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POLITICIAN ASKS TURKEY TO DO MORE FOR SYRIAN KURDS
Al-Monitor
Sept 23 2014
Author: Radikal (Turkey)Posted September 22, 2014
This has always been the core of the AKP (Justice and Development
Party) government's Syria impasse and is one of the most telling clues
of why Turkey's foreign policy has been mired in the Syria crisis:
thwarting Kurdish aspirations for autonomy that could also set a
precedent for the Kurds of Turkey.
There have been alarm bells in the media of the Kurdish political
movement about the threat Kobani was facing. Kobani (Ain al-Arab in
Arabic) is directly opposite the Turkish town of Suruc. Kobani is
the one of the three cantons established in the Rojava region with
the initiative of the Democratic Union Party (PYD). It is also the
birthplace of PYD Co-chairman Salih Muslim. Rojava is politically
more distinct than other Kurdish cantons. Before he was arrested
and imprisoned in Turkey, PKK leader Abdullah Ocalan had labeled the
developments in Rojava as a revolution; this revolution was declared
in Kobani in July 2012.
Kobani is now the prime target of the Islamic State (IS) offensive. IS
forces moved westward to capture Kobani; 35 kilometers (22 miles)
of the 70 kilometers separating Kobani and Tel Abyad and 21 Kurdish
villages along the way are now in IS hands. Kobani is facing a total
IS siege.
If Kobani falls, the stronghold of the Rojava revolution will have
fallen. It would also put the Turkey-Syria border from Tel Abyad to
Karkamis under IS control.
It will then be easier for IS to capture the westernmost Kurdish
canton of Afrin and IS will be able to ramp up its pressure on Aleppo.
In the Sept. 5 issue of Istanbul's Armenian weekly Agos, Vahakn
Kesisyan, who hails from Aleppo, wrote that IS was nearing the center
of Aleppo and was actually on the fringes of the Armenian district.
People tend to focus on Mosul and Erbil with regard to IS intentions,
but the attack against Kobani has significant political and even more
crucial military implications. That is why the Kurdish movement has
been pleading for international help.
This is why the statement of the a key Kurdish politician, Selahattin
Demirtas, to the DHA news agency yesterday recalled the words of Ahmet
Davutoglu, then the foreign minister, "We won't allow a fait accompli"
while the PYD is preparing for the autonomy of Rojava. Demirtas'
remarks were accurate: "The prime minister at that time had said they
would not allow a fait accompli and would do whatever is needed to
foil it. We are now expecting the same stand from the prime minister
and the president. Will they be able to say, 'We will not allow an
IS fait accompli ... when they are declaring a caliphate there?' We
are really curious if they will actually be as uneasy with IS as they
are with the Kurds."
It is obvious that Ankara is not at all eager for a PYD-dominated
autonomy experiment in Rojava. The green light Ankara flashed to
various Islamist-Salafist groups was not only because of Ankara's hope
of their clashing with Syrian President Bashar al-Assad. Those groups
were also fighting the Kurds dominated by the PYD on Turkey's border.
Ankara turned a blind eye to Jabhat al-Nusra, Ahrar al-Sham and many
other Islamist-Salafist groups you wouldn't even know the names of
with the hope they would foil Rojava autonomy. Of course, these groups
included IS.
This is how Demirtas continued with his statement to the DHA news
agency:
"It is a reality that Turkey refrains from tough language against IS.
They are reluctant even to criticize IS. To attribute this only
to the hostages case is a massive smoke and mirrors. Everybody is
now wondering if Turkey intentionally delivered those hostages to
IS. Did Turkey provide IS with an ace so that Ankara won't have to
participate in an operation against IS? There are serious allegations,
debates about this. Turkey's staying out of the anti-IS coalition,
its lack of support to the Kurds fighting IS have provoked serious
questions. The government may deny all charges of supporting IS but
even that attitude means providing IS with indirect support. Never mind
the dispatch of weapons with trucks and trains, Turkey is providing
support by keeping silent."
Also what Demirtas said on Sterk TV yesterday [Sept. 21] was
important. Demirtas said Turkey had provided extraordinary facilities
to IS for logistics, weapons and personnel support on its border. "IS
has been trying to capture Kobani with heavy weapons for a long time,"
he said.
Prime Minister Ahmet Davutolgu yesterday opened Turkey's border
to Kurdish refugees escaping from IS attacks at Kobani. He did
well. He is fully justified. Even the main opposition CHP supported
this decision. But somehow that decision did not prevent the Kurdish
political movement from a totally divergent assessment. This is how
Demirtas saw it:
"To say, 'We are getting ready to receive people who are fleeing' only
means, 'Let IS hit them and then they can migrate to our side.' This
statement by Prime Minister Davutoglu won't scare off IS, but will only
encourage it. To declare, 'We told our governors to receive the people
coming to the border' means conceding IS superiority in advance and
agreeing with its massacre policy. To tell our civilians, 'Run, run
away, we opened the border for you,' means abandon your land to IS."
Whether Davutoglu's remarks should be understood in this context is
something else. But that there is a critically serious schism between
the Kurdish political movement and the government has been confirmed
by Demirtas' words.
PKK military chief Murat Karayilan has called Ankara's proposal to set
up a buffer zone in Syria as an indication of Turkey's intention to
"occupy Rojava and terminate the Kurdish administration of Rojava."
Karayilan warned that such a move would mean the end of the Kurdish
solution process.
The AKP government appears headed toward bottlenecks with the Kurds
in addition to facing tough tests with IS, the West and Turkish
public opinion.
http://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/security/2014/09/turkey-syria-kobani-rojava-isis-kurds-pkk.html
From: A. Papazian
Al-Monitor
Sept 23 2014
Author: Radikal (Turkey)Posted September 22, 2014
This has always been the core of the AKP (Justice and Development
Party) government's Syria impasse and is one of the most telling clues
of why Turkey's foreign policy has been mired in the Syria crisis:
thwarting Kurdish aspirations for autonomy that could also set a
precedent for the Kurds of Turkey.
There have been alarm bells in the media of the Kurdish political
movement about the threat Kobani was facing. Kobani (Ain al-Arab in
Arabic) is directly opposite the Turkish town of Suruc. Kobani is
the one of the three cantons established in the Rojava region with
the initiative of the Democratic Union Party (PYD). It is also the
birthplace of PYD Co-chairman Salih Muslim. Rojava is politically
more distinct than other Kurdish cantons. Before he was arrested
and imprisoned in Turkey, PKK leader Abdullah Ocalan had labeled the
developments in Rojava as a revolution; this revolution was declared
in Kobani in July 2012.
Kobani is now the prime target of the Islamic State (IS) offensive. IS
forces moved westward to capture Kobani; 35 kilometers (22 miles)
of the 70 kilometers separating Kobani and Tel Abyad and 21 Kurdish
villages along the way are now in IS hands. Kobani is facing a total
IS siege.
If Kobani falls, the stronghold of the Rojava revolution will have
fallen. It would also put the Turkey-Syria border from Tel Abyad to
Karkamis under IS control.
It will then be easier for IS to capture the westernmost Kurdish
canton of Afrin and IS will be able to ramp up its pressure on Aleppo.
In the Sept. 5 issue of Istanbul's Armenian weekly Agos, Vahakn
Kesisyan, who hails from Aleppo, wrote that IS was nearing the center
of Aleppo and was actually on the fringes of the Armenian district.
People tend to focus on Mosul and Erbil with regard to IS intentions,
but the attack against Kobani has significant political and even more
crucial military implications. That is why the Kurdish movement has
been pleading for international help.
This is why the statement of the a key Kurdish politician, Selahattin
Demirtas, to the DHA news agency yesterday recalled the words of Ahmet
Davutoglu, then the foreign minister, "We won't allow a fait accompli"
while the PYD is preparing for the autonomy of Rojava. Demirtas'
remarks were accurate: "The prime minister at that time had said they
would not allow a fait accompli and would do whatever is needed to
foil it. We are now expecting the same stand from the prime minister
and the president. Will they be able to say, 'We will not allow an
IS fait accompli ... when they are declaring a caliphate there?' We
are really curious if they will actually be as uneasy with IS as they
are with the Kurds."
It is obvious that Ankara is not at all eager for a PYD-dominated
autonomy experiment in Rojava. The green light Ankara flashed to
various Islamist-Salafist groups was not only because of Ankara's hope
of their clashing with Syrian President Bashar al-Assad. Those groups
were also fighting the Kurds dominated by the PYD on Turkey's border.
Ankara turned a blind eye to Jabhat al-Nusra, Ahrar al-Sham and many
other Islamist-Salafist groups you wouldn't even know the names of
with the hope they would foil Rojava autonomy. Of course, these groups
included IS.
This is how Demirtas continued with his statement to the DHA news
agency:
"It is a reality that Turkey refrains from tough language against IS.
They are reluctant even to criticize IS. To attribute this only
to the hostages case is a massive smoke and mirrors. Everybody is
now wondering if Turkey intentionally delivered those hostages to
IS. Did Turkey provide IS with an ace so that Ankara won't have to
participate in an operation against IS? There are serious allegations,
debates about this. Turkey's staying out of the anti-IS coalition,
its lack of support to the Kurds fighting IS have provoked serious
questions. The government may deny all charges of supporting IS but
even that attitude means providing IS with indirect support. Never mind
the dispatch of weapons with trucks and trains, Turkey is providing
support by keeping silent."
Also what Demirtas said on Sterk TV yesterday [Sept. 21] was
important. Demirtas said Turkey had provided extraordinary facilities
to IS for logistics, weapons and personnel support on its border. "IS
has been trying to capture Kobani with heavy weapons for a long time,"
he said.
Prime Minister Ahmet Davutolgu yesterday opened Turkey's border
to Kurdish refugees escaping from IS attacks at Kobani. He did
well. He is fully justified. Even the main opposition CHP supported
this decision. But somehow that decision did not prevent the Kurdish
political movement from a totally divergent assessment. This is how
Demirtas saw it:
"To say, 'We are getting ready to receive people who are fleeing' only
means, 'Let IS hit them and then they can migrate to our side.' This
statement by Prime Minister Davutoglu won't scare off IS, but will only
encourage it. To declare, 'We told our governors to receive the people
coming to the border' means conceding IS superiority in advance and
agreeing with its massacre policy. To tell our civilians, 'Run, run
away, we opened the border for you,' means abandon your land to IS."
Whether Davutoglu's remarks should be understood in this context is
something else. But that there is a critically serious schism between
the Kurdish political movement and the government has been confirmed
by Demirtas' words.
PKK military chief Murat Karayilan has called Ankara's proposal to set
up a buffer zone in Syria as an indication of Turkey's intention to
"occupy Rojava and terminate the Kurdish administration of Rojava."
Karayilan warned that such a move would mean the end of the Kurdish
solution process.
The AKP government appears headed toward bottlenecks with the Kurds
in addition to facing tough tests with IS, the West and Turkish
public opinion.
http://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/security/2014/09/turkey-syria-kobani-rojava-isis-kurds-pkk.html
From: A. Papazian