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Gayane NovikovThe South Caucasus States Are Trapped By The Ukrainian

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  • Gayane NovikovThe South Caucasus States Are Trapped By The Ukrainian

    GAYANE NOVIKOVTHE SOUTH CAUCASUS STATES ARE TRAPPED BY THE UKRAINIAN CRISIS

    ArmInfo's interview with Gayane Novikova, Founding Director of the
    Center for Strategic Analysis SPECTRUM

    by Emmanuil Lazarian

    Tuesday, April 21, 11:45

    Against the background of the upcoming nation-wide events regarding the
    commemoration of the Armenian Genocide Centennial, all other events
    appear to have paled into insignificance. However, there are serious
    processes in the world which - to a different extent - influence the
    region and Armenia. Gayane, I am sure that you are following these
    developments closely. I'd like to start our interview referring to
    your speech at the Second South Caucasus Security Forum in Tbilisi
    in November, 2014. I was present there and I'd like to recall your
    statement suggesting that the Ukrainian crisis became a watershed in
    the EU-Russia relations, and the South Caucasus states have become
    hostages to that situation. Don't you think that Europe has also
    become a hostage to the United States' geopolitical ambitions?

    Everyone has become a hostage of this situation. Some European states
    follow in the footsteps of U.S. policy, which does not always serve
    its interests. Sanctions indirectly affect also the U.S. , restricting
    its space for political and diplomatic maneuvering in areas where
    cooperation with Russia is inevitable, at least in the foreseeable
    future. Moreover, each European state has its own political,
    historical, economic, social, and cultural reasons to cooperate or
    not to cooperate with Russia. Not everything can be drawn in black
    and white All of these nations, or more precisely those seriously
    affected by the sanctions against Russia, have begun to realize that
    the sanctions give an impetus to Russia -that is, they force the
    latter seriously to think about the diversification of economy. If
    prompt and successful diversification occurs, the European states will
    lose a part of the huge Russian and, to some degree, Eurasian market
    at that moment when the EU will lift sanctions against Russia (and
    it will inevitably happen). After all, Russia was one of the largest
    consumers of EU goods and services. Therefore, Europeans have begun
    to ask traditionally "Russian questions," such as "What to do?" and
    "Who is to blame?"

    In October, 2014, I participated in one of the fora organized
    by the Italian Institute of International Affairs. The theme was
    relations between the West and Russia in the context of processes
    in Ukraine. It was the only conference of its kind which did not
    provide any recommendations. The expert community, represented by
    well-known European, American, Russian, and Ukrainian analysts did
    not come to any conclusion. It was obvious that Russia cannot be
    isolated. Neither can it be ignored when it comes to settlement of
    some very important problems.

    Do you think they realize that?

    Sure, the analysts (not politicians!) are well aware of this. They
    understand that the best option for all the parties, and first of all,
    for Europe and Russia, is to take a step back. The point is how to walk
    away from a confrontational model and to save face. Russia offered
    cooperation at different stages, but from its vantage point did not
    receive any proper response. The return of Crimea (as Russia calls
    it) or its annexation (according to international law) was simply
    Russia's response to the misunderstanding or neglect by the West of
    its strategic interests. President Putin also addressed this issue
    on Russian television's "Direct Line" on April 16.

    Interestingly, at the conference in Rome, which I mentioned earlier,
    the experts did not focus on the Crimea issue. It appears that, at
    a psychological level, the Crimea issue has been settled, although
    conclusions regarding its legal status will take decades.

    In spite of the West's attempts to isolate Russia, it is still involved
    in many international processes. You advocate a further cooperation
    between the West and Russia, not least because there are many areas
    of common interest, for instance, in the resolution of the complex
    issues in the South Caucasus.

    This is correct. I am trying to deliver this message to the expert
    community and to the political establishment of the European
    states. I am deeply convinced that in the global international
    agenda there are many serious issues where this cooperation must
    occur. They exist in our region as well. As you can observe,
    after Armenia's geopolitical choice, European organizations have
    not terminated their cooperation with Armenia and even intensified
    interaction in some areas. The recent economic agreement on further
    EU assistance is one of the piece of evidence. The Ukrainian crisis
    forced Europe to reconsider its cooperation with the South Caucasus
    states, particularly, with Armenia. In fact, Russia's monopoly over
    the management of all processes in our region was cracked long ago,
    and this crack - if we take into consideration the processes inside
    and outside the region - is becoming wider. Armenia, as a country
    with limited political, military, and economic maneuverability, in
    turn strives "to milk two cows at once" (Russia and EU). This is a
    pragmatic and strategically quite justified approach, especially if
    one takes into account the cancellation of some projects supported by
    the US government. Becoming a member of the Eurasian Economic Union
    and at the same time maintaining quite serious ties with the EU,
    Armenia can and must restore its foreign policy balance and continue
    its complementary policy. The invitation of President Serzh Sargsyan
    to the NATO Summit in Wales should be considered in this very context.

    Some Russian analysts view the Eastern Partnership Project as a
    US-Polish provocation, as an attempt to weaken the geopolitical
    influence of Russia. Russia for a long time and, at first sight, had
    observed the pompous presentation of the EaP to the eastern partners
    of Europe indifferently. These states, in turn, tried to adjust and
    synchronize the European standards with the needs of their countries in
    a way that would not anger Russia. Why did they shift from that calm
    process to the burdened geo-strategic "either...or" choice? It became
    clear that the EaP initially pursued political goals and contained
    elements of a geopolitical game directly related to the interests
    of the Euro-Atlantic bloc. After all, some North African states and
    Turkey have Association Agreements with the EU, but no one in these
    countries highlights these AA as geopolitically very important.

    Your observation regarding both the political component and the extreme
    pompousness of the EaP is correct. It is the normal posture owing to
    the fact that this program needed and sought huge funding. To receive
    such funds, Poland and Sweden had to demonstrate the importance of
    this project for the entire European Union - and most members were
    quite skeptical. Many of us realized then that Ukraine, as the most
    important of the three eastern European states, was the pivotal element
    in this game. Along with Moldova and Belarus, it should have become a
    "buffer zone" between Russia and Europe.

    According to the European experts, such a buffer zone would increase
    European security. However, Russia's response was quite predictable.

    European officials by pushing the partners to make a choice,
    miscalculated the consequences. They could have been more flexible
    and could have avoided a confrontation, especially in this situation:
    namely, it was obvious that the Russian president was prepared to
    further test the strength of the mentioned partnership relations.

    Anyway, Russia failed to hold Ukraine, and it "went" to the West.

    In Ukraine the situation is very special. Ukraine is a very unique and
    diverse country - and this cannot be neglected. Russia has powerful
    leverage there, such as the belonging of two nations to the same
    civilization. There are still heated debates about what state's cradle
    - the Kievan Rus (Kievskaya Rus') - was. For the Ukrainian people it
    is a very important question now. On the other hand, Russia puts the
    idea of "compatriot" at the top of its list of priorities and hence
    supports those groups in Eastern Ukraine that advocate, on the basis
    of their Russian identity, for separation.

    As for the idea that the security of the EU will be increased by
    the AA, it should be stressed that Ukraine's move to the West, and
    the war that followed, actually thwarted these plans. Many European
    countries, namely Poland and Sweden, followed by the Baltic States,
    began to demand an increase in their security not through soft power
    measures, but through hard power: they demanded more and more military
    defense investment. In fact, we will probably face a serious round
    of militarization, with all its consequences. The decisions of the
    recent NATO Summit and the frequency of military maneuvers held by
    the conflicting parties confirm this trend.

    To what frame of axes should the South Caucasus belong ?

    On the one hand, the South Caucasus states have become the hostages
    of the Ukrainian crisis, which is absorbing all the "energy" of the
    European institutions and Russia alike. Ukraine is becoming the focus
    of their attention. On the other hand, the South Caucasus, also viewed
    as a buffer zone, is becoming more important for the European states
    and for Russia. I am thinking of their common threat: the Islamic
    State. Turkey and Azerbaijan have become the main transit routes for
    Islamists of all nationalities. In this context, ensuring the stability
    of the Caucasus in general, and its southern part in particular,
    is the priority for regional as well as non-regional actors.

    NATO does not interfere in the settlement of South Caucasus conflicts,
    but it continues its efforts to involve the region's countries in
    its programs. Despite the political decision on Georgia's possible
    accession to NATO, Georgia has not been provided with the Membership
    Action Plan so far. There is a plan to set up a regional training
    center in Georgia to pave the way for cooperation between the Georgian
    armed forces and NATO. This accelerated rapprochement is directly
    connected with the developments in Ukraine. Don't you think that NATO
    is making its way to the South Caucasus "on the sly" and that this
    movement is unlikely to maintain the fragile balance of forces?

    I don't think so. The developments in Ukraine have demonstrated that
    the West is not ready to fight for this key state. As the saying goes,
    every man must carry his own sack to the mill. Military advisers can
    continue to provide recommendations and to hope that someone will
    follow their counsel. Frankly speaking, the West wants all domestic
    processes in the buffer states - in Southeastern Europe and the South
    Caucasus - to be predictable and reasonable. One should not forget that
    Europe prefers to operate using soft power, which does not require
    significant financial investments, unlike the expensive programs of
    NATO. The latter quickly shifts from soft power measures to hard power.

    Regarding developments in our region: The balance of power in the
    South Caucasus is achieved owing to the military parity (with intense
    Russian participation) between the parties to the Nagorno Karabakh
    conflict, as well as because of - paradoxically - the division lines
    existing and growing in the region. You have mentioned that NATO does
    not intervene in the resolution of the South Caucasus conflicts.

    However, these conflicts are one of the mechanisms to establish control
    in our region. Russia is a direct participant in the "Georgian"
    conflicts and a mediator (along with the United States and France)
    in the Nagorno Karabakh conflict. Furthermore, Russia uses this
    conflict against both Armenia and Azerbaijan, although "against"
    is probably irrelevant here. Perhaps it would be more correct to say
    that Russia is trying "to retain hold of" both Armenia and Azerbaijan.

    It is obvious that for Russia it is hard to make an unambiguous choice
    in favor of one or the other of the parties to the conflict.

    At one of the conferences organized by your analytical center in early
    2014, the NATO representatives praised Armenia for its ability to sit
    on two chairs. They stressed that the republic is the only CSTO member
    which participates in NATO peacekeeping operations. They emphasized
    that Yerevan's ability to combine two different approaches is an
    important factor taking into consideration the current discrepancies
    between the CSTO and NATO. In your opinion how sincere are these
    statements through the prism of developments in Ukraine and will we
    continue to hear such statements? NATO sent already its clear signal
    to Moscow, and the latter in turn began serious talk about the NATO
    threat to Russian interests.

    First and foremost, Russia has been considering NATO as a direct
    threat to its interests for a long time. In August, 2008, in Georgia,
    and in March, 2014, in Ukraine it demonstrated its serious approach
    to this issue. In such a situation, Armenia should act cautiously;
    hence, the praise of our state's stand is absolutely well-grounded.

    Furthermore, Armenia has repeatedly expressed its willingness to be,
    and to serve, as a bridge or a platform between the European Union
    and the Eurasian Economic Union.

    Could you please forecast the further developments in the region?

    Maintaining stability in the South Caucasus is becoming a priority for
    all non-regional actors. Much will depend on the internal political
    situation in each of the regional states. Azerbaijan is still in the
    most advantageous situation: it contends, due to its oil revenues,
    at least for the role of a regional energy power (until the sanctions
    against Iran will be lifted) and it maintains quite successfully
    a balance in its relations with both Russia and the West. It will
    most likely enjoy also more support from them to the extent that,
    as likely, its role in the fight against the Islamic State grows.

    Georgia is in a quite stable situation: its official pro-EU and
    pro-NATO policy no longer irritates Russia, and the emerging group
    holding pro-Russian sentiments in Georgia do not change anything.

    Armenia is also experiencing stability, which is, however, of a
    different kind. It is still governable by its political authorities
    because on the one hand the negative example provided by Ukraine
    has tempered the strident voices of many. On the other hand,
    conflicts among the political elites have sparked a new wave of public
    disappointment. Against this background it is important to preserve the
    status quo in the area of the Nagorno Karabakh conflict. Major efforts
    should be concentrated on returning Nagorno Karabakh to the negotiating
    table in order to continue discussion on the non-use of force agreement
    within a new format. This new format should include meetings between
    all three - Armenian, Azerbaijani, and Nagorno Karabakh - presidents.

    But it is impossible to apply the third international principle
    - non-use of force - until the problem of the future status of
    Nagorno Karabakh is settled. Azerbaijan is not interested in its
    implementation.

    The return of Nagorno Karabakh to the negotiation table will itself
    create the necessary open space for all the parties concerned. It
    will give a fresh and vigorous impetus to the peace process. I am
    sure that all parties, all of whom are genuinely interested in the
    conflict's resolution, will benefit from it.

    http://www.arminfo.am/index.cfm?objectid=51E32B40-E7FA-11E4-862E0EB7C0D21663

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