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GERARD LIBARIDIAN'S SECRET VISIT TO AFGHANISTAN IN 1994
March 3, 2015 11:59
exclusive
Mediamax continues its Special File project, which aims to present
the unknown or less known details of Armenian foreign policy events.
In 1990s, Historian, Professor Gerard Libaridian was the Senior
Advisor to first President of Armenia Levon Ter-Petrosyan. He is
presently working on his memorial book and agreed to present one of
the episodes of the book to us. (The interview with Gerard Libariadian
was orginially held in Armenian and was then translated into English
by Mediamax).
In 1994, the Bishkek Protocol was signed and it was followed by the
ceasefire agreement. There were two main points in that document -
complete halt of fire and military operations, and "completion of
negotiations in the next 10 days and conclusion of an agreement on the
cessation of the armed conflict not later than May 22 of this year".
Both the Armenian and Azerbaijani parties used to think that this
ceasefire agreement is conventional as the question - "how to act
if no negotiations are held within the mentioned 10 days or if
the negotiations fail?" - remained open. The three parties of the
conflict used to take this document as a "pause" and were getting
ready for resumption of war. We certainly did not need it as we
were the winning party - whatever we could do through war was already
done. The ceasefire was expected to be followed by prompt and intensive
negotiations and Russian President's Special Envoy for Nagorno Karabakh
Vladimir Kazimirov was expected to be actively involved in it. However,
it all did not take place - great efforts were not committed.
The Azerbaijani Army was in a terrible state. Thus, they had signed
an agreement with Afghanistan to engage Mujahideens in war. It is
no secret that the Mujahideens were actively engaged in military
operations against Armenia and Nagorno Karabakh in 1993-1994. We knew
that this time Azerbaijan had reached an agreement over engaging
a great number of Mujahideens, and Baku had high hopes for them to
resume the war. We started pondering over the measures that could be
employed to prevent it.
Through an intermediary we got to know a person called Abdulhak who
was one of the leaders of Afghan Mujahideens carrying war on the USSR.
Abdulhak was in Jalalabad and his brother was the governor of that
territory. We turned to Abdulhak asking to organize a meeting with
Afghan Prime Minister Gulbuddin Hekmatyar.
Quite secretly, we arranged my visit to Jalalabad to meet with
Gulbuddin Hekmatyar. Very few people were aware of my visit - President
Levon Ter-Petrosyan who had conceived that idea, Armenian President's
Special Envoy David Shahnazaryan and my Principal Assistant Hasmik
Harutyunyan.
Back then Afghanistan was at civil war and the UN had banned flights
there. However, by a special and light aircraft and several times
bribing locals for fuel, I eventually reached Jalalabad along with the
abovementioned intermediary. I was accompanied to the queen's country
house from the airport and two hours later I was taken to the house of
governor Qadir - the brother of Abdulhak. I started placing stronger
focus on my meeting with PM Hekmatyar. I also conferred with Abdulhak
and Qadir. Hekmatyar had dispatched his two advisors to talk to me and
see what should be done - the PM was familiar with the subject of the
meeting but he did not know anything more. After our conversation the
advisors left, presumably to inform the PM about the details of our
talk. Shortly afterwards, one of them returned and took me to the PM.
His residence was in an army camp outside the city.
Jalalabad
Photo:
When we arrived there, we had to go several floors down. I was told
he was praying at that moment and was asked to wait.
A short time later, I met with Hekmatyar. Besides Hekmatyar, there
were 7-8 more people there - they were all seated on pillows on the
floor, in a cross-legged position. We talked for over an hour. I was
sparing no effort to convince him of that the Mujahideens should
not go to Azerbaijan. He was trying to refute that they had such
agreement with Azerbaijan but at the same time, he was continuing to
lend an ear to my arguments. From afar, it might resemble a talk of
the deaf but it was a different type of talk - it was highly important
to watch the niceties of each of Hekmatyar's refutations and also the
changes in his continuous smile when he was finding one of my words or
expressions important. Hekmatyar's smile and manner of talking were
relaxed and I managed to persuade him. I was then taken back to the
governor's place where I spent the night. I was to leave next morning,
however, it turned out we didn't have fuel. We had to wait for the
only airplane in Afghanistan operating flights to the Persian Gulf
to return in order to purchase fuel from it.
At 3 am, June 13, my small airplane landed at Yerevan airport and
left immediately after I got off.
Early in the morning, I reported about my visit to President Levon
Ter-Petrosyan. We decided to disseminate a short press release about my
visit and assert my positive impression from it. I contacted Abdulhak
and asked him to contact PM Hekmatyar and let him know about our wish
to have a short press release in one of our newspapers on that the
Advisor to the Armenian President paid a visit to Afghanistan and
discussed issues of mutual interest with the PM. His consent would
imply they have decided to give up the large-scale program of sending
Mujahideens to Azerbaijan. Around two days later Abdulhak called saying
that Hekmatyar said "do as you wish, simply let me know about it".
Thus, we managed to prevent the support of around 1500 Mujahideens for
the Azerbaijani Army and mitigate the risk of resuming the war. This
step was followed by others by us, and owing to them, in July-August
1994, we succeeded in signing a permanent ceasefire agreement with
Azerbaijan.
Aram Araratyan - See more at:
http://www.mediamax.am/en/news/special-file/13374/#sthash.tp0DBtVD.dpuf
From: Baghdasarian
March 3, 2015 11:59
exclusive
Mediamax continues its Special File project, which aims to present
the unknown or less known details of Armenian foreign policy events.
In 1990s, Historian, Professor Gerard Libaridian was the Senior
Advisor to first President of Armenia Levon Ter-Petrosyan. He is
presently working on his memorial book and agreed to present one of
the episodes of the book to us. (The interview with Gerard Libariadian
was orginially held in Armenian and was then translated into English
by Mediamax).
In 1994, the Bishkek Protocol was signed and it was followed by the
ceasefire agreement. There were two main points in that document -
complete halt of fire and military operations, and "completion of
negotiations in the next 10 days and conclusion of an agreement on the
cessation of the armed conflict not later than May 22 of this year".
Both the Armenian and Azerbaijani parties used to think that this
ceasefire agreement is conventional as the question - "how to act
if no negotiations are held within the mentioned 10 days or if
the negotiations fail?" - remained open. The three parties of the
conflict used to take this document as a "pause" and were getting
ready for resumption of war. We certainly did not need it as we
were the winning party - whatever we could do through war was already
done. The ceasefire was expected to be followed by prompt and intensive
negotiations and Russian President's Special Envoy for Nagorno Karabakh
Vladimir Kazimirov was expected to be actively involved in it. However,
it all did not take place - great efforts were not committed.
The Azerbaijani Army was in a terrible state. Thus, they had signed
an agreement with Afghanistan to engage Mujahideens in war. It is
no secret that the Mujahideens were actively engaged in military
operations against Armenia and Nagorno Karabakh in 1993-1994. We knew
that this time Azerbaijan had reached an agreement over engaging
a great number of Mujahideens, and Baku had high hopes for them to
resume the war. We started pondering over the measures that could be
employed to prevent it.
Through an intermediary we got to know a person called Abdulhak who
was one of the leaders of Afghan Mujahideens carrying war on the USSR.
Abdulhak was in Jalalabad and his brother was the governor of that
territory. We turned to Abdulhak asking to organize a meeting with
Afghan Prime Minister Gulbuddin Hekmatyar.
Quite secretly, we arranged my visit to Jalalabad to meet with
Gulbuddin Hekmatyar. Very few people were aware of my visit - President
Levon Ter-Petrosyan who had conceived that idea, Armenian President's
Special Envoy David Shahnazaryan and my Principal Assistant Hasmik
Harutyunyan.
Back then Afghanistan was at civil war and the UN had banned flights
there. However, by a special and light aircraft and several times
bribing locals for fuel, I eventually reached Jalalabad along with the
abovementioned intermediary. I was accompanied to the queen's country
house from the airport and two hours later I was taken to the house of
governor Qadir - the brother of Abdulhak. I started placing stronger
focus on my meeting with PM Hekmatyar. I also conferred with Abdulhak
and Qadir. Hekmatyar had dispatched his two advisors to talk to me and
see what should be done - the PM was familiar with the subject of the
meeting but he did not know anything more. After our conversation the
advisors left, presumably to inform the PM about the details of our
talk. Shortly afterwards, one of them returned and took me to the PM.
His residence was in an army camp outside the city.
Jalalabad
Photo:
When we arrived there, we had to go several floors down. I was told
he was praying at that moment and was asked to wait.
A short time later, I met with Hekmatyar. Besides Hekmatyar, there
were 7-8 more people there - they were all seated on pillows on the
floor, in a cross-legged position. We talked for over an hour. I was
sparing no effort to convince him of that the Mujahideens should
not go to Azerbaijan. He was trying to refute that they had such
agreement with Azerbaijan but at the same time, he was continuing to
lend an ear to my arguments. From afar, it might resemble a talk of
the deaf but it was a different type of talk - it was highly important
to watch the niceties of each of Hekmatyar's refutations and also the
changes in his continuous smile when he was finding one of my words or
expressions important. Hekmatyar's smile and manner of talking were
relaxed and I managed to persuade him. I was then taken back to the
governor's place where I spent the night. I was to leave next morning,
however, it turned out we didn't have fuel. We had to wait for the
only airplane in Afghanistan operating flights to the Persian Gulf
to return in order to purchase fuel from it.
At 3 am, June 13, my small airplane landed at Yerevan airport and
left immediately after I got off.
Early in the morning, I reported about my visit to President Levon
Ter-Petrosyan. We decided to disseminate a short press release about my
visit and assert my positive impression from it. I contacted Abdulhak
and asked him to contact PM Hekmatyar and let him know about our wish
to have a short press release in one of our newspapers on that the
Advisor to the Armenian President paid a visit to Afghanistan and
discussed issues of mutual interest with the PM. His consent would
imply they have decided to give up the large-scale program of sending
Mujahideens to Azerbaijan. Around two days later Abdulhak called saying
that Hekmatyar said "do as you wish, simply let me know about it".
Thus, we managed to prevent the support of around 1500 Mujahideens for
the Azerbaijani Army and mitigate the risk of resuming the war. This
step was followed by others by us, and owing to them, in July-August
1994, we succeeded in signing a permanent ceasefire agreement with
Azerbaijan.
Aram Araratyan - See more at:
http://www.mediamax.am/en/news/special-file/13374/#sthash.tp0DBtVD.dpuf
From: Baghdasarian