Tweet
AGOS, Istanbul
Jan 3 2015
Yetvart Danzikyan: DavutoÄ?lu's `family' dinner
Yetvart Danzikyan 01.03.2015 13:56 NEWS
Yetvart Danzikyan on the official dinner Prime Minister DavutoÄ?lu held
for religious leaders: `This is, of course, a positive meeting, and
the messages that have come out of the dinner are also positive.
However, regarding the issue of representation, one must accept that
there is something strange about the other side of the dinner table.
It is part of the job of the Prime Minister to hold such meetings, but
once you describe it as a `family' dinner, we have to ask what kind of
family we are talking about here, and about those who have been left
out.'
On January 2, Friday, Prime Minister DavutoÄ?lu had dinner with the¦
You know¦ Well, were they the representatives of minority communities
in Turkey? No, not really. Representatives of the non-Muslim minority
communities? That's how the official press agency Anadolu Agency chose
to word it¦ But that's still not it, these guys were men of god. And
it is quite a mouthful, isn't it,
non-Muslim-minority-community-representatives. Anyway, we have a
problem with the word representative, too. Whatever, it's a hazardous
issue. So, one by one, these are the people Prime Minister DavutoÄ?lu
met with:
Ecumenical Patriarch Bartholomeos, Deputy Patriarch of the Greek
Orthodox Church Peter Stefanos, Turkey Chaldean Catholic Community
Patriarchal Vicar François Yakan, Patriarchal Vicar of the Syriac
Orthodox Church in Istanbul and Ankara, Turkey's envoy to the Vatican
Mehmet Paçacı, Deputy Patriarch of the Turkey Syriac Catholic Church,
Archbishop of the Turkey Armenian Catholic Church Levan Zekiyan, Chief
Rabbi of the Jews of Turkey Ä°sak Haleva, and Armenian Deputy Patriarch
Aram AteÅ?yan.
President of the Presidency of Religious Affairs Prof. Dr. Mehmet
Görmez, Grand Mufti of Istanbul Rahmi Yaran and President of the
Directorate General of Foundations Adnan Ertem were reportedly also
present at the dinner.
Great. Ultimately, this is a good thing. And the messages that came
out of the dinner are also generally positive. `So what's bugging
you?', you may ask, because it is obvious that something is troubling
me. To be frank, the first question mark emerges at the point where
the `Ottomanist' leaning of the AKP and especially DavutoÄ?lu `
although this is not a course of action unique to the AKP ` is
reinvigorated and legitimized precisely in such places. I say it is
not a course of action unique to the AKP, let me first explain that
point a little. Yes, it is a fact that since the founding of the
Republic, the establishment has taken pains to perceive, and thus
treat, ethnic components, that were forcibly reduced into minorities,
as religious communities. The establishment conveys its messages to
the Patriarchate, the Chief Rabbi and the Metropolitan Bishops, and
makes a point of discerning and treating them as the spokespeople of
their communities, and of having the communities to also act in
accordance of this perception.
This method of the old, former establishment, ever proud of its
secular appearance, clearly made things convenient. Because this meant
that the question of `representation' was trapped within a religious,
and therefore softened zone; and as long as religious services
continued to be held at churches and synagogues and patriarchs,
metropolitan bishops and chief rabbis were elected, it seemed as if
these communities were maintaining a problem-free existence. This, of
course, was a great convenience for the regime. Besides, in this way,
members of these communities grew increasingly accustomed to seeing
their representation and `equality' within this framework; and their
remaining problems were either never mentioned, or were perceived as a
different, broader problem, making it impossible to discuss them.
However, and quite naturally, this was what happened: The Republic,
which took pride in building a `modern' ` classless, unprivileged `
nation, by forming a Presidency of Religious Affairs, held a monopoly
over official Islam, thus not only completely destroyed the principle
of secularism, but also effectively declared that it did not perceive
other ethnic groups within the framework of a universal `Republic' or
modern state, or in other words, as `equals'. Accompanied by all
manners of fascistic implementations taking place behind the scenes,
of course. To be frank, a comprehensive critique of the Republican
regime's claim of secularity from this viewpoint remains lacking to
this day.
After the AKP came to power, and consolidated its position, it also
took steps regarding this issue, within the framework of its reckoning
with the regime. That is impossible to deny. However, we now faced a
new, strange situation: While the Republic, or the old state, despite
claiming to be a modern state, based its policy on this issue on
religious representation, the AKP, too, within the framework of its
following of the Ottoman example, based its own policy on this issue
on religious representation. Thus, although certain things change in
practice, many things in the main philosophy do not change, and in
fact, this mentality has now taken even deeper roots. The following,
for instance, are from DavutoÄ?lu's press declaration before the
meeting:
`In the context of authentic cultural traditions, religious
traditions, this picture that contains all the colours of our Turkey
is important. On the other hand, it is also important in terms of the
principle of equal citizenship. We have never discriminated between
our citizens; citizenship has remained our main principle. Regardless
of their religion, denomination or ethnic origin, the lives,
properties, honour, intellect and integrity of all our citizens is
sacred for us, as it is in all religions.'
As I said above, the messages are quite positive. However, the
discussion of the entire issue within the framework of `religious'
communities and religious representation; the failure, still, to
discuss the issue of `equality' within the logic of the modern state,
and its exposition within the context of authentic cultural traditions
and religious traditions, doesn't all this reveal that we are in a
problematic zone?
Let us first ask, for instance, what are Armenians for this state, in
the most fundamental sense? A group of Christians? Yes, the Ottoman
Empire might have perceived them like that, but can that perception be
sustained today? Of course, Armenians are also Christians, but first
and foremost, they are Armenians. The Church is undoubtedly important
for them, and the Patriarch is of course important. But, first,
religion does not encapsulate the life of all Armenians. There are
Armenians who have nothing to do with religion, or those who do not
place Christianity above and ahead of everything in their lives, and
they are by no means few in number. As is the case with the Greeks. As
is the case with the Jews.
Besides, let us imagine, for one moment, that it is so. I mean, that
all the groups we mentioned above are formed of devout members. This
would still mean that this type of representation and framework is a
problematic one. Because, in this type of representation, are we not
also confronted by this further problem:
Who has elected these people? After all, they are referred to as
representatives, but let's take a closer look at how they are elected.
Yes, some Patriarchs are elected with community participation, but
this is not the case for all sections of society, and besides ` and
this is quite an interesting point ` the Armenian Community has been
without a Patriarch for a long time now. Mutafyan, who is struggling
with a grave illness, cannot fulfil his duty, and the present
Patriarch, has been acting in proxy for 7 years. Therefore, the
situation we implied above, does in fact underline a significant
point. How accurate is it to call these figures representatives?
Secondly: In what `capacity' are you meeting the representatives of
these religious communities (it should be clear by now that the word
minority is not appropriate)? As the representative of the largest
religious community? No? As the elected head of the executive power,
that on appearance has no connection with religious representation. I
would once again like to note that this meeting is of course positive,
and that the messages that have come out of the dinner are also
positive. However, regarding the issue of representation, one must
accept that there is something strange about the other side of the
dinner table. It is part of the job of the Prime Minister to hold such
meetings, but once you describe it as a `family' dinner, we have to
ask what kind of family we are talking about here, and also about
those who have been left out.
There is a broad hint there. And it spells out that DavutoÄ?lu sits
there not as the representative of a modern state, but as the
representative of the political authority that also contains the
representation of Islam, the dominant religion. In other words, we see
almost all the clues of a regression to the Ottoman system here. (The
permission given to the construction of a new church in YeÅ?ilköy, and
its announcement on this occasion should be evaluated in this
framework. Why, exactly, is this a task of the Prime Minister?)
This, as far as I'm concerned, points to a greater problem beyond all
the problems I have mentioned above: That we are now discussing all
issues along the axis of `religion'. In the same manner that in public
life in Turkey, and particularly in education, `religion' has
penetrated everything, thus indicating a highly unpleasant course of
affairs, we are now beginning to see forms of social relationship
within the framework of the distinction between Muslim and non-Muslim.
Therefore, while the establishment now codes the majority as `devout'
and `non-devout' individuals, and as public life is reconstructed
according to this new code, there is a possibility that minorities,
too, will be perceived within this code of Muslims and non-Muslims.
This, I mean this policy on minorities, is according to some, a better
stage than that of the former state. Because some foundation
properties are being returned, the official discourse has become more
moderate compared to the past, etc. However, this relative softening
of the state's stance does not mean `progress'. Because the place we
could have arrived at in the year 2015, is for people to be treated
equal as `individuals', without reference to any other identity, and
to find representation in fields other than religious representation,
and to seek their rights in such frameworks. And the basis for that
would not be authentic traditions, or arguments based around the
terribly opaque concept of ancient civilisations that seems to have
been pulled out of thin air, but constitutional and legal assurances.
http://www.agos.com.tr/en/article/10143/yetvart-danzikyan-davutoglus-family-dinner
From: A. Papazian
Jan 3 2015
Yetvart Danzikyan: DavutoÄ?lu's `family' dinner
Yetvart Danzikyan 01.03.2015 13:56 NEWS
Yetvart Danzikyan on the official dinner Prime Minister DavutoÄ?lu held
for religious leaders: `This is, of course, a positive meeting, and
the messages that have come out of the dinner are also positive.
However, regarding the issue of representation, one must accept that
there is something strange about the other side of the dinner table.
It is part of the job of the Prime Minister to hold such meetings, but
once you describe it as a `family' dinner, we have to ask what kind of
family we are talking about here, and about those who have been left
out.'
On January 2, Friday, Prime Minister DavutoÄ?lu had dinner with the¦
You know¦ Well, were they the representatives of minority communities
in Turkey? No, not really. Representatives of the non-Muslim minority
communities? That's how the official press agency Anadolu Agency chose
to word it¦ But that's still not it, these guys were men of god. And
it is quite a mouthful, isn't it,
non-Muslim-minority-community-representatives. Anyway, we have a
problem with the word representative, too. Whatever, it's a hazardous
issue. So, one by one, these are the people Prime Minister DavutoÄ?lu
met with:
Ecumenical Patriarch Bartholomeos, Deputy Patriarch of the Greek
Orthodox Church Peter Stefanos, Turkey Chaldean Catholic Community
Patriarchal Vicar François Yakan, Patriarchal Vicar of the Syriac
Orthodox Church in Istanbul and Ankara, Turkey's envoy to the Vatican
Mehmet Paçacı, Deputy Patriarch of the Turkey Syriac Catholic Church,
Archbishop of the Turkey Armenian Catholic Church Levan Zekiyan, Chief
Rabbi of the Jews of Turkey Ä°sak Haleva, and Armenian Deputy Patriarch
Aram AteÅ?yan.
President of the Presidency of Religious Affairs Prof. Dr. Mehmet
Görmez, Grand Mufti of Istanbul Rahmi Yaran and President of the
Directorate General of Foundations Adnan Ertem were reportedly also
present at the dinner.
Great. Ultimately, this is a good thing. And the messages that came
out of the dinner are also generally positive. `So what's bugging
you?', you may ask, because it is obvious that something is troubling
me. To be frank, the first question mark emerges at the point where
the `Ottomanist' leaning of the AKP and especially DavutoÄ?lu `
although this is not a course of action unique to the AKP ` is
reinvigorated and legitimized precisely in such places. I say it is
not a course of action unique to the AKP, let me first explain that
point a little. Yes, it is a fact that since the founding of the
Republic, the establishment has taken pains to perceive, and thus
treat, ethnic components, that were forcibly reduced into minorities,
as religious communities. The establishment conveys its messages to
the Patriarchate, the Chief Rabbi and the Metropolitan Bishops, and
makes a point of discerning and treating them as the spokespeople of
their communities, and of having the communities to also act in
accordance of this perception.
This method of the old, former establishment, ever proud of its
secular appearance, clearly made things convenient. Because this meant
that the question of `representation' was trapped within a religious,
and therefore softened zone; and as long as religious services
continued to be held at churches and synagogues and patriarchs,
metropolitan bishops and chief rabbis were elected, it seemed as if
these communities were maintaining a problem-free existence. This, of
course, was a great convenience for the regime. Besides, in this way,
members of these communities grew increasingly accustomed to seeing
their representation and `equality' within this framework; and their
remaining problems were either never mentioned, or were perceived as a
different, broader problem, making it impossible to discuss them.
However, and quite naturally, this was what happened: The Republic,
which took pride in building a `modern' ` classless, unprivileged `
nation, by forming a Presidency of Religious Affairs, held a monopoly
over official Islam, thus not only completely destroyed the principle
of secularism, but also effectively declared that it did not perceive
other ethnic groups within the framework of a universal `Republic' or
modern state, or in other words, as `equals'. Accompanied by all
manners of fascistic implementations taking place behind the scenes,
of course. To be frank, a comprehensive critique of the Republican
regime's claim of secularity from this viewpoint remains lacking to
this day.
After the AKP came to power, and consolidated its position, it also
took steps regarding this issue, within the framework of its reckoning
with the regime. That is impossible to deny. However, we now faced a
new, strange situation: While the Republic, or the old state, despite
claiming to be a modern state, based its policy on this issue on
religious representation, the AKP, too, within the framework of its
following of the Ottoman example, based its own policy on this issue
on religious representation. Thus, although certain things change in
practice, many things in the main philosophy do not change, and in
fact, this mentality has now taken even deeper roots. The following,
for instance, are from DavutoÄ?lu's press declaration before the
meeting:
`In the context of authentic cultural traditions, religious
traditions, this picture that contains all the colours of our Turkey
is important. On the other hand, it is also important in terms of the
principle of equal citizenship. We have never discriminated between
our citizens; citizenship has remained our main principle. Regardless
of their religion, denomination or ethnic origin, the lives,
properties, honour, intellect and integrity of all our citizens is
sacred for us, as it is in all religions.'
As I said above, the messages are quite positive. However, the
discussion of the entire issue within the framework of `religious'
communities and religious representation; the failure, still, to
discuss the issue of `equality' within the logic of the modern state,
and its exposition within the context of authentic cultural traditions
and religious traditions, doesn't all this reveal that we are in a
problematic zone?
Let us first ask, for instance, what are Armenians for this state, in
the most fundamental sense? A group of Christians? Yes, the Ottoman
Empire might have perceived them like that, but can that perception be
sustained today? Of course, Armenians are also Christians, but first
and foremost, they are Armenians. The Church is undoubtedly important
for them, and the Patriarch is of course important. But, first,
religion does not encapsulate the life of all Armenians. There are
Armenians who have nothing to do with religion, or those who do not
place Christianity above and ahead of everything in their lives, and
they are by no means few in number. As is the case with the Greeks. As
is the case with the Jews.
Besides, let us imagine, for one moment, that it is so. I mean, that
all the groups we mentioned above are formed of devout members. This
would still mean that this type of representation and framework is a
problematic one. Because, in this type of representation, are we not
also confronted by this further problem:
Who has elected these people? After all, they are referred to as
representatives, but let's take a closer look at how they are elected.
Yes, some Patriarchs are elected with community participation, but
this is not the case for all sections of society, and besides ` and
this is quite an interesting point ` the Armenian Community has been
without a Patriarch for a long time now. Mutafyan, who is struggling
with a grave illness, cannot fulfil his duty, and the present
Patriarch, has been acting in proxy for 7 years. Therefore, the
situation we implied above, does in fact underline a significant
point. How accurate is it to call these figures representatives?
Secondly: In what `capacity' are you meeting the representatives of
these religious communities (it should be clear by now that the word
minority is not appropriate)? As the representative of the largest
religious community? No? As the elected head of the executive power,
that on appearance has no connection with religious representation. I
would once again like to note that this meeting is of course positive,
and that the messages that have come out of the dinner are also
positive. However, regarding the issue of representation, one must
accept that there is something strange about the other side of the
dinner table. It is part of the job of the Prime Minister to hold such
meetings, but once you describe it as a `family' dinner, we have to
ask what kind of family we are talking about here, and also about
those who have been left out.
There is a broad hint there. And it spells out that DavutoÄ?lu sits
there not as the representative of a modern state, but as the
representative of the political authority that also contains the
representation of Islam, the dominant religion. In other words, we see
almost all the clues of a regression to the Ottoman system here. (The
permission given to the construction of a new church in YeÅ?ilköy, and
its announcement on this occasion should be evaluated in this
framework. Why, exactly, is this a task of the Prime Minister?)
This, as far as I'm concerned, points to a greater problem beyond all
the problems I have mentioned above: That we are now discussing all
issues along the axis of `religion'. In the same manner that in public
life in Turkey, and particularly in education, `religion' has
penetrated everything, thus indicating a highly unpleasant course of
affairs, we are now beginning to see forms of social relationship
within the framework of the distinction between Muslim and non-Muslim.
Therefore, while the establishment now codes the majority as `devout'
and `non-devout' individuals, and as public life is reconstructed
according to this new code, there is a possibility that minorities,
too, will be perceived within this code of Muslims and non-Muslims.
This, I mean this policy on minorities, is according to some, a better
stage than that of the former state. Because some foundation
properties are being returned, the official discourse has become more
moderate compared to the past, etc. However, this relative softening
of the state's stance does not mean `progress'. Because the place we
could have arrived at in the year 2015, is for people to be treated
equal as `individuals', without reference to any other identity, and
to find representation in fields other than religious representation,
and to seek their rights in such frameworks. And the basis for that
would not be authentic traditions, or arguments based around the
terribly opaque concept of ancient civilisations that seems to have
been pulled out of thin air, but constitutional and legal assurances.
http://www.agos.com.tr/en/article/10143/yetvart-danzikyan-davutoglus-family-dinner
From: A. Papazian