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January 12, 2005
Article | Improving Turkish-Russian Relations
Mavi Boncuk
Analysis of Near East Policy from the scholars and associates of THE WASHINGTON
INSTITUTE
942 January 12, 2005
Improving Turkish-Russian Relations: Turkey's New Foreign Policy and Its
Implications for the United States
By Soner Cagaptay and Nazli Gencsoy
Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan finished his three-day visit to
Moscow today. This trip follows Russian president Vladimir Putin's December
2004 Turkey trip, the first by a Russian head of state since Russia and the
Ottoman Empire established relations in the fifteenth century - excluding a 1972
sojourn by Nikolai Podgorny, the titular head of state of the former Soviet
Union. Although Erdogan's visit fell short of finalizing a number of pipeline
construction and gas export deals, twin Putin-Erdogan visits herald a new era
of improved Turkish-Russian relations. What is the background of this
development, and what are its implications for the U.S.?
Background: Conflictual Relations. During the Cold War and in the 1990s,
Turkish-Russian relations were characterized by tension. Throughout the Cold
War, Turkey, which was on NATO's southern flank against the Soviet Union, was
suspicious of Moscow, which asked for control of the Turkish Straits (Bosporus
and Dardanelles) in 1946. In the early 1990s, as the Soviet Union fell apart,
Turkey acted to fill the power vacuum in Central Asia and the Caucasus by
developing close ties with Georgia and Azerbaijan. Russia, on the other hand,
supported Armenia in the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict against Azerbaijan while
backing separatist movements in Georgia. These policies put the two countries
at odds. Along the same pattern, Turkey's sympathy for Chechen rebels in the
1990s coincided with Russia becoming a safe haven for the Kurdish terrorist
group the Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK).
Cooperation in the Present Decade: Booming Economic Ties. Over the last few
years, however, Russia and Turkey have shifted their mutual foreign policy,
paving the way to the twin visits. Booming trade is a sign of improved
relations between the two countries. For the first eleven months of 2004,
Russian-Turkish trade was worth $9.4 billion, 50 percent more than in 2003.
Gas and oil deals: Natural gas constitutes around 68 percent of Russian exports
to Turkey, which imports 70 percent of its gas from Russia and is the second
largest consumer of Russian gas after Germany. In December 1997, Turkey and
Russia signed an agreement establishing the Blue Stream Pipeline to operate
between the two countries and transfer 565 billion cubic feet per year of
Russian natural gas. The Blue Stream pipeline started operating in 2003;
however, a disagreement between the two countries about the exact price of gas
remains.
Pillars of the New Turkish-Russian Relationship: the View from Ankara. During
Putin's visit to Turkey, Ankara and Moscow signed six agreements for
cooperation in the defense and energy industries. In addition, the two
countries issued a declaration for `deepening friendship and multidimensional
partnership.' From Ankara's perspective, together with the personal
relationship between Erdogan and Putin, the following factors are facilitating
better relations with Russia.
North-south axis on the energy corridor: With the construction of the
Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan pipeline, which will start operating this year, Turkey is
now a key country on the east-west axis of the energy corridor between Central
Asia and the Mediterranean. Ankara now aspires to become a player on the
north-south energy axis from the Black Sea to the Mediterranean. A major
Turkish concern regarding the transfer of oil from the Black Sea is the
bottleneck in the Bosporus, a narrow zigzagging waterway half a mile wide.
Increased tanker traffic through the Bosporus may lead to catastrophic
accidents and environmental disasters for downtown Istanbul on this waterway.
Accordingly, the following pipelines bypassing the Bosporus are now being
discussed:
- Trans-Thrace pipeline - would transfer oil from Kiyikoy, on the Black Sea coast
of Turkish Thrace, to Kibrikbaba on the Saros Gulf in the northern Aegean. The
pipeline, with the ability to transport 60 million tons per year, would be
approximately 193 kilometers long. Together with loading facilities it would
cost around $900 million. Russia supports this project despite concerns from
Turkey over potential tanker traffic in the environmentally sensitive Saros
Gulf.
- Samsun-Kirikkale-Ceyhan pipeline - would transfer Russian oil across Turkey,
from Samsun on the Black Sea coast to Yumurtalik (Ceyhan) on the Mediterranean.
The project, favored by Ankara, would cost an estimated $1 billion and would be
510 kilometers long.
Business lobbies' interest in Russia: Many business groups benefiting from
booming bilateral trade, including those in the construction, retail, banking,
telecommunications, food and beverage, glass, and machinery industries are
pushing for stronger political ties with Moscow - with more than 600 businessmen
accompanying Erdogan - to increase their access to the Russian market, and take
advantage of the awaiting energy deals.
Cooperation in the War on Terror in Chechnya: In the 1990s, Russia often accused
Ankara of ignoring the activities of Chechen activists who used Turkey, home to
large immigrant communities from the north Caucasus, including Chechnya, as a
safe haven. In a gesture before Putin's visit, the Istanbul police detained
twelve people believed to be Chechen militants. In return, Russia is now
examining Turkish demands to put the PKK on its list of terrorist groups.
Concrete Progress? Despite the latest developments, including closer ties on
Black Sea security issues (See PolicyWatch no. 924) and the announcement that
the two countries will conduct joint naval exercises in the Black Sea this
year - the litmus test of the improved relationship will be the answers to the
following questions: Will Turkey and Russia build genuine cooperation in the
war on terror? Will Putin's rhetoric espousing the Turkish position in Cyprus
turn into actual support? Less likely, will Ankara switch to Russian arms in
place of Western and U.S. arms? On the energy front, will the two countries
finally agree on the price of Blue Stream gas, and will Russia opt for an
east-west trans-Balkan pipeline, bypassing the Bosporus and pipelines in
Turkey?
Improved Ties with Russia: Ankara's New Foreign Policy. There would need to be
concrete foreign policy steps before the improvement in Turkish-Russian
relations constituted a full-fledged rapprochement. The following factors
behind this development are, nevertheless, important as the leitmotifs of
current Turkish foreign policy:
- `Neighborhood policy': Since 1999, when the European Union (EU) declared
Turkey's candidacy for membership, Ankara has strived to establish better
relations with its neighbors based on the EU notion of a `neighborhood policy.'
After significantly improving ties with Syria, Iran (see PolicyWatch no. 825),
and Greece - with which it had mostly poor relations in the 1990s - Ankara is now
intent on developing good ties with Russia.
- Foreign policy portfolio diversification: Most circles in Ankara believe that
unlike the EU or the United States, Russia treats Turkey as an equal partner.
They see enhanced relations with Russia as a counterweight to ties with the EU
and the United States, should Ankara run into problems with Washington with
regard to the war in Iraq or with Brussels during EU accession talks.
- `Strategic depth': Based on the `strategic depth' concept favored by the
Justice and Development Party (AKP) government, which states that Turkey will
become more powerful only if it develops better relations with its non-Western
neighbors (including Iran, Syria, and Russia), Ankara sees improved ties with
Russia in its interest.
Implications for the United States. As Washington becomes more engaged in
Turkey's Middle Eastern and Eurasian neighborhoods, Turkey seems increasingly
eager to diversify its foreign policy portfolio while acting independently from
the United States. This orientation is likely to persist so long as the Iraq
issue separates Ankara and Washington, a factor that leads Turkey to look for
ways of complementing its relationship with the United States.
Soner Cagaptay is a senior fellow and the director of the Turkish Research
Program at The Washington Institute. Nazli Gencsoy, a Dr. Marcia Robbins-Wilf
young scholar, is a research assistant at the Institute.
January 12, 2005
Article | Improving Turkish-Russian Relations
Mavi Boncuk
Analysis of Near East Policy from the scholars and associates of THE WASHINGTON
INSTITUTE
942 January 12, 2005
Improving Turkish-Russian Relations: Turkey's New Foreign Policy and Its
Implications for the United States
By Soner Cagaptay and Nazli Gencsoy
Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan finished his three-day visit to
Moscow today. This trip follows Russian president Vladimir Putin's December
2004 Turkey trip, the first by a Russian head of state since Russia and the
Ottoman Empire established relations in the fifteenth century - excluding a 1972
sojourn by Nikolai Podgorny, the titular head of state of the former Soviet
Union. Although Erdogan's visit fell short of finalizing a number of pipeline
construction and gas export deals, twin Putin-Erdogan visits herald a new era
of improved Turkish-Russian relations. What is the background of this
development, and what are its implications for the U.S.?
Background: Conflictual Relations. During the Cold War and in the 1990s,
Turkish-Russian relations were characterized by tension. Throughout the Cold
War, Turkey, which was on NATO's southern flank against the Soviet Union, was
suspicious of Moscow, which asked for control of the Turkish Straits (Bosporus
and Dardanelles) in 1946. In the early 1990s, as the Soviet Union fell apart,
Turkey acted to fill the power vacuum in Central Asia and the Caucasus by
developing close ties with Georgia and Azerbaijan. Russia, on the other hand,
supported Armenia in the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict against Azerbaijan while
backing separatist movements in Georgia. These policies put the two countries
at odds. Along the same pattern, Turkey's sympathy for Chechen rebels in the
1990s coincided with Russia becoming a safe haven for the Kurdish terrorist
group the Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK).
Cooperation in the Present Decade: Booming Economic Ties. Over the last few
years, however, Russia and Turkey have shifted their mutual foreign policy,
paving the way to the twin visits. Booming trade is a sign of improved
relations between the two countries. For the first eleven months of 2004,
Russian-Turkish trade was worth $9.4 billion, 50 percent more than in 2003.
Gas and oil deals: Natural gas constitutes around 68 percent of Russian exports
to Turkey, which imports 70 percent of its gas from Russia and is the second
largest consumer of Russian gas after Germany. In December 1997, Turkey and
Russia signed an agreement establishing the Blue Stream Pipeline to operate
between the two countries and transfer 565 billion cubic feet per year of
Russian natural gas. The Blue Stream pipeline started operating in 2003;
however, a disagreement between the two countries about the exact price of gas
remains.
Pillars of the New Turkish-Russian Relationship: the View from Ankara. During
Putin's visit to Turkey, Ankara and Moscow signed six agreements for
cooperation in the defense and energy industries. In addition, the two
countries issued a declaration for `deepening friendship and multidimensional
partnership.' From Ankara's perspective, together with the personal
relationship between Erdogan and Putin, the following factors are facilitating
better relations with Russia.
North-south axis on the energy corridor: With the construction of the
Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan pipeline, which will start operating this year, Turkey is
now a key country on the east-west axis of the energy corridor between Central
Asia and the Mediterranean. Ankara now aspires to become a player on the
north-south energy axis from the Black Sea to the Mediterranean. A major
Turkish concern regarding the transfer of oil from the Black Sea is the
bottleneck in the Bosporus, a narrow zigzagging waterway half a mile wide.
Increased tanker traffic through the Bosporus may lead to catastrophic
accidents and environmental disasters for downtown Istanbul on this waterway.
Accordingly, the following pipelines bypassing the Bosporus are now being
discussed:
- Trans-Thrace pipeline - would transfer oil from Kiyikoy, on the Black Sea coast
of Turkish Thrace, to Kibrikbaba on the Saros Gulf in the northern Aegean. The
pipeline, with the ability to transport 60 million tons per year, would be
approximately 193 kilometers long. Together with loading facilities it would
cost around $900 million. Russia supports this project despite concerns from
Turkey over potential tanker traffic in the environmentally sensitive Saros
Gulf.
- Samsun-Kirikkale-Ceyhan pipeline - would transfer Russian oil across Turkey,
from Samsun on the Black Sea coast to Yumurtalik (Ceyhan) on the Mediterranean.
The project, favored by Ankara, would cost an estimated $1 billion and would be
510 kilometers long.
Business lobbies' interest in Russia: Many business groups benefiting from
booming bilateral trade, including those in the construction, retail, banking,
telecommunications, food and beverage, glass, and machinery industries are
pushing for stronger political ties with Moscow - with more than 600 businessmen
accompanying Erdogan - to increase their access to the Russian market, and take
advantage of the awaiting energy deals.
Cooperation in the War on Terror in Chechnya: In the 1990s, Russia often accused
Ankara of ignoring the activities of Chechen activists who used Turkey, home to
large immigrant communities from the north Caucasus, including Chechnya, as a
safe haven. In a gesture before Putin's visit, the Istanbul police detained
twelve people believed to be Chechen militants. In return, Russia is now
examining Turkish demands to put the PKK on its list of terrorist groups.
Concrete Progress? Despite the latest developments, including closer ties on
Black Sea security issues (See PolicyWatch no. 924) and the announcement that
the two countries will conduct joint naval exercises in the Black Sea this
year - the litmus test of the improved relationship will be the answers to the
following questions: Will Turkey and Russia build genuine cooperation in the
war on terror? Will Putin's rhetoric espousing the Turkish position in Cyprus
turn into actual support? Less likely, will Ankara switch to Russian arms in
place of Western and U.S. arms? On the energy front, will the two countries
finally agree on the price of Blue Stream gas, and will Russia opt for an
east-west trans-Balkan pipeline, bypassing the Bosporus and pipelines in
Turkey?
Improved Ties with Russia: Ankara's New Foreign Policy. There would need to be
concrete foreign policy steps before the improvement in Turkish-Russian
relations constituted a full-fledged rapprochement. The following factors
behind this development are, nevertheless, important as the leitmotifs of
current Turkish foreign policy:
- `Neighborhood policy': Since 1999, when the European Union (EU) declared
Turkey's candidacy for membership, Ankara has strived to establish better
relations with its neighbors based on the EU notion of a `neighborhood policy.'
After significantly improving ties with Syria, Iran (see PolicyWatch no. 825),
and Greece - with which it had mostly poor relations in the 1990s - Ankara is now
intent on developing good ties with Russia.
- Foreign policy portfolio diversification: Most circles in Ankara believe that
unlike the EU or the United States, Russia treats Turkey as an equal partner.
They see enhanced relations with Russia as a counterweight to ties with the EU
and the United States, should Ankara run into problems with Washington with
regard to the war in Iraq or with Brussels during EU accession talks.
- `Strategic depth': Based on the `strategic depth' concept favored by the
Justice and Development Party (AKP) government, which states that Turkey will
become more powerful only if it develops better relations with its non-Western
neighbors (including Iran, Syria, and Russia), Ankara sees improved ties with
Russia in its interest.
Implications for the United States. As Washington becomes more engaged in
Turkey's Middle Eastern and Eurasian neighborhoods, Turkey seems increasingly
eager to diversify its foreign policy portfolio while acting independently from
the United States. This orientation is likely to persist so long as the Iraq
issue separates Ankara and Washington, a factor that leads Turkey to look for
ways of complementing its relationship with the United States.
Soner Cagaptay is a senior fellow and the director of the Turkish Research
Program at The Washington Institute. Nazli Gencsoy, a Dr. Marcia Robbins-Wilf
young scholar, is a research assistant at the Institute.