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Sevak Sarukhanyan: Concerns about possible emergence of ISIS in
Azerbaijan focus Tehran's attention on Baku
ArmInfo's Interview with Sevak Sarukhanyan, Fulbright Scholar at
Georgetown University (Washington)
by David Stepanyan
Saturday, March 28, 09:22
The energy sector of the Armenian SSR developed with due regard for
the presence of some 1,400 industrial enterprises in the republic,
which were unique throughout the former USSR. Today, Armenia keeps
developing its thermal and nuclear power stations with Russian
investments and neglects the development of alternative power
engineering. These processes are going on amid the standstill of all
the largest enterprises of the country and minimum export of energy
resources to the neighboring countries. Why should Armenia keep
developing its energy sector?
The main reason for this development is that the Armenian energy
industry will be facing serious problems and challenges in the coming
years. The problems are to be solved only by developing new power
capacities. The problem is that the main power capacities - Metsamor
NPP and Hrazdan TPP are rather old. These capacities will sooner or
later (probably, sooner than later) break down. That is why Armenia
needs new sources of energy production. Armenia prefers thermal power
to alternative energy resources due to the gas cheapness. The price
will not increase in the coming years. The raw materials for
alternative energy resources are to be expensive so that the
alternative energy production can give the TPP a run for its
production. Armenia will not be facing that threat in the near future.
Moscow and Yerevan have signed an agreement for a $300 million loan
for extension of the Armenian NPP's service life for another 15 years.
Does it mean that Armenia has finally given up the idea of
construction of a new power unit?
Although there is no official refusal from construction of a new
nuclear power unit in Armenia, the chances for construction are
miserable. The reasons are financial: there is neither investor nor
sales market. The new power unit will have a 2.5- fold higher capacity
than the operating one. What to do with the surplus and expensive
electric power that will be generated? Nothing. Georgia does not need
it. Iran will not pay 15 cents for 1kWh of electric power. The border
with Turkey is closed. Even it if opens, I see no reasons for Turkey
to invest dozens of millions to create in its territory a 'power
island' that will depend on the electric power generated by the
Armenian NPP. Armenia can consume the electric power to be generated
by the new NPP for domestic purposes, but then what to do with the
electric power generated by the operating thermal and hydro power
plants. I think the new plant, if built, must have a capacity of some
600-650MW, but such reactors are not produced in Russia. Russia, as
the only country that may have some political interest in construction
of a new power plant in Armenia will hardly fund construction of a
French reactor.
According to ArmInfo's information, the Iranian side has already
transferred 85 million USD to one of the Armenian commercial banks
under the agreements on construction of the third Iran-Armenia power
transmission line. Though Iran has fulfilled part of its obligations,
the project is still far from being implemented. Why?
I do not doubt the implementation of that project. Despite some
technical problems related to the power capacities through which the
energy is to be exported to Iran, I believe the project will be
implemented for it has certain economic feasibility.
The project of the Iran-Armenia railway construction is still on the
agenda of the Armenian-Iranian relations. In the meantime, the issue
of linkage of the Iran-Azerbaijan railway systems through construction
of the Qazvin-Rasht-Astara branch line has already been included in
the Tehran-Baku agenda. Why do you think Tehran is playing such a game
and what prospects do the two projects have, given the lack of the
Armenian-Iranian project among Iran's railway projects?
The project is delayed for a range of problems. The major reason is
lack of investors, while the project is estimated at $4- $6 billion.
The second reason is that the railway is not necessary. If it is part
of the North-South transport corridor, it duplicates the
Qazvin-Rasht-Astara railway through which cargoes from the Persian
Gulf will be transported to the Black Sea via the territory of
Azerbaijan and Georgia and to Russia and North Europe via Azerbaijan
and through the Russian ports in the Baltic Sea. If they are building
one railway, there is no sense in building a similar one. The point is
that construction of the Qazvin-Rasht-Astara railway was to be
completed yet in 2010. It is not clear either if the Abkhazian section
of the Russian-Georgian railway will be reactivated. If no, so why do
they build the railway from Iran to Armenia? If they do it to link the
Persian Gulf with the Black Sea, it does not cost $6 billion.
Furthermore, the plans to expand Tabriz-Erzrum road and develop
railway communication in Turkey are enough to settle those tasks. It
is unreasonable to focus on the given project. Armenia just should
properly complete the construction of the North-South transport
corridor which will settle a range of strategic tasks.
Washington's rather serious concessions in the US-Iran talks on the
nuclear problem demonstrate the enhancement of Iran's geopolitical
capacities. Iranian experts speak of Tehran's striving to extend its
presence in the South Caucasus geopolitics. Do you expect any impulses
here?
Tehran's policy in the South Caucasus has been focused on Azerbaijan
over the past two years. This is proved by Aliyev's visit to Tehran
and Hassan Rouhani's visit to Baku, by a number of important documents
signed in the course of those visits, and unfortunately by a
declaration pointing out that there is no alternative to the Karabakh
problem settlement through observing the territorial integrity of
Azerbaijan.
Rouhani seeks to minimize the discrepancies with the neighbors while
Tehran is holding active negotiations with Washington. So, today Iran
is playing a "big game" and does not want to abstract from it. Given
that Iran had serious discrepancies with Baku, the Azeri agenda of
Iran is quite active today. It should be noted that Tehran has taken
advantage of the crisis in the Baku-Washington relations and started
feeling comfortable with respect to Baku and this has been reflected
on the interstate relations. One should not neglect the ISIS factor
either. The fears that this factor may emerge in Azerbaijan will focus
Tehran's attention on Baku, because the emergence of the ISIS in the
South Caucasus is a direct threat to Iran's security.
http://www.arminfo.am/index.cfm?objectidÐ8E45B0-D512-11E4-B6110EB7C0D21663
From: A. Papazian
Azerbaijan focus Tehran's attention on Baku
ArmInfo's Interview with Sevak Sarukhanyan, Fulbright Scholar at
Georgetown University (Washington)
by David Stepanyan
Saturday, March 28, 09:22
The energy sector of the Armenian SSR developed with due regard for
the presence of some 1,400 industrial enterprises in the republic,
which were unique throughout the former USSR. Today, Armenia keeps
developing its thermal and nuclear power stations with Russian
investments and neglects the development of alternative power
engineering. These processes are going on amid the standstill of all
the largest enterprises of the country and minimum export of energy
resources to the neighboring countries. Why should Armenia keep
developing its energy sector?
The main reason for this development is that the Armenian energy
industry will be facing serious problems and challenges in the coming
years. The problems are to be solved only by developing new power
capacities. The problem is that the main power capacities - Metsamor
NPP and Hrazdan TPP are rather old. These capacities will sooner or
later (probably, sooner than later) break down. That is why Armenia
needs new sources of energy production. Armenia prefers thermal power
to alternative energy resources due to the gas cheapness. The price
will not increase in the coming years. The raw materials for
alternative energy resources are to be expensive so that the
alternative energy production can give the TPP a run for its
production. Armenia will not be facing that threat in the near future.
Moscow and Yerevan have signed an agreement for a $300 million loan
for extension of the Armenian NPP's service life for another 15 years.
Does it mean that Armenia has finally given up the idea of
construction of a new power unit?
Although there is no official refusal from construction of a new
nuclear power unit in Armenia, the chances for construction are
miserable. The reasons are financial: there is neither investor nor
sales market. The new power unit will have a 2.5- fold higher capacity
than the operating one. What to do with the surplus and expensive
electric power that will be generated? Nothing. Georgia does not need
it. Iran will not pay 15 cents for 1kWh of electric power. The border
with Turkey is closed. Even it if opens, I see no reasons for Turkey
to invest dozens of millions to create in its territory a 'power
island' that will depend on the electric power generated by the
Armenian NPP. Armenia can consume the electric power to be generated
by the new NPP for domestic purposes, but then what to do with the
electric power generated by the operating thermal and hydro power
plants. I think the new plant, if built, must have a capacity of some
600-650MW, but such reactors are not produced in Russia. Russia, as
the only country that may have some political interest in construction
of a new power plant in Armenia will hardly fund construction of a
French reactor.
According to ArmInfo's information, the Iranian side has already
transferred 85 million USD to one of the Armenian commercial banks
under the agreements on construction of the third Iran-Armenia power
transmission line. Though Iran has fulfilled part of its obligations,
the project is still far from being implemented. Why?
I do not doubt the implementation of that project. Despite some
technical problems related to the power capacities through which the
energy is to be exported to Iran, I believe the project will be
implemented for it has certain economic feasibility.
The project of the Iran-Armenia railway construction is still on the
agenda of the Armenian-Iranian relations. In the meantime, the issue
of linkage of the Iran-Azerbaijan railway systems through construction
of the Qazvin-Rasht-Astara branch line has already been included in
the Tehran-Baku agenda. Why do you think Tehran is playing such a game
and what prospects do the two projects have, given the lack of the
Armenian-Iranian project among Iran's railway projects?
The project is delayed for a range of problems. The major reason is
lack of investors, while the project is estimated at $4- $6 billion.
The second reason is that the railway is not necessary. If it is part
of the North-South transport corridor, it duplicates the
Qazvin-Rasht-Astara railway through which cargoes from the Persian
Gulf will be transported to the Black Sea via the territory of
Azerbaijan and Georgia and to Russia and North Europe via Azerbaijan
and through the Russian ports in the Baltic Sea. If they are building
one railway, there is no sense in building a similar one. The point is
that construction of the Qazvin-Rasht-Astara railway was to be
completed yet in 2010. It is not clear either if the Abkhazian section
of the Russian-Georgian railway will be reactivated. If no, so why do
they build the railway from Iran to Armenia? If they do it to link the
Persian Gulf with the Black Sea, it does not cost $6 billion.
Furthermore, the plans to expand Tabriz-Erzrum road and develop
railway communication in Turkey are enough to settle those tasks. It
is unreasonable to focus on the given project. Armenia just should
properly complete the construction of the North-South transport
corridor which will settle a range of strategic tasks.
Washington's rather serious concessions in the US-Iran talks on the
nuclear problem demonstrate the enhancement of Iran's geopolitical
capacities. Iranian experts speak of Tehran's striving to extend its
presence in the South Caucasus geopolitics. Do you expect any impulses
here?
Tehran's policy in the South Caucasus has been focused on Azerbaijan
over the past two years. This is proved by Aliyev's visit to Tehran
and Hassan Rouhani's visit to Baku, by a number of important documents
signed in the course of those visits, and unfortunately by a
declaration pointing out that there is no alternative to the Karabakh
problem settlement through observing the territorial integrity of
Azerbaijan.
Rouhani seeks to minimize the discrepancies with the neighbors while
Tehran is holding active negotiations with Washington. So, today Iran
is playing a "big game" and does not want to abstract from it. Given
that Iran had serious discrepancies with Baku, the Azeri agenda of
Iran is quite active today. It should be noted that Tehran has taken
advantage of the crisis in the Baku-Washington relations and started
feeling comfortable with respect to Baku and this has been reflected
on the interstate relations. One should not neglect the ISIS factor
either. The fears that this factor may emerge in Azerbaijan will focus
Tehran's attention on Baku, because the emergence of the ISIS in the
South Caucasus is a direct threat to Iran's security.
http://www.arminfo.am/index.cfm?objectidÐ8E45B0-D512-11E4-B6110EB7C0D21663
From: A. Papazian