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Is PKK becoming a new Middle East power?
- POSTED ON SEPTEMBER 2, 2014POSTED IN: NEWS
People wave Kurdish flags and hold up a picture of jailed Kurdish
militant leader Abdullah Ocalan (C) of the Kurdistan Workers Party
(PKK) in Diyarbakir, March 21, 2014. (photo by REUTERS/Umit Bektas)
The world is apprehensively watching the dramatic rise and expansion
of the Islamic State (IS) in Iraq and Syria. The jihadists becoming
the No. 1 threat to global security is no doubt a grave development
and an appropriate focus of international attention. Yet, the jihadist
threat should not overshadow the interrelated rise of another power in
the region: Turkey's Kurdish movement, theKurdistan Workers Party
(PKK).
Created in 1978 by Abdullah Ocalan and his comrades, the PKK started
out as an armed, leftist, separatist organization. Since then, it has
evolved into a movement that today enjoys political and military might
and a popular base across all the Kurdish-populated regions in the
Middle East. The PKK's armed insurgency in Turkey that began in 1984
has gone through ups and downs marked by periods of serious bloodshed.
The PKK is currently in a "state of non-conflict" as part of its
engagement in the "peace and settlement process" the Justice and
Development Party (AKP) government initiated in 2012.
The rise of the Kurdish movement is underway on two tracks
simultaneously, manifesting itself in different forms on each. The
first is Turkey, and the second is Iraq and Syria.
A major landmark on the Turkey track was the Aug. 10 presidential
election, in whichSelahattin Demirtas, the candidate of the People's
Democracy Party (HDP), an offshoot of the Kurdish movement, scored a
major success. Demirtas, the HDP's co-chair, mustered 9.8% of the
vote, boosting by half the 6.44% his party won in the March 30 local
elections -- an outcome that has the potential to change existing
equations and calculations in Turkish politics.
On the Syria-Iraq track, the PKK has emerged as the sole power capable
of confronting and stopping the jihadist expansion in the past two
years. In Rojava, the Kurdish-populated region in northern Syria, the
PKK has fought the jihadists since the summer of 2012. In Iraq, it has
only recently arrived on the scene following IS' capture of Mosul and
its ensuing thrust into Kurdish areas. With Iraqi Kurdish peshmerga
forces retreating without a fight, the PKK became the force to stop
IS, putting up a particularly notable resistance inSinjar.
The PKK's military showing in Syria and Iraq has made it a power to be
reckoned with in the Middle East, while Demirtas' political success in
Turkey has paved the way for the HDP to grow into a nationwide party.
Both achievements were made possible thanks to the same resources.
Hence, an understanding of one track gives a better understanding of
the other.
The HDP is a legacy but not a successor of the Peace and Democracy
Party (BDP), which continues to legally exist. The BDP is a Kurdish
regional party, while the HDP claims to be an all-Turkey party.
Demirtas fleshed out that claim with an election campaign based on a
vision of a pluralist, inclusive, libertarian and egalitarian Turkey.
He ran as a candidate of Kurdish ethnicity, but what he demanded for
the Kurds he demanded for everyone in a united Turkey, linking the
solution of the Kurdish issue to the solution of Turkey's democracy
crisis. By doing so, he managed to build a leftist opposition front
that opened up the HDP to voters beyond the party's traditional
Kurdish constituency. The opening was also helped by the HDP
leadership's makeup already representing an alliance between Kurds and
the Turkish left in a nucleus form.
As a result, Demirtas managed to add 1 million votes to the 2.8
million his party had garnered in the municipal polls, demonstrating
that the HDP has begun to build bonds with the country's ethnically
Turkish west.
Demirtas' votes elevated the HDP to a notch below the 10% threshold
that parties are required to pass to win parliamentary seats in the
general elections. Support for him was no doubt also partially boosted
by disenchanted Alevi and leftist supporters of the main opposition
Republican People's Party (CHP), who voted for the HDP in protest of
the CHP's decision to align with the Nationalist Action Party (MHP)
and field a joint candidate, the conservative Ekmeleddin Ihsanoglu.
Kurdish parties in Turkey have traditionally mustered about 5% or 6%
of the vote, which leaves them below the parliamentary threshold. To
circumvent the 10% barrier, they have contested the general elections
with independent candidates, who, once in parliament, regroup under
the party banner. Now, for the first time, HDP representatives are
raising the possibility of entering the 2015 elections as a party.
If the HDP does run as a party and succeeds in passing the vote
requirement, the political balance in Turkey can change to the AKP's
detriment. An eligible HDP is expected to mean at least 20 additional
parliamentary seats for the party from the Kurdish-majority southeast.
Due to the twists of the electoral system, those seats have so far
ended up in the hands of the AKP, the only party that rivals the
Kurdish movement in the southeast. Twenty seats fewer for the AKP in
the next parliament could strip the ruling party from the majority it
requires to unilaterally draw up a new constitution introducing
thepresidential system Recep Tayyip Erdogan craves and take it to a
referendum.
To achieve all this, the HDP needs to make further strides toward
becoming a major party with a nationwide appeal. This will depend on
certain conditions:
First, the HDP will need time, which means the general elections
should be held on schedule, in June 2015, and not moved up. Second,
the "state of non-conflict" should continue. Third, the party's
political line of anti-government opposition should be sustained and
strengthened. And last, the HDP base should transform itself to
embrace a new, inclusive political culture in which Kurdish demands
are seen and advocated as part of a shared vision for a democratic
Turkey.
With the PKK's armed wing and its jailed leader Ocalan standing out as
the two major Kurdish actors, their legal political wing could
establish itself as a third one by luring support from western Turkey,
a prospect that could encourage more pluralist trends.
Sole force challenging Islamic State
The AKP government's policies have catalyzed the Kurdish movement's
growing influence in Turkey and the region. In Turkey, this happened
through the "peace and settlement process," while in Syria, the
catalyst was Ankara's hostility to the autonomy drive launched in the
summer of 2012 by the Democratic Union Party (PYD), the PKK's Syrian
branch.
The PYD has long contended that Jabhat al-Nusra and IS jihadists, who
began attacking Syrian Kurds in the summer of 2012, receive support
from Ankara and are allowed to use Turkish territory to mount their
attacks.
Those claims are quite credible. It is hard to imagine how the
jihadists would have managed to put strong military pressure on the
People's Protection Units (YPG), the PYD's armed wing, in areas
neighboring Turkey -- Ras al-Ain, Kobani and Afrin -- without using
Turkish territory. Yet, the PYD has been able to hold on to these
three regions and resist the jihadists for more than two years. Hence,
long before IS' capture of Mosul, the PKK already deserved to be
recognized as the Middle East's only fighting force to defy and resist
IS for the struggle it has waged in Rojava.
The Kurdish forces in Syria have surprised the world not only with
their resolve against the jihadists but also with their female
fighters. Against a barbarian mindset that enslaves and sells women as
concubines, the PYD has displayed a secular mindset embracing gender
equality, which has enormously contributed to its international image.
In Iraq, on the other hand, the PKK has put aside disagreements with
the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP) to form a national military
alliance against the jihadist threat to Iraqi Kurdistan.
That the Western public is already discussing the prospect of the
PKK's removal from the lists of terrorist organizations is a clear
indication of how much the PKK's struggle against the jihadists has
contributed to its international standing.
http://www.armenianlife.com/2014/09/02/is-pkk-becoming-a-new-middle-east-power/
- POSTED ON SEPTEMBER 2, 2014POSTED IN: NEWS
People wave Kurdish flags and hold up a picture of jailed Kurdish
militant leader Abdullah Ocalan (C) of the Kurdistan Workers Party
(PKK) in Diyarbakir, March 21, 2014. (photo by REUTERS/Umit Bektas)
The world is apprehensively watching the dramatic rise and expansion
of the Islamic State (IS) in Iraq and Syria. The jihadists becoming
the No. 1 threat to global security is no doubt a grave development
and an appropriate focus of international attention. Yet, the jihadist
threat should not overshadow the interrelated rise of another power in
the region: Turkey's Kurdish movement, theKurdistan Workers Party
(PKK).
Created in 1978 by Abdullah Ocalan and his comrades, the PKK started
out as an armed, leftist, separatist organization. Since then, it has
evolved into a movement that today enjoys political and military might
and a popular base across all the Kurdish-populated regions in the
Middle East. The PKK's armed insurgency in Turkey that began in 1984
has gone through ups and downs marked by periods of serious bloodshed.
The PKK is currently in a "state of non-conflict" as part of its
engagement in the "peace and settlement process" the Justice and
Development Party (AKP) government initiated in 2012.
The rise of the Kurdish movement is underway on two tracks
simultaneously, manifesting itself in different forms on each. The
first is Turkey, and the second is Iraq and Syria.
A major landmark on the Turkey track was the Aug. 10 presidential
election, in whichSelahattin Demirtas, the candidate of the People's
Democracy Party (HDP), an offshoot of the Kurdish movement, scored a
major success. Demirtas, the HDP's co-chair, mustered 9.8% of the
vote, boosting by half the 6.44% his party won in the March 30 local
elections -- an outcome that has the potential to change existing
equations and calculations in Turkish politics.
On the Syria-Iraq track, the PKK has emerged as the sole power capable
of confronting and stopping the jihadist expansion in the past two
years. In Rojava, the Kurdish-populated region in northern Syria, the
PKK has fought the jihadists since the summer of 2012. In Iraq, it has
only recently arrived on the scene following IS' capture of Mosul and
its ensuing thrust into Kurdish areas. With Iraqi Kurdish peshmerga
forces retreating without a fight, the PKK became the force to stop
IS, putting up a particularly notable resistance inSinjar.
The PKK's military showing in Syria and Iraq has made it a power to be
reckoned with in the Middle East, while Demirtas' political success in
Turkey has paved the way for the HDP to grow into a nationwide party.
Both achievements were made possible thanks to the same resources.
Hence, an understanding of one track gives a better understanding of
the other.
The HDP is a legacy but not a successor of the Peace and Democracy
Party (BDP), which continues to legally exist. The BDP is a Kurdish
regional party, while the HDP claims to be an all-Turkey party.
Demirtas fleshed out that claim with an election campaign based on a
vision of a pluralist, inclusive, libertarian and egalitarian Turkey.
He ran as a candidate of Kurdish ethnicity, but what he demanded for
the Kurds he demanded for everyone in a united Turkey, linking the
solution of the Kurdish issue to the solution of Turkey's democracy
crisis. By doing so, he managed to build a leftist opposition front
that opened up the HDP to voters beyond the party's traditional
Kurdish constituency. The opening was also helped by the HDP
leadership's makeup already representing an alliance between Kurds and
the Turkish left in a nucleus form.
As a result, Demirtas managed to add 1 million votes to the 2.8
million his party had garnered in the municipal polls, demonstrating
that the HDP has begun to build bonds with the country's ethnically
Turkish west.
Demirtas' votes elevated the HDP to a notch below the 10% threshold
that parties are required to pass to win parliamentary seats in the
general elections. Support for him was no doubt also partially boosted
by disenchanted Alevi and leftist supporters of the main opposition
Republican People's Party (CHP), who voted for the HDP in protest of
the CHP's decision to align with the Nationalist Action Party (MHP)
and field a joint candidate, the conservative Ekmeleddin Ihsanoglu.
Kurdish parties in Turkey have traditionally mustered about 5% or 6%
of the vote, which leaves them below the parliamentary threshold. To
circumvent the 10% barrier, they have contested the general elections
with independent candidates, who, once in parliament, regroup under
the party banner. Now, for the first time, HDP representatives are
raising the possibility of entering the 2015 elections as a party.
If the HDP does run as a party and succeeds in passing the vote
requirement, the political balance in Turkey can change to the AKP's
detriment. An eligible HDP is expected to mean at least 20 additional
parliamentary seats for the party from the Kurdish-majority southeast.
Due to the twists of the electoral system, those seats have so far
ended up in the hands of the AKP, the only party that rivals the
Kurdish movement in the southeast. Twenty seats fewer for the AKP in
the next parliament could strip the ruling party from the majority it
requires to unilaterally draw up a new constitution introducing
thepresidential system Recep Tayyip Erdogan craves and take it to a
referendum.
To achieve all this, the HDP needs to make further strides toward
becoming a major party with a nationwide appeal. This will depend on
certain conditions:
First, the HDP will need time, which means the general elections
should be held on schedule, in June 2015, and not moved up. Second,
the "state of non-conflict" should continue. Third, the party's
political line of anti-government opposition should be sustained and
strengthened. And last, the HDP base should transform itself to
embrace a new, inclusive political culture in which Kurdish demands
are seen and advocated as part of a shared vision for a democratic
Turkey.
With the PKK's armed wing and its jailed leader Ocalan standing out as
the two major Kurdish actors, their legal political wing could
establish itself as a third one by luring support from western Turkey,
a prospect that could encourage more pluralist trends.
Sole force challenging Islamic State
The AKP government's policies have catalyzed the Kurdish movement's
growing influence in Turkey and the region. In Turkey, this happened
through the "peace and settlement process," while in Syria, the
catalyst was Ankara's hostility to the autonomy drive launched in the
summer of 2012 by the Democratic Union Party (PYD), the PKK's Syrian
branch.
The PYD has long contended that Jabhat al-Nusra and IS jihadists, who
began attacking Syrian Kurds in the summer of 2012, receive support
from Ankara and are allowed to use Turkish territory to mount their
attacks.
Those claims are quite credible. It is hard to imagine how the
jihadists would have managed to put strong military pressure on the
People's Protection Units (YPG), the PYD's armed wing, in areas
neighboring Turkey -- Ras al-Ain, Kobani and Afrin -- without using
Turkish territory. Yet, the PYD has been able to hold on to these
three regions and resist the jihadists for more than two years. Hence,
long before IS' capture of Mosul, the PKK already deserved to be
recognized as the Middle East's only fighting force to defy and resist
IS for the struggle it has waged in Rojava.
The Kurdish forces in Syria have surprised the world not only with
their resolve against the jihadists but also with their female
fighters. Against a barbarian mindset that enslaves and sells women as
concubines, the PYD has displayed a secular mindset embracing gender
equality, which has enormously contributed to its international image.
In Iraq, on the other hand, the PKK has put aside disagreements with
the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP) to form a national military
alliance against the jihadist threat to Iraqi Kurdistan.
That the Western public is already discussing the prospect of the
PKK's removal from the lists of terrorist organizations is a clear
indication of how much the PKK's struggle against the jihadists has
contributed to its international standing.
http://www.armenianlife.com/2014/09/02/is-pkk-becoming-a-new-middle-east-power/