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RUSSIA IS INCREASINGLY USING AGGRESSION TO GET ITS WAY
The Hill, DC
feb 12 2015
By Giorgi Meladze
When the Soviet Union broke up in 1991, it looked for a while as
though Russia might use diplomacy as opposed to military might to
exercise its influence in the region.
First, Russia had its hands full transitioning to a market economy.
The 1990s witnessed the deterioration of the economy, the rise of
oligarchs who seized large chunks of the industrial base and the
rise of a mafia that was grabbing slices of the economy. Second, the
country's military was left in a shambles after the Soviet fall. Key
problems were inadequate funding and the loss of military equipment
to former-Soviet states that had become independent.
ADVERTISEMENT There were ominous signs, however, that when Russia
thought the time was right, it might use force again to impose its
will on its neighbors. The clearest was perhaps the war in Chechnya,
a bloody battle waged on Russian territory that cost the lives of
tens of thousands of citizens.
Another was that it refused to pull its troops out of Moldova, where
the largely ethnic-Russian Transnistria region sought independence. It
similarly continued to keep troops in Armenia and Georgia, and played
a highly ambiguous role in the war between Azerbaijan and Armenia
over Nagorno-Karabakh, which resulted in the rise of a separatist
government on that territory.
The Kremlin also succeeded in creating a frozen conflict in South
Ossetia and another breakaway region, Abkhazia -- that is, a situation
in which the two areas have de-facto independence from Georgia.
Russia likes having these areas in limbo because it keeps Georgia
off-balance, making it harder for Tbilisi to achieve both domestic
and foreign-policy progress. One goal in particular that Moscow does
not want Georgia to achieve is its longtime dream of becoming part
of the European Union.
Although Russia defeated Georgia in the 2008 war, international
military experts say Russian forces were inept in the conflict,
winning only because they had superior numbers.
The embarrassing showing prompted the Kremlin to launch a major
overhaul of its military, including tens of billions of dollars in
equipment upgrades.
When Ukrainians who wanted their country to join the EU threw out the
pro-Russian President Viktor Yanukovych for rejecting an EU association
agreement, Russia's military had rebounded to the point that the
Kremlin felt no compunction about using it to force its will on Kiev.
We all know what happened next.
Russia seized Crimea with special forces wearing no military markings.
Then it backed separatists in eastern Ukraine who wanted their
provinces to become independent. That support has included hundreds
of tons of military equipment and both irregular and regular Russian
forces. NATO has said Russia has 2,000 regular forces in the country
now.
Ukraine puts the figure at 9,000.
Russia has denied its troops are in Ukraine, but the hordes of body
bags returning to Russia for burial and the numerous Russian troops
captured in Ukraine have proved otherwise.
Russia's objective in backing the separatists is to keep Ukraine so
unstable that Kiev surrenders its stated goals of joining the EU and
NATO, Russia experts say.
Meanwhile, other countries in the former Soviet Union with sizable
ethnic-Russian minorities or with regions that have been making noise
about independence are becoming increasingly nervous about Russia's
inclination to use military force in the region.
Among them are the Baltic states -- Latvia, Lithuania and Estonia --
which have hundreds of thousands of ethnic Russians. Their nervousness
comes despite the fact that they are NATO members. They fear the
kind of stealth tactics Russia used to seize Crimea and destabilize
eastern Ukraine.
Another country with reason to worry about Russian aggression is
Azerbaijan. It is afraid that Russia could capitalize on a separatist
movement in the Talysh region to send troops in, with the goal of
creating a frozen conflict there.
Those living in the Talysh region are not ethnic Russians. But given
Moscow's proclivity to create conflicts to control its neighbors,
Azerbaijan is worried that Russia might support a Talysh separatist
movement. Some experts point to an article penned by Talysh leader
Fakhruddin Aboszoda, which was recently published by the Russian
news agency IAREX and claims that the region will soon become an
independent state, as evidence in this regard.
Many countries in the former Soviet region and in the West would
undoubtedly oppose such a development. A primary reason is that
Azerbaijan is a stable country in a strategically critical area
-- at the crossroads of the Caucasus, Europe, the Middle East and
Central Asia. Another is that the oil- and gas-rich country has been
a staunchly reliable energy partner for Europe.
Russia has now used force -- or the threat of force -- to achieve
frozen conflicts in Georgia, Ukraine and Moldova and to impose its
will on Armenia, which recently dropped plans to join the EU in favor
of becoming a member of the Russia-dominated Eurasian Economic Union.
Moscow may be attaining short-term foreign-policy gains by using
force. But this throwback to Soviet times will cost it in the long
run. Most of its neighbors want as little to do with it as possible.
And most of the West -- and many other countries -- are actively
opposing its aggression and trying to isolate the Kremlin.
It is going to take time for Moscow to admit that it is on the
wrong track.
The sooner it does, and stops using military aggression as an
instrument of foreign policy, the better off it -- and the world --
will be.
Meladze is the director of the Ilia State University Center for
Constitutional Studies and the executive director of the Liberty
Institute, a libertarian think-tank in the nation of Georgia. He is
also the founder and editor of LobbyingAlert.com, a blog analyzing
lobbying issues.
http://thehill.com/blogs/congress-blog/foreign-policy/232557-russia-is-increasingly-using-aggression-to-get-its-way
The Hill, DC
feb 12 2015
By Giorgi Meladze
When the Soviet Union broke up in 1991, it looked for a while as
though Russia might use diplomacy as opposed to military might to
exercise its influence in the region.
First, Russia had its hands full transitioning to a market economy.
The 1990s witnessed the deterioration of the economy, the rise of
oligarchs who seized large chunks of the industrial base and the
rise of a mafia that was grabbing slices of the economy. Second, the
country's military was left in a shambles after the Soviet fall. Key
problems were inadequate funding and the loss of military equipment
to former-Soviet states that had become independent.
ADVERTISEMENT There were ominous signs, however, that when Russia
thought the time was right, it might use force again to impose its
will on its neighbors. The clearest was perhaps the war in Chechnya,
a bloody battle waged on Russian territory that cost the lives of
tens of thousands of citizens.
Another was that it refused to pull its troops out of Moldova, where
the largely ethnic-Russian Transnistria region sought independence. It
similarly continued to keep troops in Armenia and Georgia, and played
a highly ambiguous role in the war between Azerbaijan and Armenia
over Nagorno-Karabakh, which resulted in the rise of a separatist
government on that territory.
The Kremlin also succeeded in creating a frozen conflict in South
Ossetia and another breakaway region, Abkhazia -- that is, a situation
in which the two areas have de-facto independence from Georgia.
Russia likes having these areas in limbo because it keeps Georgia
off-balance, making it harder for Tbilisi to achieve both domestic
and foreign-policy progress. One goal in particular that Moscow does
not want Georgia to achieve is its longtime dream of becoming part
of the European Union.
Although Russia defeated Georgia in the 2008 war, international
military experts say Russian forces were inept in the conflict,
winning only because they had superior numbers.
The embarrassing showing prompted the Kremlin to launch a major
overhaul of its military, including tens of billions of dollars in
equipment upgrades.
When Ukrainians who wanted their country to join the EU threw out the
pro-Russian President Viktor Yanukovych for rejecting an EU association
agreement, Russia's military had rebounded to the point that the
Kremlin felt no compunction about using it to force its will on Kiev.
We all know what happened next.
Russia seized Crimea with special forces wearing no military markings.
Then it backed separatists in eastern Ukraine who wanted their
provinces to become independent. That support has included hundreds
of tons of military equipment and both irregular and regular Russian
forces. NATO has said Russia has 2,000 regular forces in the country
now.
Ukraine puts the figure at 9,000.
Russia has denied its troops are in Ukraine, but the hordes of body
bags returning to Russia for burial and the numerous Russian troops
captured in Ukraine have proved otherwise.
Russia's objective in backing the separatists is to keep Ukraine so
unstable that Kiev surrenders its stated goals of joining the EU and
NATO, Russia experts say.
Meanwhile, other countries in the former Soviet Union with sizable
ethnic-Russian minorities or with regions that have been making noise
about independence are becoming increasingly nervous about Russia's
inclination to use military force in the region.
Among them are the Baltic states -- Latvia, Lithuania and Estonia --
which have hundreds of thousands of ethnic Russians. Their nervousness
comes despite the fact that they are NATO members. They fear the
kind of stealth tactics Russia used to seize Crimea and destabilize
eastern Ukraine.
Another country with reason to worry about Russian aggression is
Azerbaijan. It is afraid that Russia could capitalize on a separatist
movement in the Talysh region to send troops in, with the goal of
creating a frozen conflict there.
Those living in the Talysh region are not ethnic Russians. But given
Moscow's proclivity to create conflicts to control its neighbors,
Azerbaijan is worried that Russia might support a Talysh separatist
movement. Some experts point to an article penned by Talysh leader
Fakhruddin Aboszoda, which was recently published by the Russian
news agency IAREX and claims that the region will soon become an
independent state, as evidence in this regard.
Many countries in the former Soviet region and in the West would
undoubtedly oppose such a development. A primary reason is that
Azerbaijan is a stable country in a strategically critical area
-- at the crossroads of the Caucasus, Europe, the Middle East and
Central Asia. Another is that the oil- and gas-rich country has been
a staunchly reliable energy partner for Europe.
Russia has now used force -- or the threat of force -- to achieve
frozen conflicts in Georgia, Ukraine and Moldova and to impose its
will on Armenia, which recently dropped plans to join the EU in favor
of becoming a member of the Russia-dominated Eurasian Economic Union.
Moscow may be attaining short-term foreign-policy gains by using
force. But this throwback to Soviet times will cost it in the long
run. Most of its neighbors want as little to do with it as possible.
And most of the West -- and many other countries -- are actively
opposing its aggression and trying to isolate the Kremlin.
It is going to take time for Moscow to admit that it is on the
wrong track.
The sooner it does, and stops using military aggression as an
instrument of foreign policy, the better off it -- and the world --
will be.
Meladze is the director of the Ilia State University Center for
Constitutional Studies and the executive director of the Liberty
Institute, a libertarian think-tank in the nation of Georgia. He is
also the founder and editor of LobbyingAlert.com, a blog analyzing
lobbying issues.
http://thehill.com/blogs/congress-blog/foreign-policy/232557-russia-is-increasingly-using-aggression-to-get-its-way