U.S. DECISION ON KARABAKH. WHO WILL THEY DISCUSS IT WITH?
Igor Muradyan, Political Analyst
Comments - 03 February 2015, 20:42
With its geopolitical importance, stakeholders and states, practice
of observation and discussions, influence on the political processes
the Karabakh issue is an international one.
In the past years the Karabakh issue was discussed on the international
arena more intensively, which was explained by the increased focus
of the Western community on the South Caucasus and the Caspian Sea,
as well as Eastern Europe.
At the same time, the Karabakh issue, as well as other similar issues
on the South Caucasus and Eastern Europe, were observed beside other
more large-scale geopolitical and political issues.
In this respect, the consideration of the Karabakh issue as an
international issue requires a certain balance of notions and criteria,
in other words, at a certain level and actuality and importance.
The main criterion in considering the Karabakh issue, as well as
other similar issues is security. So far the Karabakh issue has been
considered as part of projection of security.
Territorial integrity, democracy, tolerance and other principles are
agreed with consideration of only security conditions. A hierarchy
of conditions and factors of security has been formed in the South
Caucasus which are primarily directed at successful extraction and
transportation of energy resources.
The United States and Great Britain declare different goals and
objectives in the South Caucasus but if earlier their actual policy
was subject to energy projects and their security and stability were
the priority, now the situation has changed.
Along with these basic conditions a combination of "pure" geopolitics
and geoeconomics is in place which is considered primary or secondary
depending on the situation. The combination of political and economic
interests misleads not only the society but also the political class.
The United States and the United Kingdom have lost interest in
functions of transit of Caspian oil, as well as Afghanistan. Along
with its increasing participation in the political processes in the
South Caucasus and North Caucasus the United Kingdom has started
playing a leading role in the development of Karabakh settlement
plans and schemes.
The United Kingdom is trying to conduct a systemic policy of
participation and influence in the region. In this respect it is
necessary to have a more substantial look at the British policy on the
region as a complete "British Caucasian project". The next stage of
the Karabakh settlement in 1999-2002 was more important in terms of
the understanding of the issue by the United States and the leading
European states.
Starting from 1999 the Clinton administration tried to get down to
the settlement of the Karabakh issue without a clearly developed plan
and understanding of a real opportunity of settlement, hoping that
the Democratic Party will succeed in retaining power and continue a
foreign policy with a considerable ideological basis.
However, the Clinton administration did not have time and political
resources to have an incentive for the settlement process.
In 2001 the most important and the only attempt of the Bush
administration to activate the settlement process was related to the
upcoming decision on change in missile defense and the U.S.-Russia
agreement.
Aside from such a crucial lever of pressure on Russia as NATO expansion
in Central Europe an attempt was made to put pressure on Russia in
the southern strategic direction, i.e. the South Caucasus.
The central development of this stage of the settlement - the Key West
meeting - demonstrated that the Karabakh issue defies a settlement,
whether democratic or through use of force.
Having found itself in the role of "observer", Russia was able to make
its situation an advantage because in the result of this process the
United States was not able to make use of this as a lever of pressure
on Russia.
The process of negotiations over Karabakh lost this function and
stopped mattering to the United States.
The U.S. Deputy Secretary John Armitage and the Director of Policy
Planning for the State Department Richard Haass who were experienced
analysts and policy planners played an important role in the period
of discussion of the Karabakh issue in 2001.
Further development of the settlement process which was under the U.S.
control and influence was planned and inspired by the developments of
2001. In September-October 2001 the U.S. representative to the Minsk
Group Rudolf Perina had a long trip across Europe and held meetings
to discuss "transfer" of part of responsibility for the settlement
process onto the European partners.
In fall 2002 the United States decided to share responsibility for
the Karabakh settlement with the European community, primarily the
United Kingdom which has geo-economic interests in the South Caucasus.
The fall 2002 was marked by the efforts of the United States to
implement the sovereignty intentions of Nagorno-Karabakh Republic,
realizing the impossibility of settlement of the Karabakh issue based
on outdated principles and approaches.
During the Obama administration the Karabakh issue was forgotten. In
parallel, Russia made concessions in Eastern Europe that resulted in
the war in Ukraine and Russian expansion in the South Caucasus.
In the past stage the U.S. attitude to the states of the South
Caucasus was formed, which was agreed with the European partners. It
is understood that this inheritance acquired meaning in the American
policy during the Bush administration, and now the U.S. administration
is so confident of this situation that it underlies the U.S. policy
on the South Caucasus.
During the George Bush administration new relations with Turkey were
set up which resulted in aggravation of the U.S. relations with this
country. The United States sees Turkey and its satellite Azerbaijan
as states that act against the interests of the Western community.
The United States sees Armenia as a country which acts as a constraint
for Turkey and its satellite.
Hence, the U.S. policy on the South Caucasus has changed, and Russia's
stance, strange though it may seem, will increasingly affect the
hostile attitude to Turkey because Russia and Turkey are trying to
coordinate their foreign policy and shape something like an alliance.
This is the clear policy and stance of the United States and NATO
and it does affect the attitude of the United States and the Western
community on the Karabakh issue.
The problem is in Armenia which has become Russia's vassal and the
U.S. and the European Union cannot find someone who they would be
able to talk to on these issues.
http://www.lragir.am/index/eng/0/comments/view/33581#sthash.AVRnsT6a.dpuf
From: Baghdasarian
Igor Muradyan, Political Analyst
Comments - 03 February 2015, 20:42
With its geopolitical importance, stakeholders and states, practice
of observation and discussions, influence on the political processes
the Karabakh issue is an international one.
In the past years the Karabakh issue was discussed on the international
arena more intensively, which was explained by the increased focus
of the Western community on the South Caucasus and the Caspian Sea,
as well as Eastern Europe.
At the same time, the Karabakh issue, as well as other similar issues
on the South Caucasus and Eastern Europe, were observed beside other
more large-scale geopolitical and political issues.
In this respect, the consideration of the Karabakh issue as an
international issue requires a certain balance of notions and criteria,
in other words, at a certain level and actuality and importance.
The main criterion in considering the Karabakh issue, as well as
other similar issues is security. So far the Karabakh issue has been
considered as part of projection of security.
Territorial integrity, democracy, tolerance and other principles are
agreed with consideration of only security conditions. A hierarchy
of conditions and factors of security has been formed in the South
Caucasus which are primarily directed at successful extraction and
transportation of energy resources.
The United States and Great Britain declare different goals and
objectives in the South Caucasus but if earlier their actual policy
was subject to energy projects and their security and stability were
the priority, now the situation has changed.
Along with these basic conditions a combination of "pure" geopolitics
and geoeconomics is in place which is considered primary or secondary
depending on the situation. The combination of political and economic
interests misleads not only the society but also the political class.
The United States and the United Kingdom have lost interest in
functions of transit of Caspian oil, as well as Afghanistan. Along
with its increasing participation in the political processes in the
South Caucasus and North Caucasus the United Kingdom has started
playing a leading role in the development of Karabakh settlement
plans and schemes.
The United Kingdom is trying to conduct a systemic policy of
participation and influence in the region. In this respect it is
necessary to have a more substantial look at the British policy on the
region as a complete "British Caucasian project". The next stage of
the Karabakh settlement in 1999-2002 was more important in terms of
the understanding of the issue by the United States and the leading
European states.
Starting from 1999 the Clinton administration tried to get down to
the settlement of the Karabakh issue without a clearly developed plan
and understanding of a real opportunity of settlement, hoping that
the Democratic Party will succeed in retaining power and continue a
foreign policy with a considerable ideological basis.
However, the Clinton administration did not have time and political
resources to have an incentive for the settlement process.
In 2001 the most important and the only attempt of the Bush
administration to activate the settlement process was related to the
upcoming decision on change in missile defense and the U.S.-Russia
agreement.
Aside from such a crucial lever of pressure on Russia as NATO expansion
in Central Europe an attempt was made to put pressure on Russia in
the southern strategic direction, i.e. the South Caucasus.
The central development of this stage of the settlement - the Key West
meeting - demonstrated that the Karabakh issue defies a settlement,
whether democratic or through use of force.
Having found itself in the role of "observer", Russia was able to make
its situation an advantage because in the result of this process the
United States was not able to make use of this as a lever of pressure
on Russia.
The process of negotiations over Karabakh lost this function and
stopped mattering to the United States.
The U.S. Deputy Secretary John Armitage and the Director of Policy
Planning for the State Department Richard Haass who were experienced
analysts and policy planners played an important role in the period
of discussion of the Karabakh issue in 2001.
Further development of the settlement process which was under the U.S.
control and influence was planned and inspired by the developments of
2001. In September-October 2001 the U.S. representative to the Minsk
Group Rudolf Perina had a long trip across Europe and held meetings
to discuss "transfer" of part of responsibility for the settlement
process onto the European partners.
In fall 2002 the United States decided to share responsibility for
the Karabakh settlement with the European community, primarily the
United Kingdom which has geo-economic interests in the South Caucasus.
The fall 2002 was marked by the efforts of the United States to
implement the sovereignty intentions of Nagorno-Karabakh Republic,
realizing the impossibility of settlement of the Karabakh issue based
on outdated principles and approaches.
During the Obama administration the Karabakh issue was forgotten. In
parallel, Russia made concessions in Eastern Europe that resulted in
the war in Ukraine and Russian expansion in the South Caucasus.
In the past stage the U.S. attitude to the states of the South
Caucasus was formed, which was agreed with the European partners. It
is understood that this inheritance acquired meaning in the American
policy during the Bush administration, and now the U.S. administration
is so confident of this situation that it underlies the U.S. policy
on the South Caucasus.
During the George Bush administration new relations with Turkey were
set up which resulted in aggravation of the U.S. relations with this
country. The United States sees Turkey and its satellite Azerbaijan
as states that act against the interests of the Western community.
The United States sees Armenia as a country which acts as a constraint
for Turkey and its satellite.
Hence, the U.S. policy on the South Caucasus has changed, and Russia's
stance, strange though it may seem, will increasingly affect the
hostile attitude to Turkey because Russia and Turkey are trying to
coordinate their foreign policy and shape something like an alliance.
This is the clear policy and stance of the United States and NATO
and it does affect the attitude of the United States and the Western
community on the Karabakh issue.
The problem is in Armenia which has become Russia's vassal and the
U.S. and the European Union cannot find someone who they would be
able to talk to on these issues.
http://www.lragir.am/index/eng/0/comments/view/33581#sthash.AVRnsT6a.dpuf
From: Baghdasarian