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Kathimerini, Greece
June 23 2005
Greece's ostpolitik
By Petros Papaconstantinou
Turkey's EU membership aspirations appear to be a main casualty of
the crisis triggered by the French and Dutch rejection by referendum
of the European Constitution. Former Commission president Romano
Prodi, who could become Italy's prime minister after a general
election next year, has said that `the conditions now are no longer
there for Turkey's entry in the short or medium term.'
In Germany, Angela Merkel, leader of the main opposition
conservatives, is favored to win an early general election. She has
made opposition to full Turkish membership the main platform of her
Christian Democratic Union party. Even French President Jacques
Chirac, once a warm advocate of Ankara's bid, is now stressing the
need to define Europe's geographical limits. Finally, it was US
Deputy Secretary of State Robert Zoellick who urged Ankara `to look
beyond the EU to a global context.'
Athens must adapt to these shifting parameters. By lifting its
objection to Turkish EU prospects, Greece materialized an
`ostpolitik' toward Turkey - much like the West did with the former
communist countries of Eastern Europe - while not becoming the
scapegoat for other European nations who did not want Turkey in the
EU.
Greece should be wary of being too keen on backing Turkey's bid. In
fact, too much zeal could cost Athens key continental allies and
leave it only with the gratification of British Prime Minister Tony
Blair, from whom the government can expect little, be it on the
Cyprus issue or the community budget.
Political pragmatism may advise us against imitating the French and
German parliaments, which raised the Armenian genocide issue. Yet
Merkel also said it would be disastrous if Ankara did not recognize
Cyprus before the start of membership talks, and it's hard to see why
these comments did not resonate in Athens.
June 23 2005
Greece's ostpolitik
By Petros Papaconstantinou
Turkey's EU membership aspirations appear to be a main casualty of
the crisis triggered by the French and Dutch rejection by referendum
of the European Constitution. Former Commission president Romano
Prodi, who could become Italy's prime minister after a general
election next year, has said that `the conditions now are no longer
there for Turkey's entry in the short or medium term.'
In Germany, Angela Merkel, leader of the main opposition
conservatives, is favored to win an early general election. She has
made opposition to full Turkish membership the main platform of her
Christian Democratic Union party. Even French President Jacques
Chirac, once a warm advocate of Ankara's bid, is now stressing the
need to define Europe's geographical limits. Finally, it was US
Deputy Secretary of State Robert Zoellick who urged Ankara `to look
beyond the EU to a global context.'
Athens must adapt to these shifting parameters. By lifting its
objection to Turkish EU prospects, Greece materialized an
`ostpolitik' toward Turkey - much like the West did with the former
communist countries of Eastern Europe - while not becoming the
scapegoat for other European nations who did not want Turkey in the
EU.
Greece should be wary of being too keen on backing Turkey's bid. In
fact, too much zeal could cost Athens key continental allies and
leave it only with the gratification of British Prime Minister Tony
Blair, from whom the government can expect little, be it on the
Cyprus issue or the community budget.
Political pragmatism may advise us against imitating the French and
German parliaments, which raised the Armenian genocide issue. Yet
Merkel also said it would be disastrous if Ankara did not recognize
Cyprus before the start of membership talks, and it's hard to see why
these comments did not resonate in Athens.