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The Reproduction Of Authoritarian Politics In The AKP Era

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  • The Reproduction Of Authoritarian Politics In The AKP Era

    THE REPRODUCTION OF AUTHORITARIAN POLITICS IN THE AKP ERA

    Open Democracy
    Feb 6 2015

    Umit Kurt and Oguz Dilek 6 February 2015

    Turkey has passed the blurred threshold that demarcates democratic
    politics from an authoritarian system. The Schmittian language that the
    AKP leadership has assumed moves Turkey beyond the militant-Baathist
    mode of authoritarian rule.

    Authoritarianism is an illusionist practise insofaras it presents an
    incomplete picture of reality while leaving the audience with the
    perception that they are seeing all of it. It becomes possible to
    conceal the tricky part of the show from the audience who is fully
    convinced that the whole show is laid bare before their eyes. As a
    result, they no longer push the boundaries.

    Authoritarianism emerges out of that ambiguous domain which is located
    firmly in between democratic pluralism and totalitarian monism.

    Differing from totalitarian systems by a handsome margin, the distance
    from democratic forms of politics, as opposed to conventional belief,
    is rather more intricate.

    An authoritarian political frame may perfectly satisfy the minimum and
    common denominators of democracy. Totalitarian regimes, in comparison,
    easily wither away for there is no legal framework to make a case
    for the idea of representation.

    Political sovereignty in most of the exemplars of authoritarian models
    rests upon the backing of (some of) the citizens. 'Statist' ideologies
    are almost completely absent from the scene, however. Authoritarian
    orders are seldom to be found embroiled within a cycle of violence. It
    is mostly the case that authoritarian leaders are 'benevolent tutors'
    whose polity combines elements of both persuasion and coercion.

    All the democratic institutions, on the other hand, such as political
    parties, parliament or the judicial body convey a mere nominal value.

    These, and other similar institutions, actually provide little clue
    about the way political power is obtained or exercised within this
    type of politics.

    This is so because the principal mechanisms for distributing political
    power are structured into informal social processes. The latent power
    structures are what determine social discourse within all the known
    breeds of authoritarian settings. Thanks to this esoteric character
    of the system, authoritarian ways of ruling can successfully hide
    themselves in plain sight, precisely inasmuch as that the idea of
    democracy remains a potentiality, but not an actuality.

    Caglay Keyder, in his monumental piece, State and Classes in Turkey,
    asks a deadly question: 'Why didn't a liberal ideology arise in
    Turkey?' To this his response is equally deadly: a social class
    (a.k.a. a bourgeoisie) that has fundamental interests in establishing
    solid boundaries between power and those who hold that power never
    existed in Turkey.

    The AKP's loud advocacy for civic conservatism, Ottoman cosmopolitanism
    and/or Islamic economic puritanism seemed to raise the flag of
    liberties--at least for a brief period of time. Now many concur that
    such a marriage between the AKP and a democratic ideal that also
    entails liberal principles has come to an end.

    Especially among left-liberal intellectuals, the AKP invoked the
    sense that the Party would radically transform the fundamentals of the
    ancién regime without disowning Turkey's age-old political agenda:
    catching up with the 'west.'

    It was therefore promoted by those intellectuals as a progressive
    political current that, first, would discontinue with their Islamically
    oriented predecessors and, second, was intent on skirmishing with 'the
    establishment' for the sake of expanding the domain of liberties. All
    the ideological instruments and resources in the liberal arsenal were
    weaponized at the birth of the party to prove that the AKP was the
    spearhead of new democratic advances - but to no avail.

    The AKP's posture of confomrity and appeasement towards the
    nationalist/state-centred bloc has been quick to reveal itself,
    again and again, in the following instances--the Å~^emdinli incident,
    headscarf and constitutional debates, and the e-coup of 27 April
    2007. In each and every one of these incidents, their ears were attuned
    to any possibility of reconciling with what they were supposed to
    stamp out in the first place: a tutelary regime.

    One of the vanguards of the party recently swore off any connection
    between the AKP and the Ergenekon Trials by referring to the latter
    as an 'ambush' and 'plot.' This is only one example from an exhaustive
    list of remarks all of which can be taken as evidence of the following
    point. That it has never been an absolute must for the AKP to put an
    end to what was oppressing them previously: that is, the classical
    foundations of the republic based around a strict sense of secularism,
    an exclusionary state and an official ideology of nationalism.

    The AKP, until 2013, oppressed the defenders of this order, thus
    becoming the oppressor of their oppressors. And, when it became
    possible and convenient, joined in the ranks of those guardians--i.e.

    dominant classes with powerful economic/political stakes to act in
    defence of 'old' Turkey.

    A liberal-leftist intelligentsia is said to be disillusioned with
    the recent turn of events in Turkish politics, for it increasingly
    resembles present-day Russia under Putin's leadership. Both of these
    leaders frame their nation's self in contrast to Europe, devise
    ways to legitimize repressive measures and, among many other things,
    demonstrate their one-man rule as the sole way for securing national
    sovereignty.

    Even though there is little recourse to the crudest violence of
    authoritarian systems in Turkey, they do unsparingly employ the
    language required for legitimizing violence. One side of this rhetoric
    breeds a large inventory of conspiracy theories. Any explanation that
    sounds plausible is readily accepted, without actually testing its
    accuracy, to such an extent that conspiracy theories completely take
    over critical thinking in public debates.

    Another side of this rhetoric is the typically authoritarian enemy
    image: a continual fabrication of demonic others--both inside and
    outside the country. It is a constant in any authoritarian order to
    construct exclusive borderlines to first decide on who 'we' are and
    then deny the political opposition a legitimate place in this imagined
    domain of the national self, which never fully includes the existing
    cultural/social diversities. Projected 'others' and accompanying
    conspiracies are essential to authoritarian politics.

    This orientation (re-)entered on the Turkish political stage suddenly
    during the Gezi Park protests. It continued with the moral castigation
    of extra-marital lifestyles and 'boys-girls mixed houses.' And,
    it was updated by reframing Gulenists as Trojan horses serving a
    massive global conspiracy by bringing together all sorts of diverse
    forces such as the Papacy, the CIA, Jewish capital, and even the
    Templars/Illuminati.

    Another concept that marks the benchmark of authoritarian politics is
    what Foucault called 'discipline'. Citizens are subject to perpetual
    monitoring by the state's intelligence services.

    Evolutionary biology suggests that individuals who perceive themselves
    to be targets of a 'big brother', upon detecting it, will try to erase
    all the differences that separate them from socially/politically
    acceptable norms. Taking self-censure as a survival strategy, they
    cast aside all faculties for critical thinking and social agency and
    awareness. In the AKP era, the state's profiling and keeping track
    of individuals on the basiss of whether they conform to the AKP's
    rule seems now to have made a glorious return.

    A third feature is the way ruling parties/governments act out some
    sort of superintendent role to enable wealth transfer to those who
    are favoured. This suggests that the tie, which bonds the government
    with its domestic constituency, is one of a clientelist relationship.

    Into this network providing selective access to economic means and/or
    political clout, those who assume an opposing posture have limited
    permission to enter. When the allocation of state contracts is under
    the purview of non-market forces, state elites are able to forge an
    extensive alignment matrix. Economic players who would otherwise be
    rivals come to meet under the common umbrella of, and become attached
    to, the regime as clients.

    Elites can thereby achieve two ends at one time: limiting the
    democratic opposition while enlarging that of your allies. In Turkey's
    case, the legal basis of state contracts has seen more than 160 changes
    within the last decade. This says that, policy-makers don't manage
    resource distribution according to a preceding law, but according
    to that of a self-serving mentality mirroring the ever-shifting
    composition of political alignment at any given time.

    Finally, authoritarian regimes in different magnitudes create a
    leadership cult. By this means it becomes possible to squeeze the
    notion of voter support--based on 'conditionality' and 'changeability',
    away from the essence of democratic legitimacy. The profile of a
    citizen who chooses among various political agendas according to
    his/her best interest disappears, to be replaced by a new one who is
    fiercely loyal to a leadership fetish.

    This unquestioned culture of submission breeds the delusion of a
    leader that possesses some sort of superhuman qualities; that he is
    eschatologically chosen; or that he is all that stands in between
    his people and those demonic forces both inside and outside the nation.

    This conserves the power base of the leader amidst even periodical
    economic or political disruptions. The image of the 'grand master',
    specifically constructed for Erdogan, must be one of the most
    convincing exemples to hand.

    The present state of affairs within the Turkish political arena is
    a conundrum that pushes the boundaries of what is acceptable within
    a healthy operating democratic order.

    It seems that the country has already passed that threshold that
    demarcates democratic politics from an authoritarian system. The
    Schmittian language that the AKP leadership has assumed, is hurling
    Turkey from a militant-Baathist mode of authoritarian rule to a wholly
    different one--one that takes on a rather civilian-Baathist character.

    This has already changed everything in Turkey.

    ---- About the authors

    Umit Kurt is a Ph.D. candidate in the department of history at Clark
    University and a lecturer at Sabanci University. His research focuses
    on Aintab Armenians and the confiscation and appropriation of Armenian
    properties during 1915-1921.

    Oguz Dilek has a Ph.D. from Keele University and is now an Associate
    Professor of International Relations at Zirve University.

    https://www.opendemocracy.net/arab-awakening/umit-kurt-oguz-dilek/reproduction-of-authoritarian-politics-in-akp-era



    From: Emil Lazarian | Ararat NewsPress
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