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VIKTOR YAKUBYAN: BORN BY "REVOLUTION": SAAKASHVILI AND RUSSIA
Viktor Yakubyan - expert on the South Caucasus
Regnum, Russia
Aug. 29, 2006
The three years of Mikheil Saakashvili's presidency have brought
about significant changes not only in Georgia itself but in the whole
South Caucasus. We will hardly exaggerate if we say that any change
in the South Caucasus directly or indirectly affects the fates of
the nations of the Big Caucasus. Consequently, directly or indirectly
affected are also the positions and interests of Russia as the fourth
Caucasian state along with Georgia, Azerbaijan and Armenia.
Georgia is showing steadily growing regional activity and increasingly
open ambition to get involved in important international processes
and initiatives. The advent of Saakashvili and his team into power has
caused an obvious upsurge in Georgia's foreign political activity and
has posed a whole number of questions to Russia. The nature of those
questions and the lack of adequate answers to them is turning them
into a kind of challenges. We should admit that Russian politicians
and analysts have proved unprepared for responding to such challenges.
Despite the vexed comments from Moscow regarding certain Georgian
politicians and the ways they carry out their policies, the results
of the Saakashvili government's work are evident. At least, they are
enough for being enumerated:
1. Tbilisi has gained unconditional control over Ajaria and is
carrying out big investment projects in Batumi and other regions of
that autonomy. Foreign capital is actively involved therein. Quite
active in Ajaria are Kazakh companies and banks. This is due mostly
to Georgia's plans to increase the Kazakh gas transit via the region.
The only country Tbilisi reckons and will reckon with on Ajaria is
Turkey. The period of Russian sway that started in Batumi in 1878
is over.
2. Pressed by the international community, Georgia has got Russia to
withdraw its military bases from its territory. Now Russia is actively
withdrawing its arms, ammunition and personnel from two strategic
regional-level points: Batumi (a big Black Sea port, an object of
close interest for Turkey) and Akhalkalaki (junction of the state
frontiers of Armenia, Azerbaijan and Turkey). Along with Armenian
Gyumri, Akhalkalaki is the "key" to the South Caucasus, and it is
via this region exactly that Georgia is laying the Kars-Tbilisi-Baku
railroad. This project is meant to cut off Russia and its regional
partner, Armenia, from the Central Asia-Asia Minor cargo flow and it
would be impossible were the Russian military bases on the way. Here,
Georgia has solved not only the problem of Russia's military presence
in its territory but, much more importantly, the problem related to
Moscow's regional military-strategic positions.
3. Under Saakashvili's rule Georgia has managed to go back into
the orbit of the international financial process. Under Eduard
Shevardnadze, Georgia went through a series of defaults and was,
in fact, struck off the IMF and WB trust list. Presently, both
organizations have resumed their basic credit and humanitarian projects
in the country.
4. Georgia has significantly increased and improved its
military-technical potential. Irrespective of who has supplied the
arms (Turkey, the Czech republic, Bulgaria, Ukraine or the US), who
has instructed the personnel (Turkey, France or the US) and what this
potential is actually for - it exists, has been built without Russia
and is aimed against regions with compact Russian communities - the
regions Russia takes care of. The military budget Georgia can afford
is steadily growing. Today, the Georgian army is a real force of a
regional scale, who can do whatever its leaders will tell it to. The
military and police salaries have substantially grown. The reserve
system is being successfully developed.
5. By systematically raising the tensions in the Georgian-Ossetian
conflict zone, the Georgian authorities have increased the outflow
of Ossetians from the region, have significantly improved their
military positions in the conflict zone and political positions on
the international arena. As a result, now the world community is
considering the efficiency of the Russian peacekeeping mission rather
than the prospects of the independence or, at least, the safety of
people in South Ossetia. That was a hard job to do for Georgia as even
its western partners realize that, before annexing South Ossetia,
Georgia will carry out a mass ethnic cleansing and will expel the
majority of Ossetians from the territory of that unrecognized republic.
6. Tbilisi has effected quite an unexpected operation in Kodori
Gorge. A region that was de jure recognized by everybody as an
Abkhazian territory and was de facto never controlled by either
Tbilisi or Sokhumi has now gone under the full control of Georgia.
Even more, for the first time since the end of the Abkhazian war, the
so-called "Abkhazian government in exile" can be actually called so.
Of course, this is a trick, a sharp practice with terms and that
government governs only the ground under its own feet... However,
we should remind you once again that those feet have stepped on the
ground everybody recognizes as Abkhazia. And so, the size of the shoes
of "the exiled governors" - whose very existence was already something
forgotten - does not matter much now. What actually matters is that,
yesterday, there was no such government for anybody except Tbilisi,
while today, it is a factor in a local game - a small but real
factor. Russia was just a looker-on throughout the Kodori operation,
and Georgia reacted immediately: after the end of the operation,
it insisted that Russia be excluded from the group who will shortly
monitor the region. Besides liquidating the relatively unreliable
Svan factor, Georgia has attained one more, even bigger goal: having
gained control over the upper part of Kodori Gorge, Georgia has, in
fact, got an "overhanging" position over Abkhazia and a springboard
for future attack on Gali - quite a practicable scenario given the
prevalence of Georgians in that region.
7. The effective use of available resources and favorable geographical
situation has allowed Georgia to fully neutralize the internal
potential of the Armenian population of Samtskhe-Javakheti region. The
withdrawal of a Russian base from the regional center Akhalkalaki
and Armenia's total passivity were decisive in the matter. Yerevan's
neutrality was due to Mikheil Saakashvili's efforts, particularly,
his meetings with Armenian President Robert Kocharyan. The period
of Russian influence and the Russian orientation of the local
mostly-Armenian population that started in Akhalkalaki in 1829 is over.
8. The Georgian authorities have managed to stabilize the energy
situation in the country. They undertook just one simple and absolutely
productive step: they accepted the requirements of RAO UES. What has
Russia gained from achieving "commanding heights" in Georgia's energy
sector? Russian companies have been given management over Georgia's
power generating and distributing facilities, which has obliged them to
keep this strategic sector in a proper state. And their achievements,
after years of devastation, have all been ascribed to the Saakashvili
government. Now, electricity supplies are regular, and each Georgian
knows that this is due to his president.
In this light, we would like to note that all of Russia's efforts to
gain control over Georgia's gas transit infrastructure, particularly,
the Soviet-time Russia-Georgia-Armenia gas pipeline, are coming across
the fierce resistance of Georgia and the US (!).
9. Georgia is becoming a foothold for the US in the South Caucasus,
while the Georgian President openly says that he is the mouthpiece
of US policies in the region.
We could easily continue the list if we'd like to.
However, there are errors, too, and we should point them out lest
they in Georgia might think that everything is cloudless in their
country. Of course, the key problems of Georgia are the conflicts in
South Ossetia and Abkhazia, especially the moods of the authorities
and people of those republics. Georgia is facing serious problems
with Ukraine. The new political format in that country has made
things much more difficult for Saakashvili, who now risks to lose a
key anti-Russian partner. The US will not support Georgia as actively
should Ukraine opt for a policy meeting its national interests. For
the US, Georgia is, first of all, a link (a transit unit). Ukraine's
withdrawal from the "sanitary," i.e. anti-Russian, belt will strongly
limit Georgia's operational and political positions. No coincidence
that right after Viktor Yanukovich's comeback as Ukrainian Prime
Minister, Georgian Foreign Minister Salome Zourabichvili said: "The
example of Ukraine has shown that one should not form a coalition
with an inexperienced partner. The Ukrainian President will now find
it hard to bring his country back onto its former path."
Nevertheless, it seems that, when visiting the US before the G8 Summit
in St. Petersburg, Saakashvili managed to prolong the benevolence
of Georgia Bush, especially as the US President owes Georgia the
disclosed "attempt" on his life. Exactly after that visit Georgia
made a demarche against Russia's admission into WTO and carried out
an operation in Kodori Gorge.
Some of the problems have been caused by impulsive and unreasoned
actions and statements by Saakashvili and his men. One such problem
is the time trouble in decision-making on South Ossetia caused by the
statement of Defense Minister Irakly Okruashvili that he is going to
celebrate the year 2007 in Tskhinvali.
The much too aggressive rhetoric towards Moscow has also had a
reverse effect. Extremely indecisive until recently, the Russian
Foreign Ministry has appeared with a number of harsh statements. The
growing harshness of the Russian-Georgian polemic has left no room
for spontaneous concessions or good will gestures.
Tens of thousands of people once making wines and mineral waters
can also be "grateful" to Georgian politicians for their unbalanced
character. We can only guess how much damages they have actually
sustained as a result of the loss of the 80% of the sales market
of Georgia's key export item. Tough and effective control over
information and statistics can also be described as Saakashvili's
achievement. As you may know, for quite a long time already Georgia
has failed to provide its economic and financial statistics to the
CIS Statistical Committee. We think one can easily understand the
logic of this decision.
Some unpopular methods, like pressure on media, opposition, public
and business sectors, are presented by Saakashvili as part of his
policy to consolidate the potential of the Georgian nation for
preserving the Georgian statehood (a policy proclaimed after the
overthrow of Shevardnadze). Today, many in Georgia are beginning to
doubt that Saakashvili's rule is democratic. In order to prevent this
doubt, the Georgian authorities feed their people with fantastically
exaggerated populism. On the other hand, it is clear that the very
hard tasks Saakashvili has to tackle and the very little time he has
for tackling them are pushing him to risk. Regimes born by revolution
cannot be matricides. That's why they inevitably seek revolutionary
breakthroughs. Once risking themselves, those born by revolution
ignore those who are reluctant to risk - or are reluctant to share.
As a result, we can see rows of Georgian oppositionists going
to London and meeting with the international tandem of oligarchs
Patarkatsishvili-Berezovsky.
We should remind you that Badri Patarkatsishvili, who is also the
President of the Federation of Businessmen of Georgia, has joined his
crony Boris Berezovsky in London. Before that, he appeared in Tbilisi
with a whole number of charges against the Georgian authorities. He
said that they censored his "Imedi" TV channel and extorted money
from his business for their various funds. As of now, the Georgian
oligarch has managed to bring "under censorship" Rupert Murdoch's
media conglomerate, News Corporation, who is reported to have bought
a big share in "Imedi."
So, the Georgian opposition is seeking support in London. This reality
has been directly or indirectly confirmed by oppositionists themselves
- the leader of the New Rights party David Gamkrelidze, the leader of
the Republican Party David Usupashvili and others - and has obviously
worried the pro-governmental camp. At least, one of the leaders of
the ruling United National Movement party, MP Giga Bokeria said that
"...judging from the information received, one can conclude that in
London the oppositionists have discussed two key issues: getting
a financing and, probably, nominating Patarkatsishvili as united
opposition candidate for Tbilisi Mayor."
To all appearances, Saakashvili is no longer going to make advances
to Patarkatsishvili as the latter is beginning to seek a place in
the Georgian political pyramid. Meanwhile, before learning that,
Saakashvili presented Patarkatsishvili's big investment projects,
particularly, projects to restore Georgia's recreation infrastructure,
as a proof of the successful economic policy of "the rose authorities."
With no view to analyze all the possible troubles and scenarios of this
process, we just establish the fact: the Georgian authorities, who
are carrying out a special mission in the region, have got a serious
opponent. The Georgian oppositionists are turning their eyes on London,
while one of the key Georgian mouthpieces, Imedia TV company, has,
in fact, been given to a western corporation.
At any rate, this makes little difference for Russia. We dare say
that Russia has lost: simply, all the niches of the Georgian political
elite - the government, the opposition and, consequently, the public
are all fully oriented towards the West. Of course, certain Georgian
politicians are still on good terms with their Russian colleagues
but in Georgia they are labeled as marginals and this label is quite
effective even if those people appear with ideas that are less marginal
in essence than those offered by the authorities.
Still, it would be a big and quite primitive mistake to say that the
Georgian public is hostile towards Russia and Russians. It would be
much more correct to say that they in Georgia expect nothing good
from Russia. Even more, in fact, it is not quite clear how actually
Russia treats Georgia - and not only Georgia but the whole region.
Russia is showing weakness, and the weak are not only ignored, they
are despised. One proof is the chain of shameful actions in front of
the Russian Embassy in Tbilisi. For a whole week, openly insulting
words and images were projected on the facade of the building. This
could be enough for severing diplomatic relations with Georgia -
especially as the whole blame for crowds of Georgians citizens denied
visas would be on the Georgian authorities. However, the Russian
Foreign Ministry preferred to keep silence.
Let's assume that the trump of the US policy in the South Caucasus is
precise and timely analytical information and well-planned tactics in
achieving well-targeted priorities. In quite a short period, the US has
clearly determined: who is its partner, who will provide it territory
or supply it with resources and who is its enemy. Of course, the US
can also fail, but for the US such failures are just of economic and
tactical nature, while for Russia, they mean instability on its own
southern border - in the region connected to the explosive Northern
Caucasus with hundreds of arteries.
Unlike the US, Russia is trying to balance and wait and is slow
in reacting to challenges and problems. Though trying to build its
policy on market relations only, Russia is still unwilling to give
up its status of leading regional force. Meanwhile, it is clear that
Georgia, Armenia and Azerbaijan are simply unable to develop pure
market relations with Russia - relations based on European standards
and, most importantly, tariffs. Thus, once subsidized, those countries
are now simply forced to look for other subsidizers. The Americans
are always there to be ones, but everybody knows that once they have
filled this niche they are very much reluctant to leave it.
Russia's position on Georgia and its smoldering conflicts is quite
contradictory. By unreservedly recognizing the territorial integrity
of Georgia in its long-inexistent borders, which can be restored
only through bloodshed, Moscow is putting itself in an ambiguous
situation. The political and expert communities realize that Russia
has a decisive say in the matter, but nobody can be sure - at least,
neither its enemies nor friends in the South Caucasus - what exactly
Russia will decide and what it has already decided on. And if the
uncertainty of the enemies is good for Russia, the uncertainty of
the friends is hardly so.
Obviously, the next step of Georgia after Ajaria and Kodori will be
the use of the Georgian enclaves in South Ossetia and Gali region
in Abkhazia. Russia's war with Georgia can spur a chain of extremely
unpleasant processes all over the Caucasus. Have the Russian analysts
weighed all "pros" and "contras"? Judging from what we see now, they
can hardly answer this question. The lingering uncertainly on this
flank is losing Russia its key strings in the region. It is time for
Moscow to determine and openly proclaim its priorities or, simply,
to admit that the problems of the regions are a puzzle it cannot
solve on its own and, if so, to ask Georgia to help it solve their
mutual problems. It must no longer pretend that existing problems are
inexistent. It must no longer comfort itself that losing influence
in the South Caucasus does not yet mean losing positions. In fact,
it must understand that once beginning to retreat in the region,
it will not be able to stop, at least, on its own will.
One proof is Russia's full setback from active mediation in the
Nagorno-Karabakh peace process. The last two years' talks have shown
that dominating in the process is the US, and, if they in Russia
don't see that (because they refuse to see), everybody in the South
Caucasus does.
In conclusion, we should admit that Russia will never be able to fence
itself off the South Caucasus by just showing a pragmatic economic
policy. This tactics will result in growing political influence
by third forces and serious problems. The time trouble the Georgian
authorities have put themselves in is equally pressing for Russia. The
clock hands are running equally quickly for both.
Viktor Yakubyan - expert on the South Caucasus
Regnum, Russia
Aug. 29, 2006
The three years of Mikheil Saakashvili's presidency have brought
about significant changes not only in Georgia itself but in the whole
South Caucasus. We will hardly exaggerate if we say that any change
in the South Caucasus directly or indirectly affects the fates of
the nations of the Big Caucasus. Consequently, directly or indirectly
affected are also the positions and interests of Russia as the fourth
Caucasian state along with Georgia, Azerbaijan and Armenia.
Georgia is showing steadily growing regional activity and increasingly
open ambition to get involved in important international processes
and initiatives. The advent of Saakashvili and his team into power has
caused an obvious upsurge in Georgia's foreign political activity and
has posed a whole number of questions to Russia. The nature of those
questions and the lack of adequate answers to them is turning them
into a kind of challenges. We should admit that Russian politicians
and analysts have proved unprepared for responding to such challenges.
Despite the vexed comments from Moscow regarding certain Georgian
politicians and the ways they carry out their policies, the results
of the Saakashvili government's work are evident. At least, they are
enough for being enumerated:
1. Tbilisi has gained unconditional control over Ajaria and is
carrying out big investment projects in Batumi and other regions of
that autonomy. Foreign capital is actively involved therein. Quite
active in Ajaria are Kazakh companies and banks. This is due mostly
to Georgia's plans to increase the Kazakh gas transit via the region.
The only country Tbilisi reckons and will reckon with on Ajaria is
Turkey. The period of Russian sway that started in Batumi in 1878
is over.
2. Pressed by the international community, Georgia has got Russia to
withdraw its military bases from its territory. Now Russia is actively
withdrawing its arms, ammunition and personnel from two strategic
regional-level points: Batumi (a big Black Sea port, an object of
close interest for Turkey) and Akhalkalaki (junction of the state
frontiers of Armenia, Azerbaijan and Turkey). Along with Armenian
Gyumri, Akhalkalaki is the "key" to the South Caucasus, and it is
via this region exactly that Georgia is laying the Kars-Tbilisi-Baku
railroad. This project is meant to cut off Russia and its regional
partner, Armenia, from the Central Asia-Asia Minor cargo flow and it
would be impossible were the Russian military bases on the way. Here,
Georgia has solved not only the problem of Russia's military presence
in its territory but, much more importantly, the problem related to
Moscow's regional military-strategic positions.
3. Under Saakashvili's rule Georgia has managed to go back into
the orbit of the international financial process. Under Eduard
Shevardnadze, Georgia went through a series of defaults and was,
in fact, struck off the IMF and WB trust list. Presently, both
organizations have resumed their basic credit and humanitarian projects
in the country.
4. Georgia has significantly increased and improved its
military-technical potential. Irrespective of who has supplied the
arms (Turkey, the Czech republic, Bulgaria, Ukraine or the US), who
has instructed the personnel (Turkey, France or the US) and what this
potential is actually for - it exists, has been built without Russia
and is aimed against regions with compact Russian communities - the
regions Russia takes care of. The military budget Georgia can afford
is steadily growing. Today, the Georgian army is a real force of a
regional scale, who can do whatever its leaders will tell it to. The
military and police salaries have substantially grown. The reserve
system is being successfully developed.
5. By systematically raising the tensions in the Georgian-Ossetian
conflict zone, the Georgian authorities have increased the outflow
of Ossetians from the region, have significantly improved their
military positions in the conflict zone and political positions on
the international arena. As a result, now the world community is
considering the efficiency of the Russian peacekeeping mission rather
than the prospects of the independence or, at least, the safety of
people in South Ossetia. That was a hard job to do for Georgia as even
its western partners realize that, before annexing South Ossetia,
Georgia will carry out a mass ethnic cleansing and will expel the
majority of Ossetians from the territory of that unrecognized republic.
6. Tbilisi has effected quite an unexpected operation in Kodori
Gorge. A region that was de jure recognized by everybody as an
Abkhazian territory and was de facto never controlled by either
Tbilisi or Sokhumi has now gone under the full control of Georgia.
Even more, for the first time since the end of the Abkhazian war, the
so-called "Abkhazian government in exile" can be actually called so.
Of course, this is a trick, a sharp practice with terms and that
government governs only the ground under its own feet... However,
we should remind you once again that those feet have stepped on the
ground everybody recognizes as Abkhazia. And so, the size of the shoes
of "the exiled governors" - whose very existence was already something
forgotten - does not matter much now. What actually matters is that,
yesterday, there was no such government for anybody except Tbilisi,
while today, it is a factor in a local game - a small but real
factor. Russia was just a looker-on throughout the Kodori operation,
and Georgia reacted immediately: after the end of the operation,
it insisted that Russia be excluded from the group who will shortly
monitor the region. Besides liquidating the relatively unreliable
Svan factor, Georgia has attained one more, even bigger goal: having
gained control over the upper part of Kodori Gorge, Georgia has, in
fact, got an "overhanging" position over Abkhazia and a springboard
for future attack on Gali - quite a practicable scenario given the
prevalence of Georgians in that region.
7. The effective use of available resources and favorable geographical
situation has allowed Georgia to fully neutralize the internal
potential of the Armenian population of Samtskhe-Javakheti region. The
withdrawal of a Russian base from the regional center Akhalkalaki
and Armenia's total passivity were decisive in the matter. Yerevan's
neutrality was due to Mikheil Saakashvili's efforts, particularly,
his meetings with Armenian President Robert Kocharyan. The period
of Russian influence and the Russian orientation of the local
mostly-Armenian population that started in Akhalkalaki in 1829 is over.
8. The Georgian authorities have managed to stabilize the energy
situation in the country. They undertook just one simple and absolutely
productive step: they accepted the requirements of RAO UES. What has
Russia gained from achieving "commanding heights" in Georgia's energy
sector? Russian companies have been given management over Georgia's
power generating and distributing facilities, which has obliged them to
keep this strategic sector in a proper state. And their achievements,
after years of devastation, have all been ascribed to the Saakashvili
government. Now, electricity supplies are regular, and each Georgian
knows that this is due to his president.
In this light, we would like to note that all of Russia's efforts to
gain control over Georgia's gas transit infrastructure, particularly,
the Soviet-time Russia-Georgia-Armenia gas pipeline, are coming across
the fierce resistance of Georgia and the US (!).
9. Georgia is becoming a foothold for the US in the South Caucasus,
while the Georgian President openly says that he is the mouthpiece
of US policies in the region.
We could easily continue the list if we'd like to.
However, there are errors, too, and we should point them out lest
they in Georgia might think that everything is cloudless in their
country. Of course, the key problems of Georgia are the conflicts in
South Ossetia and Abkhazia, especially the moods of the authorities
and people of those republics. Georgia is facing serious problems
with Ukraine. The new political format in that country has made
things much more difficult for Saakashvili, who now risks to lose a
key anti-Russian partner. The US will not support Georgia as actively
should Ukraine opt for a policy meeting its national interests. For
the US, Georgia is, first of all, a link (a transit unit). Ukraine's
withdrawal from the "sanitary," i.e. anti-Russian, belt will strongly
limit Georgia's operational and political positions. No coincidence
that right after Viktor Yanukovich's comeback as Ukrainian Prime
Minister, Georgian Foreign Minister Salome Zourabichvili said: "The
example of Ukraine has shown that one should not form a coalition
with an inexperienced partner. The Ukrainian President will now find
it hard to bring his country back onto its former path."
Nevertheless, it seems that, when visiting the US before the G8 Summit
in St. Petersburg, Saakashvili managed to prolong the benevolence
of Georgia Bush, especially as the US President owes Georgia the
disclosed "attempt" on his life. Exactly after that visit Georgia
made a demarche against Russia's admission into WTO and carried out
an operation in Kodori Gorge.
Some of the problems have been caused by impulsive and unreasoned
actions and statements by Saakashvili and his men. One such problem
is the time trouble in decision-making on South Ossetia caused by the
statement of Defense Minister Irakly Okruashvili that he is going to
celebrate the year 2007 in Tskhinvali.
The much too aggressive rhetoric towards Moscow has also had a
reverse effect. Extremely indecisive until recently, the Russian
Foreign Ministry has appeared with a number of harsh statements. The
growing harshness of the Russian-Georgian polemic has left no room
for spontaneous concessions or good will gestures.
Tens of thousands of people once making wines and mineral waters
can also be "grateful" to Georgian politicians for their unbalanced
character. We can only guess how much damages they have actually
sustained as a result of the loss of the 80% of the sales market
of Georgia's key export item. Tough and effective control over
information and statistics can also be described as Saakashvili's
achievement. As you may know, for quite a long time already Georgia
has failed to provide its economic and financial statistics to the
CIS Statistical Committee. We think one can easily understand the
logic of this decision.
Some unpopular methods, like pressure on media, opposition, public
and business sectors, are presented by Saakashvili as part of his
policy to consolidate the potential of the Georgian nation for
preserving the Georgian statehood (a policy proclaimed after the
overthrow of Shevardnadze). Today, many in Georgia are beginning to
doubt that Saakashvili's rule is democratic. In order to prevent this
doubt, the Georgian authorities feed their people with fantastically
exaggerated populism. On the other hand, it is clear that the very
hard tasks Saakashvili has to tackle and the very little time he has
for tackling them are pushing him to risk. Regimes born by revolution
cannot be matricides. That's why they inevitably seek revolutionary
breakthroughs. Once risking themselves, those born by revolution
ignore those who are reluctant to risk - or are reluctant to share.
As a result, we can see rows of Georgian oppositionists going
to London and meeting with the international tandem of oligarchs
Patarkatsishvili-Berezovsky.
We should remind you that Badri Patarkatsishvili, who is also the
President of the Federation of Businessmen of Georgia, has joined his
crony Boris Berezovsky in London. Before that, he appeared in Tbilisi
with a whole number of charges against the Georgian authorities. He
said that they censored his "Imedi" TV channel and extorted money
from his business for their various funds. As of now, the Georgian
oligarch has managed to bring "under censorship" Rupert Murdoch's
media conglomerate, News Corporation, who is reported to have bought
a big share in "Imedi."
So, the Georgian opposition is seeking support in London. This reality
has been directly or indirectly confirmed by oppositionists themselves
- the leader of the New Rights party David Gamkrelidze, the leader of
the Republican Party David Usupashvili and others - and has obviously
worried the pro-governmental camp. At least, one of the leaders of
the ruling United National Movement party, MP Giga Bokeria said that
"...judging from the information received, one can conclude that in
London the oppositionists have discussed two key issues: getting
a financing and, probably, nominating Patarkatsishvili as united
opposition candidate for Tbilisi Mayor."
To all appearances, Saakashvili is no longer going to make advances
to Patarkatsishvili as the latter is beginning to seek a place in
the Georgian political pyramid. Meanwhile, before learning that,
Saakashvili presented Patarkatsishvili's big investment projects,
particularly, projects to restore Georgia's recreation infrastructure,
as a proof of the successful economic policy of "the rose authorities."
With no view to analyze all the possible troubles and scenarios of this
process, we just establish the fact: the Georgian authorities, who
are carrying out a special mission in the region, have got a serious
opponent. The Georgian oppositionists are turning their eyes on London,
while one of the key Georgian mouthpieces, Imedia TV company, has,
in fact, been given to a western corporation.
At any rate, this makes little difference for Russia. We dare say
that Russia has lost: simply, all the niches of the Georgian political
elite - the government, the opposition and, consequently, the public
are all fully oriented towards the West. Of course, certain Georgian
politicians are still on good terms with their Russian colleagues
but in Georgia they are labeled as marginals and this label is quite
effective even if those people appear with ideas that are less marginal
in essence than those offered by the authorities.
Still, it would be a big and quite primitive mistake to say that the
Georgian public is hostile towards Russia and Russians. It would be
much more correct to say that they in Georgia expect nothing good
from Russia. Even more, in fact, it is not quite clear how actually
Russia treats Georgia - and not only Georgia but the whole region.
Russia is showing weakness, and the weak are not only ignored, they
are despised. One proof is the chain of shameful actions in front of
the Russian Embassy in Tbilisi. For a whole week, openly insulting
words and images were projected on the facade of the building. This
could be enough for severing diplomatic relations with Georgia -
especially as the whole blame for crowds of Georgians citizens denied
visas would be on the Georgian authorities. However, the Russian
Foreign Ministry preferred to keep silence.
Let's assume that the trump of the US policy in the South Caucasus is
precise and timely analytical information and well-planned tactics in
achieving well-targeted priorities. In quite a short period, the US has
clearly determined: who is its partner, who will provide it territory
or supply it with resources and who is its enemy. Of course, the US
can also fail, but for the US such failures are just of economic and
tactical nature, while for Russia, they mean instability on its own
southern border - in the region connected to the explosive Northern
Caucasus with hundreds of arteries.
Unlike the US, Russia is trying to balance and wait and is slow
in reacting to challenges and problems. Though trying to build its
policy on market relations only, Russia is still unwilling to give
up its status of leading regional force. Meanwhile, it is clear that
Georgia, Armenia and Azerbaijan are simply unable to develop pure
market relations with Russia - relations based on European standards
and, most importantly, tariffs. Thus, once subsidized, those countries
are now simply forced to look for other subsidizers. The Americans
are always there to be ones, but everybody knows that once they have
filled this niche they are very much reluctant to leave it.
Russia's position on Georgia and its smoldering conflicts is quite
contradictory. By unreservedly recognizing the territorial integrity
of Georgia in its long-inexistent borders, which can be restored
only through bloodshed, Moscow is putting itself in an ambiguous
situation. The political and expert communities realize that Russia
has a decisive say in the matter, but nobody can be sure - at least,
neither its enemies nor friends in the South Caucasus - what exactly
Russia will decide and what it has already decided on. And if the
uncertainty of the enemies is good for Russia, the uncertainty of
the friends is hardly so.
Obviously, the next step of Georgia after Ajaria and Kodori will be
the use of the Georgian enclaves in South Ossetia and Gali region
in Abkhazia. Russia's war with Georgia can spur a chain of extremely
unpleasant processes all over the Caucasus. Have the Russian analysts
weighed all "pros" and "contras"? Judging from what we see now, they
can hardly answer this question. The lingering uncertainly on this
flank is losing Russia its key strings in the region. It is time for
Moscow to determine and openly proclaim its priorities or, simply,
to admit that the problems of the regions are a puzzle it cannot
solve on its own and, if so, to ask Georgia to help it solve their
mutual problems. It must no longer pretend that existing problems are
inexistent. It must no longer comfort itself that losing influence
in the South Caucasus does not yet mean losing positions. In fact,
it must understand that once beginning to retreat in the region,
it will not be able to stop, at least, on its own will.
One proof is Russia's full setback from active mediation in the
Nagorno-Karabakh peace process. The last two years' talks have shown
that dominating in the process is the US, and, if they in Russia
don't see that (because they refuse to see), everybody in the South
Caucasus does.
In conclusion, we should admit that Russia will never be able to fence
itself off the South Caucasus by just showing a pragmatic economic
policy. This tactics will result in growing political influence
by third forces and serious problems. The time trouble the Georgian
authorities have put themselves in is equally pressing for Russia. The
clock hands are running equally quickly for both.