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Hurriyet Daily News, Turkey
Jan 2 2014
Nervous neighbors: Five years after the Armenia-Turkey protocols
DAVID SHAHNAZARYAN
The evolution of the relationship between Turkey and Armenia has
entailed various phases, with some contradictory dynamics. The
Republic of Turkey was one of the first countries to recognize Armenia
as an independent state in 1991. This was followed by the
establishment of official contacts between Yerevan and Ankara. After
the 1998 coup that brought Robert Kocharian to power in Armenia, the
Armenia-Turkey relationship entered a new stage. Kocharian moved to
revise some key provisions of the country's foreign policy agenda,
declaring the international recognition of the 1915 Armenian Genocide
in the Ottoman Empire as the axis of his foreign policy. In 2005,
then-Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip ErdoÄ?an wrote a letter to
President Kocharian proposing that Armenia and Turkey establish a
joint group consisting of historians and other experts from the two
countries to study the developments and events of 1915.
The integration of the `historical' component in the official
Armenia-Turkey relationship took pace in 1998, conditioning the
resolution of political issues on the resolution of historical issues.
This has significantly complicated the Armenia-Turkey relationship,
which was already preconditioned by Turkey on Azerbaijan, the
Nagorno-Karabakh conflict and the Armenian diaspora.
A new stage in the Armenia-Turkey relations began in 2008 and resulted
in the signing of the Zurich Protocols on Oct. 10, 2009. The Zurich
Protocols failed to take into account two major realities. One was the
provision on the establishment of the sub-commission of historians,
which bound the normalization of relations to achieving a common
assessment of Armenian-Turkish history. The other was the fact that
the reality of power politics was underestimated. Both the
international peace brokers and Armenia's authorities tried to
separate the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict issue from the Armenia-Turkey
normalization process, while for the officials in Ankara they were and
are indivisible issues. This is the reason for Turkey's blatant
refusal to ratify the protocols, in contrast to the officials in
Yerevan who are ready for unconditional ratification and
implementation.
What do we have today, five years after the signing of the protocols?
First, they had a negative impact on the efforts of the OSCE Minsk
Group to advance the Nagorno-Karabakh peace process. Second, the
tension between Yerevan and Ankara began to mount after the signing of
the protocols to a level never seen before. Third, Moscow moved to
exploit this tension to substantially step up its military presence in
Armenia. The fact that Russia has dramatically increased its political
leverage in the region is perhaps the most serious outcome of the
Zurich Protocols.
It is wrong to believe that the extent of the build-up of Russian
influence in Armenia is in line with Turkey's national interest. Also,
no one believes that if Azerbaijan attacks Nagorno-Karabakh and
Armenia, the Russian military base in Gyumri would act to protect
Armenian interests.
The current tension in Armenia-Turkey relations could be diffused, as
long as the process is free from external mediation. Unmediated
contacts on the government level should continue, such as Edward
Nalbandian's visit to Turkey to attend the inauguration ceremony of
President ErdoÄ?an in August 2014. In fact, these visits are more
likely to happen after the April 24 centennial.
Because they were aimed at trying to produce agreement on the past
from the onset, the Zurich Protocols could not serve as a basis for
the normalization of Armenia-Turkey relations. To usher in the
post-Zurich phase in Armenian-Turkey relations, it is clear that
efforts to reconcile issues of history should be clearly separated
from Armenia-Turkey relations at the state level. Only once diplomatic
relations are established between the two states can a real process of
Turkish-Armenian reconciliation between societies (including the
diaspora) start.
* Ambassador David Shahnazaryan is a Senior Analyst with the Regional
Studies Center, Yerevan, Armenia. He served as the Ambassador of the
President of Armenia on Special Missions and Special Representative of
the President of Armenia from 1992-95 and as the Armenian Minister of
National Security in 1994-95. This is an abridged version of the
original article in Turkish Policy Quarterly's (TPQ) Fall 2014 issue.
www.turkishpolicy.com
January/02/2015
From: Baghdasarian
Jan 2 2014
Nervous neighbors: Five years after the Armenia-Turkey protocols
DAVID SHAHNAZARYAN
The evolution of the relationship between Turkey and Armenia has
entailed various phases, with some contradictory dynamics. The
Republic of Turkey was one of the first countries to recognize Armenia
as an independent state in 1991. This was followed by the
establishment of official contacts between Yerevan and Ankara. After
the 1998 coup that brought Robert Kocharian to power in Armenia, the
Armenia-Turkey relationship entered a new stage. Kocharian moved to
revise some key provisions of the country's foreign policy agenda,
declaring the international recognition of the 1915 Armenian Genocide
in the Ottoman Empire as the axis of his foreign policy. In 2005,
then-Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip ErdoÄ?an wrote a letter to
President Kocharian proposing that Armenia and Turkey establish a
joint group consisting of historians and other experts from the two
countries to study the developments and events of 1915.
The integration of the `historical' component in the official
Armenia-Turkey relationship took pace in 1998, conditioning the
resolution of political issues on the resolution of historical issues.
This has significantly complicated the Armenia-Turkey relationship,
which was already preconditioned by Turkey on Azerbaijan, the
Nagorno-Karabakh conflict and the Armenian diaspora.
A new stage in the Armenia-Turkey relations began in 2008 and resulted
in the signing of the Zurich Protocols on Oct. 10, 2009. The Zurich
Protocols failed to take into account two major realities. One was the
provision on the establishment of the sub-commission of historians,
which bound the normalization of relations to achieving a common
assessment of Armenian-Turkish history. The other was the fact that
the reality of power politics was underestimated. Both the
international peace brokers and Armenia's authorities tried to
separate the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict issue from the Armenia-Turkey
normalization process, while for the officials in Ankara they were and
are indivisible issues. This is the reason for Turkey's blatant
refusal to ratify the protocols, in contrast to the officials in
Yerevan who are ready for unconditional ratification and
implementation.
What do we have today, five years after the signing of the protocols?
First, they had a negative impact on the efforts of the OSCE Minsk
Group to advance the Nagorno-Karabakh peace process. Second, the
tension between Yerevan and Ankara began to mount after the signing of
the protocols to a level never seen before. Third, Moscow moved to
exploit this tension to substantially step up its military presence in
Armenia. The fact that Russia has dramatically increased its political
leverage in the region is perhaps the most serious outcome of the
Zurich Protocols.
It is wrong to believe that the extent of the build-up of Russian
influence in Armenia is in line with Turkey's national interest. Also,
no one believes that if Azerbaijan attacks Nagorno-Karabakh and
Armenia, the Russian military base in Gyumri would act to protect
Armenian interests.
The current tension in Armenia-Turkey relations could be diffused, as
long as the process is free from external mediation. Unmediated
contacts on the government level should continue, such as Edward
Nalbandian's visit to Turkey to attend the inauguration ceremony of
President ErdoÄ?an in August 2014. In fact, these visits are more
likely to happen after the April 24 centennial.
Because they were aimed at trying to produce agreement on the past
from the onset, the Zurich Protocols could not serve as a basis for
the normalization of Armenia-Turkey relations. To usher in the
post-Zurich phase in Armenian-Turkey relations, it is clear that
efforts to reconcile issues of history should be clearly separated
from Armenia-Turkey relations at the state level. Only once diplomatic
relations are established between the two states can a real process of
Turkish-Armenian reconciliation between societies (including the
diaspora) start.
* Ambassador David Shahnazaryan is a Senior Analyst with the Regional
Studies Center, Yerevan, Armenia. He served as the Ambassador of the
President of Armenia on Special Missions and Special Representative of
the President of Armenia from 1992-95 and as the Armenian Minister of
National Security in 1994-95. This is an abridged version of the
original article in Turkish Policy Quarterly's (TPQ) Fall 2014 issue.
www.turkishpolicy.com
January/02/2015
From: Baghdasarian