Tweet
Eurasia Daily Monitor
Monday, November 20, 2006 -- Volume 3, Issue 215
MOSCOW WELCOMES THREE EMBOLDENED SECESSIONIST LEADERS
by Vladimir Socor
Sergei Bagapsh, Eduard Kokoiti, and Igor Smirnov, Russian-installed
leaders respectively of Abkhazia, South Ossetia, and Transnistria, conferred
with Russian government officials in Moscow on November 16-18, held a joint
news conference, and were featured extensively on Russian state television
channels.
All three made it clear that by seeking the `independence' of their
territories they meant their ultimate affiliation to the Russian Federation
(NTV Mir Television, November 19, as monitored by the BBC, November 20).
In a sign of growing confidence, the trio advertised themselves as
`proud to be citizens of Russia' and made unusually open statements of
loyalty to Russia, partly based on Soviet nostalgia: `Moscow remains our
capital just as it was in Soviet times. For us, this is our capital whether
one likes this fact or not,' Bagapsh declared (Interfax, November 17).
Kokoiti pronounced Georgia guilty of separatism because it withdrew from the
Soviet Union, thus losing any title to territorial integrity, in his view
(Russian Television Channel One, November 16). Smirnov elliptically but
pointedly remarked, `I've been in Russia ever since birth' (Interfax,
November 17) -- a double allusion to his Khabarovsk origins and to the
Tiraspol authorities' view of Transnistria as a part of Greater Russia. This
acknowledgment will undoubtedly embarrass those OSCE officials who still
advocate power-sharing between Chisinau and the Tiraspol leaders supposedly
representing left-bank Moldova, even though most of that group are
non-natives on mission from Russia.
The trio announced their respective preconditions to a resumption of
negotiations with Tbilisi and Chisinau. Thus, Bagapsh ruled out any
negotiations until all Georgian `troops' [by which the Abkhaz mean Georgian
police] and Georgian administration withdraw from the upper Kodori Valley.
Moreover, `Any envoy who goes to upper Kodori will not be received in
Abkhazia, irrespective of the country he represents' -- a warning perhaps
immediately intended for U.S. Deputy Assistant Secretary of State Matt Bryza
who was holding talks in Tbilisi and en route to Sukhumi. The restoration of
Georgian control in upper Kodori `has buried the process of negotiations,'
Bagapsh declared (Interfax, November 16-18), reflecting Sukhumi's greater
intransigence in the wake of the UN Security Council's Western-approved
resolution in October that criticized Georgia's Kodori move (see EDM,
October 17).
Smirnov demanded the signing of an agreement in the 5+2 framework,
recognizing Transnistria's `right' to conduct its own foreign trade as a
precondition to resuming negotiations. This Moscow-backed demand is known to
be unacceptable to the European Union and the United States as well as to
Chisinau. For his part, Kokoiti named his precondition to a proposed meeting
with Georgian President Mikheil Saakashvili: the signing of an agreement on
the mutual renunciation of force. Tskhinvali wants such an agreement in the
form of a treaty-type document that would imply Georgia's recognition of
South Ossetia -- a tactic that Sukhumi also uses vis-à-vis Tbilisi.
Kokoiti and Smirnov accused Georgia and Moldova, respectively, of
practicing or intending `fascism' and `genocide;' and Bagapsh added the
unsubstantiated Russian charge of `militarization' regarding Georgia, an
excuse for the actual militarization of Abkhazia.
Russian State Secretary and Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs Grigory
Karasin received Kokoiti for `congratulations with the convincing victory'
in the November 12 referendum on `independence' and the `presidential'
election, noting `unanimous support' in South Ossetia for Kokoiti and
independence. The Russian MFA's communiqué curtly dismissed the `so-called
alternative voting' (see EDM, November 15, 17) and insisted on maintaining
`the existing format' for any future negotiations. In tune with the hosts,
Kokoiti insisted that Russian `peacekeeping' troops will remain in South
Ossetia `until the full resolution of the conflict' -- that is, a
self-perpetuating presence.
The trio declared in unison that they did not need a Kosovo precedent
or model to justify their respective secessions. Indeed they took pains to
distance themselves from the Kosovo case, arguing that their own cases had
greater validity. Smirnov dismissed the Kosovo case as `academic
talk....Recognition or non-recognition of Kosovo bears no relation to our
state.' Bagapsh would `not in the least compare our movement toward
independence with the case of Kosovo,' particularly since the
[Moscow-encouraged] Serbian referendum recently decided for Serbia's
territorial integrity. Likewise, Kokoiti is `not counting on [a precedent
in] Kosovo, we have stronger legal and political grounds for recognition
than Kosovo does' (RIA Novosti, Interfax, November 17, 18).
Their political preconditions and accompanying propaganda line, as
well as their insouciance about Kosovo, indicate that the secessionist
leaderships now behave more confidently than at any time in the past. By the
same token they indicate that Moscow has decided to impose a deep freeze on
all the three sets of negotiations until further notice while acting
unilaterally in the post-Soviet conflicts and "multilaterally" on Kosovo.
--Vladimir Socor
Monday, November 20, 2006 -- Volume 3, Issue 215
MOSCOW WELCOMES THREE EMBOLDENED SECESSIONIST LEADERS
by Vladimir Socor
Sergei Bagapsh, Eduard Kokoiti, and Igor Smirnov, Russian-installed
leaders respectively of Abkhazia, South Ossetia, and Transnistria, conferred
with Russian government officials in Moscow on November 16-18, held a joint
news conference, and were featured extensively on Russian state television
channels.
All three made it clear that by seeking the `independence' of their
territories they meant their ultimate affiliation to the Russian Federation
(NTV Mir Television, November 19, as monitored by the BBC, November 20).
In a sign of growing confidence, the trio advertised themselves as
`proud to be citizens of Russia' and made unusually open statements of
loyalty to Russia, partly based on Soviet nostalgia: `Moscow remains our
capital just as it was in Soviet times. For us, this is our capital whether
one likes this fact or not,' Bagapsh declared (Interfax, November 17).
Kokoiti pronounced Georgia guilty of separatism because it withdrew from the
Soviet Union, thus losing any title to territorial integrity, in his view
(Russian Television Channel One, November 16). Smirnov elliptically but
pointedly remarked, `I've been in Russia ever since birth' (Interfax,
November 17) -- a double allusion to his Khabarovsk origins and to the
Tiraspol authorities' view of Transnistria as a part of Greater Russia. This
acknowledgment will undoubtedly embarrass those OSCE officials who still
advocate power-sharing between Chisinau and the Tiraspol leaders supposedly
representing left-bank Moldova, even though most of that group are
non-natives on mission from Russia.
The trio announced their respective preconditions to a resumption of
negotiations with Tbilisi and Chisinau. Thus, Bagapsh ruled out any
negotiations until all Georgian `troops' [by which the Abkhaz mean Georgian
police] and Georgian administration withdraw from the upper Kodori Valley.
Moreover, `Any envoy who goes to upper Kodori will not be received in
Abkhazia, irrespective of the country he represents' -- a warning perhaps
immediately intended for U.S. Deputy Assistant Secretary of State Matt Bryza
who was holding talks in Tbilisi and en route to Sukhumi. The restoration of
Georgian control in upper Kodori `has buried the process of negotiations,'
Bagapsh declared (Interfax, November 16-18), reflecting Sukhumi's greater
intransigence in the wake of the UN Security Council's Western-approved
resolution in October that criticized Georgia's Kodori move (see EDM,
October 17).
Smirnov demanded the signing of an agreement in the 5+2 framework,
recognizing Transnistria's `right' to conduct its own foreign trade as a
precondition to resuming negotiations. This Moscow-backed demand is known to
be unacceptable to the European Union and the United States as well as to
Chisinau. For his part, Kokoiti named his precondition to a proposed meeting
with Georgian President Mikheil Saakashvili: the signing of an agreement on
the mutual renunciation of force. Tskhinvali wants such an agreement in the
form of a treaty-type document that would imply Georgia's recognition of
South Ossetia -- a tactic that Sukhumi also uses vis-à-vis Tbilisi.
Kokoiti and Smirnov accused Georgia and Moldova, respectively, of
practicing or intending `fascism' and `genocide;' and Bagapsh added the
unsubstantiated Russian charge of `militarization' regarding Georgia, an
excuse for the actual militarization of Abkhazia.
Russian State Secretary and Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs Grigory
Karasin received Kokoiti for `congratulations with the convincing victory'
in the November 12 referendum on `independence' and the `presidential'
election, noting `unanimous support' in South Ossetia for Kokoiti and
independence. The Russian MFA's communiqué curtly dismissed the `so-called
alternative voting' (see EDM, November 15, 17) and insisted on maintaining
`the existing format' for any future negotiations. In tune with the hosts,
Kokoiti insisted that Russian `peacekeeping' troops will remain in South
Ossetia `until the full resolution of the conflict' -- that is, a
self-perpetuating presence.
The trio declared in unison that they did not need a Kosovo precedent
or model to justify their respective secessions. Indeed they took pains to
distance themselves from the Kosovo case, arguing that their own cases had
greater validity. Smirnov dismissed the Kosovo case as `academic
talk....Recognition or non-recognition of Kosovo bears no relation to our
state.' Bagapsh would `not in the least compare our movement toward
independence with the case of Kosovo,' particularly since the
[Moscow-encouraged] Serbian referendum recently decided for Serbia's
territorial integrity. Likewise, Kokoiti is `not counting on [a precedent
in] Kosovo, we have stronger legal and political grounds for recognition
than Kosovo does' (RIA Novosti, Interfax, November 17, 18).
Their political preconditions and accompanying propaganda line, as
well as their insouciance about Kosovo, indicate that the secessionist
leaderships now behave more confidently than at any time in the past. By the
same token they indicate that Moscow has decided to impose a deep freeze on
all the three sets of negotiations until further notice while acting
unilaterally in the post-Soviet conflicts and "multilaterally" on Kosovo.
--Vladimir Socor