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The case for the Turkish-Israeli alliance
By Serap Merve Dogan and Maxime Gauin
01/19/2015
[Serap Merve Dogan is the director of the Center for Jewish Studies of
Turkey and Maxime Gauin is a researcher at the Center for Eurasian
Studies, Ankara.]
Both Turkey and Israel need each other, and that is why reason should
prevail in Ankara and Jerusalem.
As everybody knows, the once-flourishing Turkish-Israeli alliance has
encountered serious problems during the past few years. To attempt to
solve the issue, misunderstandings on both sides should be avoided.
Turkey ` which saved tens of thousands Jews during the Second World
War ` was never at war with Israel, unlike the Arab world. Ankara
recognized Israel as early as 1949 and signed its first bilateral
agreement with the Jewish state in 1958. In spite of all the Arab
pressures, the diplomatic relations were never severed, either after
the Six Day War or after the Yom Kippur war.
Zionism has historically attracted quite diverse supporters in Turkey,
such as the ideologue of Kemalism, Tekin Alp (who was Jewish),
president Celal Bayar (1950-1960) and Turgut Ozal, prime minister
(1983-1989), president of Turkey (1989-1993) and even today, a
reference for the AKP ` the nationalist politician Alparslan Turkes
(admirer of the IDF and of Israeli hi-tech), or even the ideologue of
the secular far Right, Nihal Atsiz, who moved after 1945 to a staunch
admiration for Jews and Israel. On the other side, David Ben-Gurion
had the best of relations with the Ottoman authorities until 1914 and
saw Ataturk as an example.
The alliance developed to a great extent from 1981 to 2000s in the
economic, diplomatic and military fields, including during the first
years of the AKP.
The bilateral treaty prepared by a secular government in Turkey and
the Rabin cabinet in Israel in 1995 but finally signed by N. Erbakan
(an Islamist) and Benjamin Netanyahu in 1996, secured access to
Turkish air space for the IDF, reinforced the cooperation between the
Mossad and the Turkish MIT and enlarged the access of the Israeli
defense industry to the Turkish market. Even after the crisis of 2010,
trade did not suffer: in 2014, Turkish-Israeli trade attained a
historical record, a particularly remarkable fact in the context of
global economic difficulties.
As a result, it does not make any sense to look for the origin of the
problem in any (imaginary) "essence" of Islam.
It would be equally wrong to argue that the two countries found
alternative solutions ` they did not. Turkey is once again in conflict
with Syria, the tensions with the Iraqi government are not a secret,
and the diplomatic dispute with Egypt recently led to economic
reprisals from Cairo: the three-year transit trade agreement signed in
2015 will not be renewed. As a result, the port of Haifa is the only
remaining solution for the Turkish trucks transiting to Jordan (via
the port) and to the Arabian peninsula.
Correspondingly, the negotiations of Turkey with the EU, even if they
improved after the defeat of Nicolas Sarkozy, are certainly not as
good as Ankara wished.
On the Israeli side, it is quite obvious that Romania, Bulgaria and
Greece cannot replace Turkey.
Romania and Bulgaria do not possess the economic importance of Turkey.
Greece is a completely devastated. Even more problematically, in spite
of some incontrovertible achievements, such as the rapprochement with
India, Israel is facing a certain diplomatic isolation, in addition to
waves of anti-Semitism abroad. This is not to assert that Turkish
diplomacy is now at its zenith, but Turkey is currently chairing the
G20.
In other terms, if Turkey certainly needs Israel, Israel ` at least in
the current context ` needs Turkey even more. As former foreign
minister Avigdor Liberman himself noted, this country needs allies in
the Muslim world ` or, to put things more brutally, it is not in
Israel's interest to change the conflict with the Palestinian
movements into a religious war. Correspondingly Israel is supporting
Turkey's Southeastern Anatolia Project (GAP).
Not only there is no alternative solution for either side, but the
Turkish-Israeli political problems are annoying for their main common
ally in the neighborhood: Azerbaijan. This country is the main
furnisher (40%) of oil to Israel, one of the key clients of Israeli
hi-tech industry and, at the same time, the closest country to Turkey
in cultural terms as well as one of the 10 main investors in the
Turkish economy.
And needless to say, Washington is no happier than Baku. And once
again, if the Turkish-American relation is not, at a political level,
what it was a few years ago, the Israeli-American one is now facing
problems unprecedented since 1967.
The fact remains that both Turkey and Israel need each other, and that
is why reason should prevail in Ankara and Jerusalem. In Turkey, the
nationalist MHP party urged the government to normalize relations with
Israel (and Egypt). In Israel president Shimon Peres repeatedly
advocated a conciliatory attitude toward Turkey. Such voices should be
finally listened to. To achieve this goal, it is necessary to
understand that the golden age of 1980s, 1990s and 2000s was too
dependent on high-level relations, neglecting the exchanges between
the two societies.
In this regard, tourism could be an interesting beginning.
http://www.jpost.com/Opinion/The-case-for-the-Turkish-Israeli-alliance-388258
From: A. Papazian
By Serap Merve Dogan and Maxime Gauin
01/19/2015
[Serap Merve Dogan is the director of the Center for Jewish Studies of
Turkey and Maxime Gauin is a researcher at the Center for Eurasian
Studies, Ankara.]
Both Turkey and Israel need each other, and that is why reason should
prevail in Ankara and Jerusalem.
As everybody knows, the once-flourishing Turkish-Israeli alliance has
encountered serious problems during the past few years. To attempt to
solve the issue, misunderstandings on both sides should be avoided.
Turkey ` which saved tens of thousands Jews during the Second World
War ` was never at war with Israel, unlike the Arab world. Ankara
recognized Israel as early as 1949 and signed its first bilateral
agreement with the Jewish state in 1958. In spite of all the Arab
pressures, the diplomatic relations were never severed, either after
the Six Day War or after the Yom Kippur war.
Zionism has historically attracted quite diverse supporters in Turkey,
such as the ideologue of Kemalism, Tekin Alp (who was Jewish),
president Celal Bayar (1950-1960) and Turgut Ozal, prime minister
(1983-1989), president of Turkey (1989-1993) and even today, a
reference for the AKP ` the nationalist politician Alparslan Turkes
(admirer of the IDF and of Israeli hi-tech), or even the ideologue of
the secular far Right, Nihal Atsiz, who moved after 1945 to a staunch
admiration for Jews and Israel. On the other side, David Ben-Gurion
had the best of relations with the Ottoman authorities until 1914 and
saw Ataturk as an example.
The alliance developed to a great extent from 1981 to 2000s in the
economic, diplomatic and military fields, including during the first
years of the AKP.
The bilateral treaty prepared by a secular government in Turkey and
the Rabin cabinet in Israel in 1995 but finally signed by N. Erbakan
(an Islamist) and Benjamin Netanyahu in 1996, secured access to
Turkish air space for the IDF, reinforced the cooperation between the
Mossad and the Turkish MIT and enlarged the access of the Israeli
defense industry to the Turkish market. Even after the crisis of 2010,
trade did not suffer: in 2014, Turkish-Israeli trade attained a
historical record, a particularly remarkable fact in the context of
global economic difficulties.
As a result, it does not make any sense to look for the origin of the
problem in any (imaginary) "essence" of Islam.
It would be equally wrong to argue that the two countries found
alternative solutions ` they did not. Turkey is once again in conflict
with Syria, the tensions with the Iraqi government are not a secret,
and the diplomatic dispute with Egypt recently led to economic
reprisals from Cairo: the three-year transit trade agreement signed in
2015 will not be renewed. As a result, the port of Haifa is the only
remaining solution for the Turkish trucks transiting to Jordan (via
the port) and to the Arabian peninsula.
Correspondingly, the negotiations of Turkey with the EU, even if they
improved after the defeat of Nicolas Sarkozy, are certainly not as
good as Ankara wished.
On the Israeli side, it is quite obvious that Romania, Bulgaria and
Greece cannot replace Turkey.
Romania and Bulgaria do not possess the economic importance of Turkey.
Greece is a completely devastated. Even more problematically, in spite
of some incontrovertible achievements, such as the rapprochement with
India, Israel is facing a certain diplomatic isolation, in addition to
waves of anti-Semitism abroad. This is not to assert that Turkish
diplomacy is now at its zenith, but Turkey is currently chairing the
G20.
In other terms, if Turkey certainly needs Israel, Israel ` at least in
the current context ` needs Turkey even more. As former foreign
minister Avigdor Liberman himself noted, this country needs allies in
the Muslim world ` or, to put things more brutally, it is not in
Israel's interest to change the conflict with the Palestinian
movements into a religious war. Correspondingly Israel is supporting
Turkey's Southeastern Anatolia Project (GAP).
Not only there is no alternative solution for either side, but the
Turkish-Israeli political problems are annoying for their main common
ally in the neighborhood: Azerbaijan. This country is the main
furnisher (40%) of oil to Israel, one of the key clients of Israeli
hi-tech industry and, at the same time, the closest country to Turkey
in cultural terms as well as one of the 10 main investors in the
Turkish economy.
And needless to say, Washington is no happier than Baku. And once
again, if the Turkish-American relation is not, at a political level,
what it was a few years ago, the Israeli-American one is now facing
problems unprecedented since 1967.
The fact remains that both Turkey and Israel need each other, and that
is why reason should prevail in Ankara and Jerusalem. In Turkey, the
nationalist MHP party urged the government to normalize relations with
Israel (and Egypt). In Israel president Shimon Peres repeatedly
advocated a conciliatory attitude toward Turkey. Such voices should be
finally listened to. To achieve this goal, it is necessary to
understand that the golden age of 1980s, 1990s and 2000s was too
dependent on high-level relations, neglecting the exchanges between
the two societies.
In this regard, tourism could be an interesting beginning.
http://www.jpost.com/Opinion/The-case-for-the-Turkish-Israeli-alliance-388258
From: A. Papazian