seek the justice that has eluded those of the passing
generations. Recep Tayyip Erdogan has just won a convincing victory as
president
of
Turkey that should keep him in power for another five years. Facing a
weakened Armenia will only stiffen his resistance to genocide recognition
and a host of other issues that have remained dormant for the past century.
The likelihood of Ankara bowing to either domestic or international
pressure is highly questionable for the foreseeable future. Can it be
expected that a weakened Armenia will encourage the xenophobic leaders of
Georgia to implement much-needed and promised programs and policies to
improve the onerous political, economic, and cultural environments within
which the *Javakhahayer* must live? And of greater significance is the fate
of our brothers and sisters in Artsakh, whose sacrifices to live on our
historic lands as free and independent Armenians would have been in vain.
The continuation of the status quo for Artsakh is reasonably certain,
especially when the interests of the European Union and the United States
do not coincide with Russia's. However, passive reliance on this fact alone
cannot guarantee ultimate victory. It is vital that we implement a
well-thought-out plan properly funded to accelerate a constant annual
increase in Artsakh's population as well as its strategic distribution.
Land without people has seldom been a winning combination. To facilitate
this need for a significant increase in population, economic development
must also be accelerated not only to attract repatriates, but to develop a
positive attitude that Artsakh is permanently ours. It is not an easy task,
but it is a vital task that cannot be delayed or sold short. The future of
Armenia and Artsakh is inextricably linked, as is the creditability of *Hai
Tahd* which hangs in the balance.
http://www.armenianweekly.com/2014/08/30/artsakh-president-aliyevs-dilemma-revisited/
By Michael Mensoian
on August 30, 2014
Azeri incursions along the Line of Contact (LoC) during the past several
weeks have escalated significantly
in frequency and intensity. As would be expected, the Artsakh defenders
have been more than
able to protect their homeland against these blatant violations of the
ceasefire agreement. The escalation occurring just prior to Azerbaijani
President Ilham Aliyev's meeting with Armenian President Serge Sarkisian
and Russian President Vladimir Putin in Sochi, Russia, seemed
counterproductive.
Border violations or not, no worthwhile result for Artsakh and Armenia
could be expected to come out of the Sochi meeting or any subsequent
meetings for obvious reasons. Sarkisian is concerned with the de jure
recognition of Artsakh's independence while Aliyev, ignoring Artsakh's de
facto independence, is determined to brand Armenia as an aggressor
illegally occupying Azeri territory. How can negotiations produce any
meaningful results when there is no agreement on the conflict that must be
resolved? For too long we have allowed Azerbaijan to frame the issue in its
favor. Unfortunately for us, the European Union and the United States have
bought into this fiction, to the detriment of Armenia and Artsakh. The
impossibility of reconciling the Azeri claim of territorial integrity with
Artsakh's rightful claim to independence based on the principle of
self-determination should be obvious. It must be one or the other (see
"Artsakh:
A Zero Sum Solution Weighted in Favor of Azerbaijan
").
Russia, as the third member of the Minsk Group (with the United States and
the European Union) charged with monitoring the negotiations, is pleased
with the present impasse, which facilitates Putin's policy of playing both
sides against the middle. How bizarre, even in the Machiavellian world of
international politics, to have your treaty ally selling up-to-date
military hardware to your enemy. Unfortunately we must suffer an ally who
enjoys playing the alternating role of good friend-bad friend at our
expense. And with respect to Armenia's less than voluntary agreement to
join the Eurasian Economic Union (EEU), President Putin allowed Kazakhstani
President Nursultan Nazarbayev to support Aliyev's claim against Armenia by
chiding Sarkisian that Armenia's accession to the EEU must be based on its
officially recognized borders.
Given the sophisticated intelligence-gathering technology available, the
need for these cross-border violations by Azerbaijan with its loss of life
are unnecessary. By now each side should be well aware of the number, type,
disposition, and preparedness of the troops manning the LoC. If these
cross-border incursions by Azerbaijan are meant to weaken the morale not
only of our soldiers but the civilian population, most of whom live in
rather close proximity to the LoC, they have failed. It should be apparent
to Azerbaijan that these flagrant violations of the ceasefire agreement
have only increased the preparedness and determination of the Artsakh
Armenians to protect their rightful claim to independence.
The second objective that these constant violations seek is to project
Aliyev as being in control of a situation that seems to escape a successful
conclusion. Aliyev is a victim of his own making. He has not hesitated to
proclaim that his military appropriations continually exceed Armenia's
annual national budget. That his purchase of military equipment has created
the largest military force in the south Caucasus more than capable of
retaking Artsakh should negotiations fail. Conveniently overlooked is the
fact that he is squandering the nation's wealth on these military
acquisitions and the self-aggrandizement of a favored few to the detriment
of a socioeconomically impovished population. How much longer can his bellicose
statements ring
true when rhetoric fails to match results? A dictator that is perceived as
a toothless tiger should begin to worry about his ability to remain in
power.
No doubt Aliyev is fully cognizant of this dilemma as well as the
constraints on his oft-repeated threat to use military force, if necessary,
to retake Artsakh if negotiations fail. Whether or not there is support by
the three co-chairs of the Minsk Group for Armenia and Artsakh's
independence, all nations (with the questionable exception of Turkey) that
have an interest in the south Caucasus abhor the thought of renewed
hostilities. Russia, Iran, the European Union, the United States, Georgia,
and the United Nations would immediately pressure Azerbaijan to enter into
renewed negotiations or mediation at the first sign that it was preparing
for a resumption of hostilities. International economic interests would
raise cautionary flags. Any disruption in the flow of energy resources
would have global ramifications. However, the more worrisome development
would be the range of unintended political consequences that might unfold.
Can it be anticipated what the response by Russia and Iran might be if
Ankara decided to augment its forces along the Armenian frontier or to a
friendly occupation of Nakhitchevan on behalf of Azerbaijan? Or just as
ominous are the possible repercussions if worried Georgian officials
decided to refuse, restrict, or delay the urgent need by Russia to increase
its garrison in Gyumri. Russia cannot afford to lose its only anchor in the
south Caucasus or be unprepared to respond to any likely Turkish
provocation against Armenia. Any weakening of this vital foothold would not
only push historic Russian interests back to the northern slopes of the
Caucasus, but likely reawaken anti-Russian movements within the region's
already restive Muslim population. It would facilitate Turkish economic and
political domination of the south Caucasus and its long-sought expansion
across the Caspian Sea that would compete with Russian interests in Central
Asia. Multi-ethnic Shi'ite Iran neither needs nor wants a strong Sunni
Turkish-Azeri alliance along its northern and northwestern borders that
would accompany a weakened Armenia if it lost Artsakh.
We do have our limitations. However, when we factor in our strategic
location (Armenia-Artsakh) that politically benefits Russian interests and
economically benefits Iranian interests, we are not without some leverage.
We do play an important role in limiting Turkish expansion in the southern
Caucasus. Knowing this, we cannot allow our efforts to be circumscribed
either by the uncertainty of success or the possibility of failure.
The unthinkable loss of Artsakh would be a catastrophic blow not only to
Armenia, but to *Hai Tahd*and the morale of those of the younger generation
who must continue to seek the justice that has eluded those of the passing
generations. Recep Tayyip Erdogan has just won a convincing victory as
president
of
Turkey that should keep him in power for another five years. Facing a
weakened Armenia will only stiffen his resistance to genocide recognition
and a host of other issues that have remained dormant for the past century.
The likelihood of Ankara bowing to either domestic or international
pressure is highly questionable for the foreseeable future. Can it be
expected that a weakened Armenia will encourage the xenophobic leaders of
Georgia to implement much-needed and promised programs and policies to
improve the onerous political, economic, and cultural environments within
which the *Javakhahayer* must live? And of greater significance is the fate
of our brothers and sisters in Artsakh, whose sacrifices to live on our
historic lands as free and independent Armenians would have been in vain.
The continuation of the status quo for Artsakh is reasonably certain,
especially when the interests of the European Union and the United States
do not coincide with Russia's. However, passive reliance on this fact alone
cannot guarantee ultimate victory. It is vital that we implement a
well-thought-out plan properly funded to accelerate a constant annual
increase in Artsakh's population as well as its strategic distribution.
Land without people has seldom been a winning combination. To facilitate
this need for a significant increase in population, economic development
must also be accelerated not only to attract repatriates, but to develop a
positive attitude that Artsakh is permanently ours. It is not an easy task,
but it is a vital task that cannot be delayed or sold short. The future of
Armenia and Artsakh is inextricably linked, as is the creditability of *Hai
Tahd* which hangs in the balance.
http://www.armenianweekly.com/2014/08/30/artsakh-president-aliyevs-dilemma-revisited/