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ARMENIA AND AZERBAIJAN FEEL THE EFFECTS OF THE UKRAINE STANDOFF
EurActiv, EU
Jan 23 2015
The standoff between Russia and the West over Ukraine has given
Azerbaijan more clout as Armenia's has decreased, writes Stratfor,
the Texas-based global intelligence company.
Prior to the conflict in Ukraine, Russia was in a very strong position
in the Caucasus region, which includes Armenia, Azerbaijan and
Georgia. Russia's defeat of Georgia in the August 2008 war countered
Tbilisi's efforts to join NATO, and Moscow expanded its military
presence in the breakaway territories of Abkhazia and South Ossetia.
Armenia, a longtime ally of Russia and the site of the Russian
102nd Military Base in Gyumri, had strengthened ties with Moscow
in the security and economic spheres. Azerbaijan maintained a more
independent and diversified foreign policy position because of its
sizable energy resources and strategic location on the Caspian Sea.
However, Russia's military presence in the region and its alliance with
Armenia effectively kept Baku in check, particularly since Russia is
Armenia's security guarantor in its ongoing conflict with Azerbaijan
over the breakaway territory of Nagorno-Karabakh, which Azerbaijan
lost in its 1988-1994 war with Armenia.
After the uprising against former Ukrainian President Viktor Yanukovich
in February 2014, however, Russia's strategic position took a massive
hit. Replacing Yanukovich was a pro-Western government that prioritized
strengthening ties with the European Union and United States. Given
Ukraine's existential importance to Russia, Moscow responded by
annexing Crimea and backing a pro-Russian separatist movement in
eastern Ukraine. Although these moves have created serious challenges
for the Ukrainian government, they have also isolated Moscow from
the West, sparking EU and U.S. sanctions against Russia and bringing
relations to their lowest point since the end of the Cold War. This
has also coincided with a drastic fall in global oil prices, which
has seriously weakened Russia's economy and limited Moscow's room to
maneuver on the foreign policy front.
The evolution of the standoff between Russia and the West has thus
had ripple effects throughout Eurasia, with each country in the former
Soviet periphery having to re-evaluate its position. In this context,
Azerbaijan is a particularly important country because Baku had
previously maintained a balanced position between the two sides and
because the country's energy resources could play a pivotal role in
the standoff. The Europeans have ardently courted Azerbaijan -- along
with Turkmenistan -- as they seek to diversify away from Russian energy
supplies via the Southern Corridor. This has considerably strengthened
Baku's strategic position, as demonstrated by a 21 January meeting
between German Chancellor Angela Merkel and Azerbaijani President
Ilham Aliyev in Berlin. Merkel praised the important role Azerbaijan
plays in "ensuring the energy security of Europe," while downplaying
the human rights issue that normally accompanies European interactions
with Aliyev.
Azerbaijan's new importance has increased its leverage over Russia,
a development that could explain the shift in the Nagorno-Karabakh
theater during the past year. Violence in the region has escalated
since the Ukraine crisis broke out, including a sharp spike in
cross-border casualties in August 2014 and the downing of an Armenian
helicopter by Azerbaijani forces in November. This appears to be a
product of a renewed assertiveness by Azerbaijan, which may no longer
feel as threatened by an Armenian -- and, by extension, Russian --
reprisal as it once did. This could also explain why Armenia has
so far been subdued and cautious in responding to acts such as the
helicopter downing; Yerevan knows that Russia's focus is still very
concentrated on the Ukrainian theater.
That said, the uptick in violence does not mean that a return to
full-scale military conflict between Azerbaijan and Armenia is
looming. Russia still retains its military presence in Armenia, and
Azerbaijan knows it cannot win a direct military confrontation with
Russia, even considering Moscow's current political and economic
constraints. Instead, Baku has been testing the waters with a more
limited engagement along the line of contact and with diplomatic
maneuvering with key players like the European Union, the United States
and Turkey. This strategy demonstrates Azerbaijan's leverage to all
parties involved and shows its ability to avoid making a commitment
to any single country in what is still a very dynamic environment.
Armenia, meanwhile, has grown closer to Russia. It joined the
Moscow-led Eurasian Economic Union at the start of 2015, a time of
serious economic decline in Russia. Yerevan had political motivations
for joining the bloc; it knew Armenia would be isolated and vulnerable
without Moscow's political and security backing.
Though the European Union has attempted to woo Armenia into its
camp, Yerevan has so far rebuffed the West, choosing to forego an
EU association and free trade agreement in favor of Eurasian Union
membership. This strategy poses considerable risks for Armenia. Its
economy is now closely tied to Russia's, and some domestic political
elements oppose further integration with Russia, but the Armenian
government sees closer cooperation with Russia as the best option in
the current environment.
The standoff between Russia and the West over Ukraine has given
Azerbaijan more clout as Armenia's has decreased, yet both countries
remain significantly constrained by larger and more powerful forces.
Still, their positions in the ongoing Nagorno-Karabakh conflict and
their broader ties with Moscow and the West will play an important,
and perhaps pivotal, role as the standoff continues.
Stratfor
http://www.euractiv.com/sections/europes-east/armenia-and-azerbaijan-feel-effects-ukraine-standoff-311532
EurActiv, EU
Jan 23 2015
The standoff between Russia and the West over Ukraine has given
Azerbaijan more clout as Armenia's has decreased, writes Stratfor,
the Texas-based global intelligence company.
Prior to the conflict in Ukraine, Russia was in a very strong position
in the Caucasus region, which includes Armenia, Azerbaijan and
Georgia. Russia's defeat of Georgia in the August 2008 war countered
Tbilisi's efforts to join NATO, and Moscow expanded its military
presence in the breakaway territories of Abkhazia and South Ossetia.
Armenia, a longtime ally of Russia and the site of the Russian
102nd Military Base in Gyumri, had strengthened ties with Moscow
in the security and economic spheres. Azerbaijan maintained a more
independent and diversified foreign policy position because of its
sizable energy resources and strategic location on the Caspian Sea.
However, Russia's military presence in the region and its alliance with
Armenia effectively kept Baku in check, particularly since Russia is
Armenia's security guarantor in its ongoing conflict with Azerbaijan
over the breakaway territory of Nagorno-Karabakh, which Azerbaijan
lost in its 1988-1994 war with Armenia.
After the uprising against former Ukrainian President Viktor Yanukovich
in February 2014, however, Russia's strategic position took a massive
hit. Replacing Yanukovich was a pro-Western government that prioritized
strengthening ties with the European Union and United States. Given
Ukraine's existential importance to Russia, Moscow responded by
annexing Crimea and backing a pro-Russian separatist movement in
eastern Ukraine. Although these moves have created serious challenges
for the Ukrainian government, they have also isolated Moscow from
the West, sparking EU and U.S. sanctions against Russia and bringing
relations to their lowest point since the end of the Cold War. This
has also coincided with a drastic fall in global oil prices, which
has seriously weakened Russia's economy and limited Moscow's room to
maneuver on the foreign policy front.
The evolution of the standoff between Russia and the West has thus
had ripple effects throughout Eurasia, with each country in the former
Soviet periphery having to re-evaluate its position. In this context,
Azerbaijan is a particularly important country because Baku had
previously maintained a balanced position between the two sides and
because the country's energy resources could play a pivotal role in
the standoff. The Europeans have ardently courted Azerbaijan -- along
with Turkmenistan -- as they seek to diversify away from Russian energy
supplies via the Southern Corridor. This has considerably strengthened
Baku's strategic position, as demonstrated by a 21 January meeting
between German Chancellor Angela Merkel and Azerbaijani President
Ilham Aliyev in Berlin. Merkel praised the important role Azerbaijan
plays in "ensuring the energy security of Europe," while downplaying
the human rights issue that normally accompanies European interactions
with Aliyev.
Azerbaijan's new importance has increased its leverage over Russia,
a development that could explain the shift in the Nagorno-Karabakh
theater during the past year. Violence in the region has escalated
since the Ukraine crisis broke out, including a sharp spike in
cross-border casualties in August 2014 and the downing of an Armenian
helicopter by Azerbaijani forces in November. This appears to be a
product of a renewed assertiveness by Azerbaijan, which may no longer
feel as threatened by an Armenian -- and, by extension, Russian --
reprisal as it once did. This could also explain why Armenia has
so far been subdued and cautious in responding to acts such as the
helicopter downing; Yerevan knows that Russia's focus is still very
concentrated on the Ukrainian theater.
That said, the uptick in violence does not mean that a return to
full-scale military conflict between Azerbaijan and Armenia is
looming. Russia still retains its military presence in Armenia, and
Azerbaijan knows it cannot win a direct military confrontation with
Russia, even considering Moscow's current political and economic
constraints. Instead, Baku has been testing the waters with a more
limited engagement along the line of contact and with diplomatic
maneuvering with key players like the European Union, the United States
and Turkey. This strategy demonstrates Azerbaijan's leverage to all
parties involved and shows its ability to avoid making a commitment
to any single country in what is still a very dynamic environment.
Armenia, meanwhile, has grown closer to Russia. It joined the
Moscow-led Eurasian Economic Union at the start of 2015, a time of
serious economic decline in Russia. Yerevan had political motivations
for joining the bloc; it knew Armenia would be isolated and vulnerable
without Moscow's political and security backing.
Though the European Union has attempted to woo Armenia into its
camp, Yerevan has so far rebuffed the West, choosing to forego an
EU association and free trade agreement in favor of Eurasian Union
membership. This strategy poses considerable risks for Armenia. Its
economy is now closely tied to Russia's, and some domestic political
elements oppose further integration with Russia, but the Armenian
government sees closer cooperation with Russia as the best option in
the current environment.
The standoff between Russia and the West over Ukraine has given
Azerbaijan more clout as Armenia's has decreased, yet both countries
remain significantly constrained by larger and more powerful forces.
Still, their positions in the ongoing Nagorno-Karabakh conflict and
their broader ties with Moscow and the West will play an important,
and perhaps pivotal, role as the standoff continues.
Stratfor
http://www.euractiv.com/sections/europes-east/armenia-and-azerbaijan-feel-effects-ukraine-standoff-311532