Tweet
Russia's rigid policy towards Georgia could backfire, paper says
Kommersant, Moscow
11 Mar 05
Russia is reluctant to withdraw its military bases in Georgia fearing
this might weaken its influence in the Transcaucasus, a Russian
newspaper suggests. However, attempts to retain its military presence
in Georgia at any price could backfire - Moscow's rigid policy towards
Tbilisi is making political elites in the post-Soviet area
increasingly wary and Russia's position there increasingly shaky. The
following is the text of a report by Russian newspaper Kommersant on
11 March.
Probably Moscow's main argument in its years-long dispute with Tbilisi
over the future of the Russian military bases on Georgian territory is
the idea that the withdrawal of such a large number of troops is an
extremely expensive undertaking, and that time (a lengthy period of
it) and money (a substantial amount of it) are needed to find and
equip a place for their future stationing. Therefore, Moscow says,
the Russian troops will not be able to leave Georgia for at least
seven or eight years, and Tbilisi's demands for their immediate
withdrawal are unrealistic and therefore not serious.
However, the problem of the withdrawal of the Russian troops from
Georgia is not merely a bitter dispute about the timeframe for their
withdrawal and possible compensation. The stakes in this dispute are
far more serious. It is a question of whether Russia retains or loses
its presence and influence in the Transcaucasus.
Moscow's main strategic partner in the region is Armenia, where there
is a major Russian military base, whose future, as far as the position
of the Armenian authorities is concerned, provides no cause for even
the slightest concern. However, the route to Russia's base in Armenia
passes through Georgian territory, and the presence of Russian
servicemen there is perceived by Moscow as a sort of guarantee that
the route will not be blocked. Russia's loss of effective levers of
influence on Tbilisi will make its military presence in Armenia
virtually pointless. Communications with the base there will have to
be made through airspace, Georgian airspace, and this will make those
communications extremely unstable, and therefore unreliable.
So Russia's loss of influence in Georgia will inevitably lead to a
weakening of its position throughout the Transcaucasus. And this, in
turn, will bury once and for all the idea of recovering Moscow's
former influence in Central Asia: after all, the Central Asian
republics see the Transcaucasus as an alternative to the Russian route
for exporting their strategic resources to the West; first and
foremost this takes the form of the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan oil pipeline.
Therefore the Kremlin is not happy with mere normalization of
relations with Tbilisi, a key point in which is the future of the
Russian bases. Moscow would like to radically change its relations
with its southern neighbour. And the main idea of this change is to
preserve (or, even better, to consolidate) Russian influence in
Georgia. Moscow seems unwilling to accept anything less, taking the
view that either the normalization of Russian-Georgian relations leads
to a strengthening of Russia's presence in Georgia, or else
normalization does not take place at all.
However, attempts to retain its military presence in Georgia at any
price could backfire on Moscow and eventually cost it even
more. Moscow's rigid policy towards Tbilisi is making political elites
in the post-Soviet area increasingly wary and Russia's position there
increasingly shaky.
From: Emil Lazarian | Ararat NewsPress
Kommersant, Moscow
11 Mar 05
Russia is reluctant to withdraw its military bases in Georgia fearing
this might weaken its influence in the Transcaucasus, a Russian
newspaper suggests. However, attempts to retain its military presence
in Georgia at any price could backfire - Moscow's rigid policy towards
Tbilisi is making political elites in the post-Soviet area
increasingly wary and Russia's position there increasingly shaky. The
following is the text of a report by Russian newspaper Kommersant on
11 March.
Probably Moscow's main argument in its years-long dispute with Tbilisi
over the future of the Russian military bases on Georgian territory is
the idea that the withdrawal of such a large number of troops is an
extremely expensive undertaking, and that time (a lengthy period of
it) and money (a substantial amount of it) are needed to find and
equip a place for their future stationing. Therefore, Moscow says,
the Russian troops will not be able to leave Georgia for at least
seven or eight years, and Tbilisi's demands for their immediate
withdrawal are unrealistic and therefore not serious.
However, the problem of the withdrawal of the Russian troops from
Georgia is not merely a bitter dispute about the timeframe for their
withdrawal and possible compensation. The stakes in this dispute are
far more serious. It is a question of whether Russia retains or loses
its presence and influence in the Transcaucasus.
Moscow's main strategic partner in the region is Armenia, where there
is a major Russian military base, whose future, as far as the position
of the Armenian authorities is concerned, provides no cause for even
the slightest concern. However, the route to Russia's base in Armenia
passes through Georgian territory, and the presence of Russian
servicemen there is perceived by Moscow as a sort of guarantee that
the route will not be blocked. Russia's loss of effective levers of
influence on Tbilisi will make its military presence in Armenia
virtually pointless. Communications with the base there will have to
be made through airspace, Georgian airspace, and this will make those
communications extremely unstable, and therefore unreliable.
So Russia's loss of influence in Georgia will inevitably lead to a
weakening of its position throughout the Transcaucasus. And this, in
turn, will bury once and for all the idea of recovering Moscow's
former influence in Central Asia: after all, the Central Asian
republics see the Transcaucasus as an alternative to the Russian route
for exporting their strategic resources to the West; first and
foremost this takes the form of the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan oil pipeline.
Therefore the Kremlin is not happy with mere normalization of
relations with Tbilisi, a key point in which is the future of the
Russian bases. Moscow would like to radically change its relations
with its southern neighbour. And the main idea of this change is to
preserve (or, even better, to consolidate) Russian influence in
Georgia. Moscow seems unwilling to accept anything less, taking the
view that either the normalization of Russian-Georgian relations leads
to a strengthening of Russia's presence in Georgia, or else
normalization does not take place at all.
However, attempts to retain its military presence in Georgia at any
price could backfire on Moscow and eventually cost it even
more. Moscow's rigid policy towards Tbilisi is making political elites
in the post-Soviet area increasingly wary and Russia's position there
increasingly shaky.
From: Emil Lazarian | Ararat NewsPress