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GYUMRI MASSACRE AND ARMENIA'S INDISPENSABLE ALLIANCE
New Eastern Europe
Feb 6 2015
After the bloody murder of the Avetisyan family committed by a Russian
soldier in Gyumri and subsequent mass protests, questions about the
sense of the indispensable Armenian alliance with the North Bear have
returned with doubled intensity.
Photo by Shutterstock
In the early morning of January 12th, six members of the Avetisyan
family were found dead in the second largest Armenian city of Gyumri.
Wounded 6-month-old infant Seryozha was taken to the hospital in the
capital Yerevan where, he/she died on January 19th. The main suspect
of the crime is an 18 year-old soldier stationed at the Russian 102nd
military base in Gyumri, Valery Permyakov. He was captured the same
day the crime happened by the Russian military service in Bayandur,
a village close to the Turkish border. Permyakov confessed to having
committed the murder, but the motives of his killing spree are still
unknown.
Offended dignity
Shortly after the Gyumri murder, Armenia faced the biggest rallies
since 2013 protests after rigged presidential elections. Although
Sarkisyan's government has been confronting mass protests almost every
year, January's demonstrations seemed to be unusual because of the
recipient of the anger. For an outbreak of the anti-government and
anti-Russian mass protests Armenian authorities should blame mainly
themselves. The usually warm feelings of Gyumri inhabitants towards
the Russian base presence have been impaired in effect for a lack
of a sincere reaction in Yerevan and Moscow, and among the military
base leadership. The first key factor which irritated citizens has
been lying in circumstances of crime. Armenians were shocked after it
was disclosed that Permyakov had left the base in the middle of the
night fully-armed. No reaction of Armenian law enforcement or Russian
soldiers had been noticed. After the capture, Armenian authorities
released a statement which has been viewed with suspicion. It says
that the suspect entered the house of the Avetisyan family just to
ask for a glass of water, and, after being refused, he shot everyone.
Russia was briefly informed that Permyakov will be judged in front of
a military jury, which increased the anger of the Armenians who were
expecting that for a civil crime he shall be judged by the Armenian
justice service. Along with the silence of the state-controlled first
TV channel shortly after tragedy, impatience of the inhabitants of
Gyumri led to mass anti-Russian rallies in which dozens of citizens
and at least two policemen were wounded. The nature of the protests
revealed the lack of respect to Armenian sovereignty repeatedly
expressed by the Russian protectors. Activity of the Armenian
government seemed to be just a strained reaction for the events from
January 15th, when the funeral of the Avetisyans turned into a regular
anti-Russian rally with attempts to burn the Russian flag. Additional
tensions appeared in Yerevan and Gyumri after the death of the youngest
victim, 6-month-old Seryozha, in Yerevan hospital on January19th.
Ambiguous presence
The presence of the Russian military base in Gyumri has had an
ambiguous character from the beginning. In the city, which is still
suffering from the effects of a terrible earthquake in 1988, the 102nd
base is one of the biggest employers, which helps give at least the
impression of development. On the other hand, this murder was not
the first act of violence committed by Russian soldiers. In 1999 two
drunk officers opened fire killing two and wounding twelve people. In
2013 two boys died from the explosion of devises left outside the base.
Military and economic ties with Moscow since the coup d'état in 1998
have continued to be controversial in Armenian politics and society,
but has yet remained an indisputable fact of life and the sole choice
faced by Armenians, regardless of one's political affiliation and
views. Mass assemblies after the crime reveal a larger degree of
complexity of the indispensable alliance with Russia. As Richard
Giragosian, the founding director of the Regional Studies Centre,
an independent think tank in Yerevan, mentioned this in his special
contribution for Al-Jazeera: "For small, landlocked Armenia, a
strategic alliance with Russia is generally accepted as essential
in the face of such inherent insecurity. And beyond an imperative
of security, Armenia also depends on Russia as a crucial source of
remittances, or money sent home by large numbers of Armenians living
and working in Russia."
Girogasian underlined the surprising debate over the strategic
alliance and its probable outcomes in the future not only for bilateral
relations, but also for general security in the Caucasus region. In
his point of view the alliance is under threat and "Armenia can't
count on Russia any more". The possibility of a more serious outcome
caused by social dissatisfaction was noticed also in Moscow.
Foreign Affairs Minister Sergei Lavrov, a few days after the crime
and protests, along with condolences to relatives of those killed
in the tragedy, emphasized that usage of the tragedy to achieve
geopolitical goals is "disgusting" and "unacceptable". Even though the
current situation is the first real challenge for mutual relations,
the possibility that events might disturb them and in consequence
change the geopolitical course of Sarkisyan's government is doubtful.
Speaking from the perspective of the geopolitical position of Armenia,
and being in a "permanent state of exception" since 1994, Armenia
does not have any choice other than close cooperation with Russia.
Three the reasons for the protests
Even though the protests laid bare the weaknesses of the strategic
political, economic, and military alliance between Armenia and
Russia, at least three important elements seem to be simultaneously
the reasons for the protests and also noticeable obstacles to change
for Armenian's political course.
The first element is connected with the current intensification of
diplomatic and economic activity between Moscow and Baku in 2014. In
November and December both sides announced that in 2015 a new gas
pipeline would be opened that would significantly increase gas supplies
exported from Caspian republic and tie both countries closer.
In Yerevan this energetic partnership of the biggest enemy and the
closest friend caused understandable anxiety. Armenia, landlocked from
both the east (Turkey) and west (Azerbaijan), has been almost fully
dependent for its energy security on resources from Russia and Iran.
Transit from Russia is frequently in danger because of the unstable
relations between Tbilisi and Moscow, which worsened after the November
Russian-driven alliance treaty with separatist Abkhazia.
Cooperation with Azerbaijan in these circumstances seems to be
the pragmatic choice of the Kremlin to maintain a presence in
the Caucasus. The second element which threatened authoritarian
authorities in Yerevan lies in military contracts between Aliev and
Putin. In previous months Armenian politicians had been repeatedly
accusing Moscow of covert weaponry deliveries for the Azerbaijani
army. From the perspective of Yerevan this policy is clear evidence
of betrayal of the alliance. However the armour supplies deliveries
seem to be a long-lasting strategy of Moscow whose purpose is
the creation of an artificial balance of power between the two
conflicting republics. "Unstable stability" and a lack of progress
in Azerbaijani-Armenian conflict resolution remains the best scenario
for the Kremlin and an ideal explanation for Russian presence in the
South Caucasus. Russia is playing its bargaining card on two fronts
and nothing indicates that significant changes in alliances may happen
in the near future.
The second factor lies in dramatic economic situation of Armenia.
Sarkisyan's decision last year to withdraw from advanced negotiations
with the European Union was met with a great deal of misunderstanding.
Nonetheless after a few incidents Armenian citizens mainly agreed
on the government's chosen course and started to expect closer
cooperation with Russian help for the failing economy. Due to Western
embargos connected with the Ukrainian conflict, Russia is unable to
deliver observable support for Armenia. This fact, broadly discussed
in Yerevan, aroused considerable frustration and civil society
opposition. After great expectations it was not immediately clear
whether any results were visible. Nevertheless, Sarkisyan's Republic
Party has its hands tied. Familiar with the Georgian example, Armenian
authorities know that in case of an extreme worsening of the situation
they cannot count on Western support in the context of the economy and
possible outbreak of conflict. As a result, despite its weaknesses,
the strategic alliance with Russia seems to be indispensable for both
parties. This dependence is extremely visible especially in the last
element of the complex jigsaw puzzle.
The most fragile and important factor which is increasing the role of
Armenia as Russia's protégé and vassal is obviously the "frozen"
conflict over the Nagorno-Karabakh republic. Armenian politics is
dominated by the discourse in which Armenia exists in a "permanent
state of exception". The August 2014 border clashes have increased,
resulting in the deaths of dozens of soldiers on both sides. The
conflict, which is traditionally called "Post-Soviet" and "frozen"
cannot be defined with the usage of these categories. Along with
tensions over Armenian Genocide recognition, blockade from Turkey
and economic and military advantage of Azerbaijan, Armenia is
constantly under the pressure of external threat (both subjectively
in the perspective of Yerevan and objectively in the perspective of
neutral observers). This state of affairs is narrowing the choices
of the Armenian ruling party. Russia seems to be the only guarantee
for artificial and wobbly stability, even though this steadiness is
far from the generally-approved definition of regional stability. On
January 29th President Aliev tweeted that "Armenia is not even a
colony, it is not even worthy of being servant". This statement is
another instance of aggressive narration of Azerbaijani authorities
which have appeared in previous months. Knowing the advantages of
the Caspian republic in comparison to Armenia, Yerevan has no other
choice but the continuation of military dependency on Moscow. The
unpredictability of the Kremlin's reaction is obvious after the 2008
war in Georgia and the conflict in Eastern Ukraine seem to be the
only obstacle, which inhibits the authoritarian regime of Aliev to
hold military operations for the purpose of retaking the occupied
territories and Nagorno-Karabakh.
In light of all of these factors, any radical changes in Armenian
politics seem to be not possible in the near future. However, general
public opinion about strategic association with Russia after the
murder in Gyumri has been tested, and geopolitics and pragmatism
are blocking any opportunity for a rearrangement of alliances of the
smallest South Caucasian republic. The most conceivable scenario for
Yerevan is increasing on dependency on Russia with repeated violations
of Armenian sovereignty. Armenia has no other choice and will most
probably continue to be the subject of Moscow "vassalisation".
BartÅ~Bomiej Krzysztan is a PhD candidate at the University of
WrocÅ~Baw currently based in Tbilisi. His research interests include
cultural memory and identity in the Post-Soviet space and the politics
in the South Caucasus.
http://www.neweasterneurope.eu/articles-and-commentary/1476-gyumri-massacre-and-armenia-s-indispensable-alliance
From: Emil Lazarian | Ararat NewsPress
New Eastern Europe
Feb 6 2015
After the bloody murder of the Avetisyan family committed by a Russian
soldier in Gyumri and subsequent mass protests, questions about the
sense of the indispensable Armenian alliance with the North Bear have
returned with doubled intensity.
Photo by Shutterstock
In the early morning of January 12th, six members of the Avetisyan
family were found dead in the second largest Armenian city of Gyumri.
Wounded 6-month-old infant Seryozha was taken to the hospital in the
capital Yerevan where, he/she died on January 19th. The main suspect
of the crime is an 18 year-old soldier stationed at the Russian 102nd
military base in Gyumri, Valery Permyakov. He was captured the same
day the crime happened by the Russian military service in Bayandur,
a village close to the Turkish border. Permyakov confessed to having
committed the murder, but the motives of his killing spree are still
unknown.
Offended dignity
Shortly after the Gyumri murder, Armenia faced the biggest rallies
since 2013 protests after rigged presidential elections. Although
Sarkisyan's government has been confronting mass protests almost every
year, January's demonstrations seemed to be unusual because of the
recipient of the anger. For an outbreak of the anti-government and
anti-Russian mass protests Armenian authorities should blame mainly
themselves. The usually warm feelings of Gyumri inhabitants towards
the Russian base presence have been impaired in effect for a lack
of a sincere reaction in Yerevan and Moscow, and among the military
base leadership. The first key factor which irritated citizens has
been lying in circumstances of crime. Armenians were shocked after it
was disclosed that Permyakov had left the base in the middle of the
night fully-armed. No reaction of Armenian law enforcement or Russian
soldiers had been noticed. After the capture, Armenian authorities
released a statement which has been viewed with suspicion. It says
that the suspect entered the house of the Avetisyan family just to
ask for a glass of water, and, after being refused, he shot everyone.
Russia was briefly informed that Permyakov will be judged in front of
a military jury, which increased the anger of the Armenians who were
expecting that for a civil crime he shall be judged by the Armenian
justice service. Along with the silence of the state-controlled first
TV channel shortly after tragedy, impatience of the inhabitants of
Gyumri led to mass anti-Russian rallies in which dozens of citizens
and at least two policemen were wounded. The nature of the protests
revealed the lack of respect to Armenian sovereignty repeatedly
expressed by the Russian protectors. Activity of the Armenian
government seemed to be just a strained reaction for the events from
January 15th, when the funeral of the Avetisyans turned into a regular
anti-Russian rally with attempts to burn the Russian flag. Additional
tensions appeared in Yerevan and Gyumri after the death of the youngest
victim, 6-month-old Seryozha, in Yerevan hospital on January19th.
Ambiguous presence
The presence of the Russian military base in Gyumri has had an
ambiguous character from the beginning. In the city, which is still
suffering from the effects of a terrible earthquake in 1988, the 102nd
base is one of the biggest employers, which helps give at least the
impression of development. On the other hand, this murder was not
the first act of violence committed by Russian soldiers. In 1999 two
drunk officers opened fire killing two and wounding twelve people. In
2013 two boys died from the explosion of devises left outside the base.
Military and economic ties with Moscow since the coup d'état in 1998
have continued to be controversial in Armenian politics and society,
but has yet remained an indisputable fact of life and the sole choice
faced by Armenians, regardless of one's political affiliation and
views. Mass assemblies after the crime reveal a larger degree of
complexity of the indispensable alliance with Russia. As Richard
Giragosian, the founding director of the Regional Studies Centre,
an independent think tank in Yerevan, mentioned this in his special
contribution for Al-Jazeera: "For small, landlocked Armenia, a
strategic alliance with Russia is generally accepted as essential
in the face of such inherent insecurity. And beyond an imperative
of security, Armenia also depends on Russia as a crucial source of
remittances, or money sent home by large numbers of Armenians living
and working in Russia."
Girogasian underlined the surprising debate over the strategic
alliance and its probable outcomes in the future not only for bilateral
relations, but also for general security in the Caucasus region. In
his point of view the alliance is under threat and "Armenia can't
count on Russia any more". The possibility of a more serious outcome
caused by social dissatisfaction was noticed also in Moscow.
Foreign Affairs Minister Sergei Lavrov, a few days after the crime
and protests, along with condolences to relatives of those killed
in the tragedy, emphasized that usage of the tragedy to achieve
geopolitical goals is "disgusting" and "unacceptable". Even though the
current situation is the first real challenge for mutual relations,
the possibility that events might disturb them and in consequence
change the geopolitical course of Sarkisyan's government is doubtful.
Speaking from the perspective of the geopolitical position of Armenia,
and being in a "permanent state of exception" since 1994, Armenia
does not have any choice other than close cooperation with Russia.
Three the reasons for the protests
Even though the protests laid bare the weaknesses of the strategic
political, economic, and military alliance between Armenia and
Russia, at least three important elements seem to be simultaneously
the reasons for the protests and also noticeable obstacles to change
for Armenian's political course.
The first element is connected with the current intensification of
diplomatic and economic activity between Moscow and Baku in 2014. In
November and December both sides announced that in 2015 a new gas
pipeline would be opened that would significantly increase gas supplies
exported from Caspian republic and tie both countries closer.
In Yerevan this energetic partnership of the biggest enemy and the
closest friend caused understandable anxiety. Armenia, landlocked from
both the east (Turkey) and west (Azerbaijan), has been almost fully
dependent for its energy security on resources from Russia and Iran.
Transit from Russia is frequently in danger because of the unstable
relations between Tbilisi and Moscow, which worsened after the November
Russian-driven alliance treaty with separatist Abkhazia.
Cooperation with Azerbaijan in these circumstances seems to be
the pragmatic choice of the Kremlin to maintain a presence in
the Caucasus. The second element which threatened authoritarian
authorities in Yerevan lies in military contracts between Aliev and
Putin. In previous months Armenian politicians had been repeatedly
accusing Moscow of covert weaponry deliveries for the Azerbaijani
army. From the perspective of Yerevan this policy is clear evidence
of betrayal of the alliance. However the armour supplies deliveries
seem to be a long-lasting strategy of Moscow whose purpose is
the creation of an artificial balance of power between the two
conflicting republics. "Unstable stability" and a lack of progress
in Azerbaijani-Armenian conflict resolution remains the best scenario
for the Kremlin and an ideal explanation for Russian presence in the
South Caucasus. Russia is playing its bargaining card on two fronts
and nothing indicates that significant changes in alliances may happen
in the near future.
The second factor lies in dramatic economic situation of Armenia.
Sarkisyan's decision last year to withdraw from advanced negotiations
with the European Union was met with a great deal of misunderstanding.
Nonetheless after a few incidents Armenian citizens mainly agreed
on the government's chosen course and started to expect closer
cooperation with Russian help for the failing economy. Due to Western
embargos connected with the Ukrainian conflict, Russia is unable to
deliver observable support for Armenia. This fact, broadly discussed
in Yerevan, aroused considerable frustration and civil society
opposition. After great expectations it was not immediately clear
whether any results were visible. Nevertheless, Sarkisyan's Republic
Party has its hands tied. Familiar with the Georgian example, Armenian
authorities know that in case of an extreme worsening of the situation
they cannot count on Western support in the context of the economy and
possible outbreak of conflict. As a result, despite its weaknesses,
the strategic alliance with Russia seems to be indispensable for both
parties. This dependence is extremely visible especially in the last
element of the complex jigsaw puzzle.
The most fragile and important factor which is increasing the role of
Armenia as Russia's protégé and vassal is obviously the "frozen"
conflict over the Nagorno-Karabakh republic. Armenian politics is
dominated by the discourse in which Armenia exists in a "permanent
state of exception". The August 2014 border clashes have increased,
resulting in the deaths of dozens of soldiers on both sides. The
conflict, which is traditionally called "Post-Soviet" and "frozen"
cannot be defined with the usage of these categories. Along with
tensions over Armenian Genocide recognition, blockade from Turkey
and economic and military advantage of Azerbaijan, Armenia is
constantly under the pressure of external threat (both subjectively
in the perspective of Yerevan and objectively in the perspective of
neutral observers). This state of affairs is narrowing the choices
of the Armenian ruling party. Russia seems to be the only guarantee
for artificial and wobbly stability, even though this steadiness is
far from the generally-approved definition of regional stability. On
January 29th President Aliev tweeted that "Armenia is not even a
colony, it is not even worthy of being servant". This statement is
another instance of aggressive narration of Azerbaijani authorities
which have appeared in previous months. Knowing the advantages of
the Caspian republic in comparison to Armenia, Yerevan has no other
choice but the continuation of military dependency on Moscow. The
unpredictability of the Kremlin's reaction is obvious after the 2008
war in Georgia and the conflict in Eastern Ukraine seem to be the
only obstacle, which inhibits the authoritarian regime of Aliev to
hold military operations for the purpose of retaking the occupied
territories and Nagorno-Karabakh.
In light of all of these factors, any radical changes in Armenian
politics seem to be not possible in the near future. However, general
public opinion about strategic association with Russia after the
murder in Gyumri has been tested, and geopolitics and pragmatism
are blocking any opportunity for a rearrangement of alliances of the
smallest South Caucasian republic. The most conceivable scenario for
Yerevan is increasing on dependency on Russia with repeated violations
of Armenian sovereignty. Armenia has no other choice and will most
probably continue to be the subject of Moscow "vassalisation".
BartÅ~Bomiej Krzysztan is a PhD candidate at the University of
WrocÅ~Baw currently based in Tbilisi. His research interests include
cultural memory and identity in the Post-Soviet space and the politics
in the South Caucasus.
http://www.neweasterneurope.eu/articles-and-commentary/1476-gyumri-massacre-and-armenia-s-indispensable-alliance
From: Emil Lazarian | Ararat NewsPress