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Federal Document Clearing House Congressional Testimony
March 8, 2005 Tuesday
SECTION: CAPITOL HILL HEARING TESTIMONY
COMMITTEE: SENATE FOREIGN RELATIONS
SUBCOMMITTEE: EUROPEAN AFFAIRS
FUTURE OF DEMOCRACY IN BLACK SEA AREA
TESTIMONY-BY: MR. BRUCE P. JACKSON, PRESIDENT
AFFILIATION: PROJECT ON TRANSITIONAL DEMOCRACIES
Statement of Mr. Bruce P. Jackson President, Project on Transitional
Democracies
Committee on Senate Foreign Relations Subcommittee on European
Affairs
March 8, 2005
Mr. Chairman, Members of the Committee, thank you for the opportunity
to testify before you on the state of democracy in the Black Sea
region and the possibilities which the vast democratic transformation
of this region presents for US policy. I would like to discuss three
major questions: (1) What is the Black Sea region and why should
developments there command the attention of this Committee and of US
policymakers? (2) Where are the states of the Black Sea region in the
development of democratic governance and what factors retard
development of a free and prosperous civil society in these states?
(3) Given the strategic importance of the region and the threats to
the freedom of peoples who profess to share our values, what should
be the policy of the United States towards the new democracies around
the Black Sea?
I Historically, the Black Sea has stood at the confluence of the
Russian, Ottoman and Persian Empires and has been a central theater
in the "Great Game" which was played out along its shores throughout
the nineteenth century1. The contours of the Black Sea region which
were established in the competitions between the great European
powers in the Crimean War and World War I are still evident today.
The geopolitics of the region remain heavily influenced by the
internal character and foreign policy aspirations of the larger
regional powers, Russia and Turkey. The middle powers, Ukraine,
Romania and Bulgaria, continue to seek security and stability in
regional cooperation and, particularly, in closer relations with
European institutions. The smaller littoral states, Moldova, Georgia,
Azerbaijan, and Armenia, watch the great regional powers fearfully,
envy the more cosmopolitan and Europeanized middle powers, and are
bloodied by every tremor along the tectonic plate of the former
imperial powers. Today, the same factors, which rendered the Black
Sea region a "black hole" in European history, now argue that this
region is of central strategic interest to Europe and the United
States. There are six major points: 1 For a fuller discussion see
Ronald D. Asmus and Bruce P. Jackson, "The Black Sea and the
Frontiers of Freedom" in Policy Review, June & July 2004
The Black Sea region has for centuries been the entry point to the
broader Middle East. The borders of the democracies of the region
touch Syria, Iraq, Iran and the shores of the Caspian Sea. As the
United States discovered to its dismay on March 1, 2003, without the
cooperation of Black Sea states, in this instance Turkey, we cannot
easily reach the northern approaches to the broader Middle East.
Every nineteenth century European power understood that the nation
which controlled the Black Sea could control the most important real
estate in the Middle East. If we are to be successful in our efforts
to support the democratization of the Middle East, we will have to
build a secure, prosperous, and democratic Black Sea region in the
process.
The Black Sea region was the beginning of the Silk Road of trade with
Asia. While silk and spices have lost much of their allure since the
times of Marco Polo, the energy reserves of Central Asia are becoming
increasingly important to our European allies and to the stability of
world oil prices. Today, the member states of the European Union
import approximately 50% of their energy needs; by 2020 imports will
rise to 70% of consumption. This increase will be delivered to Europe
across and around the Black Sea region, on routes such as the
Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan pipeline.
3. The Black Sea region is rapidly becoming part of Europe. With the
exception of Croatia, all current candidates for EU membership are
from the Black Sea region. Romania and Bulgaria are expected to gain
EU membership in 2007 and Turkey sometime around 2014. The western
and southern shores of the Black Sea are also the borders of NATO and
soon the European Union. These facts so impressed the heads of state
of member states of NATO that at the Istanbul Summit in July 2004 the
NATO Joint Communiquerecognized that the Black Sea region was an
essential part of Euro-Atlantic security.
4. It is not, however, only US interests which tie us to the Black
Sea region, but also our political values. Both the Rose Revolution
in Georgia and the Orange Revolution in Ukraine occurred in countries
along the northern and eastern shores of the sea. The possibilities
created by these democratic revolutions not only inspired President
Bush's Second Inaugural Address and his recent speech in Bratislava,
but they changed the structure of politics in Minsk, Chisinau and as
far away as Almaty, Bishkek and Beirut. Without doubt, the largest
and most dramatic democratic changes are occurring in this part of
the Euro-Atlantic.
5. Sadly, it is not only our hopes that draw our attention to this
region, but also our fears. The most sharp and dangerous fragments of
the former Soviet Union lie scattered in an arc across the northern
shore of the Black Sea. A belt of 'frozen conflicts" begins in
Transdnistria in eastern Moldova and runs through Abkhazia and South
Ossetia in Georgia to the mountain heights of Nagorno-Karabakh on the
border of Armenia and Azerbaijan. In each of these "frozen conflicts"
created in the civil wars of the dying Soviet empire, brutal warfare
and ethnic cleansing have occurred and could reoccur. In
Transdnistria, Abkhazia and South Ossetia, transnational crime has
found a home and developed a base for trafficking in weapons, drugs,
women and children. These criminal enterprises destabilize the
governments of the region, threaten Europe with illicit traffic, and
ultimately pose a danger to the United States with their capability
and intent to sell weapons and technology to our enemies.
6. Finally, the most negative expression of Russian foreign policy
aspirations now occurs along the northern rim of the Black Sea
region. Since I have already been given an opportunity by the
Committee to testify on the subject of Russian neo-imperialism in
what the Kremlin regards as Russia's "near abroad," I will not repeat
the argument here2 . Suffice it to say, whether we are intent on
protecting new democracies from outside inference and coercion or are
simply concerned about the damage Russian policy is doing to its own
people, we are forced to focus on the region.
In short, the democracies of the Black Sea lie on the knife edge of
history which separates the politics of nineteenth century
imperialism from European modernity. Reactionary forces in the region
(separatism, historical Russian aspirations, and criminal interest)
would prefer a return to a balance of power system where the powerful
rule over spheres of interest and the powerless would serve either
autocrat or kleptocrat. On the other hand, those democratic reformers
who view themselves as the direct descendants of the leaders of
Solidarity and Charter 77 who freed Central and Eastern Europe in
1989, aspire to see their new democracies following the path of
Poland and the Czech Republic into a European system based on liberal
values and shared security.
Which of these forces ends up defining a modern Black Sea system is a
matter of great consequence for the United States and Europe. Not
only would a return to the politics of the past constrain our ability
to work for democratic change in the greater Middle East and damage
the energy security of Europe, but if the new democracies fail to
make the Black Sea a part of the Euro-Atlantic system, the lives of a
quarter of a billion Europeans will be nastier, more brutish, and
(inevitably) shorter. II Let me turn from the region as a whole to a
summary discussion of the state of democracy in its constituent
states, where it is somewhat easier to see the great possibilities
and the factors which retard reform and political integration.
Romania and Bulgaria are undoubtedly the success stories of Southeast
Europe and the Black Sea. Both were invited to join NATO in 2002
where they have performed well and contributed to missions in
Afghanistan and Iraq. As I mentioned earlier, both are expected to
join the European Union on January 1, 2007 leading their region into
the institutional core of Europe. The two factors that retard the
political and economic development of both Romania and Bulgaria are
deeply entrenched 2 Bruce Pitcairn Jackson, Testimony before the
Senate Foreign Affairs Committee on "Democracy in Russia," February
17, 2005. governmental corruption and a weak and often compromised
judiciary. But, even in this, there is a good news story to be told.
In the recent Romanian Presidential election for the first time, the
issue of corruption dominated the campaign and swept reformer Traian
Basescu into the Presidency. His Government has launched a large-
scale offensive against corruption in government and business.
Forthcoming elections in Bulgaria may offer a similar, albeit long
overdue, opportunity to accelerate reform. Clearly, Romania and
Bulgaria are two democracies whose long-term prospects look extremely
bright.
Incidentally, Mr. Chairman, President Basescu arrives in Washington
later today for a meeting tomorrow with President Bush and members of
the Senate. President Basescu is one of the most eloquent advocates
of a comprehensive strategy for the Black Sea, aimed at advancing
prosperity and democracy throughout the region. His goal is nothing
less than to make the Black Sea "a second Mediterranean" in terms of
shared security, commerce, and political cooperation.
Turkey achieved an historic milestone on December 17, 2004 when the
European Union finally agreed to open membership negotiations.
Despite this confirmation of Turkey's European destiny, there are
strong indications that Turkey's national and geopolitical identity
crisis is far from over and that Turkey may be entering a difficult
and problematic stage. In June 2004, in order to maintain some manner
of regional hegemony, Turkey played a key role in blocking the
extension of the NATO surveillance operation ACTIVE ENDEAVOR to the
Black Sea. Internally, the ruling AK Party seems have taken a turn
for the worse, characterized by strident anti-Americanism, cultural
anti- Europeanism, and a resurgent xenophobia. (The television
footage of Turkish riot police savagely beating young women at a
peaceful protest for political rights that appeared on BBC yesterday
is but the most recent negative development.)
In foreign policy, during the term of Prime Minister Erdogan, Turkey
has quietly broken off its strategic relationship with Israel,
refused to negotiate with Armenia on the opening of their common
border (thereby obstructing negotiations on Nagorno- Karabakh), and
demanded of the United States a draconian treatment of the Kurdish
population of Iraq. In diplomatic parlance, Turkey has become
"unhelpful."
Perhaps, most worrying are reports of Turkish-Russian discussions of
a coordinated policy in the Black Sea region, which would inevitably
be conducted at the expense of smaller, pro-European democracies. The
motivation for Turkey's negative regional behavior appears to be a
classic case of Great Power insecurity and a fear that Turkey will
lose its distinct identity in the economic and demographic
uncertainty of modern Europe. We can hope that the negative trend in
Turkish politics is related to the turmoil in the Middle East and the
problems and contradictions which a secular Islamic government
encounters in the course of European integration rather than a
response to the flowering of democracy around the Black Sea.
Nevertheless, Turkey has entered a dangerous period both for itself
and for US-Turkish relations which deserves serious attention.
Ukraine is possibly the best-known and most inspiring of the Black
Sea democracies. The triumph of Viktor Yushchenko and the Ukrainian
people is without question the most significant event in the advance
of democracy in Europe since the fall of the Berlin Wall. That said,
President Yushchenko and Prime Minister Yulia Tymoshenko have a
Herculean task in front of them. First and foremost, they must unite
a nation even as they undertake the reforms which are necessary for
Ukraine to become a European democracy.
The most dangerous year for a new democracy is its first year, and
for Ukraine the critical period is from today through the
Parliamentary elections in March 2006. In this defining twelve- month
period, Viktor Yushchenko will have to address the criminal conduct
of the Kuchma period, define and negotiate the rules of the game for
the business community, and make significant progress both within the
Action Plan of the European Union's Neighborhood Policy and in an
intensified dialogue with NATO. Any one of these tasks would be
formidable, but the new government must accomplish this and more, and
do so in such a way that convinces the people of Kiev, Lviv, and
Donetsk that they share a common future in a united pro-Western
Ukraine. The critical task will be to establish transparent business
practices and to eliminate the "grey economy" without resorting to
large-scale re-nationalization which would destroy the confidence of
foreign investors and dangerously inflame sectional resentments.
The further danger for Ukrainian democracy lies in the hostility of
Moscow towards pro-European democracies in the former Soviet space
and the fear that democratic reform inspires in the criminal clans,
which have dominated the "grey economy" of Ukraine up until now.
Sadly, but necessarily, the stability and security of EU and NATO
membership is some years off and over the immediate political
horizon. The United States and our European allies must bring their
entire diplomatic and economic power to bear to ensure that Russia,
or criminal groups emboldened by Russia, do not undermine the
Yushchenko Government. We must support the Ukrainian people in their
truly historic endeavor.
Georgia's democratic revolution is only slightly less well-known than
Ukraine's and is succeeding against even longer odds. Georgia, under
the leadership of President Misha Saakashvili, has finished an
extraordinary first year of reform, which saw the breakaway province
of Adjaria reunited with the constitutional government in Tbilisi. By
all indicators, such as its qualification for participation within
the Millennium Challenge Account, Georgia is delivering on its
commitments to economic reform and the democratic transformation of
its society and government. Like Ukraine, however, Georgia has
encountered serious and continuous obstruction from Russia. The
Russian Government has refused to comply with its international
treaty obligation to withdraw its troops from the Soviet-era bases on
Georgian soil and has consistently supported separatists in the
breakaway Georgian region of Abkhazia. Late last year, Russia blocked
the OSCE from reinforcing a peacekeeping mission in South Ossetia in
order to protect its ability to ship prohibited weapons and
explosives through the Roki Tunnel to paramilitary gangs in South
Ossetia. And, at the December OSCE Summit in Sofia, Bulgaria, Russia
forced the OSCE to close the Border Monitoring Operation which
patrolled the northern border of Georgia with Ingushetia, Dagestan
and Chechnya. Russia's actions could very well prove to be the death
knell for the OSCE; we must ensure that they are not for democratic
Georgia.
Despite Russian attempts to destabilize the Saakashvili Government,
Georgian democracy continues to mature and was strong enough to
withstand the recent tragic death of Prime Minister Zurab Zhvania,
who was a mainstay of the Rose Revolution. If democracies could be
compared to sports teams, Georgia would be the 1980's US Olympic
Hockey team. Like the Lake Placid Olympic team, Georgia should not be
winning, except it does. It seems to me that Georgia has the
essential quality of scrappiness that animated successful democratic
movements in Poland, the Czech Republic, Slovakia and the Baltic
States against the monolith of Soviet power; they care more and are
willing to work harder for democracy than the reactionary forces are
willing to work to restore autocratic rule and criminal enterprise.
In contrast, the other smaller states of the Black Sea regime,
Moldova, Azerbaijan and Armenia, retain more characteristics of
post-Soviet autocracies than of emerging European democracies. To
varying degrees, recent elections have not met European standards.
Opposition parties are harassed and opposition candidates are
occasionally threatened with criminal charges or simply imprisoned.
Both civil society and the free press are under duress in these
countries, as we can see from the recent assassination of the editor
of an opposition newspaper in Baku. For the most part, the major
factors retarding the democratic development of Moldova, Azerbaijan
and Armenia are the persistence of frozen conflicts on their
territories and the negative effect these conflicts have on their
economic development and domestic politics. The stand-off between
Moldovan government and the Smirnov clan in Transdnistria has
proliferated corruption and crime throughout Moldova and served as an
excuse for President Voronin to limit the political and press
freedoms of Moldovan citizens. Similarly, the impasse on
Nagorno-Karabakh has served to maintain extremists in both Azeri and
Armenian politics, and succeeded in isolating both countries from
constructive interaction with their Black Sea neighbors and with
Euro-Atlantic institutions.
This brief survey of the mature, nascent and inchoate democracies of
the Black Sea region reveals a special class of democracies which are
torn between the desire of their peoples for a European future (and
all the economic and political freedoms these peoples associate with
Europe) and the lingering grip of a brutal past. In short, this is a
region of Europe where the future of democracy is still at risk.
III If I am correct in arguing that the Black Sea region is a area of
enormous democratic potential, but where democracy remains at risk,
then the policy of the United States has to be to support new
democracies, to dissuade or deter foreign powers from intervening in
their development, and to ensure that the Euro-Atlantic institutions
they seek remain open to them. I have six recommendations for this
Committee to consider and for US policy generally: 1. Accelerate the
leading democracies of the region. The prospects for democracy in the
Black Sea region will be substantially enhanced by the formal
integration of Romania and Bulgaria in the European Union. Their
accession must remain on track for January 1, 2007 in order to convey
to the other states of the region that the possibility of near-term
European integration exists and that painful reforms have their
reward in security and prosperity. The United States can assist
Romania and Bulgaria in achieving their goal by pushing hard for
judicial reform and strict standards of official conduct. The
Department of Defense should make its long-delayed decision on the
repositioning of US European bases to the sites offered by the
Romanian Government in the vicinity of Constanza on the Black Sea.
Nothing could make more clear that the United States shares the view
of the European Union that security and stability in the Black Sea
region is essential to Euro-Atlantic security. 2. Reform and adapt
our institutions to perform in the Black Sea region. Existing
institutions, such as NATO and the OSCE, must be made to perform in
service of democracy in the Black Sea littorals. We must revisit the
decision to block Active Endeavor from being extended to the Black
Sea and overturn the archaic Montreux Convention, which is sometimes
invoked as the justification for barring NATO surveillance from
transiting the Bosphorus. Similarly, we must demand that the OSCE
fulfill its peacekeeping and monitoring responsibilities throughout
the region. Even if we are successful with both NATO and the OSCE,
the Black Sea region remains "institution-poor." Regional
initiatives, such as the confused GUUAM (Georgia, Ukraine,
Uzbekistan, Azerbaijan and Moldova) or the moribund Black Sea
Economic Cooperation forum have not filled the gap. As a consequence,
we should engage with regional leaders, such as Romanian President
Basescu, Georgian President Saakashvili, and Ukrainian President
Yushchenko, on the formation of new structures for a Black Sea
strategy. 3. Confront both Russia and Turkey: Whatever we hope to
accomplish in the Black Sea region will be impossible without the
willingness to confront Russia where its conduct goes beyond the
acceptable. But we must also communicate frankly to Turkey that we
expect our friends and allies to support other democratic states and
to work for the peaceful resolution of conflicts in their region.
Just because Russian officials become peevish when we point out that
the poison used on Yushchenko and the explosives used in the car
bombing in Gori, Georgia came from Russia, does not mean we should
ignore this conduct. Just because Turkish officials become indignant
at the mention of a genocidal campaign conducted by Ottoman
authorities against Armenian civilians in the early years of the last
century does not mean that coming to terms with history should not be
discussed between democratic allies. If we are to succeed where
democracy is at risk, we must be clear in what we say and do. 4.
Prioritize the frozen conflicts: Beginning with the conflict in
Transdnistria, our negotiators need to redouble their efforts to find
creative solutions. The Orange Revolution in Ukraine has opened up
the possibility of ending the criminal enterprise in Transdnistria
and its secessionist conflict with the constitutional government in
Chisinau. For negotiations to succeed, however, we should expand the
so-called Pentagonal-format to include both the European Union and
Romania, as essential and constructive partners. In Nagorno-Karabakh,
we must press Azerbaijan and Armenia back to serious negotiations and
insist that negotiations begin from the point reached at 2001 meeting
in Key West. Finally, we must show far greater resolve and enthusiasm
when parties take a meaningful step towards peace. President Misha
Saakashvili's enlightened peace plan for South Ossetia has been
greeted by a resounding silence in Brussels and Washington, which is
dumbfounding. It is also callous and derelict. 5. Harmonize the
democracy support programs of the United States and the European
Union: Both the Millennium Challenge Account and European Union's
Neighborhood Policy were designed to assist emerging democracies in
their efforts to accelerate economic development and strengthen the
capacity of democratic institutions. Both the United States and the
European Union are active in the Black Sea region, but formal
coordination does not yet exist. The four freedoms of market access,
labor mobility, investment and travel offered in Europe's
Neighborhood Policy are the obvious complement to what the United
States can offer in terms of security support and developmental aid.
Closer coordination is essential. We must also challenge our
Congressional-funded NGO's, such as the National Endowment of
Democracy, IRI and NDI, to address a wider spectrum of democracy-
support activities. Elections are not the only things that matter in
the Black Sea region. Strengthening civil society, the press and
parliamentary oppositions are also key. 6. Focus on Ukraine: For
better or for worse, the extent and character of democracy in the
Black Sea region will be defined to a great extent by the successes
and failures of democratic change in Ukraine. Without a democratic
Ukraine, peace in Moldova will remain elusive and the democracies of
the South Caucasus will be isolated from Europe. The ultimate
disposition of Ukraine may well finally answer the question that has
nagged at us since 1989: "What is the size of Europe?" If the Orange
Revolution succeeds and European institutions maintain an "Open Door'
policy towards Ukraine's candidacy for membership in NATO and the
European Union, then we can assume that all the democracies on the
Black Sea have a place in Europe, including, some day, Russia.
Mr. Chairman, I believe that what is occurring around the Black Sea
may be the beginning of the final phase of the completion of a Europe
whole and free. Over the five years remaining in this decade, I think
that the rapid democratic transformation of Central, Eastern, and now
Southeastern Europe will come to a conclusion, and a new (and far
larger) community of Euro-Atlantic democracies will result. While
democratic change is ultimately the responsibility of the Black Sea
states themselves, the United States has a significant role to play
both in supporting and protecting these young democracies. How well
we play this role will affect the lives of tens of millions of people
and, quite literally, shape the future of the West. Thank you, Mr.
Chairman.
Federal Document Clearing House Congressional Testimony
March 8, 2005 Tuesday
SECTION: CAPITOL HILL HEARING TESTIMONY
COMMITTEE: SENATE FOREIGN RELATIONS
SUBCOMMITTEE: EUROPEAN AFFAIRS
FUTURE OF DEMOCRACY IN BLACK SEA AREA
TESTIMONY-BY: MR. BRUCE P. JACKSON, PRESIDENT
AFFILIATION: PROJECT ON TRANSITIONAL DEMOCRACIES
Statement of Mr. Bruce P. Jackson President, Project on Transitional
Democracies
Committee on Senate Foreign Relations Subcommittee on European
Affairs
March 8, 2005
Mr. Chairman, Members of the Committee, thank you for the opportunity
to testify before you on the state of democracy in the Black Sea
region and the possibilities which the vast democratic transformation
of this region presents for US policy. I would like to discuss three
major questions: (1) What is the Black Sea region and why should
developments there command the attention of this Committee and of US
policymakers? (2) Where are the states of the Black Sea region in the
development of democratic governance and what factors retard
development of a free and prosperous civil society in these states?
(3) Given the strategic importance of the region and the threats to
the freedom of peoples who profess to share our values, what should
be the policy of the United States towards the new democracies around
the Black Sea?
I Historically, the Black Sea has stood at the confluence of the
Russian, Ottoman and Persian Empires and has been a central theater
in the "Great Game" which was played out along its shores throughout
the nineteenth century1. The contours of the Black Sea region which
were established in the competitions between the great European
powers in the Crimean War and World War I are still evident today.
The geopolitics of the region remain heavily influenced by the
internal character and foreign policy aspirations of the larger
regional powers, Russia and Turkey. The middle powers, Ukraine,
Romania and Bulgaria, continue to seek security and stability in
regional cooperation and, particularly, in closer relations with
European institutions. The smaller littoral states, Moldova, Georgia,
Azerbaijan, and Armenia, watch the great regional powers fearfully,
envy the more cosmopolitan and Europeanized middle powers, and are
bloodied by every tremor along the tectonic plate of the former
imperial powers. Today, the same factors, which rendered the Black
Sea region a "black hole" in European history, now argue that this
region is of central strategic interest to Europe and the United
States. There are six major points: 1 For a fuller discussion see
Ronald D. Asmus and Bruce P. Jackson, "The Black Sea and the
Frontiers of Freedom" in Policy Review, June & July 2004
The Black Sea region has for centuries been the entry point to the
broader Middle East. The borders of the democracies of the region
touch Syria, Iraq, Iran and the shores of the Caspian Sea. As the
United States discovered to its dismay on March 1, 2003, without the
cooperation of Black Sea states, in this instance Turkey, we cannot
easily reach the northern approaches to the broader Middle East.
Every nineteenth century European power understood that the nation
which controlled the Black Sea could control the most important real
estate in the Middle East. If we are to be successful in our efforts
to support the democratization of the Middle East, we will have to
build a secure, prosperous, and democratic Black Sea region in the
process.
The Black Sea region was the beginning of the Silk Road of trade with
Asia. While silk and spices have lost much of their allure since the
times of Marco Polo, the energy reserves of Central Asia are becoming
increasingly important to our European allies and to the stability of
world oil prices. Today, the member states of the European Union
import approximately 50% of their energy needs; by 2020 imports will
rise to 70% of consumption. This increase will be delivered to Europe
across and around the Black Sea region, on routes such as the
Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan pipeline.
3. The Black Sea region is rapidly becoming part of Europe. With the
exception of Croatia, all current candidates for EU membership are
from the Black Sea region. Romania and Bulgaria are expected to gain
EU membership in 2007 and Turkey sometime around 2014. The western
and southern shores of the Black Sea are also the borders of NATO and
soon the European Union. These facts so impressed the heads of state
of member states of NATO that at the Istanbul Summit in July 2004 the
NATO Joint Communiquerecognized that the Black Sea region was an
essential part of Euro-Atlantic security.
4. It is not, however, only US interests which tie us to the Black
Sea region, but also our political values. Both the Rose Revolution
in Georgia and the Orange Revolution in Ukraine occurred in countries
along the northern and eastern shores of the sea. The possibilities
created by these democratic revolutions not only inspired President
Bush's Second Inaugural Address and his recent speech in Bratislava,
but they changed the structure of politics in Minsk, Chisinau and as
far away as Almaty, Bishkek and Beirut. Without doubt, the largest
and most dramatic democratic changes are occurring in this part of
the Euro-Atlantic.
5. Sadly, it is not only our hopes that draw our attention to this
region, but also our fears. The most sharp and dangerous fragments of
the former Soviet Union lie scattered in an arc across the northern
shore of the Black Sea. A belt of 'frozen conflicts" begins in
Transdnistria in eastern Moldova and runs through Abkhazia and South
Ossetia in Georgia to the mountain heights of Nagorno-Karabakh on the
border of Armenia and Azerbaijan. In each of these "frozen conflicts"
created in the civil wars of the dying Soviet empire, brutal warfare
and ethnic cleansing have occurred and could reoccur. In
Transdnistria, Abkhazia and South Ossetia, transnational crime has
found a home and developed a base for trafficking in weapons, drugs,
women and children. These criminal enterprises destabilize the
governments of the region, threaten Europe with illicit traffic, and
ultimately pose a danger to the United States with their capability
and intent to sell weapons and technology to our enemies.
6. Finally, the most negative expression of Russian foreign policy
aspirations now occurs along the northern rim of the Black Sea
region. Since I have already been given an opportunity by the
Committee to testify on the subject of Russian neo-imperialism in
what the Kremlin regards as Russia's "near abroad," I will not repeat
the argument here2 . Suffice it to say, whether we are intent on
protecting new democracies from outside inference and coercion or are
simply concerned about the damage Russian policy is doing to its own
people, we are forced to focus on the region.
In short, the democracies of the Black Sea lie on the knife edge of
history which separates the politics of nineteenth century
imperialism from European modernity. Reactionary forces in the region
(separatism, historical Russian aspirations, and criminal interest)
would prefer a return to a balance of power system where the powerful
rule over spheres of interest and the powerless would serve either
autocrat or kleptocrat. On the other hand, those democratic reformers
who view themselves as the direct descendants of the leaders of
Solidarity and Charter 77 who freed Central and Eastern Europe in
1989, aspire to see their new democracies following the path of
Poland and the Czech Republic into a European system based on liberal
values and shared security.
Which of these forces ends up defining a modern Black Sea system is a
matter of great consequence for the United States and Europe. Not
only would a return to the politics of the past constrain our ability
to work for democratic change in the greater Middle East and damage
the energy security of Europe, but if the new democracies fail to
make the Black Sea a part of the Euro-Atlantic system, the lives of a
quarter of a billion Europeans will be nastier, more brutish, and
(inevitably) shorter. II Let me turn from the region as a whole to a
summary discussion of the state of democracy in its constituent
states, where it is somewhat easier to see the great possibilities
and the factors which retard reform and political integration.
Romania and Bulgaria are undoubtedly the success stories of Southeast
Europe and the Black Sea. Both were invited to join NATO in 2002
where they have performed well and contributed to missions in
Afghanistan and Iraq. As I mentioned earlier, both are expected to
join the European Union on January 1, 2007 leading their region into
the institutional core of Europe. The two factors that retard the
political and economic development of both Romania and Bulgaria are
deeply entrenched 2 Bruce Pitcairn Jackson, Testimony before the
Senate Foreign Affairs Committee on "Democracy in Russia," February
17, 2005. governmental corruption and a weak and often compromised
judiciary. But, even in this, there is a good news story to be told.
In the recent Romanian Presidential election for the first time, the
issue of corruption dominated the campaign and swept reformer Traian
Basescu into the Presidency. His Government has launched a large-
scale offensive against corruption in government and business.
Forthcoming elections in Bulgaria may offer a similar, albeit long
overdue, opportunity to accelerate reform. Clearly, Romania and
Bulgaria are two democracies whose long-term prospects look extremely
bright.
Incidentally, Mr. Chairman, President Basescu arrives in Washington
later today for a meeting tomorrow with President Bush and members of
the Senate. President Basescu is one of the most eloquent advocates
of a comprehensive strategy for the Black Sea, aimed at advancing
prosperity and democracy throughout the region. His goal is nothing
less than to make the Black Sea "a second Mediterranean" in terms of
shared security, commerce, and political cooperation.
Turkey achieved an historic milestone on December 17, 2004 when the
European Union finally agreed to open membership negotiations.
Despite this confirmation of Turkey's European destiny, there are
strong indications that Turkey's national and geopolitical identity
crisis is far from over and that Turkey may be entering a difficult
and problematic stage. In June 2004, in order to maintain some manner
of regional hegemony, Turkey played a key role in blocking the
extension of the NATO surveillance operation ACTIVE ENDEAVOR to the
Black Sea. Internally, the ruling AK Party seems have taken a turn
for the worse, characterized by strident anti-Americanism, cultural
anti- Europeanism, and a resurgent xenophobia. (The television
footage of Turkish riot police savagely beating young women at a
peaceful protest for political rights that appeared on BBC yesterday
is but the most recent negative development.)
In foreign policy, during the term of Prime Minister Erdogan, Turkey
has quietly broken off its strategic relationship with Israel,
refused to negotiate with Armenia on the opening of their common
border (thereby obstructing negotiations on Nagorno- Karabakh), and
demanded of the United States a draconian treatment of the Kurdish
population of Iraq. In diplomatic parlance, Turkey has become
"unhelpful."
Perhaps, most worrying are reports of Turkish-Russian discussions of
a coordinated policy in the Black Sea region, which would inevitably
be conducted at the expense of smaller, pro-European democracies. The
motivation for Turkey's negative regional behavior appears to be a
classic case of Great Power insecurity and a fear that Turkey will
lose its distinct identity in the economic and demographic
uncertainty of modern Europe. We can hope that the negative trend in
Turkish politics is related to the turmoil in the Middle East and the
problems and contradictions which a secular Islamic government
encounters in the course of European integration rather than a
response to the flowering of democracy around the Black Sea.
Nevertheless, Turkey has entered a dangerous period both for itself
and for US-Turkish relations which deserves serious attention.
Ukraine is possibly the best-known and most inspiring of the Black
Sea democracies. The triumph of Viktor Yushchenko and the Ukrainian
people is without question the most significant event in the advance
of democracy in Europe since the fall of the Berlin Wall. That said,
President Yushchenko and Prime Minister Yulia Tymoshenko have a
Herculean task in front of them. First and foremost, they must unite
a nation even as they undertake the reforms which are necessary for
Ukraine to become a European democracy.
The most dangerous year for a new democracy is its first year, and
for Ukraine the critical period is from today through the
Parliamentary elections in March 2006. In this defining twelve- month
period, Viktor Yushchenko will have to address the criminal conduct
of the Kuchma period, define and negotiate the rules of the game for
the business community, and make significant progress both within the
Action Plan of the European Union's Neighborhood Policy and in an
intensified dialogue with NATO. Any one of these tasks would be
formidable, but the new government must accomplish this and more, and
do so in such a way that convinces the people of Kiev, Lviv, and
Donetsk that they share a common future in a united pro-Western
Ukraine. The critical task will be to establish transparent business
practices and to eliminate the "grey economy" without resorting to
large-scale re-nationalization which would destroy the confidence of
foreign investors and dangerously inflame sectional resentments.
The further danger for Ukrainian democracy lies in the hostility of
Moscow towards pro-European democracies in the former Soviet space
and the fear that democratic reform inspires in the criminal clans,
which have dominated the "grey economy" of Ukraine up until now.
Sadly, but necessarily, the stability and security of EU and NATO
membership is some years off and over the immediate political
horizon. The United States and our European allies must bring their
entire diplomatic and economic power to bear to ensure that Russia,
or criminal groups emboldened by Russia, do not undermine the
Yushchenko Government. We must support the Ukrainian people in their
truly historic endeavor.
Georgia's democratic revolution is only slightly less well-known than
Ukraine's and is succeeding against even longer odds. Georgia, under
the leadership of President Misha Saakashvili, has finished an
extraordinary first year of reform, which saw the breakaway province
of Adjaria reunited with the constitutional government in Tbilisi. By
all indicators, such as its qualification for participation within
the Millennium Challenge Account, Georgia is delivering on its
commitments to economic reform and the democratic transformation of
its society and government. Like Ukraine, however, Georgia has
encountered serious and continuous obstruction from Russia. The
Russian Government has refused to comply with its international
treaty obligation to withdraw its troops from the Soviet-era bases on
Georgian soil and has consistently supported separatists in the
breakaway Georgian region of Abkhazia. Late last year, Russia blocked
the OSCE from reinforcing a peacekeeping mission in South Ossetia in
order to protect its ability to ship prohibited weapons and
explosives through the Roki Tunnel to paramilitary gangs in South
Ossetia. And, at the December OSCE Summit in Sofia, Bulgaria, Russia
forced the OSCE to close the Border Monitoring Operation which
patrolled the northern border of Georgia with Ingushetia, Dagestan
and Chechnya. Russia's actions could very well prove to be the death
knell for the OSCE; we must ensure that they are not for democratic
Georgia.
Despite Russian attempts to destabilize the Saakashvili Government,
Georgian democracy continues to mature and was strong enough to
withstand the recent tragic death of Prime Minister Zurab Zhvania,
who was a mainstay of the Rose Revolution. If democracies could be
compared to sports teams, Georgia would be the 1980's US Olympic
Hockey team. Like the Lake Placid Olympic team, Georgia should not be
winning, except it does. It seems to me that Georgia has the
essential quality of scrappiness that animated successful democratic
movements in Poland, the Czech Republic, Slovakia and the Baltic
States against the monolith of Soviet power; they care more and are
willing to work harder for democracy than the reactionary forces are
willing to work to restore autocratic rule and criminal enterprise.
In contrast, the other smaller states of the Black Sea regime,
Moldova, Azerbaijan and Armenia, retain more characteristics of
post-Soviet autocracies than of emerging European democracies. To
varying degrees, recent elections have not met European standards.
Opposition parties are harassed and opposition candidates are
occasionally threatened with criminal charges or simply imprisoned.
Both civil society and the free press are under duress in these
countries, as we can see from the recent assassination of the editor
of an opposition newspaper in Baku. For the most part, the major
factors retarding the democratic development of Moldova, Azerbaijan
and Armenia are the persistence of frozen conflicts on their
territories and the negative effect these conflicts have on their
economic development and domestic politics. The stand-off between
Moldovan government and the Smirnov clan in Transdnistria has
proliferated corruption and crime throughout Moldova and served as an
excuse for President Voronin to limit the political and press
freedoms of Moldovan citizens. Similarly, the impasse on
Nagorno-Karabakh has served to maintain extremists in both Azeri and
Armenian politics, and succeeded in isolating both countries from
constructive interaction with their Black Sea neighbors and with
Euro-Atlantic institutions.
This brief survey of the mature, nascent and inchoate democracies of
the Black Sea region reveals a special class of democracies which are
torn between the desire of their peoples for a European future (and
all the economic and political freedoms these peoples associate with
Europe) and the lingering grip of a brutal past. In short, this is a
region of Europe where the future of democracy is still at risk.
III If I am correct in arguing that the Black Sea region is a area of
enormous democratic potential, but where democracy remains at risk,
then the policy of the United States has to be to support new
democracies, to dissuade or deter foreign powers from intervening in
their development, and to ensure that the Euro-Atlantic institutions
they seek remain open to them. I have six recommendations for this
Committee to consider and for US policy generally: 1. Accelerate the
leading democracies of the region. The prospects for democracy in the
Black Sea region will be substantially enhanced by the formal
integration of Romania and Bulgaria in the European Union. Their
accession must remain on track for January 1, 2007 in order to convey
to the other states of the region that the possibility of near-term
European integration exists and that painful reforms have their
reward in security and prosperity. The United States can assist
Romania and Bulgaria in achieving their goal by pushing hard for
judicial reform and strict standards of official conduct. The
Department of Defense should make its long-delayed decision on the
repositioning of US European bases to the sites offered by the
Romanian Government in the vicinity of Constanza on the Black Sea.
Nothing could make more clear that the United States shares the view
of the European Union that security and stability in the Black Sea
region is essential to Euro-Atlantic security. 2. Reform and adapt
our institutions to perform in the Black Sea region. Existing
institutions, such as NATO and the OSCE, must be made to perform in
service of democracy in the Black Sea littorals. We must revisit the
decision to block Active Endeavor from being extended to the Black
Sea and overturn the archaic Montreux Convention, which is sometimes
invoked as the justification for barring NATO surveillance from
transiting the Bosphorus. Similarly, we must demand that the OSCE
fulfill its peacekeeping and monitoring responsibilities throughout
the region. Even if we are successful with both NATO and the OSCE,
the Black Sea region remains "institution-poor." Regional
initiatives, such as the confused GUUAM (Georgia, Ukraine,
Uzbekistan, Azerbaijan and Moldova) or the moribund Black Sea
Economic Cooperation forum have not filled the gap. As a consequence,
we should engage with regional leaders, such as Romanian President
Basescu, Georgian President Saakashvili, and Ukrainian President
Yushchenko, on the formation of new structures for a Black Sea
strategy. 3. Confront both Russia and Turkey: Whatever we hope to
accomplish in the Black Sea region will be impossible without the
willingness to confront Russia where its conduct goes beyond the
acceptable. But we must also communicate frankly to Turkey that we
expect our friends and allies to support other democratic states and
to work for the peaceful resolution of conflicts in their region.
Just because Russian officials become peevish when we point out that
the poison used on Yushchenko and the explosives used in the car
bombing in Gori, Georgia came from Russia, does not mean we should
ignore this conduct. Just because Turkish officials become indignant
at the mention of a genocidal campaign conducted by Ottoman
authorities against Armenian civilians in the early years of the last
century does not mean that coming to terms with history should not be
discussed between democratic allies. If we are to succeed where
democracy is at risk, we must be clear in what we say and do. 4.
Prioritize the frozen conflicts: Beginning with the conflict in
Transdnistria, our negotiators need to redouble their efforts to find
creative solutions. The Orange Revolution in Ukraine has opened up
the possibility of ending the criminal enterprise in Transdnistria
and its secessionist conflict with the constitutional government in
Chisinau. For negotiations to succeed, however, we should expand the
so-called Pentagonal-format to include both the European Union and
Romania, as essential and constructive partners. In Nagorno-Karabakh,
we must press Azerbaijan and Armenia back to serious negotiations and
insist that negotiations begin from the point reached at 2001 meeting
in Key West. Finally, we must show far greater resolve and enthusiasm
when parties take a meaningful step towards peace. President Misha
Saakashvili's enlightened peace plan for South Ossetia has been
greeted by a resounding silence in Brussels and Washington, which is
dumbfounding. It is also callous and derelict. 5. Harmonize the
democracy support programs of the United States and the European
Union: Both the Millennium Challenge Account and European Union's
Neighborhood Policy were designed to assist emerging democracies in
their efforts to accelerate economic development and strengthen the
capacity of democratic institutions. Both the United States and the
European Union are active in the Black Sea region, but formal
coordination does not yet exist. The four freedoms of market access,
labor mobility, investment and travel offered in Europe's
Neighborhood Policy are the obvious complement to what the United
States can offer in terms of security support and developmental aid.
Closer coordination is essential. We must also challenge our
Congressional-funded NGO's, such as the National Endowment of
Democracy, IRI and NDI, to address a wider spectrum of democracy-
support activities. Elections are not the only things that matter in
the Black Sea region. Strengthening civil society, the press and
parliamentary oppositions are also key. 6. Focus on Ukraine: For
better or for worse, the extent and character of democracy in the
Black Sea region will be defined to a great extent by the successes
and failures of democratic change in Ukraine. Without a democratic
Ukraine, peace in Moldova will remain elusive and the democracies of
the South Caucasus will be isolated from Europe. The ultimate
disposition of Ukraine may well finally answer the question that has
nagged at us since 1989: "What is the size of Europe?" If the Orange
Revolution succeeds and European institutions maintain an "Open Door'
policy towards Ukraine's candidacy for membership in NATO and the
European Union, then we can assume that all the democracies on the
Black Sea have a place in Europe, including, some day, Russia.
Mr. Chairman, I believe that what is occurring around the Black Sea
may be the beginning of the final phase of the completion of a Europe
whole and free. Over the five years remaining in this decade, I think
that the rapid democratic transformation of Central, Eastern, and now
Southeastern Europe will come to a conclusion, and a new (and far
larger) community of Euro-Atlantic democracies will result. While
democratic change is ultimately the responsibility of the Black Sea
states themselves, the United States has a significant role to play
both in supporting and protecting these young democracies. How well
we play this role will affect the lives of tens of millions of people
and, quite literally, shape the future of the West. Thank you, Mr.
Chairman.