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EurasiaReview
Jan 5 2015
The Turkish-Armenian Border Gate - Analysis
January 5, 2015
By Kamer Kasim
Although the closed Turkish-Armenian border is just one of the issues
in Turkish-Armenian relations, it has time and time again made its
appearance on the agenda.
Despite Turkey's recognition of the independence of Armenia after the
disintegration of the Soviet Union, normal diplomatic relations could
not be established. Armenia's state policy regarding genocide
allegations and its tentativeness with respect to the Kars Treaty,
which draws the Turkish-Armenian border, have created a rift in the
two countries' relations. The Armenian Declaration of Independence
states that "The Republic of Armenia stands in support of the task of
achieving international recognition of the 1915 Genocide in Ottoman
Turkey and Western Armenia." Here, the term "Western Armenia" refers
to territories within modern Turkey.
Location and extent of the former Nagorno-Karabakh Autonomous Oblast
(lighter color)
Despite this, the Turkish-Armenian border remained open until the
Armenian forces' occupation of Kelbecer, which clearly indicated that
Armenia had no intention of withdrawing from Azerbaijani territories.
On the contrary, the Armenian forces continued to occupy more ground
during the Nagorno-Karabakh Conflict. As a result, Turkey closed its
border with Armenia in order to demonstrate its support for
Azerbaijan. After a ceasefire to the conflict was arranged, Turkey has
used diplomatic channels to pursue a permanent solution. However, the
Nagorno-Karabakh conflict has not been resolved and violations to the
ceasefire have increased the risk of war.
Why is there pressure to open the border coming from the US and the EU?
The US and the EU are not comfortable with Armenia's policy to
maintain and further strategic ties with Russia. Indeed, Armenia has
become a country in which Russia has stationed military installments
without much domestic objection. Even the Armenian diaspora in the US
is not pleased with the state of Armenia's relations with Russia.
Some circles in the US and the EU have maintained that if the
Turkish-Armenian border were to open, then Armenia would integrate
with the West via Turkey and come to depend less on Russia. The main
deficiency of this argument is that it ignores the weakness of the
Armenian economy. The Armenian economy is in such a state that even if
the Turkish-Armenian border were to open, the trade volume between the
two countries would not experience a substantial rise and Russian
domination of the economic sphere in Armenia would persist.
Additionally, Armenia's membership in the Eurasian Economic Union
would actually indicate that Russian domination over Armenia would be
extended into the foreseeable future.
There is also the argument that if Turkey opens the border with
Armenia, the pressure coming from third countries for Turkey to
concede to genocide allegations would lessen. The administrations of
some countries which do not want their relations with Turkey to be
upset by the allegations of genocide are particularly prone to employ
this argument. Nonetheless, this argument lacks substance as the
Armenian diaspora would continue its activities regarding genocide
allegations independent from the state of Turkey-Armenia relations.
Turkey and Armenia have signed protocols with the encouragement of
various third countries who hoped for a resultant normalization of
Turkish-Armenian relations. Upon ratification of these protocols the
Turkish-Armenian border would be opened within two months. Regarding
the issue of genocide allegations, which is also one of the obstacles
to the improvement of the two countries' bilateral relations, a
sub-commission would be established in order to provide an impartial
scientific examination of the historical records.
While Azerbaijan has voiced disappointment that the protocols give no
mention of the Nagorno-Karabakh problem, the Armenian diaspora has
also criticized the protocols as well as the Armenian administration
due to the article about the establishment of a historical
sub-commission.
When it comes to the ratification of the protocols in Armenia, the
approval of the Armenian Constitutional Court is needed. While the
Armenian Constitutional Court reviewed the compatibility of the
protocols with the Armenian Constitution, it interpreted the protocols
in a way that actually clashed with the spirit of the protocols and
thus created a great debate about the meaning of the protocol's
articles.
For example, the Armenian Constitutional Court stated that the
provisions of the protocols could not be interpreted or applied in the
legislative process, and that their implications for the Republic of
Armenia as well as its interstate relations actually contradicted
provisions of the preamble to the Constitution of the Republic of
Armenia and the requirements of Paragraph 11 of the Declaration of
Independence of Armenia. Since the Armenian Declaration of
Independence refers to the genocide allegations and mentions "Western
Armenia", general questions have been raised about the protocols'
provisions regarding territorial integrity and the formation of the
historical sub-commission.
Turkey expects the protocols to allow discussion of the genocide
allegations on a scientific platform as well as to facilitate
Armenia's open recognition of the borders as they currently stand. If
these expectations are not met, the protocols would be meaningless for
Turkey, as it would be irrational for Turkey to open the border, which
was initially closed due to the Armenian occupation of Azerbaijani
territories, without a solution to the Nagorno-Karabakh issue.
Why Turkey shouldn't open the Border without a Solution to the
Nagorno-Karabakh Conflict
Turkey should not open the border without a solution to the issue that
provoked its closure in the first place. Turkey-Azerbaijan relations
would be damaged if Turkey acts otherwise. Besides, Turkey's image
would be negatively affected if it did not show decisive support to
this strategic partner.
To open the border without a solution to the Nagorno-Karabakh problem
would be baseless according to both ethical and realistic rationales.
>From an ethical point of view, it would be problematic to open the
border seeing that Armenia has continued its occupation of Azerbaijani
territories while showing no intention to withdraw. Moreover, there
are UN resolutions that call for the end of Armenian occupation and
respect for Azerbaijan's internationally recognized borders and
territorial integrity. This is not to mention the massacres of
Azerbaijani populations that have taken place during the
Nagorno-Karabakh Conflict.
>From a realistic point of view, the greater importance of Azerbaijan,
as compared to that of Armenia, with respect to Turkey's regional role
necessitates that it not open the Armenian border without a solution
to the Nagorno-Karabakh problem. Azerbaijan has a GDP of 103 billion
US Dollars and has even invested more than 5 billion US Dollars in one
single project in Turkey (Star Refinery).
There are also crucial energy lines between the two countries, namely,
the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan oil pipeline and the Baku-Tbilisi-Erzurum
natural gas pipeline. Moreover, railway lines between the two
countries are under construction and the contract for TANAP (the
Trans-Anatolian Natural Gas Pipeline), which envisages an annual
transportation capacity of 16 billion cubic meters in 2020 and 31
billion cubic meters in 2026, has been signed. On the other hand,
natural resource-poor Armenia, which hosts a small GDP of 20 billion
US Dollars and relies heavily on Russia, does not hold much economic
potential for Turkey.
The arguments and data that have been presented by the circles who
actively lobbied for the normalization of Turkish-Armenian relations,
and particularly for the opening of the border, did not take into
account Armenia's economic realities. The argument that the
Nagorno-Karabakh problem is independent from Turkish-Armenian
relations neglects the fact that Turkey closed its border with Armenia
due to the Nagorno-Karabakh Conflict in the first place.
Some Western countries which offered financial support to Armenia
based upon the expectation that it would grow closer to the West, all
the while ignoring Armenia's occupation of Azerbaijani territories and
violation of its internationally recognized borders, are now
disappointed with Armenia's membership to the Eurasian Economic Union.
Taxpayers in these Western countries should question the financial
assistance that was given to Armenia knowing the fact that it had
shown no indication of changing its foreign policy.
The solution to the Nagorno-Karabakh problem is not only the prime
condition for sustainable peace and stability in the Caucasus, but
also for the normalization of Turkish-Armenian relations.
http://www.eurasiareview.com/05012015-turkish-armenian-border-gate-analysis/
Jan 5 2015
The Turkish-Armenian Border Gate - Analysis
January 5, 2015
By Kamer Kasim
Although the closed Turkish-Armenian border is just one of the issues
in Turkish-Armenian relations, it has time and time again made its
appearance on the agenda.
Despite Turkey's recognition of the independence of Armenia after the
disintegration of the Soviet Union, normal diplomatic relations could
not be established. Armenia's state policy regarding genocide
allegations and its tentativeness with respect to the Kars Treaty,
which draws the Turkish-Armenian border, have created a rift in the
two countries' relations. The Armenian Declaration of Independence
states that "The Republic of Armenia stands in support of the task of
achieving international recognition of the 1915 Genocide in Ottoman
Turkey and Western Armenia." Here, the term "Western Armenia" refers
to territories within modern Turkey.
Location and extent of the former Nagorno-Karabakh Autonomous Oblast
(lighter color)
Despite this, the Turkish-Armenian border remained open until the
Armenian forces' occupation of Kelbecer, which clearly indicated that
Armenia had no intention of withdrawing from Azerbaijani territories.
On the contrary, the Armenian forces continued to occupy more ground
during the Nagorno-Karabakh Conflict. As a result, Turkey closed its
border with Armenia in order to demonstrate its support for
Azerbaijan. After a ceasefire to the conflict was arranged, Turkey has
used diplomatic channels to pursue a permanent solution. However, the
Nagorno-Karabakh conflict has not been resolved and violations to the
ceasefire have increased the risk of war.
Why is there pressure to open the border coming from the US and the EU?
The US and the EU are not comfortable with Armenia's policy to
maintain and further strategic ties with Russia. Indeed, Armenia has
become a country in which Russia has stationed military installments
without much domestic objection. Even the Armenian diaspora in the US
is not pleased with the state of Armenia's relations with Russia.
Some circles in the US and the EU have maintained that if the
Turkish-Armenian border were to open, then Armenia would integrate
with the West via Turkey and come to depend less on Russia. The main
deficiency of this argument is that it ignores the weakness of the
Armenian economy. The Armenian economy is in such a state that even if
the Turkish-Armenian border were to open, the trade volume between the
two countries would not experience a substantial rise and Russian
domination of the economic sphere in Armenia would persist.
Additionally, Armenia's membership in the Eurasian Economic Union
would actually indicate that Russian domination over Armenia would be
extended into the foreseeable future.
There is also the argument that if Turkey opens the border with
Armenia, the pressure coming from third countries for Turkey to
concede to genocide allegations would lessen. The administrations of
some countries which do not want their relations with Turkey to be
upset by the allegations of genocide are particularly prone to employ
this argument. Nonetheless, this argument lacks substance as the
Armenian diaspora would continue its activities regarding genocide
allegations independent from the state of Turkey-Armenia relations.
Turkey and Armenia have signed protocols with the encouragement of
various third countries who hoped for a resultant normalization of
Turkish-Armenian relations. Upon ratification of these protocols the
Turkish-Armenian border would be opened within two months. Regarding
the issue of genocide allegations, which is also one of the obstacles
to the improvement of the two countries' bilateral relations, a
sub-commission would be established in order to provide an impartial
scientific examination of the historical records.
While Azerbaijan has voiced disappointment that the protocols give no
mention of the Nagorno-Karabakh problem, the Armenian diaspora has
also criticized the protocols as well as the Armenian administration
due to the article about the establishment of a historical
sub-commission.
When it comes to the ratification of the protocols in Armenia, the
approval of the Armenian Constitutional Court is needed. While the
Armenian Constitutional Court reviewed the compatibility of the
protocols with the Armenian Constitution, it interpreted the protocols
in a way that actually clashed with the spirit of the protocols and
thus created a great debate about the meaning of the protocol's
articles.
For example, the Armenian Constitutional Court stated that the
provisions of the protocols could not be interpreted or applied in the
legislative process, and that their implications for the Republic of
Armenia as well as its interstate relations actually contradicted
provisions of the preamble to the Constitution of the Republic of
Armenia and the requirements of Paragraph 11 of the Declaration of
Independence of Armenia. Since the Armenian Declaration of
Independence refers to the genocide allegations and mentions "Western
Armenia", general questions have been raised about the protocols'
provisions regarding territorial integrity and the formation of the
historical sub-commission.
Turkey expects the protocols to allow discussion of the genocide
allegations on a scientific platform as well as to facilitate
Armenia's open recognition of the borders as they currently stand. If
these expectations are not met, the protocols would be meaningless for
Turkey, as it would be irrational for Turkey to open the border, which
was initially closed due to the Armenian occupation of Azerbaijani
territories, without a solution to the Nagorno-Karabakh issue.
Why Turkey shouldn't open the Border without a Solution to the
Nagorno-Karabakh Conflict
Turkey should not open the border without a solution to the issue that
provoked its closure in the first place. Turkey-Azerbaijan relations
would be damaged if Turkey acts otherwise. Besides, Turkey's image
would be negatively affected if it did not show decisive support to
this strategic partner.
To open the border without a solution to the Nagorno-Karabakh problem
would be baseless according to both ethical and realistic rationales.
>From an ethical point of view, it would be problematic to open the
border seeing that Armenia has continued its occupation of Azerbaijani
territories while showing no intention to withdraw. Moreover, there
are UN resolutions that call for the end of Armenian occupation and
respect for Azerbaijan's internationally recognized borders and
territorial integrity. This is not to mention the massacres of
Azerbaijani populations that have taken place during the
Nagorno-Karabakh Conflict.
>From a realistic point of view, the greater importance of Azerbaijan,
as compared to that of Armenia, with respect to Turkey's regional role
necessitates that it not open the Armenian border without a solution
to the Nagorno-Karabakh problem. Azerbaijan has a GDP of 103 billion
US Dollars and has even invested more than 5 billion US Dollars in one
single project in Turkey (Star Refinery).
There are also crucial energy lines between the two countries, namely,
the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan oil pipeline and the Baku-Tbilisi-Erzurum
natural gas pipeline. Moreover, railway lines between the two
countries are under construction and the contract for TANAP (the
Trans-Anatolian Natural Gas Pipeline), which envisages an annual
transportation capacity of 16 billion cubic meters in 2020 and 31
billion cubic meters in 2026, has been signed. On the other hand,
natural resource-poor Armenia, which hosts a small GDP of 20 billion
US Dollars and relies heavily on Russia, does not hold much economic
potential for Turkey.
The arguments and data that have been presented by the circles who
actively lobbied for the normalization of Turkish-Armenian relations,
and particularly for the opening of the border, did not take into
account Armenia's economic realities. The argument that the
Nagorno-Karabakh problem is independent from Turkish-Armenian
relations neglects the fact that Turkey closed its border with Armenia
due to the Nagorno-Karabakh Conflict in the first place.
Some Western countries which offered financial support to Armenia
based upon the expectation that it would grow closer to the West, all
the while ignoring Armenia's occupation of Azerbaijani territories and
violation of its internationally recognized borders, are now
disappointed with Armenia's membership to the Eurasian Economic Union.
Taxpayers in these Western countries should question the financial
assistance that was given to Armenia knowing the fact that it had
shown no indication of changing its foreign policy.
The solution to the Nagorno-Karabakh problem is not only the prime
condition for sustainable peace and stability in the Caucasus, but
also for the normalization of Turkish-Armenian relations.
http://www.eurasiareview.com/05012015-turkish-armenian-border-gate-analysis/