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New Eastern Europe
Sept 8 2014
Barriers to Resolving Nagorno-Karabakh
Published on Monday, 08 September 2014 10:05
Commentary Written by Eduardo Lorenzo Ochoa
The Nagorno-Karabakh conflict was back on the front pages of the
international press this summer after a deadly escalation and more
than 30 casualties since the signing of the ceasefire agreement in
1994 by Azerbaijan, Nagorno-Karabakh and Armenia. As usual, both sides
accuse each other of having shot first and therefore being responsible
for the situation.
The maintenance of the world's only self-regulated ceasefire
Recently, critical voices have risen regarding the work of the OSCE
Minsk Group, which has been in charge for the last 20 years to find a
commonly agreed settlement to the conflict. To a lesser extent, the
European Union has also been questioned. It is true that a
satisfactory solution of the conflict has not been found yet, but it
is equally true that a new large-scale war with dramatic consequences
not only for the South Caucasus, but for the entire world - and
particularly for oil dependant economies - has been avoided.
Since 1994, the OSCE Minsk Group has put forward five different
framework proposals to both sides to achieve a final settlement of the
conflict. Four of them were rejected but one remains on the table.
Obviously it starts with the basics, by creating a level of confidence
between both sides, one that is incompatible with the constant
shootings in the Nagorno-Karabakh-Azerbaijan line of contact resulting
in senseless casualties.
The OSCE Minsk Group has also worked along this line. In June 2012,
the co-chairs once again proposed two very logical steps in order to
avoid the loss of human lives in the only self-regulated ceasefire
agreement in the world. The first was to establish an investigation
mechanism for ceasefire violations. The aim would be to have an
understanding as to which side is responsible for the shootings and
ultimately to reduce these deadly incidents.
The second proposed measure was the withdrawal of all snipers from the
line of contact. To the surprise of many, both proposals were rejected
by the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Azerbaijan. In its opinion,
proposals would only strengthen the status quo. Obviously, the
implementation of both measures would have spared 30 families the loss
of their sons, as well as many others earlier, yet unfortunately for
the Azerbaijani administration their soldiers seem to be expendable.
This approach becomes even clearer when one analyses the nature of the
military operations that this South Caucasus country is carrying out
lately against Nagorno-Karabakh, not only at the beginning of August
but also in July. In fact, more and more often Azerbaijani commandoes
are ordered to break into the Nagorno-Karabakh territory and even into
the territory of the Republic of Armenia, whose superiors know clearly
that it is the way of no return.
Under these circumstances it is obvious that any mediating effort
either by the OSCE Minsk Group or any other organisation becomes
extremely challenging and progress is tremendously difficult to
achieve.
European Union efforts in Nagorno-Karabakh
Simultaneously, the EU has tried to launch some complementary
supporting measures to the OSCE Minsk Group mediating efforts in
recent years.
Firstly, the EU has launched programmes to reinforce democracy in the
South Caucasus - just like in any other neighbouring and Eastern
Partnership country. Progress was made both in Armenia and Georgia,
while the picture in Azerbaijan, according to the annual country
report published by the EU, is turning darker. The quality of the
electoral processes are seriously degrading while at the same time
opposition parties even belonging to EU political families are
systematically harassed by national security forces, impeding
activities of political dissidents. Azerbaijan even overtook Belarus
in the record of having the highest number of political prisoners
among all the Eastern Partnership countries.
In addition, this repressive wave has been extended to civil society
and human rights activists, jeopardising one of the most promising
initiatives by the EU in this field: the civil society confidence
building measures. This EU-sponsored action consists of reinforcing
civil society and gathering organisations from Azerbaijan,
Nagorno-Karabakh and Armenia around cooperation projects in different
fields in order to facilitate communication and mutual understanding.
Unfortunately, many of the NGO representatives who were involved in
these programmes were arrested, putting this initiative in
standby-mode. It is difficult to build confidence between both sides
when Azerbaijani citizens can't even call or exchange e-mails with
Armenians due to a firewall established by their own administration.
Under these circumstances one can easily understand the systematic
absence of the Republic of Azerbaijan in the EU human rights dialogue
platform, as well as the categorical and legitimate refusal of the
people living in Nagorno-Karabakh to pass under Azerbaijani ruling, no
matter the level of autonomy that this country may grant them.
In the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, there is unfortunately a clear
track of escalation: in the number of casualties and the calibre of
weapons used by Azerbaijan; in the statements by the Azerbaijani
President e.g.: "just as we have beaten the Armenians on the political
and economic fronts, we are able to defeat them on the battlefield";
and in the victims targeted by Azerbaijan which, for the past four
years, has targeted civilians both in Armenia and in Karabakh.
Looking at the full picture of Azerbaijani politics, both internally
and in terms of foreign policy, it seems to dangerously follow the
same pattern as other totalitarian regimes of the 20th Century. It is
similar to that of the last Argentinian Military Junta, chaired by
Leopoldo Galtieri, trying desperately to find an external enemy, the
United Kingdom, in order to cover up the internal deep discontent and
absence of democracy and pluralism, while smashing any opposition,
followed by catastrophic consequences for the country in 1982.
One of the fundamental problems of this conflict is that the sides do
not share the same scale of values which is a necessary condition for
its settlement. In this regard, Azerbaijan has still a long democratic
way to go and that is why the EU complementary measures to the
mediators are especially relevant in terms of human rights, democracy
building and the rule of law.
Finally, all these elements that are surely taken into consideration
by the OSCE Minks Group should also be taken into account by those
that question the only commonly agreed framework to settle the
conflict.
Eduardo Lorenzo Ochoa is the Director of European Friends of Armenia.
http://www.neweasterneurope.eu/articles-and-commentary/1320-barriers-to-resolving-nagorno-karabakh
From: Baghdasarian
Sept 8 2014
Barriers to Resolving Nagorno-Karabakh
Published on Monday, 08 September 2014 10:05
Commentary Written by Eduardo Lorenzo Ochoa
The Nagorno-Karabakh conflict was back on the front pages of the
international press this summer after a deadly escalation and more
than 30 casualties since the signing of the ceasefire agreement in
1994 by Azerbaijan, Nagorno-Karabakh and Armenia. As usual, both sides
accuse each other of having shot first and therefore being responsible
for the situation.
The maintenance of the world's only self-regulated ceasefire
Recently, critical voices have risen regarding the work of the OSCE
Minsk Group, which has been in charge for the last 20 years to find a
commonly agreed settlement to the conflict. To a lesser extent, the
European Union has also been questioned. It is true that a
satisfactory solution of the conflict has not been found yet, but it
is equally true that a new large-scale war with dramatic consequences
not only for the South Caucasus, but for the entire world - and
particularly for oil dependant economies - has been avoided.
Since 1994, the OSCE Minsk Group has put forward five different
framework proposals to both sides to achieve a final settlement of the
conflict. Four of them were rejected but one remains on the table.
Obviously it starts with the basics, by creating a level of confidence
between both sides, one that is incompatible with the constant
shootings in the Nagorno-Karabakh-Azerbaijan line of contact resulting
in senseless casualties.
The OSCE Minsk Group has also worked along this line. In June 2012,
the co-chairs once again proposed two very logical steps in order to
avoid the loss of human lives in the only self-regulated ceasefire
agreement in the world. The first was to establish an investigation
mechanism for ceasefire violations. The aim would be to have an
understanding as to which side is responsible for the shootings and
ultimately to reduce these deadly incidents.
The second proposed measure was the withdrawal of all snipers from the
line of contact. To the surprise of many, both proposals were rejected
by the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Azerbaijan. In its opinion,
proposals would only strengthen the status quo. Obviously, the
implementation of both measures would have spared 30 families the loss
of their sons, as well as many others earlier, yet unfortunately for
the Azerbaijani administration their soldiers seem to be expendable.
This approach becomes even clearer when one analyses the nature of the
military operations that this South Caucasus country is carrying out
lately against Nagorno-Karabakh, not only at the beginning of August
but also in July. In fact, more and more often Azerbaijani commandoes
are ordered to break into the Nagorno-Karabakh territory and even into
the territory of the Republic of Armenia, whose superiors know clearly
that it is the way of no return.
Under these circumstances it is obvious that any mediating effort
either by the OSCE Minsk Group or any other organisation becomes
extremely challenging and progress is tremendously difficult to
achieve.
European Union efforts in Nagorno-Karabakh
Simultaneously, the EU has tried to launch some complementary
supporting measures to the OSCE Minsk Group mediating efforts in
recent years.
Firstly, the EU has launched programmes to reinforce democracy in the
South Caucasus - just like in any other neighbouring and Eastern
Partnership country. Progress was made both in Armenia and Georgia,
while the picture in Azerbaijan, according to the annual country
report published by the EU, is turning darker. The quality of the
electoral processes are seriously degrading while at the same time
opposition parties even belonging to EU political families are
systematically harassed by national security forces, impeding
activities of political dissidents. Azerbaijan even overtook Belarus
in the record of having the highest number of political prisoners
among all the Eastern Partnership countries.
In addition, this repressive wave has been extended to civil society
and human rights activists, jeopardising one of the most promising
initiatives by the EU in this field: the civil society confidence
building measures. This EU-sponsored action consists of reinforcing
civil society and gathering organisations from Azerbaijan,
Nagorno-Karabakh and Armenia around cooperation projects in different
fields in order to facilitate communication and mutual understanding.
Unfortunately, many of the NGO representatives who were involved in
these programmes were arrested, putting this initiative in
standby-mode. It is difficult to build confidence between both sides
when Azerbaijani citizens can't even call or exchange e-mails with
Armenians due to a firewall established by their own administration.
Under these circumstances one can easily understand the systematic
absence of the Republic of Azerbaijan in the EU human rights dialogue
platform, as well as the categorical and legitimate refusal of the
people living in Nagorno-Karabakh to pass under Azerbaijani ruling, no
matter the level of autonomy that this country may grant them.
In the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, there is unfortunately a clear
track of escalation: in the number of casualties and the calibre of
weapons used by Azerbaijan; in the statements by the Azerbaijani
President e.g.: "just as we have beaten the Armenians on the political
and economic fronts, we are able to defeat them on the battlefield";
and in the victims targeted by Azerbaijan which, for the past four
years, has targeted civilians both in Armenia and in Karabakh.
Looking at the full picture of Azerbaijani politics, both internally
and in terms of foreign policy, it seems to dangerously follow the
same pattern as other totalitarian regimes of the 20th Century. It is
similar to that of the last Argentinian Military Junta, chaired by
Leopoldo Galtieri, trying desperately to find an external enemy, the
United Kingdom, in order to cover up the internal deep discontent and
absence of democracy and pluralism, while smashing any opposition,
followed by catastrophic consequences for the country in 1982.
One of the fundamental problems of this conflict is that the sides do
not share the same scale of values which is a necessary condition for
its settlement. In this regard, Azerbaijan has still a long democratic
way to go and that is why the EU complementary measures to the
mediators are especially relevant in terms of human rights, democracy
building and the rule of law.
Finally, all these elements that are surely taken into consideration
by the OSCE Minks Group should also be taken into account by those
that question the only commonly agreed framework to settle the
conflict.
Eduardo Lorenzo Ochoa is the Director of European Friends of Armenia.
http://www.neweasterneurope.eu/articles-and-commentary/1320-barriers-to-resolving-nagorno-karabakh
From: Baghdasarian