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  • US-Azerbaijan Relations: Capitol Hill Hearing Testimony: Statement O

    US-AZERBAIJAN RELATIONS: CAPITOL HILL HEARING TESTIMONY: STATEMENT OF DR. SVANTE E. CORNELL

    CQ Congressional Testimony
    February 12, 2015 Thursday

    U.S.-AZERBAIJAN RELATIONS: COMMITTEE: HOUSE FOREIGN AFFAIRS

    SUBCOMMITTEE: EUROPE, EURASIA, AND EMERGING THREATS

    CAPITOL HILL HEARING TESTIMONY

    Statement of Dr. Svante E. Cornell , Director, Central Asia-Caucasus
    Institute School of Advanced International Studies The Johns Hopkins
    University

    Committee on House Foreign Affairs Subcommittee on Europe, Eurasia,
    and Emerging Threats

    February 12, 2015 2

    Introduction

    This hearing occurs at a low point in relations between Azerbaijan and
    the United States, a relationship that was once a well-functioning
    strategic partnership characterized by a high level of trust. To
    understand the reasons behind this state of affairs, and especially to
    seek ways to improve the current situation, it is necessary to briefly
    delve into Azerbaijan's regional security situation and its politics;
    and not least, the policy of the U.S. in Eastern Europe and Eurasia
    more broadly.

    Azerbaijan's situation has unique characteristics, but the topic
    today is part and parcel of several larger trends: first of all,
    it is an acute case of the declining influence of the West, and
    particularly the United States, in all of post-communist Europe
    and Eurasia - in all sectors, including security, energy and human
    rights. Secondly, the decline of Azerbaijan's relationship with the
    U.S. bears similarities to tensions in America's ties with a number of
    other allies, from Israel to South Korea, that have grown wary of U.S.

    foreign policy.

    Before delving into these matters, it is important to review briefly
    why Azerbaijan and its region matters to America's interests.

    Why Does Azerbaijan Matter, and What Are U.S. Interests?

    The main importance of Azerbaijan and the Caucasus lies in its crucial
    geographical location at the intersection of multiple crossroads. It
    lies between the Black and Caspian seas, and thus between Europe and
    Asia as well as providing the land link between Russia and the Middle
    East. Its key strategic value is twofold. On one hand, it lies at the
    intersection between Russia, Iran and Turkey, powers playing key roles
    in international politics. On the other, it is the bottleneck of the
    burgeoning east-west corridor connecting Europe to Central Asia and
    beyond. In this Caucasus corridor, Azerbaijan is the only country
    bordering both Russia and Iran, and therefore the geopolitically
    most pivotal country. Former National Security Advisor Zbigniew
    Brzezinski acknowledged this in his 1997 book The Grand Chessboard,
    in which he termed Azerbaijan one of the five geopolitical pivots of
    Eurasia together with Ukraine, South Korea, Turkey and Iran.

    As a result, Azerbaijan and its region is key to western efforts to
    shape the future of the intersection of Europe and the Middle East, and
    to any reaction to crises occurring in this wider area. It also plays a
    central role in western access to the heart of the Eurasian continent,
    whether it be for energy, transport, trade, or military purposes. The
    strategic importance of Azerbaijan and its region can also be stated
    in terms of the current difficult moment in international politics,
    where the two most salient challenges to the transatlantic alliance
    are Russia's aggressive expansionism, and the Islamic radicalism
    emanating from the Middle East.

    The states of the Caucasus and Central Asia, Azerbaijan in particular,
    are unique as they are an important pressure point in both directions.

    The task of countering Putin's Russian imperialism goes beyond Ukraine,
    and requires a firm strategy to bolster the states on Russia's
    periphery, and especially to maintain the crucial east-west corridor
    to Central Asia open. But the Caucasus and Central Asia also include
    fully one half of secular Muslim-majority states in the world.

    These states may have far to go in terms of democratic development,
    but their governments and populations are committed to the separation
    of state and religion, to secular laws, and to the protection of
    state and society from religious extremism. Azerbaijan is unique in
    being a majority Shi'a Muslim state, bordering Iran, which is based
    on a secular form of statehood.

    Thus, the Caucasus (and Central Asia) should be seen as bulwarks
    against both Moscow and the Islamic radicalism of the Middle East.

    This is amplified by other regional trends. The Iranian theocracy
    continues to assertively expand its regional influence, as events
    from Syria to Iraq to Yemen indicate. In Turkey, the deterioration
    of secular government has given rise to a growing anti-western
    authoritarianism with Islamist underpinnings, endangering the
    Turkish-American alliance. As a country sharing linguistic bonds
    with Turkey and religious ties with Iran, Azerbaijan is once again
    uniquely situated.

    As mentioned, Azerbaijan is the lynchpin in the land bridge that
    the Caucasus constitutes linking Europe with Central Asia. This is
    important concretely in terms both of Europe's energy security,
    and America's military access to the heart of Eurasia, including
    Afghanistan.

    The creation of a pipeline system connecting Azerbaijan's Caspian
    Sea oil and gas resources via Turkey to Europe, which began a decade
    ago, broke the Russian monopoly over the exportation of Caspian
    energy resources, and provides Europe with an important source of
    diversification. Through Azerbaijan, Europe has the opportunity to
    access Central Asia's even larger natural gas resources. Second,
    after the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, the U.S. faced
    the enormous challenge of waging a war in the heart of the Eurasian
    continent, thousands of miles from the closest U.S. military base.

    America's response was made possible by the introduction of U.S.

    military power into Central Asia - which was achieved in turn through
    the air corridor across Georgia and Azerbaijan. Later, a Northern
    Distribution Network was created which includes access through Russia;
    but given the state of Russia-West relations, that corridor cannot
    be counted on. Moscow has already on two occasions in the past few
    months blocked the German Air Force from using Russian territory to
    supply its presence in Afghanistan. Thus, access through Azerbaijan
    will remain crucial for any continued presence in Afghanistan or
    future contingencies.

    In sum, therefore, the Caucasus and particularly Azerbaijan has an
    important place in the western strategy to meet imminent threats
    in Eastern Europe and the Middle East, as well as in long- term
    contingencies for a variety of challenges in the wider region. The
    U.S. has a serious and strategic interest in ensuring that the
    Caucasus, and Azerbaijan, maintain a positive relationship with the
    West, and remain open for western access.

    Concrete U.S. Interests

    The title of this hearing correctly assumes that the relations
    between Azerbaijan and the United States occur in diverse areas,
    usually summarized as security, energy and human rights; and that
    the U.S. has important interests in each area. In more specific and
    concrete terms, American interests in Azerbaijan and the region can
    be summarized as follows:

    For Azerbaijan and the states of the Caucasus to be stable, sovereign
    and self-governing states controlled by none of their neighboring
    powers; and cooperating actively with Western governments and
    institutions on regional security, counter- terrorism and conflict
    resolution.

    For the conflicts of the Caucasus, particularly the Armenian-
    Azerbaijani conflict, to be placed on a path toward long-term and
    peaceful resolution, within the framework of international law,
    and with the degree of manipulation of external powers minimized.

    For Azerbaijan to be a state with secular laws in a geographical
    environment that includes theocratic Iran, Iraq, the North Caucasus,
    and Turkey.

    For Azerbaijan and its neighbors to evolve gradually but assuredly
    into a zone of self-governing, law-based states that respect human
    rights, are free of corruption, and are responsive to citizens' needs.

    For Azerbaijan and its neighbors to be a source and transit corridor
    for energy, in particular contributing to diversifying the sources
    of Europe's energy supplies, and to function as a reliable territory
    for Western access by land and air to and from Central and South Asia.

    For Azerbaijan and its neighbors to develop into an important land
    trade corridor connecting Europe, China, and India not controlled by
    any of them but protected by all.

    Unfortunately, developments over the past decade have not
    furthered these interests. The sovereignty of the regional states
    is increasingly under question as blatant interference by Russia
    has mounted, complemented by lesser degrees of meddling by Iran and
    Turkey. The Armenian-Azerbaijani conflict is on a path of escalation,
    not resolution. Azerbaijan remains committed to secular laws, but the
    political development of the country and its rights record has come
    under increasingly strong criticism. The development of the energy
    corridor to the West has been stalled and faced multiple hurdles in
    the past decade. Progress toward making the Caucasus a land corridor
    is proceeding, but at a slow speed.

    Meanwhile, for most of the past decade, America's ability to affect
    developments in Azerbaijan and the entire region has been in decline.

    In retrospect, the 2008 Russian invasion of Georgia was a turning
    point, after which the situation in the region, and western influence
    there, has deteriorated. In fact, it is no exaggeration to state that
    at no time since the collapse of the Soviet Union has the U.S. had
    less influence over regional matters than today.

    Changes in the Region: Impact on the U.S.-Azerbaijan Relationship

    The U.S.-Azerbaijan relationship is the most acute exhibit of a
    trend of declining American influence. A decade ago, this was a
    relatively strong strategic partnership, characterized by mutual
    respect and a functioning dialogue between two governments. Today,
    its main characteristic is bitter acrimony on both sides.

    What are the reasons for this? It is customary to blame Azerbaijan's
    domestic evolution for the decline in the relationship. While this is
    one factor, the question that should be asked is how the U.S. could
    have allowed a relationship with a geostrategically pivotal country
    like Azerbaijan to deteriorate so badly, and without taking serious and
    visible efforts to engage its leadership until very recently. A decade
    ago, the Azerbaijani government was considerably more responsive to
    U.S. criticism and advice concerning its domestic political system,
    management of elections, and human rights record.

    What has changed in the past decade, and why is this no longer
    the case?

    First, Azerbaijan has benefited from a large inflow of wealth from
    its oil and gas industry. It was the fastest-growing economy in the
    world for several years - a major change in a country that was in a
    dilapidated condition, indeed a failing state, only twenty years ago.

    That has brought an ability to provide adequate funding to state
    institutions; co-opt large portions of the elite, particularly young
    professionals; as well as acquire legitimacy in considerable chunks of
    society. Opinion polling from the respected Caucasus Research Resource
    Centers shows that the broader population's approval of government
    services is growing, not falling. This new-found wealth has led to
    a growing reluctance to take advice from abroad; this factor has
    been compounded by the intra-elite politics within the government,
    as discussed below.

    A more important factor is the regional environment, which has worsened
    considerably. Aggressive Russian efforts to reassert control over the
    former Soviet republics have contributed to a siege mentality. In the
    past seven years, Russia has invaded two post-Soviet states (Georgia
    and Ukraine) militarily, helped orchestrate a coup d'etat in a third
    (Kyrgyzstan), and strong- armed a fourth (Armenia) to drop all efforts
    at European integration in favor of the Eurasian Union. Russian
    subversion is on the rise across the former Soviet sphere, as it
    is in western countries. To this should be added constant Iranian
    subversive activities, as well as a growing tendency by Turkey to
    interfere in Azerbaijan's internal affairs. This, put together, has
    formed a powerful inhibitor against loosening government control over
    state and society.

    Missteps in American Policies

    However, U.S. policies - or the lack thereof - have been an important
    contributing factor. It is important to recall that America's
    relationship with Azerbaijan, like all former Soviet states, was
    built on several components. A constructive dialogue on human rights
    and democracy was one of these. Another was American engagement in
    supporting the development of the east- west energy corridor, which
    enabled Azerbaijan to market is resources independently. A third
    was close cooperation on security issues, which included America's
    efforts to help resolve the Armenian-Azerbaijani conflict, as well
    as bilateral cooperation on defense, security, intelligence sharing
    and counter-terrorism.

    These three areas, then, formed a tripod upon which U.S. policy was
    based. But in the past decade, that tripod has for all practical
    purposes faltered. American engagement in energy issues was strong
    down to the completion of initial pipeline infrastructure ten years
    ago; it has declined since then. The position of a U.S. Special Envoy
    for Eurasian Energy has been abolished; and America's role in the
    efforts to bring Caspian natural gas to Europe is minimal. Security
    interests gained salience after 9/11, but began a slow decline after
    2003 as U.S. attention shifted to Iraq and European governments
    were unwilling to pick up the slack. Not least, U.S. leadership in
    resolving the Armenian-Azerbaijani conflict has been missing.

    As a result, for most practical purposes, the promotion of democracy
    and human rights has been the only leg of U.S. policy proceeding at
    full speed, leading to an imbalance in the tripod that forms the
    underpinning of American strategy. Furthermore, this is certainly
    the way the relationship is seen from Baku's perspective. In large
    parts of the elite, this is leading to a growing questioning of U.S.

    motivations, and a growing inclination to entertain conspiracy theories
    (propagated not least by Russian media) on alleged American plots to
    overthrow governments.

    To be clear, the argument here is not that the U.S. has engaged too
    deeply in democracy promotion. The problem is that the U.S. has not
    balanced that important commitment with equal attention to security
    and energy, and has not adapted its methods to be successful in view
    of evolving regional realities.

    In this context, the period following the 2008 war in Georgia was a
    watershed. That war laid bare the brute force Russia was willing to
    deploy to achieve its interests; it also showed that the West did
    not function as an effective deterrent against Russia. Not staying
    at that, the two American initiatives that most affected Azerbaijan
    were profoundly counter-productive for the bilateral relationship.

    First, rather than causing Russia to pay a price for its invasion of an
    independent state, the Obama administration rewarded Moscow with the
    "Reset" initiative. U.S. officials claimed it would not come at the
    price of relations with smaller post-Soviet states; but in practice,
    it did. America's weak response to the invasion of Georgia, it should
    be said in retrospect, led the Kremlin to conclude it could get away
    with an even more brazen attack on Ukraine without lasting, serious
    consequences. In Baku, it led Azerbaijani leaders to question the
    rationale of the country's westward orientation.

    Second, the Obama administration did not conclude from the Georgia war
    that it should spend additional efforts and energy on resolving the
    other unresolved conflict in the Caucasus - that between Armenia and
    Azerbaijan. Instead, it decided to embark on a project to normalize
    Turkish-Armenian relations. The core of that initiative was to open
    the Turkish-Armenian border, which Turkey had closed in 1993 because
    of Armenia's occupation of Azerbaijan's territory. Since that time,
    a link had been maintained between Turkish-Armenian relations and the
    Armenia- Azerbaijan conflict. The United States now pushed to cut that
    link, something that would heavily damage Azerbaijan's interests,
    without offering Baku anything in the process. This initiative
    effectively was understood in Baku to mean that Azerbaijan's most
    important national security issue was no longer an American concern.

    At roughly the same time, America's handling of the Arab upheavals, and
    its perceived endorsement of revolutions that brought Islamist forces
    to power, further exacerbated perceptions of American intentions.

    Further, the U.S. has failed to draw the implications of Azerbaijan's
    complex and opaque internal political scene. Because the formal
    opposition is marginalized, American observers have generally assumed
    that President Aliyev exercises autocratic power. On this basis they
    pay little attention to intra- government politics. Yet Azerbaijan's
    internal politics are complex, and take place to a significant extent
    within the government rather than between government and opposition.

    Notwithstanding the formidable powers that the Constitution accords
    the President, his power are in reality far from complete.

    In fact, since the 1990s, Azerbaijan's government developed a number
    of autonomous fiefdoms, the masters of which have shown an ability to
    effectively check the chief executive's powers. Internal rivalries
    exist in many countries, and can debilitate effective governance
    anywhere. But in Azerbaijan, two factors exacerbate them: first,
    these forces are strongest in the chief repressive organs of the state.

    Second, they have a thinly disguised (and in some cases overtly
    stated) affinity for Russia over the West, and maintain close ties to
    counterparts in Moscow that date back to the Soviet period. These
    forces have tended to oppose, and even undermine, Azerbaijan's
    relations with the West. While President Aliyev and his appointees
    have consistently sought to deepen Azerbaijan's relations with the
    West, resilient forces whose positions date back to before Aliyev
    came to power in 2003 have used their power to repress civil society
    organizations and cracked down on dissidents at times often chosen
    specifically to undermine the country's relations with the West.

    Meanwhile, the U.S. has effectively linked improved bilateral relations
    in all areas with the advancement of democratic reforms and human
    rights. This is certainly laudable in principle. But in practice,
    in the absence of a solid American strategy toward the region,
    the implication has been to give the most anti-Western forces in the
    government a de facto veto over Azerbaijan's relations with the United
    States. This has benefited only the forces in the region seeking to
    diminish U.S. influence.

    Put otherwise, American actions in response to deplorable acts of
    repression have inadvertently reinforced the most retrograde elements
    in the government and contributed to isolating the very forces in
    the government that advocate for reform, and for integration with the
    West. By curtailing engagement in other areas of common interest, e.g.

    security and energy, American and European leaders have inadvertently
    alienated some of their closest potential partners in the region.

    In the final analysis, the problem with U.S. policy has been, at
    the basic level, the absence of a concrete strategy that defines
    America's interests in the region, appreciates the existence of
    separate interests, while at all times taking into account the
    interactions between these areas of interest.

    The Way Forward

    Taking as a starting point that the U.S.-Azerbaijan relationship
    is important to the U.S. national interest, what can be done to
    improve it?

    It is sometimes implied that Azerbaijan is building closer ties
    with Russia. In a sense, at least for the caricature of Azerbaijan
    prevalent in Western media, turning toward Moscow would seem to be a
    natural choice. But in fact, Azerbaijan is one of the former Soviet
    states that has been the most determined in resisting Russian efforts
    at Eurasian integration. Instead, Azerbaijan fundamentally remains
    oriented toward the West, even though that orientation is increasingly
    tenuous. Aside from pipeline infrastructure, the country is a member
    of the Council of Europe, and joined the European Union's Eastern
    Partnership in 2009. European identity remains an important element
    of Azerbaijan's self-image, as the country's eagerness to host the
    first European Games in 2015 shows.

    As Baku's relationship with the West has cooled, it has nevertheless
    moved gradually toward a position of non-alignment: while abstaining
    from deeper integration with Russia, Azerbaijan also eschews
    integration with Europe, attempting instead to "go it alone". In view
    of the turbulence of its region, western missteps, and growing Russian
    pressure detailed above, Azerbaijan's foreign policy orientation has
    in fact been remarkably consistent. In many ways, Azerbaijan's view of
    the United States is similar to that which can be found in numerous
    other American allies from Israel to South Korea and from Bahrain to
    Saudi Arabia: confusion bordering on disbelief over America's policies
    and intentions, and a sense of frustration and abandonment. In other
    words, it is indicative of a broader problem regarding America's
    place in the world.

    That said, at this time of considerable turmoil both to Azerbaijan's
    north and south, the United States both can, and should, develop
    a new approach to Azerbaijan and its region, as the current policy
    is clearly not working. To this effect, several observers including
    former senior officials, have argued for an approach that is even
    tougher on Azerbaijan, including punitive measures. Such an approach
    would be sure to fail, because it presupposes a level of American
    leverage that is simply not in existence. In the current environment,
    a policy that would make U.S. policy even more one-dimensional would
    have almost no prospect of bringing positive results. The ruling elite
    does not perceive that it benefits from its association with the U.S.

    in key matters of national security; therefore, the U.S. simply does
    not have the leverage it once had to influence Baku's policies by
    the use of the proverbial stick.

    Furthermore, singling out Azerbaijan makes little sense in the
    absence of similar measures against regional countries with worse
    human rights records. Frustration with western indifference to the
    plight of the hundreds of thousands of displaced people from the
    Armenian-occupied territories in Mountainous Karabakh and western
    Azerbaijan is already high in Azerbaijan, and any further targeting
    of Azerbaijan would reinforce the sense of western double standards,
    which officials at very high levels already denounce.

    In fact, given the prevailing frustration with the west and the
    character of the country's intra-elite politics, such steps would
    be likely to alienate Azerbaijan even further, and could in fact
    extinguish whatever influence the U.S. still commands in the country.

    The main victims of such an outcome would be not the ruling elite,
    but the proponents of human rights and democracy in Azerbaijan itself.

    Instead, what is needed is a policy rooted in a regional strategy,
    which is based on a broad engagement of the region. A new American
    policy must coordinate and find the right balance and sequence among
    its priorities. In this context, a much stronger engagement in issues
    pertaining to sovereignty and security will do more than anything else
    to pave the way for progress in other areas, including human rights.

    The history of the past twenty years shows that whenever the U.S. has
    been strongly involved in energy and security affairs of the Caucasus,
    the Azerbaijani government has been responsive to criticism. When
    that has not been the case, as in the past several years, America's
    leverage has declined.

    In short, going forward, the U.S. cannot expect progress on governance
    and human rights without a clear commitment to security issues;
    concomitantly, Azerbaijan's leaders must understand that they cannot
    expect Western support for their security without a commitment
    to reforms in governance and human rights. As already noted, this
    does not mean that a new policy should have less of an emphasis
    on human rights issues. But it means the U.S. must do more also
    to address the issues on which it worked effectively a decade ago:
    bolstering sovereignty and independence, addressing security issues,
    working seriously to resolve the Armenian-Azerbaijani conflict,
    and re-engaging on energy politics - all of which happen to be in U.S.

    national interest. In sum, for both Azerbaijan's domestic situation
    and the bilateral relationship to improve, America's presence must
    once again be felt in the region.

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