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Prospects for Turkey's New `Armenia Opening' and Russia's Concerns
Source: iStockphoto
Posted by: Pavel Shlykov Thursday, January 29, 2015 +
Recently the normalization of Turkish-Armenian relations has often and
increasingly drawn the attention of both Turkish and world media. Turkish
politicians have also not been shirking from speaking about this topic
publicly. The recent press conference of Turkish prime minister and current
leader of the ruling Justice and Development Party (AKP) Ahmet DavutoÄ=9Flu in
London only proved this tendency. DavutoÄ=9Flu predicted
that
Turkish-Armenian relations would normalize in 2015: `Turkey and Armenia
must make an effort to build a new world for peace.' The Turkish politician
also declared that Turkey shares the sufferings of the Armenians and
sincerely strives to heal wounds by restoring friendly relations with
Armenia: `Only by breaking taboos can we hope to begin addressing the great
trauma that froze time in 1915. For its part, Turkey has transcended this
critical threshold and relinquished the generalizations and stereotypical
assertions of the past.'
Prime Minister DavutoÄ=9Flu's statement is hardly unexpected, as
some media
hurried to portray it. Even in December 2012 DavutoÄ=9Flu (who was then
minister of foreign affairs) noted in his traditional address
on foreign policy
strategy to the members of the Turkish Grand National Assembly that
`normalization of Turkish-Armenian relations would become a factor
of
stability and cooperation in the South Caucasus.' In addition, the
recently
advanced project of `Just memory' (*Adil Hafıza İnisiyatifi
*) represents another proof that the
AKP government is working on a new `Armenian opening.' In a spring 2014
article, DavutoÄ=9Flu defined and elaborated the concept of `just memory' as a
denial of unilateral approaches to history and an effort to strive to
comprehend the scale of Armenian tragedy. However, according to DavutoÄ=9Flu
,
one of the essential conditions of such an approach is mutual respect,
implying Armenians must also respect the historical memory of the Turks.
The October 2014 appointment of Etyen Mahçupyan
,
a famous journalist of Armenian origin, as a key advisor to the Turkish
prime minister also signals that a new `Armenian opening' is in
preparation. An initiative to build a new Christian Church
in
Istanbul `for the first time in the history of the Turkish Republic' should
be seen as part of this new push as well.
Within the last year the Turkish public showed a distinct expectation that
a qualitative breakthrough in the relations between Ankara and Yerevan was
coming. This public mood is partly based on the statements of DavuloÄ=9Flu,
who was one of the main players in 2009 talks aimed at political
reconciliation (notable for so called football diplomacy and un-ratified
Zurich protocols), and on Recep Tayyip ErdoÄ=9Fan's surprising statement timed
to the 99-year anniversary of the 1915 events. ErdoÄ=9Fan virtually became the
first Turkish leader to present official condolences for the numerous
victims among the Armenian population under the Ottoman Empire. ErdoÄ=9Fan
didn't use, and even studiously avoided, the word `Genocide,' preferring to
call the massacres and forced deportations of 1915 `the events of the early
20th century
.'
Nonetheless, recent Turkish media reports suggest that there are currently
attempts to come to an agreement that would allow for the opening of the
borders between the two states before April 24-the 100-year anniversary of
the 1915 Armenian Genocide.
The normalization of Turkish-Armenian relations has implications for both
foreign policy and domestic politics. On January 18, Turkey commemorated
the 8th anniversary of the assassination of Hrant Dink, the editor in chief
of the bilingual Armenian-Turkish newspaper `*Agos*' who had been known for
advocating Turkish-Armenian reconciliation, human rights and rights for
minorities in Turkey. That almost all of Turkey's central newspapers
published large editorials about these memorials to Dink testifies to a
distinct trend in Turkish public opinion. ErdoÄ=9Fan and DavutoÄ=9Flu are both
striving to make progress on the issue. Kurdish political parties also
support the normalization of Turkish-Armenian relations and the recognition
of the Armenian genocide (Sebahat Tuncel, a Kurdish politician and member
of parliament, for instance, submitted a proposal seeking
condemnation of the Armenian Genocide in the Ottoman Empire to the Grand
National Assembly). Generally in today's Turkey one would be hard-pressed
to find manifestations of mass anti-Armenian sentiment.
Armenia's joining the Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU) in January 1, 2015 may
bring additional opportunities to start the normalization process between
Yerevan and Ankara. The rising political tensions in the Turkey-EU
relationship together with the serious economic dependence of Turkey on the
European economy may prompt Turkey to develop its cooperation with the
EAEU, which, by today's estimates, has an economy with a total volume in
excess of four trillion dollars. Turkey is highly unlikely to pursue
economic alienation regarding Armenia as it did in 2003 when Yerevan joined
the WTO and Ankara declared that it wouldn't apply WTO norms in relation to
Armenia.
Standing in the way of the new `Armenia Opening' are both the official
position and the interests of Azerbaijan. The political decision of Moscow
to offer broad political and economic assistance to Armenia within the
framework of the EAEU will obviously force Baku to alter its policy toward
Yerevan. It may also facilitate the realization of DavutoÄ=9Flu's `Armenia
Opening.'
The international pressure on Turkey by the influential Armenian diaspora
must also be taken into account. The forthcoming 100-year anniversary of
the 1915 events will lead to an increase in the Armenian diaspora's
activities. And, in the United States, where 43 out of 50 states recognize
the Armenian genocide, a new resolution on the Armenian genocide may be on
the agenda, potentially creating legal grounds for numerous compensation
claims against the Turkish government.
Nowadays the Turkish political elite appears preoccupied with normalizing
Armenian-Turkish relations, in consideration of this process's potential
diplomatic, political, and economic risks and benefits. Furthermore, in the
run up to summer 2015 parliamentary elections, when political tensions will
rise and a political struggle accelerate, a diplomatic success for the AKP
government and for the new AKP party leader DavutoÄ=9Flu will obviously help
to distract people's attention from a tendency toward economic crisis (for
which the AKP government has been criticized in recent years) and make
people associate the party with a positive agenda once again.
However, current activities around the `Armenian question'
cannot help but
bring a feeling of déjà vu, recalling the situation in 2005, when, on the
eve of the 90-year anniversary of the events of 1915, the Turkish
government also made great efforts to mend relations with Armenia. At that
time the culmination of these efforts became a declaration of the Turkish
Grand National Assembly. In this document the tragic events of 1915 were
described and analyzed quite objectively (this was a real breakthrough in
the Turkish perception of the Armenian genocide), but the word `genocide'
was not used. This word proved to be a red line for Turkey, a distinct
limit of Turkey's flexibility. These steps failed to reach even the most
minimal demands from the Armenian perspective. Thus all these initiatives
failed to create solid ground for real compromise between the two states.
And the current situation surrounding dueling invitations-Armenian
President Serzh Sargsyan invited his Turkish colleague for the
commemoration of the Armenian genocide on April 24, while ErdoÄ=9Fan plans a
celebration of the Turkish victory in the Dardanelles Operation on the same
date-doesn't inspire confidence that the situation today can bear the fruit
of a sound and mutually acceptable compromise.
*Pavel Shlykov is a senior research fellow at the Institute of Asian and
African Studies, Moscow State University.*
http://carnegie.ru/eurasiaoutlook/?fa=58863&mkt_tok=3RkMMJWWfF9wsRonva3NZKXonjHpfsX6 7e8uXaag38431UFwdcjKPmjr1YIERMV0aPyQAgobGp5I5FEIQ7 XYTLB2t60MWA%3D%3D
From: Emil Lazarian | Ararat NewsPress
Source: iStockphoto
Posted by: Pavel Shlykov Thursday, January 29, 2015 +
Recently the normalization of Turkish-Armenian relations has often and
increasingly drawn the attention of both Turkish and world media. Turkish
politicians have also not been shirking from speaking about this topic
publicly. The recent press conference of Turkish prime minister and current
leader of the ruling Justice and Development Party (AKP) Ahmet DavutoÄ=9Flu in
London only proved this tendency. DavutoÄ=9Flu predicted
that
Turkish-Armenian relations would normalize in 2015: `Turkey and Armenia
must make an effort to build a new world for peace.' The Turkish politician
also declared that Turkey shares the sufferings of the Armenians and
sincerely strives to heal wounds by restoring friendly relations with
Armenia: `Only by breaking taboos can we hope to begin addressing the great
trauma that froze time in 1915. For its part, Turkey has transcended this
critical threshold and relinquished the generalizations and stereotypical
assertions of the past.'
Prime Minister DavutoÄ=9Flu's statement is hardly unexpected, as
some media
hurried to portray it. Even in December 2012 DavutoÄ=9Flu (who was then
minister of foreign affairs) noted in his traditional address
on foreign policy
strategy to the members of the Turkish Grand National Assembly that
`normalization of Turkish-Armenian relations would become a factor
of
stability and cooperation in the South Caucasus.' In addition, the
recently
advanced project of `Just memory' (*Adil Hafıza İnisiyatifi
*) represents another proof that the
AKP government is working on a new `Armenian opening.' In a spring 2014
article, DavutoÄ=9Flu defined and elaborated the concept of `just memory' as a
denial of unilateral approaches to history and an effort to strive to
comprehend the scale of Armenian tragedy. However, according to DavutoÄ=9Flu
,
one of the essential conditions of such an approach is mutual respect,
implying Armenians must also respect the historical memory of the Turks.
The October 2014 appointment of Etyen Mahçupyan
,
a famous journalist of Armenian origin, as a key advisor to the Turkish
prime minister also signals that a new `Armenian opening' is in
preparation. An initiative to build a new Christian Church
in
Istanbul `for the first time in the history of the Turkish Republic' should
be seen as part of this new push as well.
Within the last year the Turkish public showed a distinct expectation that
a qualitative breakthrough in the relations between Ankara and Yerevan was
coming. This public mood is partly based on the statements of DavuloÄ=9Flu,
who was one of the main players in 2009 talks aimed at political
reconciliation (notable for so called football diplomacy and un-ratified
Zurich protocols), and on Recep Tayyip ErdoÄ=9Fan's surprising statement timed
to the 99-year anniversary of the 1915 events. ErdoÄ=9Fan virtually became the
first Turkish leader to present official condolences for the numerous
victims among the Armenian population under the Ottoman Empire. ErdoÄ=9Fan
didn't use, and even studiously avoided, the word `Genocide,' preferring to
call the massacres and forced deportations of 1915 `the events of the early
20th century
.'
Nonetheless, recent Turkish media reports suggest that there are currently
attempts to come to an agreement that would allow for the opening of the
borders between the two states before April 24-the 100-year anniversary of
the 1915 Armenian Genocide.
The normalization of Turkish-Armenian relations has implications for both
foreign policy and domestic politics. On January 18, Turkey commemorated
the 8th anniversary of the assassination of Hrant Dink, the editor in chief
of the bilingual Armenian-Turkish newspaper `*Agos*' who had been known for
advocating Turkish-Armenian reconciliation, human rights and rights for
minorities in Turkey. That almost all of Turkey's central newspapers
published large editorials about these memorials to Dink testifies to a
distinct trend in Turkish public opinion. ErdoÄ=9Fan and DavutoÄ=9Flu are both
striving to make progress on the issue. Kurdish political parties also
support the normalization of Turkish-Armenian relations and the recognition
of the Armenian genocide (Sebahat Tuncel, a Kurdish politician and member
of parliament, for instance, submitted a proposal seeking
condemnation of the Armenian Genocide in the Ottoman Empire to the Grand
National Assembly). Generally in today's Turkey one would be hard-pressed
to find manifestations of mass anti-Armenian sentiment.
Armenia's joining the Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU) in January 1, 2015 may
bring additional opportunities to start the normalization process between
Yerevan and Ankara. The rising political tensions in the Turkey-EU
relationship together with the serious economic dependence of Turkey on the
European economy may prompt Turkey to develop its cooperation with the
EAEU, which, by today's estimates, has an economy with a total volume in
excess of four trillion dollars. Turkey is highly unlikely to pursue
economic alienation regarding Armenia as it did in 2003 when Yerevan joined
the WTO and Ankara declared that it wouldn't apply WTO norms in relation to
Armenia.
Standing in the way of the new `Armenia Opening' are both the official
position and the interests of Azerbaijan. The political decision of Moscow
to offer broad political and economic assistance to Armenia within the
framework of the EAEU will obviously force Baku to alter its policy toward
Yerevan. It may also facilitate the realization of DavutoÄ=9Flu's `Armenia
Opening.'
The international pressure on Turkey by the influential Armenian diaspora
must also be taken into account. The forthcoming 100-year anniversary of
the 1915 events will lead to an increase in the Armenian diaspora's
activities. And, in the United States, where 43 out of 50 states recognize
the Armenian genocide, a new resolution on the Armenian genocide may be on
the agenda, potentially creating legal grounds for numerous compensation
claims against the Turkish government.
Nowadays the Turkish political elite appears preoccupied with normalizing
Armenian-Turkish relations, in consideration of this process's potential
diplomatic, political, and economic risks and benefits. Furthermore, in the
run up to summer 2015 parliamentary elections, when political tensions will
rise and a political struggle accelerate, a diplomatic success for the AKP
government and for the new AKP party leader DavutoÄ=9Flu will obviously help
to distract people's attention from a tendency toward economic crisis (for
which the AKP government has been criticized in recent years) and make
people associate the party with a positive agenda once again.
However, current activities around the `Armenian question'
cannot help but
bring a feeling of déjà vu, recalling the situation in 2005, when, on the
eve of the 90-year anniversary of the events of 1915, the Turkish
government also made great efforts to mend relations with Armenia. At that
time the culmination of these efforts became a declaration of the Turkish
Grand National Assembly. In this document the tragic events of 1915 were
described and analyzed quite objectively (this was a real breakthrough in
the Turkish perception of the Armenian genocide), but the word `genocide'
was not used. This word proved to be a red line for Turkey, a distinct
limit of Turkey's flexibility. These steps failed to reach even the most
minimal demands from the Armenian perspective. Thus all these initiatives
failed to create solid ground for real compromise between the two states.
And the current situation surrounding dueling invitations-Armenian
President Serzh Sargsyan invited his Turkish colleague for the
commemoration of the Armenian genocide on April 24, while ErdoÄ=9Fan plans a
celebration of the Turkish victory in the Dardanelles Operation on the same
date-doesn't inspire confidence that the situation today can bear the fruit
of a sound and mutually acceptable compromise.
*Pavel Shlykov is a senior research fellow at the Institute of Asian and
African Studies, Moscow State University.*
http://carnegie.ru/eurasiaoutlook/?fa=58863&mkt_tok=3RkMMJWWfF9wsRonva3NZKXonjHpfsX6 7e8uXaag38431UFwdcjKPmjr1YIERMV0aPyQAgobGp5I5FEIQ7 XYTLB2t60MWA%3D%3D
From: Emil Lazarian | Ararat NewsPress