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Iran Started a Clandestine War in the Caucasus and Central Asia
13.02.2006
Ulugbek Djuraev, AIA Central-Asian section
Iranian Minister of Intelligence and Security Gholam-Hossein
Mohseni-Ejeie During the last two months, Tehran's secret services
have boosted their work in the countries of the Southern Caucasus
and Central Asia, AIA high-ranking source in the Ministry of Foreign
Affairs in one of the Central-Asian countries inform. According
to him, relevant data is received "through the internal channels
of counterintelligence, and to some extent from our diplomatic
missions in a number of neighboring countries of Central Asia and the
Southern Caucasus". In this context, security servicemen even held a
"prophylactic conversation" last week with the employees of the MFA
central apparatus. The diplomats were notified about the rise in
activity of Iranian secret services. As a consequence, a new, more
severe regime of control and report about any contacts between the
MFA employees and the official or private representatives of Iran
was tacitly introduced.
Methods
According to information that our source has at hand, within the
economic and scientific delegations from Iran, lately there are more
and more those having connection to Iranian Ministry of Intelligence
and Security.
Moreover, in January - February this year, secret servicemen working
in the region under the cover of diplomatic and economic missions
boosted their activity as well. Simultaneously, there were cases
when the representatives of Iranian companies showed interest in
strategic and military facilities that have nothing to do with
their professional activity. This phenomenon was registered as an
"occasional" emergence of the Iranians, as a rule equipped by photo
or video cameras, near such facilities (for instance, near the US
military base in Kyrgyzstan), or in their talks with local officials,
representatives of private companies, and journalists.
At the same time, Iranian military intelligence makes efforts to boost
its cooperation with the similar bodies in Armenia and Turkmenistan. As
far as the former is concerned, this task is mainly entrusted to
the military attaché of Islamic Republic in Yerevan, Colonel Bizhan
Hamzeil Hashame. The same mission in Ashkhabad is carried out by the
officers of the Iranian General Staff.
Goals
As one could expect, the regional activity of Tehran's secret services
concerns mainly the South-Caucasian and Central-Asian politics of
the USA.
> > From the point of view of confidential information, Iranian > >
representatives pay most attention to the regional contacts of the
Americans in political and military sphere, in particular - to the
Pentagon, CIA, and NATO officials' visits to the countries of the
region. The Iranians also have a particular interest in all contacts
of the employees of the local US embassies, and in the activity of
US academic circles and humanitarian foundations.
Iranian special services' primary purpose is to collect information
about possible use of the states in the region for military,
intelligence, and propaganda activity of the USA against the
Ayatollahs' regime. In addition, Iranian secret servicemen, same way
as the diplomats, have to work with the local elites, to guarantee
neutrality of the South-Caucasian and Central-Asian governments in
case of an operation against Iran. In a number of states, and in
particular in Azerbaijan and Armenia, special attention is paid to
work with journalists.
Central Asian Back Land
A lot of tendencies in South-Caucasian and Central-Asian politics serve
Tehran's interests. First of all, it is Armenia's and Georgia's growing
aspiration to end their dependence on the Russian energy supplies,
as well as weakening of the Western influence in Uzbekistan and
Kyrgyzstan in course of the last two years. Moreover, Tehran widely
exploits regional elites' concerns that destabilization in Iran might
negatively impact on the economic and political situation in their own
countries (either as a result of joint economic projects' dismantling
(in particular in energy and transit trade sphere), or as a result
of the regional ethno-political map's recast).
Regardless of positive aspects in the regional situation (from Iran's
point of view), Tehran shows concern as to a possible American economic
and political pressure upon the South-Caucasian and Central-Asian
republics. Nor lesser concern of the Iranians is caused by a
situation when it is enough for the Americans or the Israelis to
"play" on personal economic interests of certain rulers and their
entourage, in order to change the geopolitical priorities of the
whole states. Iranian leadership, for example, views Turkmenistan as
an important strategic partner in Central Asia. However, the Iranians
show concern about the influence that the Israeli businessman Yosef
Maiman (head of Merhav company, and former Mossad officer) has on the
President Niyazov. Tehran representatives are sure that this influence
is based mainly upon extremely rich gifts and profitable commercial
services that the Israeli businessman renders to the President himself,
and to his confidants.
Situation in almost all the other Central-Asian countries does not
cause any Iranian concern. According to the Iranians, Kazakhstan
and Uzbekistan are too much tied to Russia and China, economically
and politically, to cooperate with the USA. Even is Astana, in
order not to spoil its relations with Washington, is ready to have
formal contact with Pentagon, Tashkent won't agree to do it after
the American-Uzbek confrontation that followed the Andijan events in
May 2005. Neighbouring Tajikistan, though taking advantage of the US
generous economic aide (in 2005, it totalled in about $60 million),
won't support the Americans in case of any operation against the
Ayatollahs, because of its traditionally close ties with Iran. This was
vividly demonstrated during the last visit of the President Rahmonov
to Tehran that took place in January, in the midst of confrontation
between Iran and the West. While his Afghani colleague cancelled his
visit to
Emomali Rahmonov meeting with Mahmoud Ahmadinejad
Tehran, the Tajik President made it clear to everyone that he is not
going to give up strategic partnership with the Ayatollahs.
However, while Dushanbe's loyalty is not questioned by Tehran, the
situation with Kyrgyzstan hides a potential threat to Iran. The
President Bakiev, who came into power last year as a result of
an overturn, initially quite rapidly endeared the Iranians. His
announcements as to the necessity of the American military base
withdrawal from the Kyrgyz territory served as a pretext to such
positive attitude. However, as soon as Washington showed readiness
to agree additional financial aide to Bishkek ($200 million), the
Kyrgyz leader momentarily satisfied all the American wishes. Thus,
it was not incidentally that Tehran paid special attention to the
fact that in the budgetary project for the new financial year the
White House reduced financial aide to all the CIS countries, except
for Kyrgyzstan and Ukraine.
The Iranians fear that these and if needed - additional means will
allow Pentagon to use its Kyrgyz base not only in the Afghan campaign,
but also to carry out operations against the Islamic Republic. Tehran,
in its turn, tries to hold its own bargain with Bishkek. As was
announced two months ago by the new Iranian Ambassador in Kyrgyzstan,
in addition to the loan that was agreed in autumn 2004 (50 million
euro), his government is ready to agree this republic 200 million
euro more, on the most advantageous terms.
The Caucasian Front
In the context of a potential Iran-American conflict, the Southern
Caucasus represents a considerably bigger danger to the Islamic
Republic, rather than the countries located to the east of the Caspian
Sea. Out of five Central-Asian republics only Turkmenistan borders
Iran, while in the Caucasus it has common border with two of the
three states of the region - Azerbaijan (611 km. long) and Armenia
(35 km). Moreover, northern Iran and neighboring Azerbaijan form a
unique ethno-cultural space - a historical living area of Azerbaijan
ethnos (30 million of its adherents live in Iran and 8 million in
Azerbaijan). Since the beginning of the 1990s, Baku openly - and from
the middle of the last decade - secretly, has patronized activists of
the separatist movement of the Iranian Azerbaijanis. A common border
connecting these two states, residents of one nation settled from both
sides, and also the traditional friction between Baku and Tehran,
have created favorable conditions for using the "Azerbaijani card"
for destabilization in Iran.
As it is known, this month Condoleezza Rice asked the consent of
Congress for allocation of an additional $75 million for subversive
actions in the Islamic Republic. In this connection, the White
House and Langley see a special value in the ethnic factor (Persians
hardly make up more than half of the Iranian population). However,
plans for provocation of interethnic tension in the Islamic Republic,
with a view toward a possible overthrow of the Ayatollahs' regime,
can be realized only with the revival of Azerbaijani separatism,
as its potential supporters form the largest ethnic minority in Iran.
The threat from the northwest in many respects is caused by the fact
that the USA has much more influence in the Southern Caucasus than
in Central Asia.
Georgia, ruled by a graduate of Colombia University in New York,
Mikhail Saakashvili, serves as the main American bridgehead in the
region. In its foreign policy as a whole, and in particular concerning
Tehran, Tbilisi is guided exclusively by Washington. The events of the
end of the previous and beginning of the current month bear eloquent
testimony to that. Despite his aspiration to end power dependence
on Russia, under American pressure Saakashvili refused the import of
Iranian gas. Currently the Pentagon considers the Georgian territory
the most suitable bridgehead for US Air Force operations in case of
military conflict with Iran.
Owing to the extreme strain in relations with Moscow, and the refusal
of cooperation with Tehran, Tbilisi has almost deprived itself of an
opportunity to reject Washington's claims on the usage of Georgian
airfields. In fact, today America is the main and almost the only
patron of Georgia on the issue of integration into international
economic institutions, cooperation with NATO and the EU, and also in
solving the South Ossetian and Abkhazian conflicts. This month, the
ambassador of the Islamic Republic in Tbilisi, Hossein Aminian Toosi,
expressed confidence that "the Georgian government will not agree to
the use of its territory in military actions against Iran". However,
in the present situation, such a statement is just another testimony
to the true fears of Tehran.
As for Azerbaijan, the situation is not so unequivocal, as in the
Georgian case. However, it does not relieve Baku of Tehran's suspicions
about possible cooperation with Washington. Ilham Aliyev from first
day of his rule was compelled to maneuver between two geopolitical
blocs competing for influence in the Southern Caucasus. On the
one hand, Azerbaijan is clamped from the south and the north by
the large regional powers - Iran and Russia. Both neighbors have
many opportunities to destabilize the situation in the republic, in
particular, using the separatist moods of the Lezghins in the north
(Moscow), and the Talish minority, and also the pro-Iranian Islamic
elements in the south (Tehran). These threats force Baku to reckon
constantly with the wishes of the Kremlin and the Ayatollahs. On
the other hand, commercial interests of the Azerbaijan ruling elite
are closely connected to the western, in particular American, oil
companies, and that, in its turn, provides the USA with rather weighty
influence in this republic. Besides, though the White House is not
interested in destabilization in Azerbaijan, (this was especially
evidenced by the American reaction to the November elections to
the local parliament), at any moment it can change its position. If
Aliyev-junior appears too intractable, or is going to refuse flatly to
cooperate with the Pentagon on the Iranian direction, Washington would
have an opportunity to support actively the Azerbaijan pro-Western
opposition, using a technique already tried in the other CIS countries.
The fact that Aliyev really understands the threats from his closest
neighbors and transatlantic partners is confirmed by the events
of this month. On the one hand, the key figures in the Azerbaijan
Government declare over and over again that the republic's territory
"cannot be used for a hypothetical US attack on Iran" (the Head of
Defense Ministry Safar Abiyev) and that "this question is not on
the agenda and cannot be on it" (the Head of the Ministry of Foreign
Affairs, Elmar Mamedyarov). On the other hand, Aliyev gave his final
consent to placing in Azerbaijan of the two American radar stations,
one of which will be directed toward Iran. The same month, the
Iranian Ambassador in Baku, Afshar Soleymani, declared that Tehran
"completely trusts the Azerbaijan leadership's assurances on the
impossibility of using the territory of the republic for military
actions against Iran". However, if such confidence were absolute,
there would be no reason to speak of it publicly.
Armenia is considered the only strategic partner of the Islamic
Republic in the Southern Caucasus. The Iran-Armenian partnership is
stipulated by the confrontation of Yerevan with Baku and Ankara,
and also by permanent tension between Teheran and Baku. The value
of connections with Iran is dictated for Armenia, first of all,
by the prospect of ending up with dependence upon power supply from
Russia through the Georgian territory. Now this task is one of the
prioritized, from the point of view of Yerevan, against the background
of diversion in January of the North-Caucasian gas pipe, and the
forthcoming increase in prices of Russian gas in April. Besides, a
strategic partnership with Iran appreciably strengthens the position
of Armenia in the Karabakh conflict.
In the regional strategy of Teheran, the importance of connections
with Yerevan is stipulated by interaction in the field of security. It
especially concerns the efforts of the Ayatollahs' regime to prevent
spreading of American military-political influence in the Southern
Caucasus.
In this context, the main support for the Islamic Republic from the
Armenian side is provided by the representatives of the military
command. They see in the Iranians a valuable ally in case of renewal
of military actions against Azerbaijan (if negotiating process
will finally fail). However, the political leadership of Armenia
prefers to limit relations with Iran to questions of power and trade
cooperation. Official Yerevan does not wish at all to look like an
ally of Tehran, against the background of growing criticism over the
Iranian nuclear program from the side of the USA and the EU.
Crisis in relations with Russia also compels Armenia to distance
itself from excessively close partnership with the Islamic
republic. Firstly, in its rapprochement with Ankara in 2004-2005,
Moscow did not even try to take care of the interests of its only
South-Caucasian ally. Secondly, despite the harshest consequences for
the Armenian economy, Russia unequivocally decided to raise prices
for gas exported to this republic starting in April of this year. The
Armenians are especially angered with one irritating circumstance,
that soon they will have to pay for Russian gas exactly as much as
Ukraine and Moldova, which have pro-Western orientation and undermine
positions of the Kremlin on the post-Soviet space. Thus, the actions
of Moscow force Yerevan to search for new foreign policy partners.
It would seem that a natural choice in such a situation should become
even greater strengthening of partner relations with Iran. However,
many representatives of the Armenian establishment are afraid that
in that case, Yerevan risks remaining with nothing. If the military
conflict between the USA and Islamic Republic would take place, and
Armenia won't turn away from its southern neighbor, and as a result
will suffer twice. On the one hand, its relations with the West will
worsen, and, on the other, all the joint Armenian-Iranian projects
will be cut short, harming first of all Armenian plans on acquiring
energy independence from the Russian sources.
Against this background, Tehran's fears that the United States will
take advantage of this situation are quite reasonable. Guaranteeing
the Armenians economic assistance and support in the Karabakh question,
the Americans can try to draw them to their side before the beginning
of the Iranian campaign.
The fears of Teheran are supported by data on the activity during
the last months of some influential representatives of the Armenian
Diaspora in the USA, supporting Yerevan's reorientation on Washington.
Priorities of Iranian Intelligence
An analysis of the situation in Central Asia and the Southern Caucasus,
in view of potential threats to the national security of the Islamic
Republic, allows determining key directions of regional activity of
the Iranian secret services.
They have two main tasks in Central Asia. The first consists
of neutralizing American - Israeli influence on the leadership
of Turkmenistan. An important role in reaching this goal may be
played by the creation of optimum conditions for strengthening the
Iranian-Turkmen economic cooperation, following the personal interests
of the highest leaders of this republic.
The second task consists of gathering information on military-political
contacts of Kyrgyzstan with the USA, and also data on any changes in
staff and technical activity at the American base in this republic. It
is possible, that in the case of a conflict, a complex of preventive
measures directed toward the breakdown of activity of this base will
be prepared.
Activity of the Iranian special services in the Southern Caucasus
represents a greater value for the Islamic Republic's security
than their actions in Central Asia. Most likely, for work in this
direction the greatest means are to be allocated and the best staff
of the Iranian special services is to be used.
Besides, they have much stronger positions in the southern Caucasus
than in Central Asia. It is stipulated by several factors. A large
community of Iranian political emigrants are living in Azerbaijan
(by various estimates, about 200 - 300 thousand) and many Iranian
students are studying in the local high schools (last year their
number exceeded 200). The Iranian secret services actively use both
for their own ends. Besides, on the territory of Azerbaijan, Tehran
oriented Islamic radical elements operate.
In neighboring Georgia, intelligence structures of the Islamic Republic
also get the assistance of some representatives of the local Muslim
community (its number reaches about one million, and almost half
of them are ethnic Azerbaijanis). In parallel, representatives of
the Iranian secret services closely cooperate with their Armenian
colleagues, primarily in the Azerbaijani direction. Thus, today in the
South - Caucasian region, rather favorable conditions for performance
of the tasks, which stand before the intelligence community of Tehran,
are created.
In Georgia the main task of the Iranian special services consists of
tracking the activity of the Pentagon and the course of the work on
restoration of the airfields built during the Soviet period, which are
suitable for military purposes. In this connection, the carrying out
of sabotage actions directed to the disruption of repairs is possible.
In Azerbaijan, the main task of the Iranian special services consists
of prevention, by all means, of using territory of the republic in
military actions against Iran. Various measures in this case can be
undertaken: from influencing public opinion through mass media, up
to diversions and acts of terrorism against American and governmental
facilities, and also attempts to destabilize the republic with the help
of radical Islamic elements and the Talish national minority. It all
depends on the degree of probability of an American - Iranian military
confrontation, and the readiness of the Azerbaijan authorities to
assist the United States. In any case, the confidential services of
Teheran will pay greater attention to the Iranian political emigrants
who live in Azerbaijan, their contacts with fellow tribesmen in
the native land, and also with the representatives of American and
Azerbaijani intelligence.
In Armenia the main task of the Iranian special services consists in
preventing in every possible way the reorientation of the republic
to the West. This can be promoted by activating contacts with
the local mass media and politicians, and also by strengthening
the pro-Iranian lobby in the business and military circles of the
republic. In parallel, the secret services of Tehran should trace
the activity and visits to the republic of representatives of the
Armenian Diaspora from the USA and the countries of Western Europe.
The Regional War of Special Services
Activating of the Iranian secret services might very well provoke
a similar response on behalf of the USA, and, as a consequence,
of traditional contenders for influence in the region - Russia and
Turkey, and also of China in Central Asia. Inveterate territorial
disputes between the republics, which have arisen from the ashes
of the former USSR, and also numerous interethnic and religious
contradictions are a fertile field for a war among the intelligence
services in the Southern Caucasus and in Central Asia. As a result,
a new spark of secret confrontation between the leading participants
of the "Great Game" will inevitably cause even greater aggravation of
an already tense situation in the region. It is quite possible that
the whole chain of the allegedly non-connected dramatic events of
the last weeks (as, for example explosions on the Russian - Georgian
gas pipeline or interethnic collisions in Northern Kyrgyzstan),
is actually a result of an already unraveled clandestine war.
--Boundary_(ID_48QbL27F0zaXdG5a0KyjLA)--
13.02.2006
Ulugbek Djuraev, AIA Central-Asian section
Iranian Minister of Intelligence and Security Gholam-Hossein
Mohseni-Ejeie During the last two months, Tehran's secret services
have boosted their work in the countries of the Southern Caucasus
and Central Asia, AIA high-ranking source in the Ministry of Foreign
Affairs in one of the Central-Asian countries inform. According
to him, relevant data is received "through the internal channels
of counterintelligence, and to some extent from our diplomatic
missions in a number of neighboring countries of Central Asia and the
Southern Caucasus". In this context, security servicemen even held a
"prophylactic conversation" last week with the employees of the MFA
central apparatus. The diplomats were notified about the rise in
activity of Iranian secret services. As a consequence, a new, more
severe regime of control and report about any contacts between the
MFA employees and the official or private representatives of Iran
was tacitly introduced.
Methods
According to information that our source has at hand, within the
economic and scientific delegations from Iran, lately there are more
and more those having connection to Iranian Ministry of Intelligence
and Security.
Moreover, in January - February this year, secret servicemen working
in the region under the cover of diplomatic and economic missions
boosted their activity as well. Simultaneously, there were cases
when the representatives of Iranian companies showed interest in
strategic and military facilities that have nothing to do with
their professional activity. This phenomenon was registered as an
"occasional" emergence of the Iranians, as a rule equipped by photo
or video cameras, near such facilities (for instance, near the US
military base in Kyrgyzstan), or in their talks with local officials,
representatives of private companies, and journalists.
At the same time, Iranian military intelligence makes efforts to boost
its cooperation with the similar bodies in Armenia and Turkmenistan. As
far as the former is concerned, this task is mainly entrusted to
the military attaché of Islamic Republic in Yerevan, Colonel Bizhan
Hamzeil Hashame. The same mission in Ashkhabad is carried out by the
officers of the Iranian General Staff.
Goals
As one could expect, the regional activity of Tehran's secret services
concerns mainly the South-Caucasian and Central-Asian politics of
the USA.
> > From the point of view of confidential information, Iranian > >
representatives pay most attention to the regional contacts of the
Americans in political and military sphere, in particular - to the
Pentagon, CIA, and NATO officials' visits to the countries of the
region. The Iranians also have a particular interest in all contacts
of the employees of the local US embassies, and in the activity of
US academic circles and humanitarian foundations.
Iranian special services' primary purpose is to collect information
about possible use of the states in the region for military,
intelligence, and propaganda activity of the USA against the
Ayatollahs' regime. In addition, Iranian secret servicemen, same way
as the diplomats, have to work with the local elites, to guarantee
neutrality of the South-Caucasian and Central-Asian governments in
case of an operation against Iran. In a number of states, and in
particular in Azerbaijan and Armenia, special attention is paid to
work with journalists.
Central Asian Back Land
A lot of tendencies in South-Caucasian and Central-Asian politics serve
Tehran's interests. First of all, it is Armenia's and Georgia's growing
aspiration to end their dependence on the Russian energy supplies,
as well as weakening of the Western influence in Uzbekistan and
Kyrgyzstan in course of the last two years. Moreover, Tehran widely
exploits regional elites' concerns that destabilization in Iran might
negatively impact on the economic and political situation in their own
countries (either as a result of joint economic projects' dismantling
(in particular in energy and transit trade sphere), or as a result
of the regional ethno-political map's recast).
Regardless of positive aspects in the regional situation (from Iran's
point of view), Tehran shows concern as to a possible American economic
and political pressure upon the South-Caucasian and Central-Asian
republics. Nor lesser concern of the Iranians is caused by a
situation when it is enough for the Americans or the Israelis to
"play" on personal economic interests of certain rulers and their
entourage, in order to change the geopolitical priorities of the
whole states. Iranian leadership, for example, views Turkmenistan as
an important strategic partner in Central Asia. However, the Iranians
show concern about the influence that the Israeli businessman Yosef
Maiman (head of Merhav company, and former Mossad officer) has on the
President Niyazov. Tehran representatives are sure that this influence
is based mainly upon extremely rich gifts and profitable commercial
services that the Israeli businessman renders to the President himself,
and to his confidants.
Situation in almost all the other Central-Asian countries does not
cause any Iranian concern. According to the Iranians, Kazakhstan
and Uzbekistan are too much tied to Russia and China, economically
and politically, to cooperate with the USA. Even is Astana, in
order not to spoil its relations with Washington, is ready to have
formal contact with Pentagon, Tashkent won't agree to do it after
the American-Uzbek confrontation that followed the Andijan events in
May 2005. Neighbouring Tajikistan, though taking advantage of the US
generous economic aide (in 2005, it totalled in about $60 million),
won't support the Americans in case of any operation against the
Ayatollahs, because of its traditionally close ties with Iran. This was
vividly demonstrated during the last visit of the President Rahmonov
to Tehran that took place in January, in the midst of confrontation
between Iran and the West. While his Afghani colleague cancelled his
visit to
Emomali Rahmonov meeting with Mahmoud Ahmadinejad
Tehran, the Tajik President made it clear to everyone that he is not
going to give up strategic partnership with the Ayatollahs.
However, while Dushanbe's loyalty is not questioned by Tehran, the
situation with Kyrgyzstan hides a potential threat to Iran. The
President Bakiev, who came into power last year as a result of
an overturn, initially quite rapidly endeared the Iranians. His
announcements as to the necessity of the American military base
withdrawal from the Kyrgyz territory served as a pretext to such
positive attitude. However, as soon as Washington showed readiness
to agree additional financial aide to Bishkek ($200 million), the
Kyrgyz leader momentarily satisfied all the American wishes. Thus,
it was not incidentally that Tehran paid special attention to the
fact that in the budgetary project for the new financial year the
White House reduced financial aide to all the CIS countries, except
for Kyrgyzstan and Ukraine.
The Iranians fear that these and if needed - additional means will
allow Pentagon to use its Kyrgyz base not only in the Afghan campaign,
but also to carry out operations against the Islamic Republic. Tehran,
in its turn, tries to hold its own bargain with Bishkek. As was
announced two months ago by the new Iranian Ambassador in Kyrgyzstan,
in addition to the loan that was agreed in autumn 2004 (50 million
euro), his government is ready to agree this republic 200 million
euro more, on the most advantageous terms.
The Caucasian Front
In the context of a potential Iran-American conflict, the Southern
Caucasus represents a considerably bigger danger to the Islamic
Republic, rather than the countries located to the east of the Caspian
Sea. Out of five Central-Asian republics only Turkmenistan borders
Iran, while in the Caucasus it has common border with two of the
three states of the region - Azerbaijan (611 km. long) and Armenia
(35 km). Moreover, northern Iran and neighboring Azerbaijan form a
unique ethno-cultural space - a historical living area of Azerbaijan
ethnos (30 million of its adherents live in Iran and 8 million in
Azerbaijan). Since the beginning of the 1990s, Baku openly - and from
the middle of the last decade - secretly, has patronized activists of
the separatist movement of the Iranian Azerbaijanis. A common border
connecting these two states, residents of one nation settled from both
sides, and also the traditional friction between Baku and Tehran,
have created favorable conditions for using the "Azerbaijani card"
for destabilization in Iran.
As it is known, this month Condoleezza Rice asked the consent of
Congress for allocation of an additional $75 million for subversive
actions in the Islamic Republic. In this connection, the White
House and Langley see a special value in the ethnic factor (Persians
hardly make up more than half of the Iranian population). However,
plans for provocation of interethnic tension in the Islamic Republic,
with a view toward a possible overthrow of the Ayatollahs' regime,
can be realized only with the revival of Azerbaijani separatism,
as its potential supporters form the largest ethnic minority in Iran.
The threat from the northwest in many respects is caused by the fact
that the USA has much more influence in the Southern Caucasus than
in Central Asia.
Georgia, ruled by a graduate of Colombia University in New York,
Mikhail Saakashvili, serves as the main American bridgehead in the
region. In its foreign policy as a whole, and in particular concerning
Tehran, Tbilisi is guided exclusively by Washington. The events of the
end of the previous and beginning of the current month bear eloquent
testimony to that. Despite his aspiration to end power dependence
on Russia, under American pressure Saakashvili refused the import of
Iranian gas. Currently the Pentagon considers the Georgian territory
the most suitable bridgehead for US Air Force operations in case of
military conflict with Iran.
Owing to the extreme strain in relations with Moscow, and the refusal
of cooperation with Tehran, Tbilisi has almost deprived itself of an
opportunity to reject Washington's claims on the usage of Georgian
airfields. In fact, today America is the main and almost the only
patron of Georgia on the issue of integration into international
economic institutions, cooperation with NATO and the EU, and also in
solving the South Ossetian and Abkhazian conflicts. This month, the
ambassador of the Islamic Republic in Tbilisi, Hossein Aminian Toosi,
expressed confidence that "the Georgian government will not agree to
the use of its territory in military actions against Iran". However,
in the present situation, such a statement is just another testimony
to the true fears of Tehran.
As for Azerbaijan, the situation is not so unequivocal, as in the
Georgian case. However, it does not relieve Baku of Tehran's suspicions
about possible cooperation with Washington. Ilham Aliyev from first
day of his rule was compelled to maneuver between two geopolitical
blocs competing for influence in the Southern Caucasus. On the
one hand, Azerbaijan is clamped from the south and the north by
the large regional powers - Iran and Russia. Both neighbors have
many opportunities to destabilize the situation in the republic, in
particular, using the separatist moods of the Lezghins in the north
(Moscow), and the Talish minority, and also the pro-Iranian Islamic
elements in the south (Tehran). These threats force Baku to reckon
constantly with the wishes of the Kremlin and the Ayatollahs. On
the other hand, commercial interests of the Azerbaijan ruling elite
are closely connected to the western, in particular American, oil
companies, and that, in its turn, provides the USA with rather weighty
influence in this republic. Besides, though the White House is not
interested in destabilization in Azerbaijan, (this was especially
evidenced by the American reaction to the November elections to
the local parliament), at any moment it can change its position. If
Aliyev-junior appears too intractable, or is going to refuse flatly to
cooperate with the Pentagon on the Iranian direction, Washington would
have an opportunity to support actively the Azerbaijan pro-Western
opposition, using a technique already tried in the other CIS countries.
The fact that Aliyev really understands the threats from his closest
neighbors and transatlantic partners is confirmed by the events
of this month. On the one hand, the key figures in the Azerbaijan
Government declare over and over again that the republic's territory
"cannot be used for a hypothetical US attack on Iran" (the Head of
Defense Ministry Safar Abiyev) and that "this question is not on
the agenda and cannot be on it" (the Head of the Ministry of Foreign
Affairs, Elmar Mamedyarov). On the other hand, Aliyev gave his final
consent to placing in Azerbaijan of the two American radar stations,
one of which will be directed toward Iran. The same month, the
Iranian Ambassador in Baku, Afshar Soleymani, declared that Tehran
"completely trusts the Azerbaijan leadership's assurances on the
impossibility of using the territory of the republic for military
actions against Iran". However, if such confidence were absolute,
there would be no reason to speak of it publicly.
Armenia is considered the only strategic partner of the Islamic
Republic in the Southern Caucasus. The Iran-Armenian partnership is
stipulated by the confrontation of Yerevan with Baku and Ankara,
and also by permanent tension between Teheran and Baku. The value
of connections with Iran is dictated for Armenia, first of all,
by the prospect of ending up with dependence upon power supply from
Russia through the Georgian territory. Now this task is one of the
prioritized, from the point of view of Yerevan, against the background
of diversion in January of the North-Caucasian gas pipe, and the
forthcoming increase in prices of Russian gas in April. Besides, a
strategic partnership with Iran appreciably strengthens the position
of Armenia in the Karabakh conflict.
In the regional strategy of Teheran, the importance of connections
with Yerevan is stipulated by interaction in the field of security. It
especially concerns the efforts of the Ayatollahs' regime to prevent
spreading of American military-political influence in the Southern
Caucasus.
In this context, the main support for the Islamic Republic from the
Armenian side is provided by the representatives of the military
command. They see in the Iranians a valuable ally in case of renewal
of military actions against Azerbaijan (if negotiating process
will finally fail). However, the political leadership of Armenia
prefers to limit relations with Iran to questions of power and trade
cooperation. Official Yerevan does not wish at all to look like an
ally of Tehran, against the background of growing criticism over the
Iranian nuclear program from the side of the USA and the EU.
Crisis in relations with Russia also compels Armenia to distance
itself from excessively close partnership with the Islamic
republic. Firstly, in its rapprochement with Ankara in 2004-2005,
Moscow did not even try to take care of the interests of its only
South-Caucasian ally. Secondly, despite the harshest consequences for
the Armenian economy, Russia unequivocally decided to raise prices
for gas exported to this republic starting in April of this year. The
Armenians are especially angered with one irritating circumstance,
that soon they will have to pay for Russian gas exactly as much as
Ukraine and Moldova, which have pro-Western orientation and undermine
positions of the Kremlin on the post-Soviet space. Thus, the actions
of Moscow force Yerevan to search for new foreign policy partners.
It would seem that a natural choice in such a situation should become
even greater strengthening of partner relations with Iran. However,
many representatives of the Armenian establishment are afraid that
in that case, Yerevan risks remaining with nothing. If the military
conflict between the USA and Islamic Republic would take place, and
Armenia won't turn away from its southern neighbor, and as a result
will suffer twice. On the one hand, its relations with the West will
worsen, and, on the other, all the joint Armenian-Iranian projects
will be cut short, harming first of all Armenian plans on acquiring
energy independence from the Russian sources.
Against this background, Tehran's fears that the United States will
take advantage of this situation are quite reasonable. Guaranteeing
the Armenians economic assistance and support in the Karabakh question,
the Americans can try to draw them to their side before the beginning
of the Iranian campaign.
The fears of Teheran are supported by data on the activity during
the last months of some influential representatives of the Armenian
Diaspora in the USA, supporting Yerevan's reorientation on Washington.
Priorities of Iranian Intelligence
An analysis of the situation in Central Asia and the Southern Caucasus,
in view of potential threats to the national security of the Islamic
Republic, allows determining key directions of regional activity of
the Iranian secret services.
They have two main tasks in Central Asia. The first consists
of neutralizing American - Israeli influence on the leadership
of Turkmenistan. An important role in reaching this goal may be
played by the creation of optimum conditions for strengthening the
Iranian-Turkmen economic cooperation, following the personal interests
of the highest leaders of this republic.
The second task consists of gathering information on military-political
contacts of Kyrgyzstan with the USA, and also data on any changes in
staff and technical activity at the American base in this republic. It
is possible, that in the case of a conflict, a complex of preventive
measures directed toward the breakdown of activity of this base will
be prepared.
Activity of the Iranian special services in the Southern Caucasus
represents a greater value for the Islamic Republic's security
than their actions in Central Asia. Most likely, for work in this
direction the greatest means are to be allocated and the best staff
of the Iranian special services is to be used.
Besides, they have much stronger positions in the southern Caucasus
than in Central Asia. It is stipulated by several factors. A large
community of Iranian political emigrants are living in Azerbaijan
(by various estimates, about 200 - 300 thousand) and many Iranian
students are studying in the local high schools (last year their
number exceeded 200). The Iranian secret services actively use both
for their own ends. Besides, on the territory of Azerbaijan, Tehran
oriented Islamic radical elements operate.
In neighboring Georgia, intelligence structures of the Islamic Republic
also get the assistance of some representatives of the local Muslim
community (its number reaches about one million, and almost half
of them are ethnic Azerbaijanis). In parallel, representatives of
the Iranian secret services closely cooperate with their Armenian
colleagues, primarily in the Azerbaijani direction. Thus, today in the
South - Caucasian region, rather favorable conditions for performance
of the tasks, which stand before the intelligence community of Tehran,
are created.
In Georgia the main task of the Iranian special services consists of
tracking the activity of the Pentagon and the course of the work on
restoration of the airfields built during the Soviet period, which are
suitable for military purposes. In this connection, the carrying out
of sabotage actions directed to the disruption of repairs is possible.
In Azerbaijan, the main task of the Iranian special services consists
of prevention, by all means, of using territory of the republic in
military actions against Iran. Various measures in this case can be
undertaken: from influencing public opinion through mass media, up
to diversions and acts of terrorism against American and governmental
facilities, and also attempts to destabilize the republic with the help
of radical Islamic elements and the Talish national minority. It all
depends on the degree of probability of an American - Iranian military
confrontation, and the readiness of the Azerbaijan authorities to
assist the United States. In any case, the confidential services of
Teheran will pay greater attention to the Iranian political emigrants
who live in Azerbaijan, their contacts with fellow tribesmen in
the native land, and also with the representatives of American and
Azerbaijani intelligence.
In Armenia the main task of the Iranian special services consists in
preventing in every possible way the reorientation of the republic
to the West. This can be promoted by activating contacts with
the local mass media and politicians, and also by strengthening
the pro-Iranian lobby in the business and military circles of the
republic. In parallel, the secret services of Tehran should trace
the activity and visits to the republic of representatives of the
Armenian Diaspora from the USA and the countries of Western Europe.
The Regional War of Special Services
Activating of the Iranian secret services might very well provoke
a similar response on behalf of the USA, and, as a consequence,
of traditional contenders for influence in the region - Russia and
Turkey, and also of China in Central Asia. Inveterate territorial
disputes between the republics, which have arisen from the ashes
of the former USSR, and also numerous interethnic and religious
contradictions are a fertile field for a war among the intelligence
services in the Southern Caucasus and in Central Asia. As a result,
a new spark of secret confrontation between the leading participants
of the "Great Game" will inevitably cause even greater aggravation of
an already tense situation in the region. It is quite possible that
the whole chain of the allegedly non-connected dramatic events of
the last weeks (as, for example explosions on the Russian - Georgian
gas pipeline or interethnic collisions in Northern Kyrgyzstan),
is actually a result of an already unraveled clandestine war.
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