Tweet
U.S. New Role for Armenia
Igor Muradyan, Political Analyst
Comments - 14 February 2015, 14:12
Russia finds that it has lost a lot of the Caucasian policy in the war
in Ossetia and is trying to rearrange its steps and priorities in the
region.
The United States fully controls Georgia and Azerbaijan, primarily
their system of communications, and Russia has practically isolated
itself in the region.
Different groups of politicians and policy makers have formed in
Moscow who handle the interests of Russia and its companies in the
South Caucasus in the context of group and corporate interests, not
national interests. It certainly supposes strengthening of Russia's
activities in the Azerbaijani direction.
The Russian political leadership is trying to change the nature of the
Russian-Azerbaijani relations and settle down in Azerbaijan through
changes in geo-economic projects, preventing its involvement in
anti-Russian policy of certain world centers of power.
At the same time, Russia understands very well in what a deadlocked
and vulnerable situation Azerbaijan has appeared, and perceives its
"new policy" as forced steps determined by Baku's frustration.
It would be a mistake to link Azerbaijan's goals and objectives on
building new relations with Russia with the settlement of the Karabakh
issue. The Azerbaijani elite understands that in the existing
international situation Russia cannot be a director of the Caucasian
policy and is no longer capable of handing Karabakh to Azerbaijan.
Russia's attempts to put the Karabakh issue onto its track of politics
have always failed, strengthening the doubts of Armenia and the
Armenian society about Russia's reliability as a partner.
Even the present government of Armenia is not capable of providing
such services to Moscow. Of course, the Karabakh issue remains among
Azerbaijan's priorities but relations with Russia which Azerbaijan is
allegedly trying to revise must be viewed as an argument in the
general chart of Baku's foreign policy.
At this stage Russia is focused on its priorities relating to the
Karabakh theme and the Armenian-Azerbaijani relations. This scheme and
logic are very simply, and apparently the specific activities are not
going to be complicated.
Russia is ready to develop relations with Azerbaijan in different
spheres but to the extent that Armenia will remain its partner in the
current format. The scheme drafted by the jugglers of Muscovite
politics has no alternative.
Apparently, Armenia has underestimated the circumstance how concerned
Moscow is with attempts to normalize Armenian-Turkish relations. It
may not understand this logic, as well as the extent of lack of
confidence of Russian politicians in Turkey and Azerbaijan in
political matters.
Russia is not worried that Armenia may appear in the orbit of Turkish
politics and economy, nor is it worried that the United States, not
Russia becomes the leading guarantor of security of Armenia against
Turkish threats.
Setting up new relations in the South Caucasus mostly determined the
new role of the United States for Armenia, transformation of Armenia
to a new Israel when the "Armenian factor" of pressure on Turkey will
be strengthened. In addition, the role of Armenia will become
significant in thwarting the plans of forming any Turkish-Russian
alliance.
Moscow thinks the plans to maintain control over the Black Sea and the
South Caucasus are possible only through deepening partnership with
Turkey. In other words, Moscow views this region as an area which
Russia and Turkey must divide.
These two states have appeared in international isolation initiated
and organized by its partners in the Unites States and NATO, with the
participation of Arab states and Iran. Now the question is which
states of the Black Sea-Caucasus and the Balkans are ready to
participate in this strategy in one way or another.
Some states are fully ready but on one condition - to what extent is
the Euro-Atlantic community ready for the long-term policy of collapse
of Turkey and Russia?
http://www.lragir.am/index/eng/0/comments/view/33635#sthash.kNXBdQxc.dpuf
Igor Muradyan, Political Analyst
Comments - 14 February 2015, 14:12
Russia finds that it has lost a lot of the Caucasian policy in the war
in Ossetia and is trying to rearrange its steps and priorities in the
region.
The United States fully controls Georgia and Azerbaijan, primarily
their system of communications, and Russia has practically isolated
itself in the region.
Different groups of politicians and policy makers have formed in
Moscow who handle the interests of Russia and its companies in the
South Caucasus in the context of group and corporate interests, not
national interests. It certainly supposes strengthening of Russia's
activities in the Azerbaijani direction.
The Russian political leadership is trying to change the nature of the
Russian-Azerbaijani relations and settle down in Azerbaijan through
changes in geo-economic projects, preventing its involvement in
anti-Russian policy of certain world centers of power.
At the same time, Russia understands very well in what a deadlocked
and vulnerable situation Azerbaijan has appeared, and perceives its
"new policy" as forced steps determined by Baku's frustration.
It would be a mistake to link Azerbaijan's goals and objectives on
building new relations with Russia with the settlement of the Karabakh
issue. The Azerbaijani elite understands that in the existing
international situation Russia cannot be a director of the Caucasian
policy and is no longer capable of handing Karabakh to Azerbaijan.
Russia's attempts to put the Karabakh issue onto its track of politics
have always failed, strengthening the doubts of Armenia and the
Armenian society about Russia's reliability as a partner.
Even the present government of Armenia is not capable of providing
such services to Moscow. Of course, the Karabakh issue remains among
Azerbaijan's priorities but relations with Russia which Azerbaijan is
allegedly trying to revise must be viewed as an argument in the
general chart of Baku's foreign policy.
At this stage Russia is focused on its priorities relating to the
Karabakh theme and the Armenian-Azerbaijani relations. This scheme and
logic are very simply, and apparently the specific activities are not
going to be complicated.
Russia is ready to develop relations with Azerbaijan in different
spheres but to the extent that Armenia will remain its partner in the
current format. The scheme drafted by the jugglers of Muscovite
politics has no alternative.
Apparently, Armenia has underestimated the circumstance how concerned
Moscow is with attempts to normalize Armenian-Turkish relations. It
may not understand this logic, as well as the extent of lack of
confidence of Russian politicians in Turkey and Azerbaijan in
political matters.
Russia is not worried that Armenia may appear in the orbit of Turkish
politics and economy, nor is it worried that the United States, not
Russia becomes the leading guarantor of security of Armenia against
Turkish threats.
Setting up new relations in the South Caucasus mostly determined the
new role of the United States for Armenia, transformation of Armenia
to a new Israel when the "Armenian factor" of pressure on Turkey will
be strengthened. In addition, the role of Armenia will become
significant in thwarting the plans of forming any Turkish-Russian
alliance.
Moscow thinks the plans to maintain control over the Black Sea and the
South Caucasus are possible only through deepening partnership with
Turkey. In other words, Moscow views this region as an area which
Russia and Turkey must divide.
These two states have appeared in international isolation initiated
and organized by its partners in the Unites States and NATO, with the
participation of Arab states and Iran. Now the question is which
states of the Black Sea-Caucasus and the Balkans are ready to
participate in this strategy in one way or another.
Some states are fully ready but on one condition - to what extent is
the Euro-Atlantic community ready for the long-term policy of collapse
of Turkey and Russia?
http://www.lragir.am/index/eng/0/comments/view/33635#sthash.kNXBdQxc.dpuf