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WAS ARMENIA THE CANARY IN THE 'NEAR-ABROAD' COAL MINE?
Transitions Online, Czech Rep.
March 12 2015
Russian moves vis a vis Yerevan were an early indicator of the
Kremlin's more muscular approach to its former vassal states. From
openDemocracy.by Kevork Oskanian12 March 2015
The current conflict in Ukraine has preoccupied Western media,
analysts, scholars, and policy-makers for well over a year now - and
has left many of the assumptions that once governed relations between
Russia and the West in tatters. There is little doubt that the outcome
of the drama being played out in the east of that country will shape
new rules of the game among Moscow, the former Soviet republics, and
Brussels, possibly for decades. Conscious of this fact, the smaller
states in the EU's Eastern Partnership region - Moldova, Georgia,
Armenia, and Azerbaijan - view the Ukrainian crisis as a decisive
moment, one that might determine the nature of their statehoods in
the foreseeable future.
To some extent, the plight of the weakest and most dependent of these
smaller states, Armenia, should have alerted policy-makers to the
seriousness of Russia's intentions in reasserting its position within
"its" near abroad. Indeed, Yerevan was clearly strong-armed into the
Eurasian Customs Union (ECU). The country had been expected to initial
its Association Agreement with the EU in Vilnius in November 2013,
after the successful conclusion of negotiations in June. So when
its president, Serzh Sargsyan, announced his dramatic U-turn on 3
September 2013, it came as a shock to both officials and seasoned
observers of Armenian politics.
STRONG-ARM TACTICS
Previously, the Kremlin had tolerated Yerevan's limited co-operation
with NATO and participation in the ENP, partly because Yerevan's
already deep and apparently irreversible military-strategic dependence
on Moscow paradoxically made such engagement palatable; and, in any
case, as was often pointed out by Yerevan in its refusals to join the
Russia-led ECU, Armenia's small economy did not share a border with
the bloc. For Russia, the gain of Yerevan's membership was therefore
minimal, both in geopolitical and geo-economic terms. The fact that
it was nonetheless strong-armed into a policy shift should have been
an early signal to all concerned - primarily in the former Soviet
Union - that the Putin administration "meant business" in pressing
ahead with its regional project.
Russian President Vladimir Putin visits Gyumri, Armenia, site of a
Russian military base, in December 2013, three months after Yerevan
announced its abrupt decision to join a Moscow-led trade bloc instead
of signing an association agreement with the EU. Kremlin photo.
While Russia may have gained little with Armenia's accession to the ECU
- which was formalized at the beginning of this year - the costs for
Armenia have been considerable. These costs go beyond the clash between
the country's WTO and ECU commitments, or the further deepening of its
economy's dependence on Russian energy and remittances. They include
Armenia's much reduced ability to hedge against major geopolitical
shift in its region - something the country once aspired to through
the "complementarity" of its foreign policy.
DEPENDENCE
Armenia's dependence on Russia was apparent during the Nagorno-Karabakh
war - won in no small part because of Russian material support -
and it intensified following the 1998 removal of the country's first
post-Soviet president, Levon Ter-Petrosyan, under his successors,
Robert Kocharyan and Sargsyan. But throughout these periods, Yerevan's
strategic dependence on Moscow was (however partially and imperfectly)
balanced by active participation in Western structures, like various
EU programs - from TACIS [an early-2000s aid program for post-Soviet
states - TOL] to the ENP - and NATO's Partnership for Peace.
Even after its accession to the ECU, Armenia has displayed a dogged
determination to adhere to the last remnants of complementarity: it
has declared its readiness to negotiate with the EU on an Association
Agreement "lite," and its representatives in the Parliamentary
Assembly of the Council of Europe (PACE) pointedly abstained on a
recent resolution suspending Russia's membership in that body.
To some, this combination of a clear strategic dependence on Russia
with sporadic interaction with the West might seem inconsistent;
it is, however, the result of the contradictory pressures Armenia's
elites have to contend with - from the domestic and regional levels,
pitting the shadows of the past against the realities of the present
and the uncertainties of the future.
Armenians have largely accepted their country's pro-Russian orientation
for two reasons. Firstly, the overwhelming focus of domestic politics
on the Karabakh conflict has obscured the costs paid by Armenia
in terms of the hollowing-out of its sovereignty and independence;
secondly, on a regional level, Armenia's interest in maintaining the
de facto status quo in Karabakh has - so far at least - coincided
with Russia's interest in maintaining that very status quo.
DOMESTIC POLITICS
The first, domestic element is related to the place of history
in Armenia's national identity and should therefore be taken as a
constant. If anything, the emphasis put by Armenian governments since
1998 on ethnic rather than civic notions of nationalism has reinforced
the place of Nagorno-Karabakh in local existential narratives.
Continued control over the enclave remains a matter of life and death
for Armenians as an ethnic group; issues of state sovereignty and
independence become secondary considerations that emerge sporadically,
when post-colonial sleights - like the aftermath of the recent Gyumri
massacre, or the humiliation of an Armenian citizen in Russia -
temporarily overwhelm that existential fear.
Much of Yerevan's pro-Russian "strategic lock" thus emerges from
linkages between the Karabakh conflict and relations with Turkey, in
effect precluding the unequivocal pro-Western, pro-NATO orientation
evidenced in neighboring Georgia. Ankara and Baku are seen as greater
threats than Moscow; and threats are to be balanced against.
But viewed from the second, regional perspective, Armenia's alliance
with Russia becomes far less secure. Granted, military agreements with
Moscow have provided for security guarantees and preferential arms
supplies. But those security guarantees remain untested and technically
do not extend to the one issue that has moved Armenian politics since
independence - Nagorno-Karabakh; meanwhile, Yerevan's Russian ally has
become one of Azerbaijan's largest arms suppliers (admittedly charging
full prices in light of Baku's enhanced, oil-fueled purchasing power).
DIVIDE AND RULE
Moscow's - some would say cynical - claim to act as peacemaker within
the Minsk Group (which leads negotiations over Nagorno-Karabakh)
while simultaneously arming both sides in the conflict is part
of a long-running divide-and-rule policy. After all, Moscow has a
fundamental interest in keeping the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict frozen:
Karabakh can be used as a disciplinary mechanism against both Yerevan
and Baku (in fact, sources close to the Kremlin claimed it played
a role in Putin's pressuring of Sargsyan in 2013). More importantly,
this regional sore precludes any trilateral co-operation among Armenia,
Azerbaijan, and Georgia. It is part of a divide-et-impera approach to
the region that predates by more than a century the transformation of
its three main nations from colonial subalterns to legally sovereign
states.
Armenia's openings to the West have, partially at least, been driven
by worst-case scenarios: a withdrawal of Russia from the Caucasus,
or a reconfiguration of the divide-and-rule policies outlined above
against Armenia's interests. Both have been well within the realm of
possibility at various points in the past two-and-a-half decades.
Such hedging has now become much less plausible; and needless to
say, being at the mercy of one single great power is not an enviable
position for a small state to find oneself in.
Kevork Oskanian is a research fellow in political science and
international studies department at the University of Birmingham. He
tweets at @CrazyPsyKO. This commentary originally appeared on
openDemocracy.
http://www.tol.org/client/article/24724-was-armenia-the-canary-in-the-near-abroad-coal-mine.html
From: Baghdasarian
Transitions Online, Czech Rep.
March 12 2015
Russian moves vis a vis Yerevan were an early indicator of the
Kremlin's more muscular approach to its former vassal states. From
openDemocracy.by Kevork Oskanian12 March 2015
The current conflict in Ukraine has preoccupied Western media,
analysts, scholars, and policy-makers for well over a year now - and
has left many of the assumptions that once governed relations between
Russia and the West in tatters. There is little doubt that the outcome
of the drama being played out in the east of that country will shape
new rules of the game among Moscow, the former Soviet republics, and
Brussels, possibly for decades. Conscious of this fact, the smaller
states in the EU's Eastern Partnership region - Moldova, Georgia,
Armenia, and Azerbaijan - view the Ukrainian crisis as a decisive
moment, one that might determine the nature of their statehoods in
the foreseeable future.
To some extent, the plight of the weakest and most dependent of these
smaller states, Armenia, should have alerted policy-makers to the
seriousness of Russia's intentions in reasserting its position within
"its" near abroad. Indeed, Yerevan was clearly strong-armed into the
Eurasian Customs Union (ECU). The country had been expected to initial
its Association Agreement with the EU in Vilnius in November 2013,
after the successful conclusion of negotiations in June. So when
its president, Serzh Sargsyan, announced his dramatic U-turn on 3
September 2013, it came as a shock to both officials and seasoned
observers of Armenian politics.
STRONG-ARM TACTICS
Previously, the Kremlin had tolerated Yerevan's limited co-operation
with NATO and participation in the ENP, partly because Yerevan's
already deep and apparently irreversible military-strategic dependence
on Moscow paradoxically made such engagement palatable; and, in any
case, as was often pointed out by Yerevan in its refusals to join the
Russia-led ECU, Armenia's small economy did not share a border with
the bloc. For Russia, the gain of Yerevan's membership was therefore
minimal, both in geopolitical and geo-economic terms. The fact that
it was nonetheless strong-armed into a policy shift should have been
an early signal to all concerned - primarily in the former Soviet
Union - that the Putin administration "meant business" in pressing
ahead with its regional project.
Russian President Vladimir Putin visits Gyumri, Armenia, site of a
Russian military base, in December 2013, three months after Yerevan
announced its abrupt decision to join a Moscow-led trade bloc instead
of signing an association agreement with the EU. Kremlin photo.
While Russia may have gained little with Armenia's accession to the ECU
- which was formalized at the beginning of this year - the costs for
Armenia have been considerable. These costs go beyond the clash between
the country's WTO and ECU commitments, or the further deepening of its
economy's dependence on Russian energy and remittances. They include
Armenia's much reduced ability to hedge against major geopolitical
shift in its region - something the country once aspired to through
the "complementarity" of its foreign policy.
DEPENDENCE
Armenia's dependence on Russia was apparent during the Nagorno-Karabakh
war - won in no small part because of Russian material support -
and it intensified following the 1998 removal of the country's first
post-Soviet president, Levon Ter-Petrosyan, under his successors,
Robert Kocharyan and Sargsyan. But throughout these periods, Yerevan's
strategic dependence on Moscow was (however partially and imperfectly)
balanced by active participation in Western structures, like various
EU programs - from TACIS [an early-2000s aid program for post-Soviet
states - TOL] to the ENP - and NATO's Partnership for Peace.
Even after its accession to the ECU, Armenia has displayed a dogged
determination to adhere to the last remnants of complementarity: it
has declared its readiness to negotiate with the EU on an Association
Agreement "lite," and its representatives in the Parliamentary
Assembly of the Council of Europe (PACE) pointedly abstained on a
recent resolution suspending Russia's membership in that body.
To some, this combination of a clear strategic dependence on Russia
with sporadic interaction with the West might seem inconsistent;
it is, however, the result of the contradictory pressures Armenia's
elites have to contend with - from the domestic and regional levels,
pitting the shadows of the past against the realities of the present
and the uncertainties of the future.
Armenians have largely accepted their country's pro-Russian orientation
for two reasons. Firstly, the overwhelming focus of domestic politics
on the Karabakh conflict has obscured the costs paid by Armenia
in terms of the hollowing-out of its sovereignty and independence;
secondly, on a regional level, Armenia's interest in maintaining the
de facto status quo in Karabakh has - so far at least - coincided
with Russia's interest in maintaining that very status quo.
DOMESTIC POLITICS
The first, domestic element is related to the place of history
in Armenia's national identity and should therefore be taken as a
constant. If anything, the emphasis put by Armenian governments since
1998 on ethnic rather than civic notions of nationalism has reinforced
the place of Nagorno-Karabakh in local existential narratives.
Continued control over the enclave remains a matter of life and death
for Armenians as an ethnic group; issues of state sovereignty and
independence become secondary considerations that emerge sporadically,
when post-colonial sleights - like the aftermath of the recent Gyumri
massacre, or the humiliation of an Armenian citizen in Russia -
temporarily overwhelm that existential fear.
Much of Yerevan's pro-Russian "strategic lock" thus emerges from
linkages between the Karabakh conflict and relations with Turkey, in
effect precluding the unequivocal pro-Western, pro-NATO orientation
evidenced in neighboring Georgia. Ankara and Baku are seen as greater
threats than Moscow; and threats are to be balanced against.
But viewed from the second, regional perspective, Armenia's alliance
with Russia becomes far less secure. Granted, military agreements with
Moscow have provided for security guarantees and preferential arms
supplies. But those security guarantees remain untested and technically
do not extend to the one issue that has moved Armenian politics since
independence - Nagorno-Karabakh; meanwhile, Yerevan's Russian ally has
become one of Azerbaijan's largest arms suppliers (admittedly charging
full prices in light of Baku's enhanced, oil-fueled purchasing power).
DIVIDE AND RULE
Moscow's - some would say cynical - claim to act as peacemaker within
the Minsk Group (which leads negotiations over Nagorno-Karabakh)
while simultaneously arming both sides in the conflict is part
of a long-running divide-and-rule policy. After all, Moscow has a
fundamental interest in keeping the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict frozen:
Karabakh can be used as a disciplinary mechanism against both Yerevan
and Baku (in fact, sources close to the Kremlin claimed it played
a role in Putin's pressuring of Sargsyan in 2013). More importantly,
this regional sore precludes any trilateral co-operation among Armenia,
Azerbaijan, and Georgia. It is part of a divide-et-impera approach to
the region that predates by more than a century the transformation of
its three main nations from colonial subalterns to legally sovereign
states.
Armenia's openings to the West have, partially at least, been driven
by worst-case scenarios: a withdrawal of Russia from the Caucasus,
or a reconfiguration of the divide-and-rule policies outlined above
against Armenia's interests. Both have been well within the realm of
possibility at various points in the past two-and-a-half decades.
Such hedging has now become much less plausible; and needless to
say, being at the mercy of one single great power is not an enviable
position for a small state to find oneself in.
Kevork Oskanian is a research fellow in political science and
international studies department at the University of Birmingham. He
tweets at @CrazyPsyKO. This commentary originally appeared on
openDemocracy.
http://www.tol.org/client/article/24724-was-armenia-the-canary-in-the-near-abroad-coal-mine.html
From: Baghdasarian