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Nagorno-karabakh: Is a solution visible?
07/02/2015 14:56:00Oratert News Portal
Eduard Nalbandyan
It's the history of a people who exercised their legitimate right to
self-determination. A people who freely expressed their determination
and who, for almost a century, have faced the hostility of those who
have pretended to be their lords. These are the people of
NagornoKarabakh.
It's the history of a people who exercised their legitimate right to
self-determination. A people who freely expressed their determination
and who, for almost a century, have faced the hostility of those who
have pretended to be their lords. These are the people of
NagornoKarabakh.
History
Karabakh (which was called #Artsakh for several centuries) was an
integral part of the Armenian kingdoms, as proven by the works of
authors from antiquity (Strabo, Pliny the Elder, Claudius Ptolemy,
Plutarch, Dion Cassius), as well as the many cultural and historical
testimonials of Armenian presence (monuments, churches, cemeteries,
etc.).
In 1918, after the collapse of the Russian Empire, Armenia, Georgia
and Azerbaijan declared their independence. Populated mostly by
Armenians, about 95%, Nagorno-Karabakh had de facto sovereignty from
1918 to 1920 (1). From that time, Azerbaijan started to claim this
territory and tried to annex it by force. From May 1918 to April 1920,
Azerbaijan carried out several massacres against the Armenian
population. In March 1920 alone, about 20,000 Armenians were killed
and another 20,000 were deported from the then Karabakh capital of
Shushi. The illegality of the Azerbaijani actions was underscored by
the League of Nations which also turned down Azerbaijan's appeal for
the membership on the grounds that it was impossible to define its
borders (2).
With the Sovietization of the Caucasian republics, Azerbaijani leaders
received a green light to annex Artsakh.
On July 5, 1921 the Caucasian Bureau of the Russian Communist Party,
under pressure from Joseph Stalin, decided to give Karabakh to
Azerbaijan. It is noteworthy that this bureau had no authority to make
decisions on territorial disputes between the third parties,
especially because at the time the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
had not been created yet and Armenia and Azerbaijan were de jure
independent republics.
After the end of its occupational program, Baku went even further.
While the Caucasian Bureau of the Communist Party planned to create an
autonomous region across all of Nagorno-Karabakh, only part of that
territory was included in the Nagorno-Karabakh Autonomous Oblast
(NKAO). As a consequence, it became an enclave and was deprived of a
common border with Armenia.
During the Soviet era the Azerbaijan authorities tried to impede the
social-economic development of the region, by carrying out a veritable
ethnic cleansing and destroying or appropriating Armenian monuments
and cultural heritage. The former President of Azerbaijan, Heydar
Aliyev, confessed in one of his interviews (3) that he did everything
possible to change the demographics of Nagorno-Karabakh, in favor of
Azerbaijanis. In fact, the Armenians, who accounted for 94.4 percent
of the population in 1921, were no more than 76.9% in 1989.
The people of Artsakh never accepted Azerbaijani authorities' policy
of depriving them of their right to choose their own destiny. Several
times, they brought their case before the Soviet
central authorities. Several applications and petitions were sent
asking Moscow to reconsider the decision of 1921 and reunite them with
Armenia.
The policy of Perestroika launched by Mikhail Gorbachev in 1985
provided an opportunity to reopen the issue. The popular movement for
reuniting Nagorno-Karabakh with Armenia (conducted by the "Karabakh"
and "Krunk" committees) expanded its scope in 1988, struggling for the
end of Azerbaijani oversight and for the right of self-determination.
This was one of the engines of the process of liberalization,
democratization, the defense of human rights and fundamental freedoms.
On February 20, 1988 the Karabakh Council of People's Representatives,
the local parliament, adopted a resolution asking the Soviet
authorities to reunite the autonomous region of Nagorno-Karabakh with
Armenia.
The reaction of Soviet Azerbaijan was swift. A new wave of ethnic
cleansing against Armenians was launched both in Artsakh and in
Armenian-populated parts of Azerbaijan. In February 1988, Sumgait saw
a massacre claiming dozens of victims. The violence quickly spread to
Baku, Kirovabad and other cities and villages. Hundreds of Armenians
were killed during these pogroms, with nearly 400,000 forced to flee,
taking refuge in Armenia, Russia and other Soviet Republics.
Legal aspects
On April 3, 1990 a new law was adopted by the USSR, which authorized
autonomous entities and compact ethnic groups within a Soviet Republic
to freely and independently decide their own legal status in case the
Republic secedes from the USSR. Following Soviet Azerbaijan's
declaration of independence on August 30, 1991, Nagorno-Karabakh
initiated the same legal procedure by adopting its own declaration of
independence. In the referendum of December 10, 1991, organized in the
presence of international observers, the people of Nagorno-Karabakh
voted for independence with an overwhelming majority (over 99% of
votes).
This referendum, which was held at a time when Nagorno-Karabakh was
part of the USSR, was fully in line with Soviet law. Logically, the
day after the collapse of the Soviet Union two states were created on
the territory of the former Azerbaijani Soviet Socialist Republic:
Nagorno-Karabakh Republic and the Republic of Azerbaijan.
Over the years, the European Parliament had adopted numerous
resolutions in support of Nagorno-Karabakh's strife for
selfdetermination. In its resolution of June 21, 1999 on
Nagorno-Karabakh, the European Parliament stated that "the autonomous
region of Nagorno-Karabakh declared its independence following similar
declarations by former Soviet Socialist Republics after the collapse
of the USSR in September 1991."
Peoples' right to self-determination is a fundamental right enshrined
in the Charter of the United Nations and reaffirmed by several other
core international documents.
Not having any legal argument against the independence of
Nagorno-Karabakh, Baku tried to represent the problem as a territorial
dispute between Armenia and Azerbaijan.
The conflict and the peace process
In Nagorno-Karabakh and the surrounding areas populated by Armenians,
the ethnic cleansing by Azerbaijani authorities quickly turned into
large-scale military actions resulting in tens of thousands losses and
causing considerable destruction. Azerbaijan used mercenaries in this
war, mainly Afghans and Chechens, closely linked to the notorious
terrorist organizations.
Such serious violations of international law did not avoid from the
attention of the international community. In 1988-1991 the U.S.
Congress on several occasions condemned the aggression of Azerbaijan
against Armenian civilians. Moreover, in 1992 it approved Section 907
of the Freedom Support Act, restricting the U.S. aid to Azerbaijan
because of Azerbaijan's aggressive policy and the blockade against
Armenia and Nagorno-Karabakh.
The Security Council of the United Nations adopted four resolutions in
1993 urging immediate cessation of hostilities, opening of
communications and the resumption of peace talks with all parties
concerned, including Nagorno-Karabakh. In response, Azerbaijan just
intensified its military offensives. But on the ground the balance of
strength turned to its disadvantage, and it soon had no other option
but to request a cease-fire from Nagorno-Karabakh.
In May 1994, the cease-fire agreement between Nagorno-Karabakh and
Azerbaijan was signed, also joined by Armenia. A new trilateral
agreement on the consolidation of the cease-fire was signed in
February 1995. Both agreements are continuously violated by
Azerbaijan.
Starting from the mid-1990s the peace talks have been mediated by the
Co-Chairs of the OSCE Minsk Group, comprising France, Russia and the
United States. In the first phase, the peace negotiations involved
three parties -- Armenia, Azerbaijan and Nagorno-Karabakh. However, in
the late 1990s Azerbaijan broke off all talks with Nagorno-Karabakh.
In order to preserve the peace process, Armenia continued
negotiations, believing that Nagorno-Karabakh would eventually have to
be involved. In fact, it will be impossible to reach a lasting
settlement without its participation; and this view is fully shared by
the Co-Chairs.
The Minsk Group Co-Chairs spared no efforts, organizing regular
high-level talks and shuttling between Baku, Stepanakert and Yerevan.
But their efforts were in vain, since all peace efforts were
undermined by Azerbaijan. In 2001 the parties met in Paris and came
close to a settlement. Unfortunately, Heydar Aliyev, the President of
Azerbaijan at the time, and the father of the current president,
backtracked from the agreements reached in the French capital.
Basic Principles
In November 2007, during the OSCE Ministerial Council in Madrid, the
Co-Chairs presented the basic principles of the Nagorno-Karabakh
conflict settlement, which later became known
as the "Madrid Principles".
Azerbaijan at first publicly refused to accept the very existence of
the Madrid proposals. Subsequently, Baku sought to falsify the essence
of the document and misinterpret the content of the peace process.
The Co-Chair countries were obliged to make public the main principles
of the Madrid Document, which drew on three fundamental principles of
international law: non use of force or the threat of force; peoples'
right to self-determination; and territorial integrity.
The main elements of the proposals were also revealed: determination
of the final legal status of Nagorno-Karabakh through a legally
binding expression of the will of the population of Nagorno-Karabakh;
an interim status for Nagorno-Karabakh until the organization of the
free expression of the will; multilayer security guarantees, including
a peacekeeping operation around Nagorno-Karabakh; return of the
territories surrounding Nagorno-Karabakh; a corridor linking
Nagorno-Karabakh to Armenia; the right of all refugees and internally
displaced persons to return to their former places of residence.
Azerbaijan rejected each of these points. Not only did it attempt to
change the essence of the negotiating process, but also to distort the
nature of the conflict within various international bodies, not
hesitating to mislead the international community by presenting the
consequences of the conflict as its causes.
The Minsk Group Co-Chairs stated at the OSCE 2010 Astana summit that
"These proposed elements were conceived as an integrated whole, and
any attempt to select some elements over others would make it
impossible to achieve a solution."
>From 2008 to 2011, former Russian President Dmitry Medvedev
considerably contributed to the peace process. He organized a number
of trilateral talks with the participation of the Presidents of
Russia, Armenia and Azerbaijan, where the parties adopted four
declarations (4).
To support the efforts for a peaceful settlement, the presidents of
the three Co-Chair countries adopted five statements (5). Statements
on the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict were also adopted within the
framework of the OSCE Ministerial Conferences and OSCE Summit (6).
Armenia welcomed all these statements and expressed its readiness to
settle the conflict on the basis of the proposals contained therein.
However, Azerbaijan not only failed to endorse these statements, it
rejected all versions of the Basic Principles of the Nagorno-Karabakh
conflict settlement proposed by the Co-Chairs of the Minsk Group,
including the latest proposals submitted at the Saint-Petersburg (June
2010), Astrakhan (October 2010), Sochi (March 2011) and Kazan (June
2011) summits.
We went to the Kazan meeting, initiated by then President Medvedev and
supported by Presidents Obama and Sarkozy, with a positive outlook and
feeling that we could reach an agreement on the Basic Principles. The
American and French presidents used all their weight. Armenian
President Serzh Sargsyan, during his speech in the Parliamentary
Assembly of the Council of Europe in Strasbourg just before the
meeting, stated that it would be possible to expect positive results
if Azerbaijan did not propose new amendments. But, once again, the
Kazan Summit did not reach a breakthrough, despite everybody's raised
hopes. Azerbaijan did an about-face at the last moment, suggesting ten
amendments to the text which had already been agreed. It was a
repetition of the scenario at the previous meetings.
The aftermath of the Kazan Summit
The Kazan Summit was followed by almost two years of stagnation in the
peace process. Azerbaijan's negative attitude not only undermined the
negotiations, but also destabilized the situation on the ground.
During this period Azerbaijan multiplied its ceasefire violations and
provocative actions along the line of contact between Nagorno-Karabakh
and Azerbaijan and along the border between Armenia and Azerbaijan.
The Co-Chairs are internationally mandated to facilitate the peace
process, as well as to help preserve and strengthen the existing
ceasefire. They proposed a number of Confidence and Security-Building
Measures (CSBM) -- consolidation of the ceasefire, withdrawal of
snipers from the line of contact, creation of a mechanism to
investigate incidents and violations of the cease-fire agreement.
These proposals were endorsed by a number of major international
organizations, as well as the UN Secretary General. They were equally
welcomed by Armenia and Nagorno-Karabakh. But all of them were
rejected by Baku.
Azerbaijan also refused implement what has been agreed by President
Aliyev on creation of investigation mechanism (Sochi declarations of
March 5, 2011 and January 23, 2012). It even threatened to veto the
entire OSCE budget for 2012 if any funding was allocated to the
creation of this type of investigation mechanism.
Armenia has always supported the implementation of the Confidence and
Security Building Measures (CSBMs). We believe that these measures
will help create favorable conditions for negotiations. Azerbaijan
takes the opposite point of view and only considers the implementation
of these measures once progress on the settlement has been achieved.
Which makes no sense, because it is obvious that if we manage to reach
a solution, there would be less need for the measures! It is also
obvious that without mutual confidence between the parties, no
solution is possible.
Armenophobia in Azerbaijan
Baku is blatantly encouraging anti-Armenian xenophobia. Azerbaijani
President Aliyev declared Armenians all over the world are the "Number
1 enemy" of Azerbaijan.
This anti-Armenian propaganda reached its apogee with the Safarov
affair. In 2004 this young Azerbaijani serviceman, who was attending a
NATO training session in Hungary, killed a sleeping Armenian officer,
with an axe, solely because he was Armenian. Convicted in Hungary,
where he was jailed, he was finally extradited in 2012 to Azerbaijan,
where he was immediately pardoned and glorified. The Azerbaijani
leadership made him a symbol of national pride and an example for
youth, earning the disapproval of the whole world. The Council of
Europe's Commissioner of Human Rights warned that "to glorify and
reward such a person flies in the face of all accepted standards for
human rights protection and rule of law." The European Parliament
President and Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe
President also expressed their concern. The United Nations High
Commissioner for Human Rights said that "ethnically motivated hate
crimes of this gravity should be deplored and properly punished - not
publicly glorified." However, despite these warnings, Baku still
maintains that what it did "is very good and right" and dares to
criticize the stance of the international community.
A top level meeting between the presidents of Armenia and Azerbaijan
resumed in Vienna in November 2013, thanks to the efforts of the
Co-Chairs, some time after the notorious "Safarov case", and there was
some hope that the negotiations could move forward. Once more, those
expectations were not met, as Azerbaijan did everything to destabilize
the situation in the conflict zone.
The Azerbaijani side made several incursions, resulting in many
deaths, and drastically raising tension on the ground. An Armenian
villager who had mistakenly strayed into Azerbaijan territory was
arrested, humiliated in front of the TV cameras -- a tactic used by
notorious terrorist organizations -- and executed the following day.
In Azerbaijan, journalists, activists and the intelligentsia are all
persecuted as "Armenian spies" and "enemies of the nation", just
because they are advocating peace and reconciliation. The writer Akram
Aylisli was ostracized for publishing a novel (7), where he talks
about the pogroms against Armenians in Baku and Sumgait. His books
were publicly burned and the writer had to leave the country because
of threats on his life.
Armenophobia is becoming a constant of political discourse in
Azerbaijan. Those who are courageous enough not to blindly follow the
propaganda of the authorities of Azerbaijan are rapidly disappearing
from the stage. The distortion of history and propaganda have reached
such an extent that Armenia, and even the several millennia-old city
of Yerevan, are being declared ancient territories of Azerbaijan.
At a time when the protection and promotion of human rights are
considered to be fundamental concepts, intolerance towards the values
of foreign civilizations, and the degradation or systematic
destruction of cultural or religious heritage must be condemned with
the same resolve and determination as violence against people.
The systematic destruction by the Azerbaijanis of many Armenian
architectural masterpieces and sacred sites, including the destruction
between 1998 and 2005 in Nakhichevan (8) of thousands of delicately
carved cross stones by Armenian masters dating from the 9th to the
16th centuries, is vivid proof of these crimes.
Thousands of these giant medieval sculptures were bulldozed under the
Azerbaijani government's watchful eyes and this area was turned into a
military zone in a government sanctioned operation. The 16th
International Council on Monuments and Sites (ICOMOS) General Assembly
resolution condemned this vandalism in no uncertain words: "This
heritage that once enjoyed its worthy place among the treasures of the
world's heritage can no longer be transmitted today to future
generations."
Many international organizations also warned about flagrant cases of
racism, intolerance and violations of human rights in Azerbaijan and
the policy of hatred against Armenians. The European Commission
against Racism and Intolerance (ECRI), in its report on Azerbaijan,
noted with deep concern the "constant and negative official and media
discourse concerning the Republic of Armenia" and recommended that
Azerbaijani authorities "adopt an appropriate response to all cases of
discrimination and hate speech against Armenians". In response, Baku
merely organizes fake conferences on tolerance and freedom, in an
attempt to impose its own distorted perception of human rights on
others.
Azerbaijan, a threat to regional security
With its long experience in domestic corruption, Azerbaijan is
attempting to transfer this "expertise" to foreign relations. In
foreign capitals and international organizations, lobbying teams seek
to justify Baku's aggressive policies.
The Minsk Group Co-Chairs -- the Russian President in Sochi (August
2014), the American Secretary of State in Newport (September 2014),
and the President of France in Paris (October 2014) -- organized summit
meetings with participation of the Heads of States of Armenia and
Azerbaijan to reduce tensions and avoid further escalation. Azerbaijan
once again refused François Hollande's proposals on Confidence
Building Measures at the Paris summit.
Immediately after those meetings the Azerbaijani authorities' raised
another wave of anti-Armenian rhetoric. The Defense Minister of that
country claimed again that his country would solve the
Nagorno-Karabakh issue through military means and bragged about a 27%
increase in Azerbaijan's military budget! The budget will reach $4.8
billion in 2015, a 30-fold increase since 2003, when Ilham Aliyev
succeeded his father as Head of State.
The latest provocation: in November 2014, a Nagorno-Karabakh Defense
Army helicopter was shot down during a training flight by Azerbaijani
forces. Three young servicemen were killed. The Azerbaijani army kept
the area under continuous fire for almost ten days, hindering rescue
teams and preventing OSCE and International Committee of the Red Cross
representatives from approaching the site. A request by the OSCE Minsk
Group Co-Chairs to open a humanitarian corridor to evacuate the bodies
of the crew members was refused as well. Facing yet another gross
violation of international humanitarian law by Azerbaijan, the
Nagorno-Karabakh Defense Army had to undertake a special operation to
recover the bodies.
Baku continues to oppose the Minsk Group and the international
community. It is not only ignoring calls to implement
confidence-building measures, but is even pouring oil on the fire,
making them fully responsible for escalating the conflict.
For the last twenty years, Azerbaijan has done everything in its power
to undermine the cease-fire agreements. Military actions along the
line of contact and on the Armenian-Azerbaijani border have resulted
in significant loss of life and greatly raised tensions on the ground.
All the statements and decisions by Baku's authorities prove that
Azerbaijan has become a serious threat to security and stability in
the South Caucasus. This country has lost its sense of reality and is
doing its utmost to undermine the peace talks. That is why, despite
the intensive efforts of the three Co-Chair countries during the last
six years (twenty summits, several dozen ministerial-level meetings,
visits by the three Co-Chairs to the region), it has not been possible
to achieve a breakthrough in negotiations.
Azerbaijan is undertaking a relentless campaign of denigration against
the Minsk Group Co-Chairs. It also continuously attacks the Personal
Representative of the OSCE Chairman-in-Office (who is trying to
prevent the escalation of the situation, along with his team).
Azerbaijani officials are trying to shift the settlement process to
different format from the OSCE Minsk-Group Co-Chairmanship.
In fact, Baku is not interested in anything but its own advantage.
That explains why they deliberately undermined recent Summits
(Saint-Petersburg in June 2010, Astrakhan in October 2010, Sochi in
March 2011, and Kazan in June 2011). Armenia deplores this attitude.
It considers, along with the Co-Chairs, that any maneuver to delay the
negotiations on achieving a balanced agreement on the basic principles
is unacceptable.
Is settlement possible?
We continue to believe that the principles and elements outlined in
the statements of the heads of the Co-Chair countries over the last
six years can be the foundations for reaching a fair and lasting
settlement of the conflict.
We absolutely agree that peoples should be prepared for peace, not
war. Unfortunately, until now the Azerbaijani leadership is doing just
the opposite. Unlike Azerbaijan, Armenia, in response to the call by
Presidents of the Co-Chair countries, has reiterated and once again
reaffirms its commitment to the principles of international law.
We fully agree with the heads of the Co-Chair countries that the use
of force will not resolve the conflict, and that only a negotiated
settlement can lead to stability and peace, which will open new
opportunities for regional cooperation and development. The sooner the
Azerbaijani leadership understands this reality, the faster the
conflict can be settled.
The day that Azerbaijan gets rid of its illusions, the day that it
realizes that it's not by pouring its oil revenues into its strategy
of endlessly increasing military tension that it can achieve a
solution in its favor, on that day, I repeat, we can hope for tangible
progress in the peace process. Armenia will spare no efforts to
achieve the settlement of the conflict exclusively by peaceful means.
(1) During the years 1918-1920, the power in Nagorno-Karabakh was held
by the Assembly of Armenians of Karabakh, which declared, on July 22,
1918, that Nagorno-Karabakh is an independent political entity. It
elected a National Council, or Parliament and a democratic government.
(2) Decision of the 5th Commission of the Assembly of the League of
Nations, December 1, 1920.
(3) Zerkalo, Azerbaijan, July 23, 2002.
(4) In Mayendorf (November 2, 2008), Astrakhan (October 27, 2010) and
Sochi (March 5, 2011 and January 23, 2012).
(5) In L'Aquila (2009), Muskoka (2010), Deauville (2011), Los Cabos
(2012), Eniskilen (2013).
(6) In Helsinki (2008), Athens (2009), Almaty (2010), Vilnius (2011),
Dublin (2012), Kiev (2013), Basel (2014), and during the OSCE Summit
in Astana (2010).
(7) "Stone Dreams", Druzhba Narodov, 2012.
(8) - Stephen Castle "Azerbaijan 'flattened' sacred Armenian site",
The Independent, 30 May 2006;
- Sarah Pickman "Tragedy on the Araxes", archaeology.org, 30 June 2006;
- "U.S. Envoy barred from Armenian cemetery in Azerbaijan", RFE/RL, 22
April 2011.
http://www.oratert.com/news/armenia/80294.html
From: A. Papazian
07/02/2015 14:56:00Oratert News Portal
Eduard Nalbandyan
It's the history of a people who exercised their legitimate right to
self-determination. A people who freely expressed their determination
and who, for almost a century, have faced the hostility of those who
have pretended to be their lords. These are the people of
NagornoKarabakh.
It's the history of a people who exercised their legitimate right to
self-determination. A people who freely expressed their determination
and who, for almost a century, have faced the hostility of those who
have pretended to be their lords. These are the people of
NagornoKarabakh.
History
Karabakh (which was called #Artsakh for several centuries) was an
integral part of the Armenian kingdoms, as proven by the works of
authors from antiquity (Strabo, Pliny the Elder, Claudius Ptolemy,
Plutarch, Dion Cassius), as well as the many cultural and historical
testimonials of Armenian presence (monuments, churches, cemeteries,
etc.).
In 1918, after the collapse of the Russian Empire, Armenia, Georgia
and Azerbaijan declared their independence. Populated mostly by
Armenians, about 95%, Nagorno-Karabakh had de facto sovereignty from
1918 to 1920 (1). From that time, Azerbaijan started to claim this
territory and tried to annex it by force. From May 1918 to April 1920,
Azerbaijan carried out several massacres against the Armenian
population. In March 1920 alone, about 20,000 Armenians were killed
and another 20,000 were deported from the then Karabakh capital of
Shushi. The illegality of the Azerbaijani actions was underscored by
the League of Nations which also turned down Azerbaijan's appeal for
the membership on the grounds that it was impossible to define its
borders (2).
With the Sovietization of the Caucasian republics, Azerbaijani leaders
received a green light to annex Artsakh.
On July 5, 1921 the Caucasian Bureau of the Russian Communist Party,
under pressure from Joseph Stalin, decided to give Karabakh to
Azerbaijan. It is noteworthy that this bureau had no authority to make
decisions on territorial disputes between the third parties,
especially because at the time the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
had not been created yet and Armenia and Azerbaijan were de jure
independent republics.
After the end of its occupational program, Baku went even further.
While the Caucasian Bureau of the Communist Party planned to create an
autonomous region across all of Nagorno-Karabakh, only part of that
territory was included in the Nagorno-Karabakh Autonomous Oblast
(NKAO). As a consequence, it became an enclave and was deprived of a
common border with Armenia.
During the Soviet era the Azerbaijan authorities tried to impede the
social-economic development of the region, by carrying out a veritable
ethnic cleansing and destroying or appropriating Armenian monuments
and cultural heritage. The former President of Azerbaijan, Heydar
Aliyev, confessed in one of his interviews (3) that he did everything
possible to change the demographics of Nagorno-Karabakh, in favor of
Azerbaijanis. In fact, the Armenians, who accounted for 94.4 percent
of the population in 1921, were no more than 76.9% in 1989.
The people of Artsakh never accepted Azerbaijani authorities' policy
of depriving them of their right to choose their own destiny. Several
times, they brought their case before the Soviet
central authorities. Several applications and petitions were sent
asking Moscow to reconsider the decision of 1921 and reunite them with
Armenia.
The policy of Perestroika launched by Mikhail Gorbachev in 1985
provided an opportunity to reopen the issue. The popular movement for
reuniting Nagorno-Karabakh with Armenia (conducted by the "Karabakh"
and "Krunk" committees) expanded its scope in 1988, struggling for the
end of Azerbaijani oversight and for the right of self-determination.
This was one of the engines of the process of liberalization,
democratization, the defense of human rights and fundamental freedoms.
On February 20, 1988 the Karabakh Council of People's Representatives,
the local parliament, adopted a resolution asking the Soviet
authorities to reunite the autonomous region of Nagorno-Karabakh with
Armenia.
The reaction of Soviet Azerbaijan was swift. A new wave of ethnic
cleansing against Armenians was launched both in Artsakh and in
Armenian-populated parts of Azerbaijan. In February 1988, Sumgait saw
a massacre claiming dozens of victims. The violence quickly spread to
Baku, Kirovabad and other cities and villages. Hundreds of Armenians
were killed during these pogroms, with nearly 400,000 forced to flee,
taking refuge in Armenia, Russia and other Soviet Republics.
Legal aspects
On April 3, 1990 a new law was adopted by the USSR, which authorized
autonomous entities and compact ethnic groups within a Soviet Republic
to freely and independently decide their own legal status in case the
Republic secedes from the USSR. Following Soviet Azerbaijan's
declaration of independence on August 30, 1991, Nagorno-Karabakh
initiated the same legal procedure by adopting its own declaration of
independence. In the referendum of December 10, 1991, organized in the
presence of international observers, the people of Nagorno-Karabakh
voted for independence with an overwhelming majority (over 99% of
votes).
This referendum, which was held at a time when Nagorno-Karabakh was
part of the USSR, was fully in line with Soviet law. Logically, the
day after the collapse of the Soviet Union two states were created on
the territory of the former Azerbaijani Soviet Socialist Republic:
Nagorno-Karabakh Republic and the Republic of Azerbaijan.
Over the years, the European Parliament had adopted numerous
resolutions in support of Nagorno-Karabakh's strife for
selfdetermination. In its resolution of June 21, 1999 on
Nagorno-Karabakh, the European Parliament stated that "the autonomous
region of Nagorno-Karabakh declared its independence following similar
declarations by former Soviet Socialist Republics after the collapse
of the USSR in September 1991."
Peoples' right to self-determination is a fundamental right enshrined
in the Charter of the United Nations and reaffirmed by several other
core international documents.
Not having any legal argument against the independence of
Nagorno-Karabakh, Baku tried to represent the problem as a territorial
dispute between Armenia and Azerbaijan.
The conflict and the peace process
In Nagorno-Karabakh and the surrounding areas populated by Armenians,
the ethnic cleansing by Azerbaijani authorities quickly turned into
large-scale military actions resulting in tens of thousands losses and
causing considerable destruction. Azerbaijan used mercenaries in this
war, mainly Afghans and Chechens, closely linked to the notorious
terrorist organizations.
Such serious violations of international law did not avoid from the
attention of the international community. In 1988-1991 the U.S.
Congress on several occasions condemned the aggression of Azerbaijan
against Armenian civilians. Moreover, in 1992 it approved Section 907
of the Freedom Support Act, restricting the U.S. aid to Azerbaijan
because of Azerbaijan's aggressive policy and the blockade against
Armenia and Nagorno-Karabakh.
The Security Council of the United Nations adopted four resolutions in
1993 urging immediate cessation of hostilities, opening of
communications and the resumption of peace talks with all parties
concerned, including Nagorno-Karabakh. In response, Azerbaijan just
intensified its military offensives. But on the ground the balance of
strength turned to its disadvantage, and it soon had no other option
but to request a cease-fire from Nagorno-Karabakh.
In May 1994, the cease-fire agreement between Nagorno-Karabakh and
Azerbaijan was signed, also joined by Armenia. A new trilateral
agreement on the consolidation of the cease-fire was signed in
February 1995. Both agreements are continuously violated by
Azerbaijan.
Starting from the mid-1990s the peace talks have been mediated by the
Co-Chairs of the OSCE Minsk Group, comprising France, Russia and the
United States. In the first phase, the peace negotiations involved
three parties -- Armenia, Azerbaijan and Nagorno-Karabakh. However, in
the late 1990s Azerbaijan broke off all talks with Nagorno-Karabakh.
In order to preserve the peace process, Armenia continued
negotiations, believing that Nagorno-Karabakh would eventually have to
be involved. In fact, it will be impossible to reach a lasting
settlement without its participation; and this view is fully shared by
the Co-Chairs.
The Minsk Group Co-Chairs spared no efforts, organizing regular
high-level talks and shuttling between Baku, Stepanakert and Yerevan.
But their efforts were in vain, since all peace efforts were
undermined by Azerbaijan. In 2001 the parties met in Paris and came
close to a settlement. Unfortunately, Heydar Aliyev, the President of
Azerbaijan at the time, and the father of the current president,
backtracked from the agreements reached in the French capital.
Basic Principles
In November 2007, during the OSCE Ministerial Council in Madrid, the
Co-Chairs presented the basic principles of the Nagorno-Karabakh
conflict settlement, which later became known
as the "Madrid Principles".
Azerbaijan at first publicly refused to accept the very existence of
the Madrid proposals. Subsequently, Baku sought to falsify the essence
of the document and misinterpret the content of the peace process.
The Co-Chair countries were obliged to make public the main principles
of the Madrid Document, which drew on three fundamental principles of
international law: non use of force or the threat of force; peoples'
right to self-determination; and territorial integrity.
The main elements of the proposals were also revealed: determination
of the final legal status of Nagorno-Karabakh through a legally
binding expression of the will of the population of Nagorno-Karabakh;
an interim status for Nagorno-Karabakh until the organization of the
free expression of the will; multilayer security guarantees, including
a peacekeeping operation around Nagorno-Karabakh; return of the
territories surrounding Nagorno-Karabakh; a corridor linking
Nagorno-Karabakh to Armenia; the right of all refugees and internally
displaced persons to return to their former places of residence.
Azerbaijan rejected each of these points. Not only did it attempt to
change the essence of the negotiating process, but also to distort the
nature of the conflict within various international bodies, not
hesitating to mislead the international community by presenting the
consequences of the conflict as its causes.
The Minsk Group Co-Chairs stated at the OSCE 2010 Astana summit that
"These proposed elements were conceived as an integrated whole, and
any attempt to select some elements over others would make it
impossible to achieve a solution."
>From 2008 to 2011, former Russian President Dmitry Medvedev
considerably contributed to the peace process. He organized a number
of trilateral talks with the participation of the Presidents of
Russia, Armenia and Azerbaijan, where the parties adopted four
declarations (4).
To support the efforts for a peaceful settlement, the presidents of
the three Co-Chair countries adopted five statements (5). Statements
on the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict were also adopted within the
framework of the OSCE Ministerial Conferences and OSCE Summit (6).
Armenia welcomed all these statements and expressed its readiness to
settle the conflict on the basis of the proposals contained therein.
However, Azerbaijan not only failed to endorse these statements, it
rejected all versions of the Basic Principles of the Nagorno-Karabakh
conflict settlement proposed by the Co-Chairs of the Minsk Group,
including the latest proposals submitted at the Saint-Petersburg (June
2010), Astrakhan (October 2010), Sochi (March 2011) and Kazan (June
2011) summits.
We went to the Kazan meeting, initiated by then President Medvedev and
supported by Presidents Obama and Sarkozy, with a positive outlook and
feeling that we could reach an agreement on the Basic Principles. The
American and French presidents used all their weight. Armenian
President Serzh Sargsyan, during his speech in the Parliamentary
Assembly of the Council of Europe in Strasbourg just before the
meeting, stated that it would be possible to expect positive results
if Azerbaijan did not propose new amendments. But, once again, the
Kazan Summit did not reach a breakthrough, despite everybody's raised
hopes. Azerbaijan did an about-face at the last moment, suggesting ten
amendments to the text which had already been agreed. It was a
repetition of the scenario at the previous meetings.
The aftermath of the Kazan Summit
The Kazan Summit was followed by almost two years of stagnation in the
peace process. Azerbaijan's negative attitude not only undermined the
negotiations, but also destabilized the situation on the ground.
During this period Azerbaijan multiplied its ceasefire violations and
provocative actions along the line of contact between Nagorno-Karabakh
and Azerbaijan and along the border between Armenia and Azerbaijan.
The Co-Chairs are internationally mandated to facilitate the peace
process, as well as to help preserve and strengthen the existing
ceasefire. They proposed a number of Confidence and Security-Building
Measures (CSBM) -- consolidation of the ceasefire, withdrawal of
snipers from the line of contact, creation of a mechanism to
investigate incidents and violations of the cease-fire agreement.
These proposals were endorsed by a number of major international
organizations, as well as the UN Secretary General. They were equally
welcomed by Armenia and Nagorno-Karabakh. But all of them were
rejected by Baku.
Azerbaijan also refused implement what has been agreed by President
Aliyev on creation of investigation mechanism (Sochi declarations of
March 5, 2011 and January 23, 2012). It even threatened to veto the
entire OSCE budget for 2012 if any funding was allocated to the
creation of this type of investigation mechanism.
Armenia has always supported the implementation of the Confidence and
Security Building Measures (CSBMs). We believe that these measures
will help create favorable conditions for negotiations. Azerbaijan
takes the opposite point of view and only considers the implementation
of these measures once progress on the settlement has been achieved.
Which makes no sense, because it is obvious that if we manage to reach
a solution, there would be less need for the measures! It is also
obvious that without mutual confidence between the parties, no
solution is possible.
Armenophobia in Azerbaijan
Baku is blatantly encouraging anti-Armenian xenophobia. Azerbaijani
President Aliyev declared Armenians all over the world are the "Number
1 enemy" of Azerbaijan.
This anti-Armenian propaganda reached its apogee with the Safarov
affair. In 2004 this young Azerbaijani serviceman, who was attending a
NATO training session in Hungary, killed a sleeping Armenian officer,
with an axe, solely because he was Armenian. Convicted in Hungary,
where he was jailed, he was finally extradited in 2012 to Azerbaijan,
where he was immediately pardoned and glorified. The Azerbaijani
leadership made him a symbol of national pride and an example for
youth, earning the disapproval of the whole world. The Council of
Europe's Commissioner of Human Rights warned that "to glorify and
reward such a person flies in the face of all accepted standards for
human rights protection and rule of law." The European Parliament
President and Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe
President also expressed their concern. The United Nations High
Commissioner for Human Rights said that "ethnically motivated hate
crimes of this gravity should be deplored and properly punished - not
publicly glorified." However, despite these warnings, Baku still
maintains that what it did "is very good and right" and dares to
criticize the stance of the international community.
A top level meeting between the presidents of Armenia and Azerbaijan
resumed in Vienna in November 2013, thanks to the efforts of the
Co-Chairs, some time after the notorious "Safarov case", and there was
some hope that the negotiations could move forward. Once more, those
expectations were not met, as Azerbaijan did everything to destabilize
the situation in the conflict zone.
The Azerbaijani side made several incursions, resulting in many
deaths, and drastically raising tension on the ground. An Armenian
villager who had mistakenly strayed into Azerbaijan territory was
arrested, humiliated in front of the TV cameras -- a tactic used by
notorious terrorist organizations -- and executed the following day.
In Azerbaijan, journalists, activists and the intelligentsia are all
persecuted as "Armenian spies" and "enemies of the nation", just
because they are advocating peace and reconciliation. The writer Akram
Aylisli was ostracized for publishing a novel (7), where he talks
about the pogroms against Armenians in Baku and Sumgait. His books
were publicly burned and the writer had to leave the country because
of threats on his life.
Armenophobia is becoming a constant of political discourse in
Azerbaijan. Those who are courageous enough not to blindly follow the
propaganda of the authorities of Azerbaijan are rapidly disappearing
from the stage. The distortion of history and propaganda have reached
such an extent that Armenia, and even the several millennia-old city
of Yerevan, are being declared ancient territories of Azerbaijan.
At a time when the protection and promotion of human rights are
considered to be fundamental concepts, intolerance towards the values
of foreign civilizations, and the degradation or systematic
destruction of cultural or religious heritage must be condemned with
the same resolve and determination as violence against people.
The systematic destruction by the Azerbaijanis of many Armenian
architectural masterpieces and sacred sites, including the destruction
between 1998 and 2005 in Nakhichevan (8) of thousands of delicately
carved cross stones by Armenian masters dating from the 9th to the
16th centuries, is vivid proof of these crimes.
Thousands of these giant medieval sculptures were bulldozed under the
Azerbaijani government's watchful eyes and this area was turned into a
military zone in a government sanctioned operation. The 16th
International Council on Monuments and Sites (ICOMOS) General Assembly
resolution condemned this vandalism in no uncertain words: "This
heritage that once enjoyed its worthy place among the treasures of the
world's heritage can no longer be transmitted today to future
generations."
Many international organizations also warned about flagrant cases of
racism, intolerance and violations of human rights in Azerbaijan and
the policy of hatred against Armenians. The European Commission
against Racism and Intolerance (ECRI), in its report on Azerbaijan,
noted with deep concern the "constant and negative official and media
discourse concerning the Republic of Armenia" and recommended that
Azerbaijani authorities "adopt an appropriate response to all cases of
discrimination and hate speech against Armenians". In response, Baku
merely organizes fake conferences on tolerance and freedom, in an
attempt to impose its own distorted perception of human rights on
others.
Azerbaijan, a threat to regional security
With its long experience in domestic corruption, Azerbaijan is
attempting to transfer this "expertise" to foreign relations. In
foreign capitals and international organizations, lobbying teams seek
to justify Baku's aggressive policies.
The Minsk Group Co-Chairs -- the Russian President in Sochi (August
2014), the American Secretary of State in Newport (September 2014),
and the President of France in Paris (October 2014) -- organized summit
meetings with participation of the Heads of States of Armenia and
Azerbaijan to reduce tensions and avoid further escalation. Azerbaijan
once again refused François Hollande's proposals on Confidence
Building Measures at the Paris summit.
Immediately after those meetings the Azerbaijani authorities' raised
another wave of anti-Armenian rhetoric. The Defense Minister of that
country claimed again that his country would solve the
Nagorno-Karabakh issue through military means and bragged about a 27%
increase in Azerbaijan's military budget! The budget will reach $4.8
billion in 2015, a 30-fold increase since 2003, when Ilham Aliyev
succeeded his father as Head of State.
The latest provocation: in November 2014, a Nagorno-Karabakh Defense
Army helicopter was shot down during a training flight by Azerbaijani
forces. Three young servicemen were killed. The Azerbaijani army kept
the area under continuous fire for almost ten days, hindering rescue
teams and preventing OSCE and International Committee of the Red Cross
representatives from approaching the site. A request by the OSCE Minsk
Group Co-Chairs to open a humanitarian corridor to evacuate the bodies
of the crew members was refused as well. Facing yet another gross
violation of international humanitarian law by Azerbaijan, the
Nagorno-Karabakh Defense Army had to undertake a special operation to
recover the bodies.
Baku continues to oppose the Minsk Group and the international
community. It is not only ignoring calls to implement
confidence-building measures, but is even pouring oil on the fire,
making them fully responsible for escalating the conflict.
For the last twenty years, Azerbaijan has done everything in its power
to undermine the cease-fire agreements. Military actions along the
line of contact and on the Armenian-Azerbaijani border have resulted
in significant loss of life and greatly raised tensions on the ground.
All the statements and decisions by Baku's authorities prove that
Azerbaijan has become a serious threat to security and stability in
the South Caucasus. This country has lost its sense of reality and is
doing its utmost to undermine the peace talks. That is why, despite
the intensive efforts of the three Co-Chair countries during the last
six years (twenty summits, several dozen ministerial-level meetings,
visits by the three Co-Chairs to the region), it has not been possible
to achieve a breakthrough in negotiations.
Azerbaijan is undertaking a relentless campaign of denigration against
the Minsk Group Co-Chairs. It also continuously attacks the Personal
Representative of the OSCE Chairman-in-Office (who is trying to
prevent the escalation of the situation, along with his team).
Azerbaijani officials are trying to shift the settlement process to
different format from the OSCE Minsk-Group Co-Chairmanship.
In fact, Baku is not interested in anything but its own advantage.
That explains why they deliberately undermined recent Summits
(Saint-Petersburg in June 2010, Astrakhan in October 2010, Sochi in
March 2011, and Kazan in June 2011). Armenia deplores this attitude.
It considers, along with the Co-Chairs, that any maneuver to delay the
negotiations on achieving a balanced agreement on the basic principles
is unacceptable.
Is settlement possible?
We continue to believe that the principles and elements outlined in
the statements of the heads of the Co-Chair countries over the last
six years can be the foundations for reaching a fair and lasting
settlement of the conflict.
We absolutely agree that peoples should be prepared for peace, not
war. Unfortunately, until now the Azerbaijani leadership is doing just
the opposite. Unlike Azerbaijan, Armenia, in response to the call by
Presidents of the Co-Chair countries, has reiterated and once again
reaffirms its commitment to the principles of international law.
We fully agree with the heads of the Co-Chair countries that the use
of force will not resolve the conflict, and that only a negotiated
settlement can lead to stability and peace, which will open new
opportunities for regional cooperation and development. The sooner the
Azerbaijani leadership understands this reality, the faster the
conflict can be settled.
The day that Azerbaijan gets rid of its illusions, the day that it
realizes that it's not by pouring its oil revenues into its strategy
of endlessly increasing military tension that it can achieve a
solution in its favor, on that day, I repeat, we can hope for tangible
progress in the peace process. Armenia will spare no efforts to
achieve the settlement of the conflict exclusively by peaceful means.
(1) During the years 1918-1920, the power in Nagorno-Karabakh was held
by the Assembly of Armenians of Karabakh, which declared, on July 22,
1918, that Nagorno-Karabakh is an independent political entity. It
elected a National Council, or Parliament and a democratic government.
(2) Decision of the 5th Commission of the Assembly of the League of
Nations, December 1, 1920.
(3) Zerkalo, Azerbaijan, July 23, 2002.
(4) In Mayendorf (November 2, 2008), Astrakhan (October 27, 2010) and
Sochi (March 5, 2011 and January 23, 2012).
(5) In L'Aquila (2009), Muskoka (2010), Deauville (2011), Los Cabos
(2012), Eniskilen (2013).
(6) In Helsinki (2008), Athens (2009), Almaty (2010), Vilnius (2011),
Dublin (2012), Kiev (2013), Basel (2014), and during the OSCE Summit
in Astana (2010).
(7) "Stone Dreams", Druzhba Narodov, 2012.
(8) - Stephen Castle "Azerbaijan 'flattened' sacred Armenian site",
The Independent, 30 May 2006;
- Sarah Pickman "Tragedy on the Araxes", archaeology.org, 30 June 2006;
- "U.S. Envoy barred from Armenian cemetery in Azerbaijan", RFE/RL, 22
April 2011.
http://www.oratert.com/news/armenia/80294.html
From: A. Papazian