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IRAN AND SOUTH CAUCASUS: THE IMPLICATIONS OF "FREEZING"
09.02.2015
Sevak Sarukhanyan
Head of the Centre for the Political Studies of the Noravank Foundation
Although Iran and the six powers were unable to reach an agreement on
the nuclear issue in 2014, the negotiations will continue in 2015 and
there is a theoretical chance that if not full, then at least some
partial settlement will be reached in the relations between Tehran
and Washington. The article presents the potential corollaries that
such arrangement may bring for South Caucasus.
Rouhani's policy of "freezing"
After Hassan Rouhani's election as president, handling relations with
the West has become one of the cornerstones of Iran's foreign policy.
The common problems that simultaneously constitute threats and matters
of interest for both Tehran and Washington are used for this process.
These include the nuclear issue, Iraq and Syria. In almost all these
three directions the two sides try to avoid clashes and consider
establishment of partial cooperation as a major component in their
policies.
Washington's airstrikes in Syria were mainly limited to territories
controlled by the "Islamic State", which caused no opposition from
Iran, as the ruling government of Syria did not suffer any damage
from those.
In Iraq, the fight against the "Islamic State" still proceeds without
clashes between Iran and the USA. In fact, quite the opposite, the
actions of the two are aimed at the same short-term goals, the results
of which should be maximal impairment of the Islamists. However,
in future both the US and Iran will have to agree on who should
control Iraq after it is "liberated from the Islamists." This issue
is potentially fraught with serious conflicts, but it is a matter of
future: given the combat-readiness and agility of the "Islamic State",
that future is not coming too soon.
The nuclear issue is not less important and requires a special
discussion, but both Tehran and the White House are interested in
finding a common denominator.
As for Rouhani's strategy of handling the relations with the West,
it has to be noted that for Iran it requires tremendous human and
expert resources. In the last 1.5 years Iran's Ministry of Foreign
Affairs and Ministry of Petroleum have both made the normalization
of the relations with West a cornerstone of their activities. This
has indirectly resulted in "freezing" the other directions in Iran's
foreign policy, which is immediately felt both in South Caucasus and
Central Asia. In the recent period Iran has adopted a strategy of
passive policy in these two regions critically important for Iran,
aiming to prevent new developments and focusing only on existing
issues, the resolution of which pursues a single primary objective of
making sure they do not interfere with the Iranian-American dialogue.
Such policy of Iran results in some quite different consequences in
South Caucasus. They can be divided in two main parts: policies for
Armenia and Georgia, and policies for Azerbaijan. Such separation
is based on the fact that there are no serious problems in Tehran's
relation with Yerevan and Tbilisi, whereas in the last 20 years some
serious controversies have accumulated in the relations with Baku.
Because of this very reason during the last 1.5 years there has been
no progress in Tehran's relations with Yerevan and Tbilisi, while
some serious steps have been made in relations with Baku, which are
aimed at not so much eliminating the conflicts, but more towards
"freezing" those.
The implications of "freezing" for Armenia and Georgia
Though frequent as it is talked in Armenia about active development of
Armenian-Iranian relations, there had been no positive news in this
direction during the last two years. Not only the two parties have
reached no agreement on any new projects (e.g. Iran-Armenia railroad),
but also no steps have been undertaken towards implementation of the
already agreed ones. This concerns Armenia-Iran high-voltage power
transmission line and the Meghri Hydropower Plant. Both projects
depend on Iran's financing, because Armenia does not have funds
available for construction of these facilities, at least not in the
public sector. The construction of the high-voltage transmission
line would perhaps be more realistic, if it was handed over to the
only organization interested in it, which is Gazprom Armenia, since
Unit 5 of Hrazdan TPS that belongs to it is the only facility with
free capacity to export electricity to Iran. However, there is no
such decision and the project relies mainly on financing from Iran,
which is unlikely to happen under the circumstances of "freezing."
Rouhani's policy in Georgian direction has actually had some serious
regress compared to that during the years Mahmud Ahmadinejad's rule.
The latter at least twice had talks with Georgia's then-president
Mikheil Saakashvili and achieved favorable terms for Iranian
businessmen in Georgia, while during the last two years the Iranian
economic and financial presence in Tbilisi has plummeted dramatically.
Furthermore, under conditions of "freezing" and inattention, Tehran
missed Georgia's decision in 2014 regarding residence of foreigners in
Georgia, which in fact eliminated the Iranians' right and opportunity
to visit Georgia without entry visa requirement.
The implications of "freezing" for Azerbaijan
Unlike the case with Armenia and Georgia, Tehran has made significant
steps towards Baku, aiming not so much at development of new
projects, but rather, "freezing" the existing problems. Rouhani-Aliyev
negotiations in Tehran and Baku resulted in substantial reduction of
strain in relations. The Azerbaijani authorities have stopped their
"games" with respect to Southern Azerbaijan and even terminated the
authorization for State Committee on Affairs with the Diaspora to
work with local residents. In turn Tehran minimized support to Shia
anti-government Islamists. This is especially noticeable in Nardaran
suburb of Baku, where in the past anti-government protests took place
directly supported by the Iran.
It has to be noted that, unfortunately, the "Armenian card" is played
in the policy of "freezing" the disputes with Baku. During the visit of
Hassan Rouhani to Baku in autumn of 2014 the Iranian president first
time ever put his signature under an Azeri-Iranian declaration, which
contained a statement regarding territorial integrity of Azerbaijan
with respect to the NKR and criticized "aggression" against Azerbaijan.
It is a separate question what will happen to Iran's policy toward
South Caucasus if the relations with the West normalize. Today it can
be argued that although the negotiation process itself has drastically
reduced the possibility of a military conflict between Iran and
the USA, its current results are rather negative for Iran-Armenia
relations, which entered a deep stagnation phase. This phase will
last as long as Tehran is focused on the problem of arranging its
relations with the West.
"Globus" analytical bulletin, No. 1, 2015
Return ________________________________ Another materials of author
WHAT MAKES US DIPLOMATS TALK OF CAUCASUS CRISIS-2014?[04.07.2014]
NEW TRANSPORT PROJECTS IN THE REGION[26.05.2014] GAS TRANSIT
PIPELINE IRAN-ARMENIA: A CHANGE OF DISCOURSE[18.03.2014]
AN OUTLOOK FOR IRANIAN GAS IN ARMENIA [06.02.2014] JOINING OF
ARMENIA TO THE CUSTOMS UNION WILL ALLOW PROVIDING LOW GAS RATES -
EXPERT[13.09.2013] CSTO AND COMMUNICATION SECURITY[01.08.2013]
IRAN AFTER THE PRESIDENTIAL ELECTIONS[01.07.2013] "IRANIAN GAS
CAN REPLACE RUSSIAN BUT IT IS MUCH MORE EXPENSIVE"[10.06.2013]
KARS-AKHLKALAKI-TBILISI RAILWAY AND ITS REGIONAL PROSPECTS
[25.04.2013] QAZVIN-RASHT-ASTARA OR IRAN-ARMENIA? [21.02.2013]
http://www.noravank.am/eng/articles/detail.php?ELEMENT_ID=13148
From: Emil Lazarian | Ararat NewsPress
09.02.2015
Sevak Sarukhanyan
Head of the Centre for the Political Studies of the Noravank Foundation
Although Iran and the six powers were unable to reach an agreement on
the nuclear issue in 2014, the negotiations will continue in 2015 and
there is a theoretical chance that if not full, then at least some
partial settlement will be reached in the relations between Tehran
and Washington. The article presents the potential corollaries that
such arrangement may bring for South Caucasus.
Rouhani's policy of "freezing"
After Hassan Rouhani's election as president, handling relations with
the West has become one of the cornerstones of Iran's foreign policy.
The common problems that simultaneously constitute threats and matters
of interest for both Tehran and Washington are used for this process.
These include the nuclear issue, Iraq and Syria. In almost all these
three directions the two sides try to avoid clashes and consider
establishment of partial cooperation as a major component in their
policies.
Washington's airstrikes in Syria were mainly limited to territories
controlled by the "Islamic State", which caused no opposition from
Iran, as the ruling government of Syria did not suffer any damage
from those.
In Iraq, the fight against the "Islamic State" still proceeds without
clashes between Iran and the USA. In fact, quite the opposite, the
actions of the two are aimed at the same short-term goals, the results
of which should be maximal impairment of the Islamists. However,
in future both the US and Iran will have to agree on who should
control Iraq after it is "liberated from the Islamists." This issue
is potentially fraught with serious conflicts, but it is a matter of
future: given the combat-readiness and agility of the "Islamic State",
that future is not coming too soon.
The nuclear issue is not less important and requires a special
discussion, but both Tehran and the White House are interested in
finding a common denominator.
As for Rouhani's strategy of handling the relations with the West,
it has to be noted that for Iran it requires tremendous human and
expert resources. In the last 1.5 years Iran's Ministry of Foreign
Affairs and Ministry of Petroleum have both made the normalization
of the relations with West a cornerstone of their activities. This
has indirectly resulted in "freezing" the other directions in Iran's
foreign policy, which is immediately felt both in South Caucasus and
Central Asia. In the recent period Iran has adopted a strategy of
passive policy in these two regions critically important for Iran,
aiming to prevent new developments and focusing only on existing
issues, the resolution of which pursues a single primary objective of
making sure they do not interfere with the Iranian-American dialogue.
Such policy of Iran results in some quite different consequences in
South Caucasus. They can be divided in two main parts: policies for
Armenia and Georgia, and policies for Azerbaijan. Such separation
is based on the fact that there are no serious problems in Tehran's
relation with Yerevan and Tbilisi, whereas in the last 20 years some
serious controversies have accumulated in the relations with Baku.
Because of this very reason during the last 1.5 years there has been
no progress in Tehran's relations with Yerevan and Tbilisi, while
some serious steps have been made in relations with Baku, which are
aimed at not so much eliminating the conflicts, but more towards
"freezing" those.
The implications of "freezing" for Armenia and Georgia
Though frequent as it is talked in Armenia about active development of
Armenian-Iranian relations, there had been no positive news in this
direction during the last two years. Not only the two parties have
reached no agreement on any new projects (e.g. Iran-Armenia railroad),
but also no steps have been undertaken towards implementation of the
already agreed ones. This concerns Armenia-Iran high-voltage power
transmission line and the Meghri Hydropower Plant. Both projects
depend on Iran's financing, because Armenia does not have funds
available for construction of these facilities, at least not in the
public sector. The construction of the high-voltage transmission
line would perhaps be more realistic, if it was handed over to the
only organization interested in it, which is Gazprom Armenia, since
Unit 5 of Hrazdan TPS that belongs to it is the only facility with
free capacity to export electricity to Iran. However, there is no
such decision and the project relies mainly on financing from Iran,
which is unlikely to happen under the circumstances of "freezing."
Rouhani's policy in Georgian direction has actually had some serious
regress compared to that during the years Mahmud Ahmadinejad's rule.
The latter at least twice had talks with Georgia's then-president
Mikheil Saakashvili and achieved favorable terms for Iranian
businessmen in Georgia, while during the last two years the Iranian
economic and financial presence in Tbilisi has plummeted dramatically.
Furthermore, under conditions of "freezing" and inattention, Tehran
missed Georgia's decision in 2014 regarding residence of foreigners in
Georgia, which in fact eliminated the Iranians' right and opportunity
to visit Georgia without entry visa requirement.
The implications of "freezing" for Azerbaijan
Unlike the case with Armenia and Georgia, Tehran has made significant
steps towards Baku, aiming not so much at development of new
projects, but rather, "freezing" the existing problems. Rouhani-Aliyev
negotiations in Tehran and Baku resulted in substantial reduction of
strain in relations. The Azerbaijani authorities have stopped their
"games" with respect to Southern Azerbaijan and even terminated the
authorization for State Committee on Affairs with the Diaspora to
work with local residents. In turn Tehran minimized support to Shia
anti-government Islamists. This is especially noticeable in Nardaran
suburb of Baku, where in the past anti-government protests took place
directly supported by the Iran.
It has to be noted that, unfortunately, the "Armenian card" is played
in the policy of "freezing" the disputes with Baku. During the visit of
Hassan Rouhani to Baku in autumn of 2014 the Iranian president first
time ever put his signature under an Azeri-Iranian declaration, which
contained a statement regarding territorial integrity of Azerbaijan
with respect to the NKR and criticized "aggression" against Azerbaijan.
It is a separate question what will happen to Iran's policy toward
South Caucasus if the relations with the West normalize. Today it can
be argued that although the negotiation process itself has drastically
reduced the possibility of a military conflict between Iran and
the USA, its current results are rather negative for Iran-Armenia
relations, which entered a deep stagnation phase. This phase will
last as long as Tehran is focused on the problem of arranging its
relations with the West.
"Globus" analytical bulletin, No. 1, 2015
Return ________________________________ Another materials of author
WHAT MAKES US DIPLOMATS TALK OF CAUCASUS CRISIS-2014?[04.07.2014]
NEW TRANSPORT PROJECTS IN THE REGION[26.05.2014] GAS TRANSIT
PIPELINE IRAN-ARMENIA: A CHANGE OF DISCOURSE[18.03.2014]
AN OUTLOOK FOR IRANIAN GAS IN ARMENIA [06.02.2014] JOINING OF
ARMENIA TO THE CUSTOMS UNION WILL ALLOW PROVIDING LOW GAS RATES -
EXPERT[13.09.2013] CSTO AND COMMUNICATION SECURITY[01.08.2013]
IRAN AFTER THE PRESIDENTIAL ELECTIONS[01.07.2013] "IRANIAN GAS
CAN REPLACE RUSSIAN BUT IT IS MUCH MORE EXPENSIVE"[10.06.2013]
KARS-AKHLKALAKI-TBILISI RAILWAY AND ITS REGIONAL PROSPECTS
[25.04.2013] QAZVIN-RASHT-ASTARA OR IRAN-ARMENIA? [21.02.2013]
http://www.noravank.am/eng/articles/detail.php?ELEMENT_ID=13148
From: Emil Lazarian | Ararat NewsPress