Eurasia Daily Monitor, DC
Jamestown Foundation
June 29 2005
CIS MILITARY STRUCTURES SEEN SHRINKING AT DEFENSE MINISTERS' MEETING
By Vladimir Socor
Wednesday, June 29, 2005
Russian Defense Minister Ivanov is chairing the CIS Council of
Defense Ministers meeting. The Council of Defense Ministers of CIS
member countries met in a depleted format on June 24 in Dushanbe,
with Russia's Defense Minister Sergei Ivanov in the chair. The host,
Tajikistan's President Imomali Rakhmonov, noted the "negative impact
of disintegration processes" -- a reversal of the ubiquitous Russian
cliche "integratsionnyie protsessy." Georgia, Moldova, and (as usual)
Turkmenistan were absent; Ukraine had announced in advance that it
would downgrade its attendance to that of an observer; and there was
no clear word regarding Uzbekistan's attendance.
Rakhmonov aired an unprecedented proposal for creation of
rapid-deployment forces of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization
(SCO) for Central Asia, in parallel with the existing
rapid-deployment structure of the CIS Collective Security Treaty
Organization (CSTO). As the SCO includes China and Uzbekistan, which
are not CSTO members, Rakhmonov's proposal may be read either as a
veiled attempt at balancing the CSTO, or as an implicit
acknowledgment of the CSTO's ineffectiveness. The Dushanbe meeting
also discussed inconclusively the issue of drug trafficking from
Afghanistan, which Ivanov and Rakhmonov termed the main security
challenge to neighboring countries. All these issues are, in any
case, beyond the competence of the CIS as such and its Defense
Ministers' Council.
The meeting was only able to review the operation of the CIS Joint
Air Defense System in 2004 and a framework plan for 2006-10. In fact,
the Dushanbe session -- like the CSTO's summit in Moscow on June 24
-- highlighted Russia's shift of emphasis from the CIS nonintegrated
air defense system to an integrated one to be developed within the
CSTO (see below).
The meeting approved a six-month extension of the powers of Russia's
Maj.-General Sergei Chaban as commander of the "CIS peacekeeping
force in the Georgian-Abkhaz conflict zone." Such extension is
granted routinely to Russian-appointed holders of that post at
six-month intervals by the CIS Defense Ministers' forum. In this
case, the decision demonstrated even more starkly than usual the
disregard for international law and internal due process in CIS
bodies. The meeting confirmed Chaban in Georgia's absence. With
Chaban first appointed in March, the extension was not due for
routine consideration until September; but, apparently, Moscow is not
certain whether another CIS defense ministers' meeting can be held
(or held smoothly) by that time. The fictitious CIS label covers a
purely Russian force. The CIS has no legal authority to grant
peacekeeping mandates; even Moscow no longer claims such authority on
behalf of the CIS, but rather for the CSTO.
In the meeting's aftermath, Russia's Air Force Commander in Chief,
General Vladimir Mikhailov, threatened to "smash terrorist bands
beyond Russia's territory." Specifically, Mikhailov accused Georgia
of harboring "bandits in that [Pankisi] valley, who can move as they
please." He dismissed Georgian concerns about violations of its
airspace by Russian planes with a guffaw: "Fear has big eyes, and
Georgians think that we are flying over Tbilisi." This latter remark
seemed to gloat over Georgia's unrequited wish to procure modern
airspace surveillance equipment (Itar-Tass, June 27). Earlier this
month, Russia's Federal Security Service anti-terrorism directorate
chief, Yuri Sapunov, similarly accused Georgia and also Azerbaijan of
allowing their territories to be used by "international terrorism."
Mikhailov supervises an ongoing CIS air defense exercise, Combat
Commonwealth 2005, the first phase of which began on June 24 and is
scheduled to culminate on July 10. The exercise includes detection
and firing practice at the Telemba range in Russia's Chita oblast, as
well as rehearsing coordinated actions of air defense units of
Kaliningrad-based Russian forces with those of Belarus. The second
stage and third stages, from July through September, will take place
in Kazakhstan and at Russia's Ashuluk training range in Astrakhan
region. Although billed in keeping with tradition as a CIS exercise,
Combat Commonwealth 2005 in fact involves only CSTO member countries.
This reflects Russia's just-announced decision to fall back on the
"core" group CSTO while bypassing or discarding CIS military
structures, due to the political fragmentation of the CIS.
Russia hopes to persuade NATO to deal with individual CSTO member
countries via Moscow, rather than directly. However, most CSTO member
countries will not willingly accept such a limitation. Armenia does
not. And, on June 24, Kazakhstan submitted the presentation document
of its Individual Partnership Action Plan (IPAP) to a meeting of the
North Atlantic Council in the NATO + Kazakhstan format in Brussels.
(Itar-Tass, Interfax, June 24-27; Avesta, Kazinform, June 24; see
EDM, June 24, 28)
Jamestown Foundation
June 29 2005
CIS MILITARY STRUCTURES SEEN SHRINKING AT DEFENSE MINISTERS' MEETING
By Vladimir Socor
Wednesday, June 29, 2005
Russian Defense Minister Ivanov is chairing the CIS Council of
Defense Ministers meeting. The Council of Defense Ministers of CIS
member countries met in a depleted format on June 24 in Dushanbe,
with Russia's Defense Minister Sergei Ivanov in the chair. The host,
Tajikistan's President Imomali Rakhmonov, noted the "negative impact
of disintegration processes" -- a reversal of the ubiquitous Russian
cliche "integratsionnyie protsessy." Georgia, Moldova, and (as usual)
Turkmenistan were absent; Ukraine had announced in advance that it
would downgrade its attendance to that of an observer; and there was
no clear word regarding Uzbekistan's attendance.
Rakhmonov aired an unprecedented proposal for creation of
rapid-deployment forces of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization
(SCO) for Central Asia, in parallel with the existing
rapid-deployment structure of the CIS Collective Security Treaty
Organization (CSTO). As the SCO includes China and Uzbekistan, which
are not CSTO members, Rakhmonov's proposal may be read either as a
veiled attempt at balancing the CSTO, or as an implicit
acknowledgment of the CSTO's ineffectiveness. The Dushanbe meeting
also discussed inconclusively the issue of drug trafficking from
Afghanistan, which Ivanov and Rakhmonov termed the main security
challenge to neighboring countries. All these issues are, in any
case, beyond the competence of the CIS as such and its Defense
Ministers' Council.
The meeting was only able to review the operation of the CIS Joint
Air Defense System in 2004 and a framework plan for 2006-10. In fact,
the Dushanbe session -- like the CSTO's summit in Moscow on June 24
-- highlighted Russia's shift of emphasis from the CIS nonintegrated
air defense system to an integrated one to be developed within the
CSTO (see below).
The meeting approved a six-month extension of the powers of Russia's
Maj.-General Sergei Chaban as commander of the "CIS peacekeeping
force in the Georgian-Abkhaz conflict zone." Such extension is
granted routinely to Russian-appointed holders of that post at
six-month intervals by the CIS Defense Ministers' forum. In this
case, the decision demonstrated even more starkly than usual the
disregard for international law and internal due process in CIS
bodies. The meeting confirmed Chaban in Georgia's absence. With
Chaban first appointed in March, the extension was not due for
routine consideration until September; but, apparently, Moscow is not
certain whether another CIS defense ministers' meeting can be held
(or held smoothly) by that time. The fictitious CIS label covers a
purely Russian force. The CIS has no legal authority to grant
peacekeeping mandates; even Moscow no longer claims such authority on
behalf of the CIS, but rather for the CSTO.
In the meeting's aftermath, Russia's Air Force Commander in Chief,
General Vladimir Mikhailov, threatened to "smash terrorist bands
beyond Russia's territory." Specifically, Mikhailov accused Georgia
of harboring "bandits in that [Pankisi] valley, who can move as they
please." He dismissed Georgian concerns about violations of its
airspace by Russian planes with a guffaw: "Fear has big eyes, and
Georgians think that we are flying over Tbilisi." This latter remark
seemed to gloat over Georgia's unrequited wish to procure modern
airspace surveillance equipment (Itar-Tass, June 27). Earlier this
month, Russia's Federal Security Service anti-terrorism directorate
chief, Yuri Sapunov, similarly accused Georgia and also Azerbaijan of
allowing their territories to be used by "international terrorism."
Mikhailov supervises an ongoing CIS air defense exercise, Combat
Commonwealth 2005, the first phase of which began on June 24 and is
scheduled to culminate on July 10. The exercise includes detection
and firing practice at the Telemba range in Russia's Chita oblast, as
well as rehearsing coordinated actions of air defense units of
Kaliningrad-based Russian forces with those of Belarus. The second
stage and third stages, from July through September, will take place
in Kazakhstan and at Russia's Ashuluk training range in Astrakhan
region. Although billed in keeping with tradition as a CIS exercise,
Combat Commonwealth 2005 in fact involves only CSTO member countries.
This reflects Russia's just-announced decision to fall back on the
"core" group CSTO while bypassing or discarding CIS military
structures, due to the political fragmentation of the CIS.
Russia hopes to persuade NATO to deal with individual CSTO member
countries via Moscow, rather than directly. However, most CSTO member
countries will not willingly accept such a limitation. Armenia does
not. And, on June 24, Kazakhstan submitted the presentation document
of its Individual Partnership Action Plan (IPAP) to a meeting of the
North Atlantic Council in the NATO + Kazakhstan format in Brussels.
(Itar-Tass, Interfax, June 24-27; Avesta, Kazinform, June 24; see
EDM, June 24, 28)