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DIVIDE AND CONQUER: RUSSIAN FOREIGN POLICY LEGACY ENDURES IN UKRAINE
Brown Political Review
Sept 21 2014
By James Janison
Since the first Russian troops began invading Crimea, the West has
considered various approaches to deter Russian aggression in Ukraine.
For the United States and the European Union, focusing on diplomatic
talks is a more effective strategy than the more punitive approach
of escalating sanctions, providing weapons to the Poroshenko
administration, or, at worst, putting boots on the ground in the
war-torn "New Russia" region.
While some argue that Putin will be pressured to retreat as a result of
sanctions, these measures fail to consider that Putin is not primarily
incentivized by economic means. In a New York Times opinion piece, Ben
Judah writes, "Mr. Putin is not rational. Any rational leader would
have reeled from the cost of Western sanctions. Russia's economy is
being hit hard by a credit crunch, capital flight, spiraling inflation
and incipient recession. This will hurt Mr.
Putin's surging popularity at home. But none of this has deterred
the smirking enigma."
United Russia, Putin's party, controls the Russian legislature,
presidency, and executive branch, most of Russia's media, and oversight
of the electoral system. As 73 percent of Russians trust and use
state media with respect to Crimea and Ukraine, there is no doubt
that United Russia would frame consequences of sanctions as the West
continuing to humiliate and assault Russia. In terms of his support
base, it seems that Putin has little to fear from these sanctions.
Putin has never derived his legitimacy from being pro-Western, nor has
he ever needed to do so. Regardless of his actual economic success, the
Russian president's enormous popularity comes from a well-established
image as an economic reformer and fighter against rampant corruption
caused in part by Western-led, IMF-supported failures at liberalization
in the '90s. Further sanctions and Western military aid to Ukraine
will, if anything, strengthen his hold over the Russian majority. Putin
is not irrational. He's highly lucid and determined in dictating the
policy of a country to which this conflict is extremely salient.
While Ukraine has indisputably borne the yoke of Russian imperialism,
this does not mean a military approach from NATO will most effectively
end the conflict given the nature of post-Soviet borders.
When the USSR fell, the independent states were divided along the
borders of the Soviet republics. The boundaries between Soviet states,
however, were not necessarily reflective of their ethno-national
makeup. Sovietization, or the formation of a pan-Soviet citizenry
with loyalty to Communist principles and Moscow administration, was
a motivating factor behind shaping the structure of the country's
republics. Dating back to the 1920s with Stalin's "Socialism in One
Country" plan, the USSR sought to build "a country with a central
state, a centralized economy, a definite territory and a monolithic
party." The goal was to create a unified Soviet people. So when Nikita
Khrushchev ceded Crimea to Ukraine in 1954, he was merely rearranging
borders to facilitate infrastructure management, according to his son,
Sergei Khrushchev. The concept of the Soviet Union as a monolithic
people still prevailed in terms of dictating top-down administrative
policy.
Another Stalinist intent with the administrative borders was to divide
and conquer indigenous populations. Issues of sovereignty over the
Nagorno-Karabakh region between Armenia and Azerbaijan persist to
this day, comparable to face-offs in Kyrgyzstan between Kyrgyz and the
Uzbek minority. Another host to Soviet-exacerbated dispute is Ukraine,
where a sizable amount of the population is Russian and identifies as
such- this in particular concerns Crimea, a Russian-majority district,
and the Donetsk City Municipality, which as of 2007 had a Russian
plurality (48.15 percent).
The Russian-Ukrainian divide in terms of national consciousness is
nothing clear-cut. There are key cultural entanglements between the
countries. A BPR article titled "How to Forget Your Ex" described
Russia's imperial legacy and encroachment on the Ukrainian people.
However, its description of Russia's alleged co-optation of Ukrainian
culture does not cover everything, for instance, regarding Russia's
"absorption" of Nikolai Gogol. Gogol may have been Ukrainian, but that
did not stop him from actively being a fervent monarchist, nor did
it stop his novel Dead Souls from waxing romantic about his beloved
"Rus" moving forward as the nations of Europe watch in awe. Other
influential writers such as Anna Akhmatova and Mikhail Bulgakov
were Ukrainian-born yet definitively Russian in terms of ethnicity,
language, and subject matter. If anything, this Ukrainian-Russian
fusion indicates complicated, shared consciousness among many living
within Ukraine's borders.
Civil war is inevitable as long as the borders of the Ukrainian state
reflect the remnants of a Soviet-era divide-and-conquer strategy.
The significance of this history is that former Soviet republics have
borders that were made to break up local resistance to the Kremlin,
not to provide paths for national self-determination. Civil war is
inevitable as long as the borders of the Ukrainian state reflect
the remnants of a Soviet-era divide-and-conquer strategy. The
Russia-administered referendum in Crimea, as a matter of fact,
probably reflects the loyalties of the Russian majority, even if the
96 percent margin of victory is likely exaggerated (given that the
Russian administration's track record winning elections by 140%).
Russia's decision to invade Crimea was an overt act of aggression,
but its relatively peaceful result is hardly a pretext for installing
NATO soldiers in Ukraine.
This is not an attempt to undermine the Ukrainian people's right
to their independence, nor is it to say that there is no distinct
Ukrainian identity, culture, or tradition. Rather, it is to say that
there is indeed also a cultural and social history of Ukrainians
expressly affiliating with Russia, and our understanding of the
situation should incorporate these ties.
Simply put, the region's complex history will not go away with US
sanctions, military supplies, or soldiers. These lengths would only
add to the body count and further exacerbate the situation. Regardless
of right and wrong, Russia sees Ukraine as an integral part of its
national history, a blood brother.
One possibility is to negotiate as follows: the West allows Russia
to keep Crimea. Then, agree to a new referendum in the Donbass
region, to be monitored and overseen by Western officials, NGOs, and
Russian officials with every possible effort at transparency. If at
all feasible, this would allow for separatists' voices to be heard,
though not necessarily obeyed, in an affirmably democratic process. In
exchange, Russia must recognize and respect all treaties Ukraine
decides to make with the EU, NATO, or other organization.
Naïve though it may sound, if NATO, the US and the EU were willing to
accept a few of Russia's terms, while maintaining Ukraine's right to
its independence, we could ward off a regressive and simplistic Cold
War mindset and minimize bloodshed.
http://www.brownpoliticalreview.org/2014/09/divide-and-conquer-russian-foreign-policy-legacy-endures-in-ukraine/
From: Emil Lazarian | Ararat NewsPress
Brown Political Review
Sept 21 2014
By James Janison
Since the first Russian troops began invading Crimea, the West has
considered various approaches to deter Russian aggression in Ukraine.
For the United States and the European Union, focusing on diplomatic
talks is a more effective strategy than the more punitive approach
of escalating sanctions, providing weapons to the Poroshenko
administration, or, at worst, putting boots on the ground in the
war-torn "New Russia" region.
While some argue that Putin will be pressured to retreat as a result of
sanctions, these measures fail to consider that Putin is not primarily
incentivized by economic means. In a New York Times opinion piece, Ben
Judah writes, "Mr. Putin is not rational. Any rational leader would
have reeled from the cost of Western sanctions. Russia's economy is
being hit hard by a credit crunch, capital flight, spiraling inflation
and incipient recession. This will hurt Mr.
Putin's surging popularity at home. But none of this has deterred
the smirking enigma."
United Russia, Putin's party, controls the Russian legislature,
presidency, and executive branch, most of Russia's media, and oversight
of the electoral system. As 73 percent of Russians trust and use
state media with respect to Crimea and Ukraine, there is no doubt
that United Russia would frame consequences of sanctions as the West
continuing to humiliate and assault Russia. In terms of his support
base, it seems that Putin has little to fear from these sanctions.
Putin has never derived his legitimacy from being pro-Western, nor has
he ever needed to do so. Regardless of his actual economic success, the
Russian president's enormous popularity comes from a well-established
image as an economic reformer and fighter against rampant corruption
caused in part by Western-led, IMF-supported failures at liberalization
in the '90s. Further sanctions and Western military aid to Ukraine
will, if anything, strengthen his hold over the Russian majority. Putin
is not irrational. He's highly lucid and determined in dictating the
policy of a country to which this conflict is extremely salient.
While Ukraine has indisputably borne the yoke of Russian imperialism,
this does not mean a military approach from NATO will most effectively
end the conflict given the nature of post-Soviet borders.
When the USSR fell, the independent states were divided along the
borders of the Soviet republics. The boundaries between Soviet states,
however, were not necessarily reflective of their ethno-national
makeup. Sovietization, or the formation of a pan-Soviet citizenry
with loyalty to Communist principles and Moscow administration, was
a motivating factor behind shaping the structure of the country's
republics. Dating back to the 1920s with Stalin's "Socialism in One
Country" plan, the USSR sought to build "a country with a central
state, a centralized economy, a definite territory and a monolithic
party." The goal was to create a unified Soviet people. So when Nikita
Khrushchev ceded Crimea to Ukraine in 1954, he was merely rearranging
borders to facilitate infrastructure management, according to his son,
Sergei Khrushchev. The concept of the Soviet Union as a monolithic
people still prevailed in terms of dictating top-down administrative
policy.
Another Stalinist intent with the administrative borders was to divide
and conquer indigenous populations. Issues of sovereignty over the
Nagorno-Karabakh region between Armenia and Azerbaijan persist to
this day, comparable to face-offs in Kyrgyzstan between Kyrgyz and the
Uzbek minority. Another host to Soviet-exacerbated dispute is Ukraine,
where a sizable amount of the population is Russian and identifies as
such- this in particular concerns Crimea, a Russian-majority district,
and the Donetsk City Municipality, which as of 2007 had a Russian
plurality (48.15 percent).
The Russian-Ukrainian divide in terms of national consciousness is
nothing clear-cut. There are key cultural entanglements between the
countries. A BPR article titled "How to Forget Your Ex" described
Russia's imperial legacy and encroachment on the Ukrainian people.
However, its description of Russia's alleged co-optation of Ukrainian
culture does not cover everything, for instance, regarding Russia's
"absorption" of Nikolai Gogol. Gogol may have been Ukrainian, but that
did not stop him from actively being a fervent monarchist, nor did
it stop his novel Dead Souls from waxing romantic about his beloved
"Rus" moving forward as the nations of Europe watch in awe. Other
influential writers such as Anna Akhmatova and Mikhail Bulgakov
were Ukrainian-born yet definitively Russian in terms of ethnicity,
language, and subject matter. If anything, this Ukrainian-Russian
fusion indicates complicated, shared consciousness among many living
within Ukraine's borders.
Civil war is inevitable as long as the borders of the Ukrainian state
reflect the remnants of a Soviet-era divide-and-conquer strategy.
The significance of this history is that former Soviet republics have
borders that were made to break up local resistance to the Kremlin,
not to provide paths for national self-determination. Civil war is
inevitable as long as the borders of the Ukrainian state reflect
the remnants of a Soviet-era divide-and-conquer strategy. The
Russia-administered referendum in Crimea, as a matter of fact,
probably reflects the loyalties of the Russian majority, even if the
96 percent margin of victory is likely exaggerated (given that the
Russian administration's track record winning elections by 140%).
Russia's decision to invade Crimea was an overt act of aggression,
but its relatively peaceful result is hardly a pretext for installing
NATO soldiers in Ukraine.
This is not an attempt to undermine the Ukrainian people's right
to their independence, nor is it to say that there is no distinct
Ukrainian identity, culture, or tradition. Rather, it is to say that
there is indeed also a cultural and social history of Ukrainians
expressly affiliating with Russia, and our understanding of the
situation should incorporate these ties.
Simply put, the region's complex history will not go away with US
sanctions, military supplies, or soldiers. These lengths would only
add to the body count and further exacerbate the situation. Regardless
of right and wrong, Russia sees Ukraine as an integral part of its
national history, a blood brother.
One possibility is to negotiate as follows: the West allows Russia
to keep Crimea. Then, agree to a new referendum in the Donbass
region, to be monitored and overseen by Western officials, NGOs, and
Russian officials with every possible effort at transparency. If at
all feasible, this would allow for separatists' voices to be heard,
though not necessarily obeyed, in an affirmably democratic process. In
exchange, Russia must recognize and respect all treaties Ukraine
decides to make with the EU, NATO, or other organization.
Naïve though it may sound, if NATO, the US and the EU were willing to
accept a few of Russia's terms, while maintaining Ukraine's right to
its independence, we could ward off a regressive and simplistic Cold
War mindset and minimize bloodshed.
http://www.brownpoliticalreview.org/2014/09/divide-and-conquer-russian-foreign-policy-legacy-endures-in-ukraine/
From: Emil Lazarian | Ararat NewsPress