Tweet
LOOKING AT ARMENIAN-IRANIAN RELATIONS THROUGH A RUSSIAN LENS
EurasiaNet.org
Feb 4 2015
February 4, 2015 - 1:29pm, by Alex Vatanka
The late January visit to Armenia by Iranian Foreign Minister Javad
Zarif got little media attention, but it could have significant
ramifications for geopolitics in Eurasia. Specifically, the trip
could help Russia gain a trade outlet that softens the blow of
Western sanctions.
Zarif's two-day stay in Armenia had all the usual diplomatic pomp
and promises. It came on the back of an October visit to Tehran by a
high-ranking delegation led by Prime Minister Hovik Abrahamyan. In
Yerevan, Zarif met his counterpart Eduard Nalbandian and President
Serzh Sargsyan. The statements that followed those meetings included
plenty of the usual diplomatic rhetoric. But they also contained
hints that the trip was more than mere diplomatic reciprocity.
Most significantly, Zarif said Iran has "no restrictions" in
developing ties with Armenia, highlighting two areas in particular --
transportation and trade. On both fronts, the role of Russia looms
large. First, both Tehran and Yerevan have emphasized the need to
make progress on the construction of the Southern Armenia Railway,
a project that would better link the two countries. On the issue of
trade, Zarif praised Armenia's accession to the Russia-dominated
Eurasian Economic Union (EEU) and pointed to it as a potentially
important development for Iran.
According to Russia's Interfax news agency, Zarif touted the EEU as
providing "broader cooperation options to Iran, Armenia and Russia."
Iran's ambassador to Moscow, Mehdi Sanai, earlier had said Tehran would
look into signing a memorandum of understanding in 2015 on trade with
the EEU. Such an agreement could spur an increase in Iranian exports to
Russia. Sanai has been on record as saying Iranian-Russian trade should
jump from the present $3-5 billion annually to $70 billion per year.
While Sanai's suggested trade volume target may be far from realistic,
a desire to achieve even an incremental increase in Iranian-Russian
trade requires the two countries to significantly expand transportation
links. At the moment, there is not even regular air cargo service
between Iran and Russia.
This is where a Russian angle to the construction of the Southern
Armenia Railway is apparent. As Prime Minister Abrahamyan put it,
"Iran and Armenia can jointly produce agricultural products and export
them to Eurasia" via the proposed rail project. However, both Moscow
and Tehran evidently have much greater ambitions than just providing an
outlet to and from the small Armenian market. Iran's trade with Armenia
is only about $300 million per year, a tiny share of its overall trade.
The 470-km rail project, which was first proposed in 2010 and has
remained largely on the drawing board since then, is seen as a
missing link in a North-South Eurasian trade corridor connecting
the Persian Gulf to the Black Sea. Its construction would give both
Iran and also Russia an important alternative outlet for trade. The
significance of the project is also reflected in President Vladimir
Putin's announcement back in September 2013 to contribute $429 million
in financing for the multi-billion-dollar rail project. Given its
current economic woes, there's no longer a guarantee that Russia
could follow through on Putin's pledge. Still, Russian diplomatic
and economic interests in Iran are intensifying.
The statements made during Zarif's trip to Yerevan are better
understood when Russia's regional role is taken into account. Since
Armenia regained independence in 1991, Russia has served as a
geopolitical protector for Yerevan. And thanks to the EEU and to
Russia's acquisition of strategic economic assets in Armenia over the
past decade, the Kremlin is in position to play economic kingmaker
for the South Caucasus country.
Meanwhile, Iran has played a complimentary role to that of Russia
as far as Armenia is concerned. Tehran has served as Armenia's
most reliable trade outlet to the world since 1994, when Turkey and
Azerbaijan imposed a blockade. In addition, Iran has tended to favor
Armenia, and not fellow Shia Azerbaijan, in the search for a lasting
political settlement to the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict.
Two factors are driving Iran's desire for closer ties to Armenia.
First, Tehran has from early on resented Azerbaijan's relatively
strong relationship with the United States and European Union, and is
particularly alarmed by Baku's growing contacts with Israel. While
Iranian-Azerbaijani relations have improved in recent months,Tehran
remains wary of Baku's intentions.
Second, Tehran has made a strategic decision not to challenge or upset
Russian interests in Moscow's self-defined "near abroad." For Iran,
Russian goodwill is important in light of Tehran's troubled relations
with the Western world.
Ultimately, when it comes to Armenia, Iran has pursued a policy that is
deferential to Russian interests. In cases where Russians interests
have been at stake - when, for example, Iran and Armenia pursued
joint energy projects that would circumvent Moscow - the Iranians
have been quick to back down in the face of Kremlin opposition.
These days when it comes to Iranian-Armenian ties, Russian calculations
are straightforward: given the rising tension between Moscow and the
West over Ukraine, the Kremlin wants to secure alternative trade
partners. As long as Russia believes closer Armenian-Iranian ties
serve its interests, the momentum that Zarif and his hosts in Yerevan
spoke about stands a good chance of building.
Editor's note: Alex Vatanka is a Senior Fellow at Middle East Institute
and The Jamestown Foundation in Washington DC.
http://www.eurasianet.org/node/71921
EurasiaNet.org
Feb 4 2015
February 4, 2015 - 1:29pm, by Alex Vatanka
The late January visit to Armenia by Iranian Foreign Minister Javad
Zarif got little media attention, but it could have significant
ramifications for geopolitics in Eurasia. Specifically, the trip
could help Russia gain a trade outlet that softens the blow of
Western sanctions.
Zarif's two-day stay in Armenia had all the usual diplomatic pomp
and promises. It came on the back of an October visit to Tehran by a
high-ranking delegation led by Prime Minister Hovik Abrahamyan. In
Yerevan, Zarif met his counterpart Eduard Nalbandian and President
Serzh Sargsyan. The statements that followed those meetings included
plenty of the usual diplomatic rhetoric. But they also contained
hints that the trip was more than mere diplomatic reciprocity.
Most significantly, Zarif said Iran has "no restrictions" in
developing ties with Armenia, highlighting two areas in particular --
transportation and trade. On both fronts, the role of Russia looms
large. First, both Tehran and Yerevan have emphasized the need to
make progress on the construction of the Southern Armenia Railway,
a project that would better link the two countries. On the issue of
trade, Zarif praised Armenia's accession to the Russia-dominated
Eurasian Economic Union (EEU) and pointed to it as a potentially
important development for Iran.
According to Russia's Interfax news agency, Zarif touted the EEU as
providing "broader cooperation options to Iran, Armenia and Russia."
Iran's ambassador to Moscow, Mehdi Sanai, earlier had said Tehran would
look into signing a memorandum of understanding in 2015 on trade with
the EEU. Such an agreement could spur an increase in Iranian exports to
Russia. Sanai has been on record as saying Iranian-Russian trade should
jump from the present $3-5 billion annually to $70 billion per year.
While Sanai's suggested trade volume target may be far from realistic,
a desire to achieve even an incremental increase in Iranian-Russian
trade requires the two countries to significantly expand transportation
links. At the moment, there is not even regular air cargo service
between Iran and Russia.
This is where a Russian angle to the construction of the Southern
Armenia Railway is apparent. As Prime Minister Abrahamyan put it,
"Iran and Armenia can jointly produce agricultural products and export
them to Eurasia" via the proposed rail project. However, both Moscow
and Tehran evidently have much greater ambitions than just providing an
outlet to and from the small Armenian market. Iran's trade with Armenia
is only about $300 million per year, a tiny share of its overall trade.
The 470-km rail project, which was first proposed in 2010 and has
remained largely on the drawing board since then, is seen as a
missing link in a North-South Eurasian trade corridor connecting
the Persian Gulf to the Black Sea. Its construction would give both
Iran and also Russia an important alternative outlet for trade. The
significance of the project is also reflected in President Vladimir
Putin's announcement back in September 2013 to contribute $429 million
in financing for the multi-billion-dollar rail project. Given its
current economic woes, there's no longer a guarantee that Russia
could follow through on Putin's pledge. Still, Russian diplomatic
and economic interests in Iran are intensifying.
The statements made during Zarif's trip to Yerevan are better
understood when Russia's regional role is taken into account. Since
Armenia regained independence in 1991, Russia has served as a
geopolitical protector for Yerevan. And thanks to the EEU and to
Russia's acquisition of strategic economic assets in Armenia over the
past decade, the Kremlin is in position to play economic kingmaker
for the South Caucasus country.
Meanwhile, Iran has played a complimentary role to that of Russia
as far as Armenia is concerned. Tehran has served as Armenia's
most reliable trade outlet to the world since 1994, when Turkey and
Azerbaijan imposed a blockade. In addition, Iran has tended to favor
Armenia, and not fellow Shia Azerbaijan, in the search for a lasting
political settlement to the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict.
Two factors are driving Iran's desire for closer ties to Armenia.
First, Tehran has from early on resented Azerbaijan's relatively
strong relationship with the United States and European Union, and is
particularly alarmed by Baku's growing contacts with Israel. While
Iranian-Azerbaijani relations have improved in recent months,Tehran
remains wary of Baku's intentions.
Second, Tehran has made a strategic decision not to challenge or upset
Russian interests in Moscow's self-defined "near abroad." For Iran,
Russian goodwill is important in light of Tehran's troubled relations
with the Western world.
Ultimately, when it comes to Armenia, Iran has pursued a policy that is
deferential to Russian interests. In cases where Russians interests
have been at stake - when, for example, Iran and Armenia pursued
joint energy projects that would circumvent Moscow - the Iranians
have been quick to back down in the face of Kremlin opposition.
These days when it comes to Iranian-Armenian ties, Russian calculations
are straightforward: given the rising tension between Moscow and the
West over Ukraine, the Kremlin wants to secure alternative trade
partners. As long as Russia believes closer Armenian-Iranian ties
serve its interests, the momentum that Zarif and his hosts in Yerevan
spoke about stands a good chance of building.
Editor's note: Alex Vatanka is a Senior Fellow at Middle East Institute
and The Jamestown Foundation in Washington DC.
http://www.eurasianet.org/node/71921