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Hurriyet Daily News, Turkey
Sept 1 2014
Low turnout shows Turkish expats 'reluctant to delve into Turkey's politics'
Barçýn Yinanç
When it comes to day-to-day politics, Turks abroad generally choose to
be active in their countries of residence rather than in Turkey, says
researcher Kerem Öktem, explaining why only 10 percent voted in the
recent presidential elections
Turkey's diaspora policy is more inclusive than it was before 2002,
when the Justice and Development Party came to power, but it remains
exclusive to many groups, says Kerem Öktem. HÜRRÝYET photo / Selçuk
ÞAMÝLOÐLU
Turks living abroad feel empowered by a strong leader like Recep
Tayyip Erdoðan but when it comes to day to day matters they are
reluctant to be active in Turkey's internal politics, says researcher
Kerem Öktem, discussing the low turnout among overseas Turks in the
recent presidential elections.
Turks abroad are seen by the government as an asset in their own
right, but there is also tendency to use them for internal politics,
according to Öktem, whose policy report titled "Turkey's New Diaspora
Policy: The Challenge of Inclusivity, Outreach and Capacity" focuses
on the work of the Presidency for Turks Abroad and Related
Communities, which was established in 2010.
What distinguishes the Justice and Development Party (AKP)
government's approach to the Turkish diaspora from its precedents?
I was born in Germany. So I also had experience of the Turkish state's
perspective on the diaspora in the 1970s, 80s and 90s. Turks abroad,
especially in Western Europe, were seen as people who you weren't
particularly proud of. They were guest workers, they were not very
well educated, they were seen as tarnishing the image of Turkey
abroad. The understanding of Turkey then was that Turkey is a modern
country, it's not an Islamic country, and these people somehow spoiled
that kind of image of the modern Turkish nation.
But then I also saw how Kurds abroad were treated with extreme
suspicion by the state, of course. And then when it came to the
non-Muslim communities, the state looked at them with even more
suspicion. So generally the Turks abroad were seen as a problem.
Now the AKP, of course, comes from a very different political
tradition. They've been reinventing Turkey and the Turkish state, and
they've done this by placing much more emphasis on the common people
in this country, the culture they come from, the religious culture
they have been brought up with. In 2002, a political movement came in
that saw these people in Germany as their own. So suddenly the massive
distance that was there between Turks abroad and the Turkish state
seems to have diminished.
When you talk about the Turkish diaspora, in what sense do you use it?
I have taken the broadest definition of diaspora, meaning people who
are related to Turkey in one way or the other, either by citizenship
or by ex-citizenship. This is because a lot of Turks abroad had to
give up their citizenship, or for historical reasons, especially when
it comes to the Armenians or the Greeks, for instance.
Is this also the understanding of the state?
I don't think the state has a clear definition of what the diaspora
means for them. If you ask Prime Minister Ahmet Davutoðlu, he would
say that everybody who feels a link to Turkey is part of Turkey's
diaspora. When you ask the presidency, they also have that definition
up to a point, but they also work at times with Azerbaijani diaspora
organizations that would like to do anything to work against the
Armenians. So the state's perspective has a very differentiated,
conjectural understanding of the diaspora, which changes over time but
at the moment is much more inclusive than it was in the 1990s or 80s.
Let's elaborate the state's approach to the diaspora.
Well actually when you look at the presidency there's obviously a very
strong emphasis on the Turkish diaspora in Europe. These are mostly
migrant workers, the guest workers.
There is also the Turkic element in Central Asia, and then there's
also the wider Muslim world that is very important in the
understanding of the presidency.
At one point in your research there's also mention of Somalis.
Well now we will see much more of this because with Davutoðlu we have
a true pan-Islamist thinker and ideologue. I think this has also
shaped the presidency in many ways. There is a sense of Muslim
pan-Islamist solidarity and a sense of pan-Islamist leadership by
Turkey of the Islamic world, which I think permeates the ideology of
the presidency. So for the presidency the diaspora is a catch-all
phrase, but it has a lot to do with the projection of Turkish power.
So having a Somali in the journal (of the presidency) for instance
gives the hint that Turkey wants to be more than a nation state.
So the aim goes beyond reaching out to Turks living abroad.
You can think of these as concentric circles, in the center you have
the aim to improve the quality of life and empower your citizens
abroad, give them opportunities, make sure that they don't lose their
connection to the homeland, etc. In the second concentric circle you
have these larger aims of how Turkey wants to see itself and that's
part of its diaspora policy. You have pan-Islamic ideas, "let's reach
out to the Islamic world, let's appear as a leader there," and there's
also a neo-Ottoman understanding and a strong showing in the Balkans.
The third circle, I think, is more about day-to-day politics. The
presidency played a central role in the mobilization of voters for the
Aug. 10 presidential elections. It played a major role in organizing
events at which Recep Tayyip Erdoðan spoke.
So you have the most legitimate aim in the center; then you have this
slightly fuzzy, unclear, slightly problematic ideological complex; and
then you have these day-to-day politics, which we saw in the
presidential election.
The diaspora is also increasingly becoming more of a part of foreign policy.
It's part of a larger understanding of Turkey's foreign policy as a
much more constructive undertaking. This includes soft power. The
diaspora policy becomes part of this, let's say, imaginative foreign
policy, which brings a lot of different aspects together. But while it
is imaginative it also takes on a lot of risks.
It is a bit of a fantasy, because it is trying to be everything.
All of these are very ambitious policies, so in that respect it's a
fantasy. But at the same time it's also a very imaginative view of
different foreign policy tools. It's forward-looking and, actually, it
is what countries like the United States do. But in Turkey we see that
there's a big mismatch between the means and the goals, both in the
foreign policy in general and in the diaspora policy part of this.
Can you elaborate on that?
The Turkish government is trying to do a lot of things for a lot of
people, and some of those things might not agree with each other. You
include the Armenians and the Greeks as part of our diaspora, but at
the same time you collaborate with Azerbaijan, working against the
Armenians.
So how are you going to square the circle? You have this imperial
understanding of basically almost everything is our diaspora, but then
when you want to bring it down to policies, it's almost impossible.
Sometimes it's even counterproductive because you have to work with
groups that have little to say to each other. This is a big risk, but
at the same time it's also a great opportunity. If Turkey had a truly
inclusive diaspora policy, it could really change relations between
Turks, Kurds and Armenians, and it could contribute to a more peaceful
relationship between those groups both in the countries where they
live and in Turkey.
You have defined the ideology of the presidency as socially
conservative, religiously Muslim, culturally nostalgic, ethnically
cosmopolitan and potentially post-nationalist.
I asked all these people working in the presidency: How can you be
both pan-Islamist and pan-Turanist and believe in citizenship rights?
These are all different traditions that don't really overlap. One of
the leaders there said, "Well this is also about emotions, and if
people feel emotionally tied to Turkey then that's enough for us." But
you cannot quantify that, what is that? It is part of Turkey's foreign
policy and it reflects the weaknesses of that foreign policy. The
diaspora policy is too ambitious, it is trying too many things.
So we need a more focused diaspora policy.
Right now the goals are all very mixed. It goes without saying that
citizens in Western Europe are the most important part, but then again
our understanding of citizenship has changed in Turkey. Citizenship
now is defined by being a pious Sunni Muslim. Historically it was
defined, in the words of academic Baskýn Oran, as "Secular Hanefi
Sunni Muslim Turk" Now that has changed, it can include Kurds, but it
excludes Alevis and secular Turks. They feel quite excluded by the
presidency's policies.
To wrap up, let's start with the positive aspect of Turkey's diaspora policy.
The positive side is that people abroad who have ties with Turkey are
seen as an asset. This is potentially empowering. For someone who has
been living in Germany, who hasn't had many opportunities and who has
experienced serious racism in European immigrant receiving countries,
it makes a big difference if you feel like your country of origin
stands behind you. It makes a big difference in people's
self-understanding as well. Having the feeling that Turkey is behind
them makes them more confident, which overall is a good thing.
Secondly, having Turkish cultural centers and programs to organize
Turks abroad in principle is a very good idea, as long as it is
inclusive. I also think the idea of not looking at Turks through a
strict ethnic perspective, which was there at the foundation of the
Turkish Republic, actually also engages with non-Muslim communities.
This has great potential if it's used well.
So Turkey's diaspora policy is more inclusive than it was before 2002,
but it's also still exclusive to many other groups.
Which brings us to the challenges.
The negatives are also many, as are the risks. As we saw in the
presidential elections, there is a tendency to use Turks living abroad
for internal politics because there are many Turks in Western Europe.
Still, the participation rate among Turks abroad was very low. This
shows that Turks feel empowered by a strong leader like Erdoðan, but
when it comes to day-to-day politics they generally choose to be
active in their countries of residence rather than in Turkey. That's
why they had a participation rate of only 10 percent.
So you don't ascribe the low participation rate to technical difficulties.
No, because especially the presidency tried very hard to push this
forward. And that's the danger: When you look to Turks abroad as a
political mass that you can manipulate for your own interest - such as
to get Erdoðan elected, or to further Turkish national interests
abroad - then you also bring these people into disrepute with their
countries of residence.
Who is Kerem Öktem
Kerem Öktem is Mercator-IPC fellow at Sabancý University's Istanbul
Policy Center, and Research Fellow at Oxford University's European
Studies Centre. His main interests lie in the connection between
domestic politics and foreign policy, nationalism, the politics of
ethnic, religious, and sexual minorities and social movements in
Turkey.
He completed his PhD at the School of Geography, Oxford, in 2006, with
a thesis on "nation-building in Turkey as a socio-spatial project"
(Geographies of Nationalism). Preceding his doctoral studies, he
obtained a M.St. in Modern Middle Eastern Studies at the Faculty for
Oriental Studies at Oxford in 2001, where he also teaches as an
Associate Faculty Member. Before his residence in Oxford, he studied
and worked in Germany in the field of urban studies.
This September, he will assume the professorial Chair for Southeast
European and Turkish Studies at the University of Graz, Austria.
http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/low-turnout-shows-turkish-expats-reluctant-to-delve-into-turkeys-politics.aspx?PageID=238&NID=71138&NewsCatID=338
From: A. Papazian
Sept 1 2014
Low turnout shows Turkish expats 'reluctant to delve into Turkey's politics'
Barçýn Yinanç
When it comes to day-to-day politics, Turks abroad generally choose to
be active in their countries of residence rather than in Turkey, says
researcher Kerem Öktem, explaining why only 10 percent voted in the
recent presidential elections
Turkey's diaspora policy is more inclusive than it was before 2002,
when the Justice and Development Party came to power, but it remains
exclusive to many groups, says Kerem Öktem. HÜRRÝYET photo / Selçuk
ÞAMÝLOÐLU
Turks living abroad feel empowered by a strong leader like Recep
Tayyip Erdoðan but when it comes to day to day matters they are
reluctant to be active in Turkey's internal politics, says researcher
Kerem Öktem, discussing the low turnout among overseas Turks in the
recent presidential elections.
Turks abroad are seen by the government as an asset in their own
right, but there is also tendency to use them for internal politics,
according to Öktem, whose policy report titled "Turkey's New Diaspora
Policy: The Challenge of Inclusivity, Outreach and Capacity" focuses
on the work of the Presidency for Turks Abroad and Related
Communities, which was established in 2010.
What distinguishes the Justice and Development Party (AKP)
government's approach to the Turkish diaspora from its precedents?
I was born in Germany. So I also had experience of the Turkish state's
perspective on the diaspora in the 1970s, 80s and 90s. Turks abroad,
especially in Western Europe, were seen as people who you weren't
particularly proud of. They were guest workers, they were not very
well educated, they were seen as tarnishing the image of Turkey
abroad. The understanding of Turkey then was that Turkey is a modern
country, it's not an Islamic country, and these people somehow spoiled
that kind of image of the modern Turkish nation.
But then I also saw how Kurds abroad were treated with extreme
suspicion by the state, of course. And then when it came to the
non-Muslim communities, the state looked at them with even more
suspicion. So generally the Turks abroad were seen as a problem.
Now the AKP, of course, comes from a very different political
tradition. They've been reinventing Turkey and the Turkish state, and
they've done this by placing much more emphasis on the common people
in this country, the culture they come from, the religious culture
they have been brought up with. In 2002, a political movement came in
that saw these people in Germany as their own. So suddenly the massive
distance that was there between Turks abroad and the Turkish state
seems to have diminished.
When you talk about the Turkish diaspora, in what sense do you use it?
I have taken the broadest definition of diaspora, meaning people who
are related to Turkey in one way or the other, either by citizenship
or by ex-citizenship. This is because a lot of Turks abroad had to
give up their citizenship, or for historical reasons, especially when
it comes to the Armenians or the Greeks, for instance.
Is this also the understanding of the state?
I don't think the state has a clear definition of what the diaspora
means for them. If you ask Prime Minister Ahmet Davutoðlu, he would
say that everybody who feels a link to Turkey is part of Turkey's
diaspora. When you ask the presidency, they also have that definition
up to a point, but they also work at times with Azerbaijani diaspora
organizations that would like to do anything to work against the
Armenians. So the state's perspective has a very differentiated,
conjectural understanding of the diaspora, which changes over time but
at the moment is much more inclusive than it was in the 1990s or 80s.
Let's elaborate the state's approach to the diaspora.
Well actually when you look at the presidency there's obviously a very
strong emphasis on the Turkish diaspora in Europe. These are mostly
migrant workers, the guest workers.
There is also the Turkic element in Central Asia, and then there's
also the wider Muslim world that is very important in the
understanding of the presidency.
At one point in your research there's also mention of Somalis.
Well now we will see much more of this because with Davutoðlu we have
a true pan-Islamist thinker and ideologue. I think this has also
shaped the presidency in many ways. There is a sense of Muslim
pan-Islamist solidarity and a sense of pan-Islamist leadership by
Turkey of the Islamic world, which I think permeates the ideology of
the presidency. So for the presidency the diaspora is a catch-all
phrase, but it has a lot to do with the projection of Turkish power.
So having a Somali in the journal (of the presidency) for instance
gives the hint that Turkey wants to be more than a nation state.
So the aim goes beyond reaching out to Turks living abroad.
You can think of these as concentric circles, in the center you have
the aim to improve the quality of life and empower your citizens
abroad, give them opportunities, make sure that they don't lose their
connection to the homeland, etc. In the second concentric circle you
have these larger aims of how Turkey wants to see itself and that's
part of its diaspora policy. You have pan-Islamic ideas, "let's reach
out to the Islamic world, let's appear as a leader there," and there's
also a neo-Ottoman understanding and a strong showing in the Balkans.
The third circle, I think, is more about day-to-day politics. The
presidency played a central role in the mobilization of voters for the
Aug. 10 presidential elections. It played a major role in organizing
events at which Recep Tayyip Erdoðan spoke.
So you have the most legitimate aim in the center; then you have this
slightly fuzzy, unclear, slightly problematic ideological complex; and
then you have these day-to-day politics, which we saw in the
presidential election.
The diaspora is also increasingly becoming more of a part of foreign policy.
It's part of a larger understanding of Turkey's foreign policy as a
much more constructive undertaking. This includes soft power. The
diaspora policy becomes part of this, let's say, imaginative foreign
policy, which brings a lot of different aspects together. But while it
is imaginative it also takes on a lot of risks.
It is a bit of a fantasy, because it is trying to be everything.
All of these are very ambitious policies, so in that respect it's a
fantasy. But at the same time it's also a very imaginative view of
different foreign policy tools. It's forward-looking and, actually, it
is what countries like the United States do. But in Turkey we see that
there's a big mismatch between the means and the goals, both in the
foreign policy in general and in the diaspora policy part of this.
Can you elaborate on that?
The Turkish government is trying to do a lot of things for a lot of
people, and some of those things might not agree with each other. You
include the Armenians and the Greeks as part of our diaspora, but at
the same time you collaborate with Azerbaijan, working against the
Armenians.
So how are you going to square the circle? You have this imperial
understanding of basically almost everything is our diaspora, but then
when you want to bring it down to policies, it's almost impossible.
Sometimes it's even counterproductive because you have to work with
groups that have little to say to each other. This is a big risk, but
at the same time it's also a great opportunity. If Turkey had a truly
inclusive diaspora policy, it could really change relations between
Turks, Kurds and Armenians, and it could contribute to a more peaceful
relationship between those groups both in the countries where they
live and in Turkey.
You have defined the ideology of the presidency as socially
conservative, religiously Muslim, culturally nostalgic, ethnically
cosmopolitan and potentially post-nationalist.
I asked all these people working in the presidency: How can you be
both pan-Islamist and pan-Turanist and believe in citizenship rights?
These are all different traditions that don't really overlap. One of
the leaders there said, "Well this is also about emotions, and if
people feel emotionally tied to Turkey then that's enough for us." But
you cannot quantify that, what is that? It is part of Turkey's foreign
policy and it reflects the weaknesses of that foreign policy. The
diaspora policy is too ambitious, it is trying too many things.
So we need a more focused diaspora policy.
Right now the goals are all very mixed. It goes without saying that
citizens in Western Europe are the most important part, but then again
our understanding of citizenship has changed in Turkey. Citizenship
now is defined by being a pious Sunni Muslim. Historically it was
defined, in the words of academic Baskýn Oran, as "Secular Hanefi
Sunni Muslim Turk" Now that has changed, it can include Kurds, but it
excludes Alevis and secular Turks. They feel quite excluded by the
presidency's policies.
To wrap up, let's start with the positive aspect of Turkey's diaspora policy.
The positive side is that people abroad who have ties with Turkey are
seen as an asset. This is potentially empowering. For someone who has
been living in Germany, who hasn't had many opportunities and who has
experienced serious racism in European immigrant receiving countries,
it makes a big difference if you feel like your country of origin
stands behind you. It makes a big difference in people's
self-understanding as well. Having the feeling that Turkey is behind
them makes them more confident, which overall is a good thing.
Secondly, having Turkish cultural centers and programs to organize
Turks abroad in principle is a very good idea, as long as it is
inclusive. I also think the idea of not looking at Turks through a
strict ethnic perspective, which was there at the foundation of the
Turkish Republic, actually also engages with non-Muslim communities.
This has great potential if it's used well.
So Turkey's diaspora policy is more inclusive than it was before 2002,
but it's also still exclusive to many other groups.
Which brings us to the challenges.
The negatives are also many, as are the risks. As we saw in the
presidential elections, there is a tendency to use Turks living abroad
for internal politics because there are many Turks in Western Europe.
Still, the participation rate among Turks abroad was very low. This
shows that Turks feel empowered by a strong leader like Erdoðan, but
when it comes to day-to-day politics they generally choose to be
active in their countries of residence rather than in Turkey. That's
why they had a participation rate of only 10 percent.
So you don't ascribe the low participation rate to technical difficulties.
No, because especially the presidency tried very hard to push this
forward. And that's the danger: When you look to Turks abroad as a
political mass that you can manipulate for your own interest - such as
to get Erdoðan elected, or to further Turkish national interests
abroad - then you also bring these people into disrepute with their
countries of residence.
Who is Kerem Öktem
Kerem Öktem is Mercator-IPC fellow at Sabancý University's Istanbul
Policy Center, and Research Fellow at Oxford University's European
Studies Centre. His main interests lie in the connection between
domestic politics and foreign policy, nationalism, the politics of
ethnic, religious, and sexual minorities and social movements in
Turkey.
He completed his PhD at the School of Geography, Oxford, in 2006, with
a thesis on "nation-building in Turkey as a socio-spatial project"
(Geographies of Nationalism). Preceding his doctoral studies, he
obtained a M.St. in Modern Middle Eastern Studies at the Faculty for
Oriental Studies at Oxford in 2001, where he also teaches as an
Associate Faculty Member. Before his residence in Oxford, he studied
and worked in Germany in the field of urban studies.
This September, he will assume the professorial Chair for Southeast
European and Turkish Studies at the University of Graz, Austria.
http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/low-turnout-shows-turkish-expats-reluctant-to-delve-into-turkeys-politics.aspx?PageID=238&NID=71138&NewsCatID=338
From: A. Papazian