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Today's Zaman, Turkey
March 15 2015
Why did Armenia give up on the protocols?
The move by Armenian President Serzh Sarksyan to withdraw protocols
signed by Turkey and Armenia in 2009 from parliament's agenda is an
indication of his desire to win over the Armenian diaspora.(Photo:
Reuters)
March 14, 2015, Saturday/ 17:00:00/ ALIN OZINIAN
On Feb. 16 Armenian President Serzh Sarksyan unexpectedly decided to
withdraw protocols signed by Turkey and Armenia in 2009 from
parliament's agenda. These protocols were intended to normalize
bilateral relations between the two countries. To say the West wanted
the protocols to be signed, and that the US masterminded the process
leading up to it, dubbed "football diplomacy,' would not amount to
disclosing highly confidential information.
Although the protocols had been marketed as not containing any
prerequisite, Turkey couldn't resist mentioning the disputed region of
Nagorno-Karabakh and sending Armenia the message that, at a minimum,
they should withdraw troops from the district of Agdam. Would Turkey
have opened its border crossings to Armenia if any progress had been
made regarding the Nagorno-Karabakh issue? The answer to this question
would most probably have been negative.
As long as it continued to see Armenia's incentive to normalize
relations and establish diplomatic ties with its neighbor, Turkey
would try to take more than its share and attempt to bait Armenia with
the potential of open borders. Turkey would bring up the issue of open
border crossings only if it perceived Armenia to be perpetually in
need and tied to Turkey's apron strings.
It would be naive to question the sincerity of a government which
launched a counteroffensive with the message "If you have your 1915,
we have our Battle of Gallipoli" ahead of the 100th anniversary of the
genocide, after issuing a so-called letter of apology in 2014. The
ruling Justice and Development Party's (AKP) idea of sharing common
sorrow with Armenia collapsed completely in 2015.
Actually, the protocols, which can be considered stillborn, were never
able to be put into practice, but were instead used to buy time and
send a message to the West that Turkey and Armenia were working on a
dialogue. At the same time, the leaders of both countries occasionally
made "harsh statements" geared specifically for domestic consumption.
Then-Foreign Minister Ahmet DavutoÄ?lu said, "The territorial integrity
of Karabakh is as precious as our own land," and Murat Mercan, the
head of the parliamentary Foreign Affairs Commission, remarked, "We
will continue to act in compliance with our responsibilities to our
country and to the Azerbaijani people and with the prestige of
Turkey."
Apparently, before the protocols were undersigned, intermediaries had
convinced Turkey that the Nagorno-Karabakh issue would be "solved" as
well. They were unable to add the settlement of the issue to the text
of the protocols as Armenia would not accept it. This "solution"
certainly meant different scenarios for Armenia and Turkey, and what
these intermediaries understood by it still remains a mystery.
As Turkey made up its mind to cite a solution to the Nagorno-Karabakh
issue as a prerequisite to signing the protocols, Armenia tried to
warn the other side by attempting to attract the West's attention. The
first move came from Sarksyan after the protocols were sent to the
Armenian parliament for ratification in 2009, when he said that
Armenia was ready to normalize ties with Turkey but was unable to see
the required political will on the Turkish side. In April 2010 he
said: "Turkey is not ready to make progress without prerequisites. We
will consider making progress if favorable conditions and a leadership
ready for normalization are created in Ankara," making clear that
Yerevan did not abandon the process but only suspended it. As he
addressed the United Nations General Assembly in September 2014,
Sarksyan gave the clearest sign of a procedural deadlock by
essentially saying, "To hell with those protocols.'
The "football diplomacy" long in abeyance started to resemble a kids'
brawl as Sarksyan invited Recep Tayyip ErdoÄ?an to the opening of the
genocide memorial on April 24 and, in response, ErdoÄ?an invited him to
attend the commemoration ceremonies for the Battle of Gallipoli on the
same day. However, Sarksyan then made the unexpected move to withdraw
the protocols from the parliamentary agenda.
Why 2015?
Preceding events have spelled trouble, but fail to answer the question
"Why did Armenia make this decision now?" That Sarksyan made this move
a few days before he declared war on Gagik Tsarukyan, the founder and
leader of main opposition party "Prosperous Armenia,' brushing him
completely off the political arena, still arouses curiosity.
When he undersigned the protocols in 2009, Sarksyan had just come out
of the elections of March 1, 2008, and was in need of international
support. Many people had taken to the streets, claiming that the
elections were rigged, and several people had died or were wounded in
resulting skirmishes. The suppression of these protests, known as
"Bloody March 1," came to be perceived as Sarksyan's victory. At such
a critical moment it was wise to play the nice boy with the West and
secure the support of Western countries. However, apparently he no
longer feels the need to secure this support for his presidency.
With this move, Sarksyan will certainly win the backing of
Dashnaktsutyun (ARF), a party which had left the coalition in the wake
of the signature of the protocols. As Dashnaktsutyun has good
relations with the Armenian diaspora, Sarksyan will clearly secure the
support of certain Armenians abroad. It is important to obtain the
support of the diaspora and be smooth-tongued with them as the
anniversary of the genocide approaches. Before he signed the
protocols, Sarksyan visited Moscow, the center of the Armenian
diaspora, which provides the most financial and political support to
Armenia, to hint that Armenia was preparing to engage in new ties with
Turkey. After signing the protocols, he paid quick visits to various
diaspora centers in order to convince the diaspora that it was a
correct and beneficial move.
Another strong possibility is that he may be trying to score a goal in
the context of the "football diplomacy" that has lost its hold. Seeing
that Turkey's "pro-dialogue" policy hadn't translated into
constructive moves, and feeling deceived, Armenia might have wanted to
flex its muscles in the international arena, sending a message that
said, "This is the first move and if no progress is made, we will
withdraw the signatures as well.'
The officials of Dashnaktsutyun, which is rumored to be joining the
coalition in the coming days, noted that while the president's move to
withdraw the protocols from the parliamentary agenda made them glad,
this represents only half of the process and they want the president
to withdraw the signatures from the protocols by April 24.
It is very likely that Armenia will completely withdraw its signatures
by this date. Yet, for the international community, the recent move
will signify that Armenia does not support the dialogue process. In
short, Armenia will be criticized for the reasons it withdrew the
protocols, though it is simply attempting to send a message to the
international community. While all parties that seek a normalization
of bilateral ties are aware that Turkey still sticks to its policy of
denial, with the added emphasis of the approaching anniversary, they
still won't accept Armenia's claim that it did its best and that
Turkey missed its chance. These parties will attempt to create a
process for "sustaining" the ties, even if most of it will be centered
on the no-solution-is-a-solution principle.
Alin Ozinian is a political analyst.
http://www.todayszaman.com/op-ed_why-did-armenia-give-up-on-the-protocols_375155.html
March 15 2015
Why did Armenia give up on the protocols?
The move by Armenian President Serzh Sarksyan to withdraw protocols
signed by Turkey and Armenia in 2009 from parliament's agenda is an
indication of his desire to win over the Armenian diaspora.(Photo:
Reuters)
March 14, 2015, Saturday/ 17:00:00/ ALIN OZINIAN
On Feb. 16 Armenian President Serzh Sarksyan unexpectedly decided to
withdraw protocols signed by Turkey and Armenia in 2009 from
parliament's agenda. These protocols were intended to normalize
bilateral relations between the two countries. To say the West wanted
the protocols to be signed, and that the US masterminded the process
leading up to it, dubbed "football diplomacy,' would not amount to
disclosing highly confidential information.
Although the protocols had been marketed as not containing any
prerequisite, Turkey couldn't resist mentioning the disputed region of
Nagorno-Karabakh and sending Armenia the message that, at a minimum,
they should withdraw troops from the district of Agdam. Would Turkey
have opened its border crossings to Armenia if any progress had been
made regarding the Nagorno-Karabakh issue? The answer to this question
would most probably have been negative.
As long as it continued to see Armenia's incentive to normalize
relations and establish diplomatic ties with its neighbor, Turkey
would try to take more than its share and attempt to bait Armenia with
the potential of open borders. Turkey would bring up the issue of open
border crossings only if it perceived Armenia to be perpetually in
need and tied to Turkey's apron strings.
It would be naive to question the sincerity of a government which
launched a counteroffensive with the message "If you have your 1915,
we have our Battle of Gallipoli" ahead of the 100th anniversary of the
genocide, after issuing a so-called letter of apology in 2014. The
ruling Justice and Development Party's (AKP) idea of sharing common
sorrow with Armenia collapsed completely in 2015.
Actually, the protocols, which can be considered stillborn, were never
able to be put into practice, but were instead used to buy time and
send a message to the West that Turkey and Armenia were working on a
dialogue. At the same time, the leaders of both countries occasionally
made "harsh statements" geared specifically for domestic consumption.
Then-Foreign Minister Ahmet DavutoÄ?lu said, "The territorial integrity
of Karabakh is as precious as our own land," and Murat Mercan, the
head of the parliamentary Foreign Affairs Commission, remarked, "We
will continue to act in compliance with our responsibilities to our
country and to the Azerbaijani people and with the prestige of
Turkey."
Apparently, before the protocols were undersigned, intermediaries had
convinced Turkey that the Nagorno-Karabakh issue would be "solved" as
well. They were unable to add the settlement of the issue to the text
of the protocols as Armenia would not accept it. This "solution"
certainly meant different scenarios for Armenia and Turkey, and what
these intermediaries understood by it still remains a mystery.
As Turkey made up its mind to cite a solution to the Nagorno-Karabakh
issue as a prerequisite to signing the protocols, Armenia tried to
warn the other side by attempting to attract the West's attention. The
first move came from Sarksyan after the protocols were sent to the
Armenian parliament for ratification in 2009, when he said that
Armenia was ready to normalize ties with Turkey but was unable to see
the required political will on the Turkish side. In April 2010 he
said: "Turkey is not ready to make progress without prerequisites. We
will consider making progress if favorable conditions and a leadership
ready for normalization are created in Ankara," making clear that
Yerevan did not abandon the process but only suspended it. As he
addressed the United Nations General Assembly in September 2014,
Sarksyan gave the clearest sign of a procedural deadlock by
essentially saying, "To hell with those protocols.'
The "football diplomacy" long in abeyance started to resemble a kids'
brawl as Sarksyan invited Recep Tayyip ErdoÄ?an to the opening of the
genocide memorial on April 24 and, in response, ErdoÄ?an invited him to
attend the commemoration ceremonies for the Battle of Gallipoli on the
same day. However, Sarksyan then made the unexpected move to withdraw
the protocols from the parliamentary agenda.
Why 2015?
Preceding events have spelled trouble, but fail to answer the question
"Why did Armenia make this decision now?" That Sarksyan made this move
a few days before he declared war on Gagik Tsarukyan, the founder and
leader of main opposition party "Prosperous Armenia,' brushing him
completely off the political arena, still arouses curiosity.
When he undersigned the protocols in 2009, Sarksyan had just come out
of the elections of March 1, 2008, and was in need of international
support. Many people had taken to the streets, claiming that the
elections were rigged, and several people had died or were wounded in
resulting skirmishes. The suppression of these protests, known as
"Bloody March 1," came to be perceived as Sarksyan's victory. At such
a critical moment it was wise to play the nice boy with the West and
secure the support of Western countries. However, apparently he no
longer feels the need to secure this support for his presidency.
With this move, Sarksyan will certainly win the backing of
Dashnaktsutyun (ARF), a party which had left the coalition in the wake
of the signature of the protocols. As Dashnaktsutyun has good
relations with the Armenian diaspora, Sarksyan will clearly secure the
support of certain Armenians abroad. It is important to obtain the
support of the diaspora and be smooth-tongued with them as the
anniversary of the genocide approaches. Before he signed the
protocols, Sarksyan visited Moscow, the center of the Armenian
diaspora, which provides the most financial and political support to
Armenia, to hint that Armenia was preparing to engage in new ties with
Turkey. After signing the protocols, he paid quick visits to various
diaspora centers in order to convince the diaspora that it was a
correct and beneficial move.
Another strong possibility is that he may be trying to score a goal in
the context of the "football diplomacy" that has lost its hold. Seeing
that Turkey's "pro-dialogue" policy hadn't translated into
constructive moves, and feeling deceived, Armenia might have wanted to
flex its muscles in the international arena, sending a message that
said, "This is the first move and if no progress is made, we will
withdraw the signatures as well.'
The officials of Dashnaktsutyun, which is rumored to be joining the
coalition in the coming days, noted that while the president's move to
withdraw the protocols from the parliamentary agenda made them glad,
this represents only half of the process and they want the president
to withdraw the signatures from the protocols by April 24.
It is very likely that Armenia will completely withdraw its signatures
by this date. Yet, for the international community, the recent move
will signify that Armenia does not support the dialogue process. In
short, Armenia will be criticized for the reasons it withdrew the
protocols, though it is simply attempting to send a message to the
international community. While all parties that seek a normalization
of bilateral ties are aware that Turkey still sticks to its policy of
denial, with the added emphasis of the approaching anniversary, they
still won't accept Armenia's claim that it did its best and that
Turkey missed its chance. These parties will attempt to create a
process for "sustaining" the ties, even if most of it will be centered
on the no-solution-is-a-solution principle.
Alin Ozinian is a political analyst.
http://www.todayszaman.com/op-ed_why-did-armenia-give-up-on-the-protocols_375155.html