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Subject: MFA: Statement by FM Oskanian in NA hearings on resolution of NK
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MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS OF
THE REPUBLIC OF ARMENIA
PRESS AND INFORMATION DEPARTMENT
Tel.: +3741. 544041 ext 202, Fax: +3741. 562543
E-mail: [email protected],
www.armeniaforeignministry.am
PRESS RELEASE
29-03-2005
Statement by Foreign Minister Vartan Oskanian in Armenian National Assembly
hearings on resolution of the Nagorno Karabakh issue
Thank you. I welcome this opportunity to discuss aloud and together the
history, development, present situation and future prospects for the
resolution of the Nagorno Karabakh issue. I believe the idea is both good
and timely. I believe that such joint, public explorations are useful and
should facilitate a healthy civic debate on premises and prospects, always
with the purpose clearly in mind: that what we seek is a peaceful, lasting
resolution to this conflict.
I've looked at the agenda of these two days; the topics and speakers are
very diversified and reflect varying political perspectives and political
forces. Such a diversified spectrum will provide us with a better picture of
the range of opinions in our republic on this issue.
Of course, this is my wish. I hope that those who speak will freely express
their opinions, honestly, and that no one will use this opportunity to
settle political scores. There are dangers in using the Nagorno Karabakh
issue to obtain individual political dividends.
I will try to be as open as possible, to present not just Armenia's
position, but also our take on those international situations and events
which may effect the Nagorno Karabakh process, our perception of the
adversary's views, and also the evolution and dynamics of the resolution
process.
Let me start with the last.
Really, we must understand the dynamics and evolution of the process if we
are to understand our situation today and the choices before us.
Let me break down the NK process into stages during which both the format
and nature of the negotiations evolved, as did the content of the discussion
s.
This most recent phase became a conflict, when, in 1988, Azerbaijan used
force to respond to peaceful demonstrations and demands, thus resulting in
military activities. During those early years, there were various
incongruent, uncoordinated, random, impulsive efforts at mediation from
within the former soviet space. These efforts did not turn into a coherent
process, however, and no documents were produced.
In 1992, the resolution process became internationalized. The Conference for
Security and Cooperation in Europe, of which both Armenia and Azerbaijan
were members, took a decision to resolve the issue of Nagorno Karabakh's
status through a conference in Minsk. As a result, the CSCE Minsk process
was born, with the participation of Nagorno Karabakh. The Russian Federation
continued to remain engaged, often competing with the Minsk Group. At the
same time, the conflict itself extended beyond the borders of Nagorno
Karabakh, when as a result of Azerbaijan's aggression, Armenian forces were
compelled to bring certain territories under Armenian control, for the
purpose of assuring Nagorno Karabakh's security. By May 1994, there was a
mutually agreed upon ceasefire, and therefore, a halt to military
activities.
As military activities ceased, the OSCE, at a Summit in Budapest, harmonized
the various negotiation tracks. They created the Minsk Group co-chairs
structure, formalized the negotiation process, and put an end to competition
among the various mediators. Thus the end of militarization coincided with
the creation of a mechanism for serious negotiations.
This cycle of negotiations that has now gone on for over a decade, can be
divided into 4 stages.
- The first stage began with the OSCE Budapest Summit and ended with the
OSCE Lisbon Summit.
- The second stage covered the post-Lisbon period through the change of
presidential administration in Armenia.
- The third stage stretched to the death of Father Aliyev.
- And the fourth stage is the one we're in now, that started with the
change of administration in Azerbaijan.
In the first stage of the formal process, negotiations revolved around a
document which dealt with eliminating the consequences of the conflict, but
didn't address the issue of political status of Nagorno Karabakh. During
this period, for the first time, direct negotiations began to take place
between Armenia and Azerbaijan. That is where the process of clarifying
Nagorno Karabakh's political status began. The decision to commence direct
talks was made at a regular Minsk Group meeting in Bonn, in November 1995.
These talks were also expected to produce an agreed-upon text on the Nagorno
Karabakh issue, to be presented for inclusion in the Lisbon Summit's
Political Document. Two weeks prior to the Summit, the Azerbaijani side
retreated from this agreement. Further, they went to the Summit, with the
threat of a veto and held all Summit documents hostage until the
Chairman-in-Office was forced to agree to present the Azerbaijani position
in its own statement. This statement outlined principles under which Nagorno
Karabakh was to receive the status of high autonomy. This document had no
legal value, since it was only a chairman's statement. Nevertheless, Armenia
rejected it.
The significant change in the second stage was that after Lisbon, and as a
result of Lisbon, the Minsk Group process was suspended. The Lisbon Summit
was in December 1996. The first MG meeting to follow Lisbon was held in
March 1997 in Moscow. It was a very short meeting. Azerbaijan insisted that
all further negotiations must be held on the basis of the Lisbon principles.
Armenia and Nagorno Karabakh walked out. What must be noted here is that
when the Minsk Group process was thus suspended, Nagorno Karabakh's official
participation, too, ceased. I want to stress this: official participation in
the plenary Minsk Group sessions ceased at that time. Otherwise, Nagorno
Karabakh has continued to be an active participant.
Following the disruption of the Minsk Group process, two distinct proposals
were presented to the sides: In May 97, a package solution was offered,
dealing with all issues, including status, but based on Lisbon principles.
Armenia and Nagorno Karabakh naturally rejected that proposal. In September
97, the co-chairs, thinking that it would be impossible to reach an
agreement on status based on the Lisbon principles, went off in another
direction, and proposed a step-by-step solution that assumed the return of
territory without addressing the question of status. Armenia's President's
serious consideration of this approach led to dramatic divisions within his
administration, and contributed to his eventual resignation.
In the third phase, partly as a result of this serious turn of events,
partly as a result of Armenia's new approach, and partly as a result of the
renewed emphasis that there has to be a comprehensive solution that cannot
be solely based on Azerbaijan's territorial integrity, the co-chairs made a
successful effort in reconciling the principles of territorial integrity and
self-determination. The result was the Common State document which was
rejected by Azerbaijan.
Direct meetings between the presidents of Armenia and Azerbaijan followed
Azerbaijan's rejection of the Common State. All together, during the third
stage the two presidents met nearly two dozen times. They came to share an
awareness of the need for a comprehensive solution. Father Aliyev, accepting
the inevitable, tried to negotiate in a way as to reap such dividends that
would make the whole package acceptable to his people.
The result, in April 2001, was the Key West document, the second important
document created during this third stage. The Key West document clearly
affirmed the fact of the self-determination of the people of Nagorno
Karabakh. Thus, in the six years from Lisbon to Key West, there had, in our
opinion, been fundamental, radical changes in thinking on this issue -
changes in sync with contemporary international developments and
self-determination processes in different parts of the world.
In the fourth stage, the stage we have been in since Azerbaijan's new
authorities came to power, there is a clear intent to attempt to reverse the
wheel of history. The presidents do meet, although not with the former
frequency. There is a parallel track of foreign ministers meetings. During
those talks, the issue of Nagorno Karabakh's status is always on the agenda.
Azerbaijan is part of those discussions.
Despite Azerbaijan's engagement, and the efforts of the sides to search for
an acceptable resolution of the issue, Azerbaijan continues to attempt to
simultaneously introduce the Nagorno Karabakh issue in those international
forums which continue to abide by a traditional, conservative approach to
the issues of territorial integrity and self-determination. The approach of
those organizations is that
n when the principles of territorial integrity and self-determination
clash with each other then the first receives preference
n all conflicts should be treated within a single resolution framework,
regardless of the degree of legitimacy of grievances and gravity of the
issue
n if a deviation is allowed and self-determination is recognized, it
will become a precedent and a domino effect will result.
Their answer to claims of self-determination is simply greater human rights
and certain economic benefits. This approach ignores a great many factors
including the role of history in shaping of one's identity and destiny.
Today, everyone recognizes that these principles cannot be universally
applied, that there are places in the world where more acceptable solutions
can and are being found, and states - new and old - continue to live in new
relationships to each other. In our time, we have witnessed East Timor's
independence through referendum, we witnessed the signing of an agreement in
Sudan putting an end to a decades-old conflict on the basis of the notion of
referendum to be held in one portion of the country in six years. We are all
following serious deliberations about the possibility of a referendum to
determine Kosovo's status. Among the political, legal, academic experts
working in and around those places, there is a growing awareness of the
possibility and reality of recognizing the right of self-determination in
certain circumstances.
In all cases, one must judge existing self-determination struggles each on
its own merits, each in terms of its own historical, legal circumstances, as
well as the realities on the ground.
As such, we can divide today's self-determination conflicts into four types
determined by the combination of degree of control the state exercises over
its entire territory (including the territory occupied by those striving for
self-determination) and the degree of self-determination achieved by them.
Quebec, for example, falls in Category I. In this case, the territorial
integrity of Canada is preserved, while the province of Quebec has voted to
remain part of Canada; that is, they have exercised their right to
self-determination.
The overwhelming majority of today's secessionists fall in Category II,
where the movements struggle without any degree of self-determination and
the state continues to fully control the territory under question. The
Kurdish people's struggle in Turkey falls into this second category.
Those in Category III are the borderline cases where the state is not able
to control those desiring self-determination, while they themselves are not
strong enough to maintain control over their territory with any certainty of
permanence, and the outcome can go either way.
Today, Nagorno Karabakh falls in a completely different, fourth, category.
Azerbaijan has no control whatsoever over those territories, as Nagorno
Karabakh has enjoyed, for the last 15 years, all the attributes of complete
sovereignty. In this case, to attempt to win over the people of Nagorno
Karabakh by enticing them with human rights and economic advantages in order
to attempt to return them to Azerbaijani jurisdiction, is a simply senseless
exercise. Furthermore, Nagorno Karabakh has not only been in a category of
its own in terms of the length and depth of its self-determination, its
situation is further reinforced and made complete by the following legal
facts.
1.. The self-determination component: It seceded legally, according to the
laws of the day.
2.. The territorial component: Its people have self-determined on those
territories that have never been within the jurisdiction of independent
Azerbaijan.
3.. The human rights component: Azerbaijan, in perpetrating violence
against people that it considered its own citizens, has lost the moral right
to custody over those people.
4.. Finally, the de facto political reality of 15 years of proven ability
to hold elections, govern its people, protect its borders and conduct
international relations.
Azerbaijan's new authorities are having a hard time coming to terms with
these indisputable realities. Clear-cut, categoric changes are obvious in
their approach to negotiations and the search for a resolution. Worse, and
more worrisome, there are new myths and premises - public and official - on
which their positions are being constructed.
First, they have convinced themselves that the essence of the issue is the
issue of their territories. When this conflict began, there were no
territories outside Nagorno Karabakh under Armenian control. Those
territories came under Armenian control because not only was there not an
agreement on Nagorno Karabakh's status, but also because Azerbaijan saw the
solution in cleansing Nagorno Karabakh of all Armenians. Therefore, the
solution today necessarily revolves around the determination of Nagorno
Karabakh's status, and continued control over those territories guaranteeing
the security of the Armenians of Nagorno Karabakh.
Second, they want to believe that if they do not receive their maximum
demands through negotiations, they can always resort to military solutions.
It is obvious that it has not been possible nor will it be possible to
conclusively resolve this issue militarily. In order for a successful
military solution, arms and munitions are not sufficient against the people
of Nagorno Karabakh who are defending their own homes and hearth. Azerbaijan
must succeed in ethnically cleansing Nagorno Karabakh of all Armenians.
Under today's circumstances, that is simply not possible. This has been
proven impossible in Serbia, for example, where the former authorities
nearly succeeded in their efforts at ethnic cleansing using military might.
But today, they are standing trial for their crimes, and the right of the
people of Kosovo to self-determination is on the table.
Third, Azerbaijan thinks that time is on their side. Of course, the obvious
reason for this is their confidence in future oil revenues to enhance their
military capacity. This is the greatest deception, because time is not
guaranteed to work in favor of any one side. Further, international
tendencies today are moving towards reinforcing the right to
self-determination. The longer that Nagorno Karabakh maintains its de-facto
independence, it will be that much harder to reverse the wheel of history.
Fourth, they think that an isolated Armenia will be economically unable to
sustain its positions, and will sooner or later agree to serious
concessions. This is in itself a faulty assumption, because it is the people
of Nagorno Karabakh who must first agree to concessions. Additionally, a
people who lived through the deprivations and hardships of the last decade
and a half have demonstrated that they can do so again if it is life and
liberty that is at stake. On the contrary, both in Armenia and Nagorno
Karabakh, the societies have gone past survival, and are recording economic
growth.
Finally, Azerbaijan has convinced itself that by presenting Armenia as
aggressor, it will become possible through resolutions in international
organizations to force Armenians to capitulate. However, Armenians have
succeeded in consistently demonstrating that Azerbaijan is a victim of its
own aggression and that today's situation is a consequence of that
aggression. If those territories must be returned to assure Nagorno Karabakh
's security and future, that is possible. If those territories must be kept
in order to assure Nagorno Karabakh's security and future, that, too, is
possible. The purpose is security and self-determination and not
territories.
To conclude, the point is the solution will not be found through military
action, it will not be found through the creation of documents and
resolutions in international forums, nor can there be a solution imposed on
the sides from the outside. The only way to a solution is to demonstrate
political will, to sit and discuss openly and honestly, by embracing
realistic positions.
Armenia remains faithful to its initial premises that there cannot be a
vertical link between Azerbaijan and Nagorno Karabakh, that it must have a
geographic link with Armenia, and that the security of the people of Nagorno
Karabakh must be assured.
Today, for us, the basis of the resolution, is the affirmation of the right
of the people of Nagorno Karabakh to self-determination and the
international recognition of that right.
Azerbaijan's simply accepting this fact, and its formalization in an
agreement, will make possible the start of a resolution of the matter, and
the elimination of the consequences of the conflict.
END.
--Boundary_(ID_8WwojoJYovtygs3jMFfR8A)--
Content-typ e: message/rfc822
From: MFA Press <[email protected]>
Subject: MFA: Statement by FM Oskanian in NA hearings on resolution of NK
MIME-version: 1.0
Content-type: text/plain; charset=koi8-r
Content-transfer-encoding: 7BIT
MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS OF
THE REPUBLIC OF ARMENIA
PRESS AND INFORMATION DEPARTMENT
Tel.: +3741. 544041 ext 202, Fax: +3741. 562543
E-mail: [email protected],
www.armeniaforeignministry.am
PRESS RELEASE
29-03-2005
Statement by Foreign Minister Vartan Oskanian in Armenian National Assembly
hearings on resolution of the Nagorno Karabakh issue
Thank you. I welcome this opportunity to discuss aloud and together the
history, development, present situation and future prospects for the
resolution of the Nagorno Karabakh issue. I believe the idea is both good
and timely. I believe that such joint, public explorations are useful and
should facilitate a healthy civic debate on premises and prospects, always
with the purpose clearly in mind: that what we seek is a peaceful, lasting
resolution to this conflict.
I've looked at the agenda of these two days; the topics and speakers are
very diversified and reflect varying political perspectives and political
forces. Such a diversified spectrum will provide us with a better picture of
the range of opinions in our republic on this issue.
Of course, this is my wish. I hope that those who speak will freely express
their opinions, honestly, and that no one will use this opportunity to
settle political scores. There are dangers in using the Nagorno Karabakh
issue to obtain individual political dividends.
I will try to be as open as possible, to present not just Armenia's
position, but also our take on those international situations and events
which may effect the Nagorno Karabakh process, our perception of the
adversary's views, and also the evolution and dynamics of the resolution
process.
Let me start with the last.
Really, we must understand the dynamics and evolution of the process if we
are to understand our situation today and the choices before us.
Let me break down the NK process into stages during which both the format
and nature of the negotiations evolved, as did the content of the discussion
s.
This most recent phase became a conflict, when, in 1988, Azerbaijan used
force to respond to peaceful demonstrations and demands, thus resulting in
military activities. During those early years, there were various
incongruent, uncoordinated, random, impulsive efforts at mediation from
within the former soviet space. These efforts did not turn into a coherent
process, however, and no documents were produced.
In 1992, the resolution process became internationalized. The Conference for
Security and Cooperation in Europe, of which both Armenia and Azerbaijan
were members, took a decision to resolve the issue of Nagorno Karabakh's
status through a conference in Minsk. As a result, the CSCE Minsk process
was born, with the participation of Nagorno Karabakh. The Russian Federation
continued to remain engaged, often competing with the Minsk Group. At the
same time, the conflict itself extended beyond the borders of Nagorno
Karabakh, when as a result of Azerbaijan's aggression, Armenian forces were
compelled to bring certain territories under Armenian control, for the
purpose of assuring Nagorno Karabakh's security. By May 1994, there was a
mutually agreed upon ceasefire, and therefore, a halt to military
activities.
As military activities ceased, the OSCE, at a Summit in Budapest, harmonized
the various negotiation tracks. They created the Minsk Group co-chairs
structure, formalized the negotiation process, and put an end to competition
among the various mediators. Thus the end of militarization coincided with
the creation of a mechanism for serious negotiations.
This cycle of negotiations that has now gone on for over a decade, can be
divided into 4 stages.
- The first stage began with the OSCE Budapest Summit and ended with the
OSCE Lisbon Summit.
- The second stage covered the post-Lisbon period through the change of
presidential administration in Armenia.
- The third stage stretched to the death of Father Aliyev.
- And the fourth stage is the one we're in now, that started with the
change of administration in Azerbaijan.
In the first stage of the formal process, negotiations revolved around a
document which dealt with eliminating the consequences of the conflict, but
didn't address the issue of political status of Nagorno Karabakh. During
this period, for the first time, direct negotiations began to take place
between Armenia and Azerbaijan. That is where the process of clarifying
Nagorno Karabakh's political status began. The decision to commence direct
talks was made at a regular Minsk Group meeting in Bonn, in November 1995.
These talks were also expected to produce an agreed-upon text on the Nagorno
Karabakh issue, to be presented for inclusion in the Lisbon Summit's
Political Document. Two weeks prior to the Summit, the Azerbaijani side
retreated from this agreement. Further, they went to the Summit, with the
threat of a veto and held all Summit documents hostage until the
Chairman-in-Office was forced to agree to present the Azerbaijani position
in its own statement. This statement outlined principles under which Nagorno
Karabakh was to receive the status of high autonomy. This document had no
legal value, since it was only a chairman's statement. Nevertheless, Armenia
rejected it.
The significant change in the second stage was that after Lisbon, and as a
result of Lisbon, the Minsk Group process was suspended. The Lisbon Summit
was in December 1996. The first MG meeting to follow Lisbon was held in
March 1997 in Moscow. It was a very short meeting. Azerbaijan insisted that
all further negotiations must be held on the basis of the Lisbon principles.
Armenia and Nagorno Karabakh walked out. What must be noted here is that
when the Minsk Group process was thus suspended, Nagorno Karabakh's official
participation, too, ceased. I want to stress this: official participation in
the plenary Minsk Group sessions ceased at that time. Otherwise, Nagorno
Karabakh has continued to be an active participant.
Following the disruption of the Minsk Group process, two distinct proposals
were presented to the sides: In May 97, a package solution was offered,
dealing with all issues, including status, but based on Lisbon principles.
Armenia and Nagorno Karabakh naturally rejected that proposal. In September
97, the co-chairs, thinking that it would be impossible to reach an
agreement on status based on the Lisbon principles, went off in another
direction, and proposed a step-by-step solution that assumed the return of
territory without addressing the question of status. Armenia's President's
serious consideration of this approach led to dramatic divisions within his
administration, and contributed to his eventual resignation.
In the third phase, partly as a result of this serious turn of events,
partly as a result of Armenia's new approach, and partly as a result of the
renewed emphasis that there has to be a comprehensive solution that cannot
be solely based on Azerbaijan's territorial integrity, the co-chairs made a
successful effort in reconciling the principles of territorial integrity and
self-determination. The result was the Common State document which was
rejected by Azerbaijan.
Direct meetings between the presidents of Armenia and Azerbaijan followed
Azerbaijan's rejection of the Common State. All together, during the third
stage the two presidents met nearly two dozen times. They came to share an
awareness of the need for a comprehensive solution. Father Aliyev, accepting
the inevitable, tried to negotiate in a way as to reap such dividends that
would make the whole package acceptable to his people.
The result, in April 2001, was the Key West document, the second important
document created during this third stage. The Key West document clearly
affirmed the fact of the self-determination of the people of Nagorno
Karabakh. Thus, in the six years from Lisbon to Key West, there had, in our
opinion, been fundamental, radical changes in thinking on this issue -
changes in sync with contemporary international developments and
self-determination processes in different parts of the world.
In the fourth stage, the stage we have been in since Azerbaijan's new
authorities came to power, there is a clear intent to attempt to reverse the
wheel of history. The presidents do meet, although not with the former
frequency. There is a parallel track of foreign ministers meetings. During
those talks, the issue of Nagorno Karabakh's status is always on the agenda.
Azerbaijan is part of those discussions.
Despite Azerbaijan's engagement, and the efforts of the sides to search for
an acceptable resolution of the issue, Azerbaijan continues to attempt to
simultaneously introduce the Nagorno Karabakh issue in those international
forums which continue to abide by a traditional, conservative approach to
the issues of territorial integrity and self-determination. The approach of
those organizations is that
n when the principles of territorial integrity and self-determination
clash with each other then the first receives preference
n all conflicts should be treated within a single resolution framework,
regardless of the degree of legitimacy of grievances and gravity of the
issue
n if a deviation is allowed and self-determination is recognized, it
will become a precedent and a domino effect will result.
Their answer to claims of self-determination is simply greater human rights
and certain economic benefits. This approach ignores a great many factors
including the role of history in shaping of one's identity and destiny.
Today, everyone recognizes that these principles cannot be universally
applied, that there are places in the world where more acceptable solutions
can and are being found, and states - new and old - continue to live in new
relationships to each other. In our time, we have witnessed East Timor's
independence through referendum, we witnessed the signing of an agreement in
Sudan putting an end to a decades-old conflict on the basis of the notion of
referendum to be held in one portion of the country in six years. We are all
following serious deliberations about the possibility of a referendum to
determine Kosovo's status. Among the political, legal, academic experts
working in and around those places, there is a growing awareness of the
possibility and reality of recognizing the right of self-determination in
certain circumstances.
In all cases, one must judge existing self-determination struggles each on
its own merits, each in terms of its own historical, legal circumstances, as
well as the realities on the ground.
As such, we can divide today's self-determination conflicts into four types
determined by the combination of degree of control the state exercises over
its entire territory (including the territory occupied by those striving for
self-determination) and the degree of self-determination achieved by them.
Quebec, for example, falls in Category I. In this case, the territorial
integrity of Canada is preserved, while the province of Quebec has voted to
remain part of Canada; that is, they have exercised their right to
self-determination.
The overwhelming majority of today's secessionists fall in Category II,
where the movements struggle without any degree of self-determination and
the state continues to fully control the territory under question. The
Kurdish people's struggle in Turkey falls into this second category.
Those in Category III are the borderline cases where the state is not able
to control those desiring self-determination, while they themselves are not
strong enough to maintain control over their territory with any certainty of
permanence, and the outcome can go either way.
Today, Nagorno Karabakh falls in a completely different, fourth, category.
Azerbaijan has no control whatsoever over those territories, as Nagorno
Karabakh has enjoyed, for the last 15 years, all the attributes of complete
sovereignty. In this case, to attempt to win over the people of Nagorno
Karabakh by enticing them with human rights and economic advantages in order
to attempt to return them to Azerbaijani jurisdiction, is a simply senseless
exercise. Furthermore, Nagorno Karabakh has not only been in a category of
its own in terms of the length and depth of its self-determination, its
situation is further reinforced and made complete by the following legal
facts.
1.. The self-determination component: It seceded legally, according to the
laws of the day.
2.. The territorial component: Its people have self-determined on those
territories that have never been within the jurisdiction of independent
Azerbaijan.
3.. The human rights component: Azerbaijan, in perpetrating violence
against people that it considered its own citizens, has lost the moral right
to custody over those people.
4.. Finally, the de facto political reality of 15 years of proven ability
to hold elections, govern its people, protect its borders and conduct
international relations.
Azerbaijan's new authorities are having a hard time coming to terms with
these indisputable realities. Clear-cut, categoric changes are obvious in
their approach to negotiations and the search for a resolution. Worse, and
more worrisome, there are new myths and premises - public and official - on
which their positions are being constructed.
First, they have convinced themselves that the essence of the issue is the
issue of their territories. When this conflict began, there were no
territories outside Nagorno Karabakh under Armenian control. Those
territories came under Armenian control because not only was there not an
agreement on Nagorno Karabakh's status, but also because Azerbaijan saw the
solution in cleansing Nagorno Karabakh of all Armenians. Therefore, the
solution today necessarily revolves around the determination of Nagorno
Karabakh's status, and continued control over those territories guaranteeing
the security of the Armenians of Nagorno Karabakh.
Second, they want to believe that if they do not receive their maximum
demands through negotiations, they can always resort to military solutions.
It is obvious that it has not been possible nor will it be possible to
conclusively resolve this issue militarily. In order for a successful
military solution, arms and munitions are not sufficient against the people
of Nagorno Karabakh who are defending their own homes and hearth. Azerbaijan
must succeed in ethnically cleansing Nagorno Karabakh of all Armenians.
Under today's circumstances, that is simply not possible. This has been
proven impossible in Serbia, for example, where the former authorities
nearly succeeded in their efforts at ethnic cleansing using military might.
But today, they are standing trial for their crimes, and the right of the
people of Kosovo to self-determination is on the table.
Third, Azerbaijan thinks that time is on their side. Of course, the obvious
reason for this is their confidence in future oil revenues to enhance their
military capacity. This is the greatest deception, because time is not
guaranteed to work in favor of any one side. Further, international
tendencies today are moving towards reinforcing the right to
self-determination. The longer that Nagorno Karabakh maintains its de-facto
independence, it will be that much harder to reverse the wheel of history.
Fourth, they think that an isolated Armenia will be economically unable to
sustain its positions, and will sooner or later agree to serious
concessions. This is in itself a faulty assumption, because it is the people
of Nagorno Karabakh who must first agree to concessions. Additionally, a
people who lived through the deprivations and hardships of the last decade
and a half have demonstrated that they can do so again if it is life and
liberty that is at stake. On the contrary, both in Armenia and Nagorno
Karabakh, the societies have gone past survival, and are recording economic
growth.
Finally, Azerbaijan has convinced itself that by presenting Armenia as
aggressor, it will become possible through resolutions in international
organizations to force Armenians to capitulate. However, Armenians have
succeeded in consistently demonstrating that Azerbaijan is a victim of its
own aggression and that today's situation is a consequence of that
aggression. If those territories must be returned to assure Nagorno Karabakh
's security and future, that is possible. If those territories must be kept
in order to assure Nagorno Karabakh's security and future, that, too, is
possible. The purpose is security and self-determination and not
territories.
To conclude, the point is the solution will not be found through military
action, it will not be found through the creation of documents and
resolutions in international forums, nor can there be a solution imposed on
the sides from the outside. The only way to a solution is to demonstrate
political will, to sit and discuss openly and honestly, by embracing
realistic positions.
Armenia remains faithful to its initial premises that there cannot be a
vertical link between Azerbaijan and Nagorno Karabakh, that it must have a
geographic link with Armenia, and that the security of the people of Nagorno
Karabakh must be assured.
Today, for us, the basis of the resolution, is the affirmation of the right
of the people of Nagorno Karabakh to self-determination and the
international recognition of that right.
Azerbaijan's simply accepting this fact, and its formalization in an
agreement, will make possible the start of a resolution of the matter, and
the elimination of the consequences of the conflict.
END.
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