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NAGORNO KARABAKH: THE BENEFITS OF BEING IN THE MARGINS
European Leadership Network
March 18 2015
By Laurence Broers
Caucasus Programme Associate at Conciliation Resources and Research
Associate at London University's School of Oriental and African Studies
Wednesday 18 March 2015
As Russia consolidates what Alexander Cooley has called a new
semi-sovereign space embracing secessionist entities in eastern
Ukraine, Abkhazia, South Ossetia and Transnistria, there is one such
entity that looks on with great interest, but from a certain distance.
The Nagorno Karabakh (NK) conflict was the first of the secessionist
conflicts accompanying the collapse of the Soviet Union; in terms of
scale and numbers of casualties it was second only to Chechnya. Ending
in 1994 with an Armenian military victory and the seizure of wide
Azerbaijani territories beyond that originally under dispute, the
conflict has lingered in the margins of Eurasian politics ever since.
Mediating the peace process between Armenia and Azerbaijan is the
OSCE's Minsk Group, which has since the mid-1990s generated no less
than five peace plans. Yet to date the political fallout from the
likely compromises involved and the top-down nature of the process
has prevented progress.
Since a much anticipated but ultimately unsuccessful meeting of the
Armenian and Azerbaijani Presidents in Kazan in 2010, escalation and
uncertainty have dominated the NK conflict, reflecting both local and
regional dynamics. Escalation has been the main short-term dynamic
along the 160-mile Line of Contact between Armenian and Azerbaijani
forces. The type, intensity and range of ceasefire violations have
significantly increased over the last 18 months. Last year, skirmishes
in July-August and the shooting down of an Armenian helicopter in
November grabbed the headlines. Constant strafing and sniper fire
across the de jure Armenia-Azerbaijan border in the Tavush/Tovuz
areas, and exchanges in the area of Azerbaijani exclave Nakhchivan,
have also extended the geographical range of violations.
Over the medium to long-term, the arms race between Armenia and
Azerbaijan has become a much-reported aspect of the conflict, pitting
Azerbaijani petro-dollars against Armenia's deepening alliance (and
reliance) on Russia. In September 2013 Armenia was effectively coerced
into turning its back on an association agreement with the European
Union in favour of accession to Russian President Vladimir Putin's
Eurasian Union integration project. Yet as Russia has strengthened
its grip over Abkhazia and South Ossetia with new boundary-dissolving
treaties, there are reasons to believe that the de facto entity in NK
may be able to keep some distance from Russian integration. Russia
has no direct border with Armenia or NK. Neither does it have
"passportized" citizens to "protect", nor peacekeepers on the ground.
Russia's influence over NK is largely indirect, via the deep
penetration of Armenia's economy, infrastructure and security
architecture. Armenia's accession to the Eurasian Union has however
raised the possibility of a customs point at the border between
Armenia and NK. Unlikely in practice, this still adds to Russian
leverage over Armenia.
Over the last year Azerbaijanis have looked at the situation in
Ukraine as vindication of their argument with Armenia, claiming that
there is no essential difference between Russia's actions in Crimea
and eastern Ukraine in 2014 and Armenia's actions in NK in 1988-1994.
Yet while Armenia's growing integration with a Russian-controlled space
may be a source of short-term validation of Azerbaijani positions,
there is little doubt that neither side desires an increased Russian
presence in the theatre of conflict. Although the current peace
proposal, the Madrid Principles, envisages the deployment of an
international peacekeeping operation in NK, conversations on all
sides of the conflict reveal consensus on apprehensions regarding
the composition, mandate, location and duration of any such
force. This negative consensus, serves as a reminder of an easily
forgotten feature of the NK conflict: the relative sustainability
of a self-regulating ceasefire. Recent escalations detract from
this aspect of the Armenian-Azerbaijani truce, which until 2014 had
seen no major escalations comparable to those disrupting ceasefires
in the Georgian-Abkhaz (in 1998) and Georgian-South Ossetian (in
2004 and 2008) contexts. Reprehensible though the lapses in the
Armenian-Azerbaijani ceasefire are, it is still a ceasefire that is
managed by Armenians and Azerbaijanis, by themselves, for themselves,
on their own.
In this light, the escalation in the range, breadth and severity of
Line of Contact clashes, which are driving calls for an increased
international presence in the area, is not only worrying, but also
puzzling. Azerbaijani frustration with a status quo that over time is
normalising the occupation of large swathes of its de jure territory
is understandable. There is a clear benefit on the Azerbaijani side
of countering perceptions of a "frozen"--and hence in some sense
acceptable-- conflict. Yet there is a common Armenian-Azerbaijani
interest in preserving the exceptionality of NK against the wider
canvas of the incorporation of de facto space into Russian-controlled
semi-sovereign space. The treaties concluded between Russia and
Abkhazia and South Ossetia respectively have further embedded the
asymmetry in this process for de facto entities, and leave little
doubt as to the fate that would befall NK were it to become part
of this space. Whatever outcome might eventually issue from an
Armenian-Azerbaijani negotiation would be averted and this conflict
would become entangled and submerged in entirely different dynamics
on a Eurasian scale.
The "proxification" of Armenia i.e. the depiction of Armenia as a
proxy already entirely under Russian influence, and hence the absence
of a real interlocutor, is popular in Azerbaijan. Yet local agency and
bilateral scope remain much greater in this conflict than others in
Eurasia. The dynamic of escalation and the appearance of diminishing
control over the Line of Contact area are contracting this scope. In
the face of accelerating centripetal pressures that could reshape the
NK conflict beyond recognition, Armenia and Azerbaijan need to act
to avoid local instability converting into metropolitan opportunity.
The opinions articulated above represent the views of the author(s),
and do not necessarily reflect the position of the European Leadership
Network or any of its members. The ELN's aim is to encourage debates
that will help develop Europe's capacity to address the pressing
foreign, defence, and security challenges of our time.
http://www.europeanleadershipnetwork.org/nagorno-karabakh-the-benefits-of-being-in-the-margins-_2557.html
From: Baghdasarian
European Leadership Network
March 18 2015
By Laurence Broers
Caucasus Programme Associate at Conciliation Resources and Research
Associate at London University's School of Oriental and African Studies
Wednesday 18 March 2015
As Russia consolidates what Alexander Cooley has called a new
semi-sovereign space embracing secessionist entities in eastern
Ukraine, Abkhazia, South Ossetia and Transnistria, there is one such
entity that looks on with great interest, but from a certain distance.
The Nagorno Karabakh (NK) conflict was the first of the secessionist
conflicts accompanying the collapse of the Soviet Union; in terms of
scale and numbers of casualties it was second only to Chechnya. Ending
in 1994 with an Armenian military victory and the seizure of wide
Azerbaijani territories beyond that originally under dispute, the
conflict has lingered in the margins of Eurasian politics ever since.
Mediating the peace process between Armenia and Azerbaijan is the
OSCE's Minsk Group, which has since the mid-1990s generated no less
than five peace plans. Yet to date the political fallout from the
likely compromises involved and the top-down nature of the process
has prevented progress.
Since a much anticipated but ultimately unsuccessful meeting of the
Armenian and Azerbaijani Presidents in Kazan in 2010, escalation and
uncertainty have dominated the NK conflict, reflecting both local and
regional dynamics. Escalation has been the main short-term dynamic
along the 160-mile Line of Contact between Armenian and Azerbaijani
forces. The type, intensity and range of ceasefire violations have
significantly increased over the last 18 months. Last year, skirmishes
in July-August and the shooting down of an Armenian helicopter in
November grabbed the headlines. Constant strafing and sniper fire
across the de jure Armenia-Azerbaijan border in the Tavush/Tovuz
areas, and exchanges in the area of Azerbaijani exclave Nakhchivan,
have also extended the geographical range of violations.
Over the medium to long-term, the arms race between Armenia and
Azerbaijan has become a much-reported aspect of the conflict, pitting
Azerbaijani petro-dollars against Armenia's deepening alliance (and
reliance) on Russia. In September 2013 Armenia was effectively coerced
into turning its back on an association agreement with the European
Union in favour of accession to Russian President Vladimir Putin's
Eurasian Union integration project. Yet as Russia has strengthened
its grip over Abkhazia and South Ossetia with new boundary-dissolving
treaties, there are reasons to believe that the de facto entity in NK
may be able to keep some distance from Russian integration. Russia
has no direct border with Armenia or NK. Neither does it have
"passportized" citizens to "protect", nor peacekeepers on the ground.
Russia's influence over NK is largely indirect, via the deep
penetration of Armenia's economy, infrastructure and security
architecture. Armenia's accession to the Eurasian Union has however
raised the possibility of a customs point at the border between
Armenia and NK. Unlikely in practice, this still adds to Russian
leverage over Armenia.
Over the last year Azerbaijanis have looked at the situation in
Ukraine as vindication of their argument with Armenia, claiming that
there is no essential difference between Russia's actions in Crimea
and eastern Ukraine in 2014 and Armenia's actions in NK in 1988-1994.
Yet while Armenia's growing integration with a Russian-controlled space
may be a source of short-term validation of Azerbaijani positions,
there is little doubt that neither side desires an increased Russian
presence in the theatre of conflict. Although the current peace
proposal, the Madrid Principles, envisages the deployment of an
international peacekeeping operation in NK, conversations on all
sides of the conflict reveal consensus on apprehensions regarding
the composition, mandate, location and duration of any such
force. This negative consensus, serves as a reminder of an easily
forgotten feature of the NK conflict: the relative sustainability
of a self-regulating ceasefire. Recent escalations detract from
this aspect of the Armenian-Azerbaijani truce, which until 2014 had
seen no major escalations comparable to those disrupting ceasefires
in the Georgian-Abkhaz (in 1998) and Georgian-South Ossetian (in
2004 and 2008) contexts. Reprehensible though the lapses in the
Armenian-Azerbaijani ceasefire are, it is still a ceasefire that is
managed by Armenians and Azerbaijanis, by themselves, for themselves,
on their own.
In this light, the escalation in the range, breadth and severity of
Line of Contact clashes, which are driving calls for an increased
international presence in the area, is not only worrying, but also
puzzling. Azerbaijani frustration with a status quo that over time is
normalising the occupation of large swathes of its de jure territory
is understandable. There is a clear benefit on the Azerbaijani side
of countering perceptions of a "frozen"--and hence in some sense
acceptable-- conflict. Yet there is a common Armenian-Azerbaijani
interest in preserving the exceptionality of NK against the wider
canvas of the incorporation of de facto space into Russian-controlled
semi-sovereign space. The treaties concluded between Russia and
Abkhazia and South Ossetia respectively have further embedded the
asymmetry in this process for de facto entities, and leave little
doubt as to the fate that would befall NK were it to become part
of this space. Whatever outcome might eventually issue from an
Armenian-Azerbaijani negotiation would be averted and this conflict
would become entangled and submerged in entirely different dynamics
on a Eurasian scale.
The "proxification" of Armenia i.e. the depiction of Armenia as a
proxy already entirely under Russian influence, and hence the absence
of a real interlocutor, is popular in Azerbaijan. Yet local agency and
bilateral scope remain much greater in this conflict than others in
Eurasia. The dynamic of escalation and the appearance of diminishing
control over the Line of Contact area are contracting this scope. In
the face of accelerating centripetal pressures that could reshape the
NK conflict beyond recognition, Armenia and Azerbaijan need to act
to avoid local instability converting into metropolitan opportunity.
The opinions articulated above represent the views of the author(s),
and do not necessarily reflect the position of the European Leadership
Network or any of its members. The ELN's aim is to encourage debates
that will help develop Europe's capacity to address the pressing
foreign, defence, and security challenges of our time.
http://www.europeanleadershipnetwork.org/nagorno-karabakh-the-benefits-of-being-in-the-margins-_2557.html
From: Baghdasarian