Announcement

Collapse
No announcement yet.

The Russia-Ukraine conflict: lessons for Europeans

Collapse
X
 
  • Filter
  • Time
  • Show
Clear All
new posts

  • The Russia-Ukraine conflict: lessons for Europeans

    Foreign Policy Blogs
    Sept 5 2014


    The Russia-Ukraine conflict: lessons for Europeans


    By Dominik P. Jankowski and Col. Dr. Tomasz K. Kowalik

    The current Russian-Ukrainian conflict is a game changer for European
    security. The entire European security architecture has trembled as
    the eastern flank of the continent has been destabilized. From a
    European perspective, four fundamental lessons-learned can already be
    drawn.

    Firstly, this conflict has confirmed that Eastern Europe remains a
    volatile space. In fact, Europe received its first wake-up call in
    2008 during the Russian-Georgian war. However, the negative trends
    stemming from the Middle East and North Africa - being both direct and
    indirect consequences of the Arab Spring - have led many Western
    countries to simply forget about Eastern Europe. In reality, the belt
    of instability stretching from the Caucasus to Transnistria never
    disappeared. The protracted conflicts in Georgia (the Russian
    occupation of about one-fifth of Georgian territory), Azerbaijan and
    Armenia (the disputed Nagorno-Karabakh region), as well as Moldova -
    the illegal stationing of a Russian contingent in Transnistria with
    neither a United Nations mandate nor Moldovan consent - render the
    current strategic situation even more fragile.

    Secondly, Russia has unfortunately confirmed its status of a
    revisionist power. Its principal foreign policy goal is to maintain
    Eastern Europe in Russia's sphere of influence by stopping, or at
    least hampering, the political aspirations of Georgia, Moldova and
    Ukraine to strengthen their ties with both the European Union (EU) and
    the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). The other goal is to
    influence or even intimidate some EU and NATO members and to put into
    question the Western political system based on democracy and the rule
    of law. To reach these ends, Moscow has reached for hybrid warfare. In
    fact, the tools thus far applied by Russia in its conflict with
    Ukraine come from different centuries: the use of pure military force:
    the nineteenth century; breach of international law and the use of
    propaganda: the twentieth century; and, finally, political and
    economic pressure, combined with new instruments such as
    cyber-attacks: twenty-first century.

    The Russian hybrid approach to conflicts has become even more
    prominent with an extensive use of their special operations forces
    ("little green men"), security forces and intelligence agencies, as
    well as Russian-speaking minorities, as tools. Furthermore, Russia as
    a revisionist power, seeks to secure its military might and signals
    its readiness to use conventional forces just as easily as it does
    other, softer means. In the past decade its military capability
    significantly rose and its defense budget is to grow even further. A
    creeping militarization of the Kaliningrad Oblast, the Crimean
    Peninsula and areas near the borders of the Baltic states, as well as
    forward basing in Belarus, poses a major threat to the stability of
    the vicinity of the EU and NATO. Finally, in recent years, Russia has
    constantly challenged the West's global geopolitical interests by
    establishing a close cooperation with other authoritarian regimes
    (especially Syria and Belarus) and therefore further destabilizing the
    world order (e.g., by fueling the war in Syria).

    Thirdly, defense still matters. Until very recently, one of the best
    deterrents for small- and medium-sized states - provided they could
    not join NATO, the EU, or both - was embedded in international law and
    diplomatic tools. However, the erosion or even the blatant breach of
    international legal commitments (the 1990 Conventional Armed Forces in
    Europe (CFE) Treaty, the 1994 Budapest Memorandum, the 1997
    NATO-Russia Founding Act, the 1999 adapted CFE Treaty) has severely
    undermined their deterrent character. Therefore, military instruments
    still remain valid in the twenty-first century and the effective
    diplomatic tools that European countries have had at their disposal
    need to be strengthened by necessary military potential. Europe should
    once-again be able to negotiate out of a position of strength. The
    well-known phrase "trust but verify" needs to apply again.

    Fourthly, the Russo-Ukrainian conflict created a pivotal moment for
    European security. The security conditions in Central and Eastern
    Europe have considerably worsened. The European security architecture,
    which was inclusive and in fact co-created by Russia, has been
    changed. Therefore, a revisionist Russia can hardly be treated as a
    "strategic partner" anymore, at least for the foreseeable future. This
    privilege should be reserved only for those countries which do not put
    at risk the health of the liberal international order based on
    democracy, self-determination, the rule of law, market economy, free
    trade, respect for human rights and effectively on mutual trust. In
    fact, over the next months and years the West's unity will likely be
    tested and undermined by Russia. Only by holding the line in this test
    can Europeans protect their vision of world order.

    At this stage, and in response to the current crisis, four
    recommendations for Europeans come to the fore:

    1) Europeans must embrace a "Ukraine first" policy. The stabilization
    of eastern and southern Ukraine, based on the fifteen-point plan for
    the peaceful settlement of the crisis presented by President Petro
    Poroshenko, remains a prerequisite for any further steps. Russia must
    stop fueling the conflict by withdrawing its forces from Ukraine and
    from the Russian-Ukrainian border, as well as by stopping financial
    and military support to the separatists. Simultaneously, the EU and
    the United States, along with the International Monetary Fund, should
    continue to support Ukraine economically, which could constitute the
    best incentive for Kyiv to implement the necessary reforms (monetary
    and fiscal policy, energy market, financial and security sectors).
    Moreover, the importance of the driving force that could change the
    long-term fate of Ukraine - its politically conscious and proactive
    civil society - should not be overlooked. Finally, Crimea needs to be
    returned to Ukraine. Some may argue that this geographic peninsula is
    practically gone, but not by international legal standards. If it is
    not returned, the Ukrainian government - with the necessary support
    from the West - should prepare a detailed account of what property has
    been seized and present this case at an international court (e.g. the
    International Court of Justice; the International Tribunal for the Law
    of the Sea). Individual Ukrainians, who lost their property in Crimea,
    should also go to the court. In fact, a creation of a special tribunal
    - based on the experiences gathered by the still existing Iran-United
    States Claims Tribunal - should also not be excluded.

    2) Europeans must understand that there can be "no business as usual"
    with Russia. Should this lesson already have not been learnt following
    the Russia-Georgia war in 2008? Russia has become an unreliable,
    irresponsible and a revisionist power. Therefore, the Western
    community should be ready to impose additional sanctions if further
    destabilization occurs. Furthermore, the European countries should
    stop all transfer of military technology to Russia, including those
    ongoing, as well as reduce Russian dominance over European energy
    markets. Finally, as in the Ukrainian case, the prime mover of the
    necessary transformation of Russia might stem from its civil society.
    Therefore, its strength could be reinvigorated by promoting an
    independent Russian-speaking media.

    3) NATO must be strategically enhanced: This could be reached both by
    conducting regular military exercises, which encompass all possible
    scenarios, as well as by transforming the NATO Response Force into a
    more accessible and agile instrument with a robust delivery
    capability. Moreover, a credible allied response to the
    Russian-Ukrainian conflict should include a strategic reinforcement of
    NATO's eastern flank. In practice, it should cover both infrastructure
    (including a proper high readiness command) as well as "boots on the
    ground." Finally, European should be more responsive to the ongoing
    U.S. requests to reverse the negative trends in military spending.
    (Two percent of Gross Domestic Product (GDP) needs to remain not only
    a rule of thumb, but stricter roadmaps to reach that should be
    developed.)

    4) Europeans need to consider rearmament. And luckily there seem to be
    a few good harbingers on the horizon with Estonia, Lithuania, Poland
    or Norway, to name a few, where military expenditures are set to grow.
    Particularly Poland, being a responsible ally, has recently given a
    constructive example. Based on a solid financial foundation, i.e. a
    legal obligation to spend 1.95 percent of GDP on defense, Poland has
    paved the way towards a robust modernization program, with particular
    emphasis on air and missile defense, naval forces, information
    technology and helicopters. Indeed, with an objective to spend at
    least twenty percent of its growing budget on procurements, and thanks
    to the recent announcement of its military budget increase to at least
    two percent of GDP in 2015-16, Poland is fast becoming one of the
    frontrunners of European military strength.

    In conclusion, the Russian-Ukrainian conflict has proven that most
    Europeans have been proven wrong in their assessments as they have
    become intellectually and emotionally dependent on wishful thinking,
    namely that they no longer had to worry about their own security and
    Moscow's actions, even if Russia fell far short of European democratic
    standards. In 2014, Europe received a second wake-up call - a chance
    that must not be missed. Anyone who fails to see this is strategically
    blind.

    This article was originally published by European Geostrategy.

    Dominik P. Jankowski is Head of the International Analyses Division at
    the National Security Bureau in Poland. Col. Dr. Tomasz K. Kowalik is
    Special Assistant to the Chairman of the North Atlantic Treaty
    Organisation's Military Committee.

    The opinions, findings and conclusions expressed herein are those of
    the authors and do not necessarily reflect those of the National
    Security Bureau of the Republic of Poland or NATO.

    http://foreignpolicyblogs.com/2014/09/05/the-russia-ukraine-conflict-lessons-for-europeans/

Working...
X