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STEPANAKERT EXPLAINED REASON OF CLAMPDOWN
Hakob Badalyan, Political Commentator
Comments - 04 February 2015, 20:15
The Artsakh Deputy Prime Minister Arthur Aghabekyan commented on
the January 31 incident and the preceding developments. There are
interesting nuances between the lines of his comments which help
figure out the picture and motives of the NKR government's clampdown
on the car march of the Founding Parliament.
After the incident the society is trying to understand the reason of
such cruel and tough, disproportionate and obviously demonstrative
use of force of the government of Artsakh.
What Arthur Aghabekyan conveys between the lines helps shed a light
on the possible reason or reasons.
Aghabekyan has announced that the Artsakh president, chief of police,
deputy prime minister, prosecutor general, head of the National
Security Service, the minister and deputy minister of defense who is
also the head of the Union of Veterans have done everything they could
to have the march cancelled, explaining it by a sensitive situation
for Artakh, challenges at the border etc.
In fact, the deputy prime minister of Artsakh points to the involvement
of the entire elite. It is difficult to imagine that there was a need
to involve the entire elite in the so-called negotiations to prevent
the car march. This indicates that the problem was given a broader
importance, more exactly, in the context of the government of Artsakh.
Evidence to this is the December meeting of President Bako Sahakyan
and all the listed officials with Zhirair Sefilyan and two others to
dissuade them from organizing the march to Artsakh.
Arthur Aghabekyan says the atmosphere seemed good, and they seemed
to have reached an agreement but they were surprised when the new
day of the march was announced after January. Aghabekyan says they
again set to prevent the march.
During January there were other developments. The most important
of them was the announcement of several members of the ARF Artsakh
Committee to leave the party and share the ideas and programs of the
Founding Parliament. When this fact is juxtaposed with the upcoming
parliamentary election in Artsakh, which is a key event ahead of the
end of Bako Sahakyan's presidency, the reason of involvement of the
entire elite of the government of Artsakh in the prevention of the
march becomes clear.
Most probably, the march and the statement of the ARF Artsakh
committee have caused concerns in the elite in terms of control
over the process of forming government, which led to a decision to
use force after a futile "negotiation" process. The key issue was
the issue of government, not stability in Artsakh because the march
itself did not and could not threaten this stability.
The possible participation in forming government was seen as a threat,
especially in the context of political statements heard in Artsakh
prior to the march.
In fact, not the march was prevented but, as the clampdown decision
makers think, influence on the process of forming government was
prevented. The problem is not how substantial their concerns or fears
were. The problem is that there was fear, and this fear led to the
decision on clampdown because force is the first and last haven of
the ruling system in Armenia and Artsakh to keep power, and all the
rest is intermediate.
The problem is more urgent to the elite in Artsakh because Bako
Sahakyan is a leaving president. Perhaps this is the reason why the
prevention of the car march became a primary issue for Artsakh, in
other words, all the participants of the government viewed it through
the prism of their personal security and risks to their offices,
viewing force as the most reliable guarantee by far.
"Zhiro, I can't let that action happen," Arthur Aghabekyan quotes
Baku Sahakyan's words of his December meeting.
Bako Sahakyan is a leaving president, and he has commitments to the
ruling elite which he must implement in full. He is leaving while
the others must stay, therefore their requirements to Sahakyan are
intensifying, and at their core is the guarantee of the closed joint
stock nature of government.
In addition, it is not ruled out that the demonstration of force is
the message of Artsakh to all the possible Yerevan-based subjects who
have aspirations to power in Artsakh, official Yerevan as well. It
is a message that in the process of forming government in Artsakh,
in case of any scenario, it will be necessary to take into account
everyone who has been involved in the prevention of the march.
In addition, it should be noted that the problem is not the
justification of concerns of the government of Artsakh, especially with
regard to a specific subject, but the general moods and disposition
ahead of an important stage of forming government.
http://www.lragir.am/index/eng/0/comments/view/33587#sthash.giB4qS4j.dpuf
Hakob Badalyan, Political Commentator
Comments - 04 February 2015, 20:15
The Artsakh Deputy Prime Minister Arthur Aghabekyan commented on
the January 31 incident and the preceding developments. There are
interesting nuances between the lines of his comments which help
figure out the picture and motives of the NKR government's clampdown
on the car march of the Founding Parliament.
After the incident the society is trying to understand the reason of
such cruel and tough, disproportionate and obviously demonstrative
use of force of the government of Artsakh.
What Arthur Aghabekyan conveys between the lines helps shed a light
on the possible reason or reasons.
Aghabekyan has announced that the Artsakh president, chief of police,
deputy prime minister, prosecutor general, head of the National
Security Service, the minister and deputy minister of defense who is
also the head of the Union of Veterans have done everything they could
to have the march cancelled, explaining it by a sensitive situation
for Artakh, challenges at the border etc.
In fact, the deputy prime minister of Artsakh points to the involvement
of the entire elite. It is difficult to imagine that there was a need
to involve the entire elite in the so-called negotiations to prevent
the car march. This indicates that the problem was given a broader
importance, more exactly, in the context of the government of Artsakh.
Evidence to this is the December meeting of President Bako Sahakyan
and all the listed officials with Zhirair Sefilyan and two others to
dissuade them from organizing the march to Artsakh.
Arthur Aghabekyan says the atmosphere seemed good, and they seemed
to have reached an agreement but they were surprised when the new
day of the march was announced after January. Aghabekyan says they
again set to prevent the march.
During January there were other developments. The most important
of them was the announcement of several members of the ARF Artsakh
Committee to leave the party and share the ideas and programs of the
Founding Parliament. When this fact is juxtaposed with the upcoming
parliamentary election in Artsakh, which is a key event ahead of the
end of Bako Sahakyan's presidency, the reason of involvement of the
entire elite of the government of Artsakh in the prevention of the
march becomes clear.
Most probably, the march and the statement of the ARF Artsakh
committee have caused concerns in the elite in terms of control
over the process of forming government, which led to a decision to
use force after a futile "negotiation" process. The key issue was
the issue of government, not stability in Artsakh because the march
itself did not and could not threaten this stability.
The possible participation in forming government was seen as a threat,
especially in the context of political statements heard in Artsakh
prior to the march.
In fact, not the march was prevented but, as the clampdown decision
makers think, influence on the process of forming government was
prevented. The problem is not how substantial their concerns or fears
were. The problem is that there was fear, and this fear led to the
decision on clampdown because force is the first and last haven of
the ruling system in Armenia and Artsakh to keep power, and all the
rest is intermediate.
The problem is more urgent to the elite in Artsakh because Bako
Sahakyan is a leaving president. Perhaps this is the reason why the
prevention of the car march became a primary issue for Artsakh, in
other words, all the participants of the government viewed it through
the prism of their personal security and risks to their offices,
viewing force as the most reliable guarantee by far.
"Zhiro, I can't let that action happen," Arthur Aghabekyan quotes
Baku Sahakyan's words of his December meeting.
Bako Sahakyan is a leaving president, and he has commitments to the
ruling elite which he must implement in full. He is leaving while
the others must stay, therefore their requirements to Sahakyan are
intensifying, and at their core is the guarantee of the closed joint
stock nature of government.
In addition, it is not ruled out that the demonstration of force is
the message of Artsakh to all the possible Yerevan-based subjects who
have aspirations to power in Artsakh, official Yerevan as well. It
is a message that in the process of forming government in Artsakh,
in case of any scenario, it will be necessary to take into account
everyone who has been involved in the prevention of the march.
In addition, it should be noted that the problem is not the
justification of concerns of the government of Artsakh, especially with
regard to a specific subject, but the general moods and disposition
ahead of an important stage of forming government.
http://www.lragir.am/index/eng/0/comments/view/33587#sthash.giB4qS4j.dpuf