Tweet
MARCHING INTO GEORGIA
By Nat Parry
Consortium News
http://www.consortiumnews.com/2008/080808b.html
A ug 8 2008
Six years ago, just six months after the 9/11 attacks as George
W. Bush's "war on terror" was still taking shape, we ran the following
article about Bush's decision to send U.S. troops into the nation of
Georgia, supposedly to help hunt down Islamic terrorists hiding in
the rugged Pankisi Gorge.
Much has changed since - Russian President Vladimir Putin and Georgian
President Eduard Schevardnadze have been replaced and Bush refocused
his attention on invading and occupying Iraq - but in light of the
flare-up of border hostilities between Russia and Georgia, we are
republishing the article with its valuable background:
George W. Bush's decision to dispatch about 150 U.S. troops to
the former Soviet republic of Georgia highlights the complexities
and dangers that his global war on terrorism will confront -- and
possibly cause.
Share this article Bookmark Digg
Email Printer friendly
The Bush administration justifies the intervention as a strike against
alleged al-Qaeda fighters who supposedly have blended among Chechen
rebels hiding out in Georgia's remote Pankisi Gorge in the Caucasus
Mountains.
Thousands of Chechens are holed up in the rugged terrain after
fleeing Russia's brutal counterinsurgency war in the neighboring
Russian province of Chechnya. Most likely, among the refugees, are
fighters who launch attacks into Russia.
As militarily daunting as it will be for the U.S. troops and their
Georgian allies to locate, separate out and eliminate the alleged
al-Qaeda terrorists, the geopolitical challenge might be even trickier.
Two governments - Georgia and Russia - are facing off against each
other over the region's nationalist claims and counterclaims dating
back centuries. Both simultaneously are confronting restive ethnic
groups operating inside their own countries.
Follow this scenario for a moment: the Russian government of Vladimir
Putin has criticized the Georgian government of Eduard Schevardnadze
for giving safe haven to the Chechen rebels. Meanwhile, Schevardnadze's
Georgian government has blamed Putin's Russia for aiding and abetting
separatists from the Abkhazia and South Ossetia regions of Georgia.
While rebels in Chechnya want to break away from Russia,
rebels in Abkhazia and South Ossetia want to break away from
Georgia. Complicating matters further, the Chechen civil war has
been the scene of widespread human rights abuses on both sides,
while the Georgian region of Abkhazia has had its own ugly scenes of
ethnic cleansing.
A 'Crusade'
Into this maelstrom of regional and ethnic warfare now steps George
W. Bush and his "crusade" to "rid the world of evil." The Bush
administration wants U.S. troops to assist Georgian soldiers in
hunting down and killing al-Qaeda fighters holed up in Georgia's
lawless Pankisi Gorge.
This operation was initiated with almost no consultation with leaders
of the U.S. Congress or with key international players who have been
working to resolve the chronic civil wars in the Caucasus territory.
The Bush administration also has offered little detail about the
hazy accusations that the al-Qaeda operatives, who are allegedly
among the Chechen fighters, have links to the Sept. 11 attacks or
represent a terrorist movement with "global reach" - the new catch-all
justification for U.S. military interventions anywhere in the world,
from Yemen to the Philippines to Colombia.
Bush committed the troops to Georgia with little or no explanation
to the Russian Federation, the United Nations and the Organization
for Security and Cooperation in Europe. All three have been active
for years addressing Georgia's separatist struggles.
Though Putin announced belatedly that he did not object to the
U.S. intervention, Russian military officials have warned that the
presence of U.S. troops so close to Russia's southern border is
a provocation.
Many in Russia see the U.S. intervention in Georgia and the placement
of four permanent military bases in former Soviet Central Asian
states as encroachments on Russia's traditional sphere of influence,
comparable to Russia sending troops to intervene in a civil war
in Mexico.
The lack of consultation was particularly galling for Moscow because
Russia has long suspected that Georgia was collaborating with the
Chechens, letting them use the Pankisi Gorge to mount assaults on
Russian forces in Chechnya in exchange for the Chechens helping the
Georgians battle pro-Russian separatists in Abkhazia, in Georgia's
northwest corner.
Oil Motive
Some observers also see U.S. motives that go beyond exacting
retribution for the Sept. 11 terrorist attacks on the World Trade
Center and the Pentagon.
Bush is seen as wanting to pacify the territory around the oil-rich
Caspian Sea basin so pipelines can be laid to extract an estimated
$5 trillion in oil and natural gas to the West. One possible route
for a pipeline would be through Georgia, bypassing Russian territory.
Beyond the long-term risk of antagonizing and destabilizing
nuclear-armed Russia, Bush's move places American troops in the
morally ambiguous spot of picking out "evil-doers" in the midst of
a murky civil war where there is plenty of guilt to go around.
European leaders, in particular, have questioned the wisdom of
Bush's unilateralism. To effectively combat terrorism, they argue,
multinational cooperation is needed.
"You can't deal with the dark side of globalization - the terrorism,
the financing of terrorism, the crime, the drugs, the trafficking
of human beings, the relationship between environmental degradation
and poverty and security," said Chris Patten, the European Union's
external affairs commissioner, "unless you deal with them as a result
of multilateral engagement."
Historical Tensions
Yet, the risks of U.S. unilateralism are especially striking in
Georgia because of its complex history of regional tensions dating
back centuries.
Georgia has historically been at odds with Russia, which has used
its might to dominate the small republic for centuries. In the
early 1800s, the Russian Empire gradually annexed Georgia's entire
territory. Eastern Georgia became part of the Russian Empire in
1801, and western Georgia was incorporated in 1804. In the second
half of the 19th Century, "Russification" of Georgia intensified,
as did Georgian rebellions.
With the collapse of the Russian Empire in October 1917, Georgia formed
a short-lived government with the neighboring states of Armenia and
Azerbaijan. When that dissolved in May 1918, Georgia declared its
independence.
For almost three years, Georgia's moderate social democratic
government survived the revolutionary fervor sweeping the old Russian
Empire. Then, in February 1921, the Red Army invaded, making Georgia
part of the Transcaucasian Federal Soviet Socialist Republic.
Georgia remained part of the Soviet Union until its collapse in 1991,
when Georgia declared its independence and sought closer ties to
the West.
Georgian-Russian relations grew tense in fall 1993, when Russia coerced
Georgia into joining the Russia-dominated Commonwealth of Independent
States in exchange for Russian military help in quashing a comeback
by the ousted Georgian President Zviad Gamsakhurdia.
Since then, there have been flashes of hostility between Georgia
and Russia, including Russian threats to invade its tiny neighbor
to the south. Despite that history, Georgia has grudgingly accepted
Russian assistance as a political mediator between Georgia and its
separatist insurgents.
Russian Bias
Georgia tolerated Russian assistance as a facilitator for negotiations
and its military presence as peacekeepers. But many Georgians feel the
Russians have undercut Georgia and tacitly supported the sovereignty of
Georgia's Abkhazia and South Ossetia regions, along the Russian border.
These two regions have declared independence and have their own
governments, although they are not recognized by the international
community, which holds that the conflicts must be settled within the
framework of a united Georgia.
There is some evidence behind Georgia's suspicions. For instance,
Russia backed away from a commitment by the Commonwealth of Independent
States to allow citizens from member states to travel without visas.
Russia imposed a visa requirement for citizens of Georgia who wished
to enter Russia, while not requiring visas for residents of Georgia's
two unrecognized separatist regions, Abkhazia and South Ossetia.
The move gave implicit legitimacy to their claims of independence
and prompted a rebuke from the U.S. State Department, which said the
Russian action "runs directly counter to [Russia's] stated policy of
support for Georgia's sovereignty and territorial integrity."
The issue of Russian peacekeepers in Georgia also has been a source
of friction between Moscow and Tbilisi, the capital of Georgia.
A Russian force of peacekeepers was dispatched under the authority
of the Commonwealth of Independent States to prevent another outbreak
of civil war in Georgia and to protect the Abkhazian population from
Georgian incursions.
But many Georgians feel the peacekeepers have favored the separatists,
while doing little to protect the 300,000 ethnic Georgians who fled
or were expelled from Abkhazia and South Ossetia eight years ago.
Chechen 'Terrorists'
The peacekeeping issue between Georgia and Russia has been complicated
by Russia's accusations that Georgia is "harboring terrorists" from
Chechnya. Russia also alleged that the Chechens fight with Georgian
guerrilla formations against the Abkhaz separatists.
Georgia responded that any Chechens in Georgia were refugees who
fled the Russian military occupation of Chechnya. Georgia invited the
Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe in December 1999
to send monitors to watch the border between Georgia and Chechnya.
Soon after the Sept. 11 terrorist attacks, Moscow began accusing
Tbilisi of a double standard. While offering Washington assistance in
the U.S. war on terrorism, Georgia refused to cooperate with Moscow
over the Chechen rebels, or even to acknowledge their presence on
Georgian territory.
Russian politicians began threatening to send Russian troops into
Georgia to capture or kill Chechen "terrorists."
In late September 2001, some Georgian deputies confirmed that there
were Chechen fighters in Georgia's Pankisi Gorge. But Georgia continued
to snub Russian requests to coordinate military efforts to root out
the Chechens.
"Georgia will not allow any foreign state to use its territory for
military operations," said a Georgian Foreign Ministry official about
Russia's pressure.
More Resources
Meanwhile, President Shevardnadze began assuring Georgia's displaced
persons that they would be returning to their homes in Abkhazia
"very soon" because, Shevardnadze said, "we have more resources now
and more international support."
The resources and support could have been an allusion to the military
aid and training that Georgia was beginning to get from NATO and the
United States, including 10 fighter helicopters in October 2001. It
also could have been a reference to the upcoming deployment of
U.S. troops.
The Georgians also took a tougher line on the presence of Russian
peacekeepers, an issue that came to a head in October 2001 as new
violence broke out in Georgia.
Some Georgians suspected the trouble was partly instigated by the
Russian peacekeepers, whose departure was demanded by the Georgian
parliament and Shevardnadze. The peacekeepers have "proved incapable
to fulfill the obligations and keep the peace in the region," the
Georgian president said.
In an Oct. 11, 2001, resolution, the parliament said the Russian
peacekeepers "are not the facilitators of the conflict settlement
but rather its instigators."
The parliament added that "after deployment of Russian peacekeepers
... ethnic cleansing of Georgians has not been stopped. It is confirmed
that during this period more than 1,700 persons were killed in the
security zone, [and that the] peacekeeping forces committed numerous
crimes against the peaceful population."
The parliament asked the UN, the OSCE and "friendly countries [to]
deploy international peacekeeping forces in [the] conflict zone in
order to substitute [for the] peacekeeping forces of the Russian
Federation."
But "friendly countries" showed no eagerness to assume the burden of
peacekeeping in Georgia. Eventually, Tbilisi rethought its stance,
and decided to let the Russians stay, with a more limited mandate.
Also in October 2001 came reports that Russia was bombing
the Pankisi Gorge in apparent attempts to kill Chechen fighters
hiding out there. Russia denied that they were bombing Georgia, but
eyewitnesses said the planes came from Russian territory. The OSCE,
which monitors the border, confirmed that there were unidentified
jets coming from Russia.
These incidents made Georgian-Russian relations even worse. The
Georgian government vowed to shoot down any unidentified planes over
its territory.
Changed Attitudes
Considering that Georgia had long denied the presence of Chechen
rebels on its territory, it seems possible that Georgia made the
admission to avert a Russian invasion. Georgia also might have seen
an opportunity to gain the support of the United States, which was
looking for allies in its global war on terrorism.
It's possible, too, that Georgia hopes to use the U.S. military
assistance to subdue Abkhazia, expel the de facto government in
Abkhazia's capital, and return the 300,000 Georgian displaced persons
to the area.
Some international observers fear the Bush administration is being
lured into a regional conflict under the guise of chasing al-Qaeda
operatives, a pursuit that could complicate multilateral efforts for
a political settlement to Georgia's separatist disputes.
These negotiations have been stalemated for a long time, but there have
been renewed efforts by the international community in recent months to
get the opposing sides back to the bargaining table. U.S. intervention
now may fuel Russian fears of a Georgian invasion of Abkhazia.
"We think it could further aggravate the situation in the region,
which is difficult as it is," said Russian Foreign Minister Igor
Ivanov on Feb. 27, 2002.
Abkhazian separatist leaders already are signaling that they may seek
closer relations with Russia, while Russian officials have indicated
they might be forced to recognize the independence of Abkhazia.
The new developments seem certain to alter the balance of power in the
Caucasus region. Only a year ago, Georgian officials were assuring
Moscow that they were not seeking membership in NATO, but now they
want to join the U.S.-dominated military alliance as early as 2005
and are hosting American troops close to Russia's border.
Despite widespread concerns in Moscow, Putin said he supports the
American intervention because Russia's greatest concern is eliminating
the Chechen terrorist threat.
Hidden Objectives?
But if the real U.S. aim is to combat the al-Qaeda terrorists allegedly
hiding among the Chechens in Pankisi Gorge, it is puzzling why the
Bush administration left Moscow so much in the dark.
While some observers speculate that there may have been very high-level
consultations, official Moscow clearly was caught off-guard by the
U.S. announcement. "There have been no preliminary consultations with
Moscow," said the mass-circulation Komsomolskaya Pravda.
The reason for the secrecy may have more to do with ulterior American
motives. One of these hidden motives may be to establish a base
for launching attacks on Iraq, if Bush acts on his warning to oust
Saddam Hussein.
Bush also has demonstrated a deep interest in the oil and natural
gas of the Caspian basin, the world's largest known deposits of
fossil fuels.
Komsomolskaya Pravda argues that the U.S. actions "are episodes in
a giant battle for controlling the major deposits of Caspian oil and
gas, primarily, for routes to transport the Caspian oil."
Without doubt, Bush and his inner circle have long had their eyes on
the Caspian oil riches.
Former Secretary of State James Baker, who was Bush's point man for
stopping the Florida recount, represents a consortium of major oil
companies based in Azerbaijan.
After taking office in January 2001, Bush brushed aside calls for
U.S. diplomatic initiatives in Israel and other hot spots. But he
personally became engaged in negotiations to settle a border dispute
between Azerbaijan and Armenia over the Nagorno-Karabakh region.
These diplomatic initiatives were widely interpreted as part of
Bush's strategy to arrange new pipeline routes out of the Caspian
basin. Currently, Russian companies control all the routes for
Caspian oil.
Those early diplomatic initiatives predated the Sept. 11 terrorist
attacks. Since those attacks, however, the Bush administration has
enjoyed broad public support to take a variety of actions that it
deems justified in bringing those behind the mass murders to justice.
A byproduct of some military actions may be to position U.S. forces
to allow pipeline construction to proceed.
"The U.S. military presence will help ensure that a majority of
oil and gas from the Caspian basin will go westward," observed the
intelligence analysis service STRATFOR.
Russian fears about Bush's underlying strategy prompted a group of
retired Russian generals to brand Putin a western lackey and a traitor
to Russian interests.
"With your [Putin's] blessing, the United States has received military
bases in Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, Kyrgyzstan, and, maybe, Kazakhstan,"
the generals declared in a published broadside. "In the long run,
these bases are for dealing a strike on Russia, not bin Laden."
So far, Putin seems to have kept his active-duty generals in
line. Col. Gen. Yuri Baluyevsky, first deputy chief of the general
staff, told a news conference that he did not consider U.S. military
trainers in Georgia to be "American troops." [NYT, March 1, 2002]
But Bush's leap into the turbulence of Central Asia may bring a host
of unintended consequences. The wild terrain of the Pankisi Gorge -
and the hunt for elusive al-Qaeda fighters - may be just the first
of many dangers.
By Nat Parry
Consortium News
http://www.consortiumnews.com/2008/080808b.html
A ug 8 2008
Six years ago, just six months after the 9/11 attacks as George
W. Bush's "war on terror" was still taking shape, we ran the following
article about Bush's decision to send U.S. troops into the nation of
Georgia, supposedly to help hunt down Islamic terrorists hiding in
the rugged Pankisi Gorge.
Much has changed since - Russian President Vladimir Putin and Georgian
President Eduard Schevardnadze have been replaced and Bush refocused
his attention on invading and occupying Iraq - but in light of the
flare-up of border hostilities between Russia and Georgia, we are
republishing the article with its valuable background:
George W. Bush's decision to dispatch about 150 U.S. troops to
the former Soviet republic of Georgia highlights the complexities
and dangers that his global war on terrorism will confront -- and
possibly cause.
Share this article Bookmark Digg
Email Printer friendly
The Bush administration justifies the intervention as a strike against
alleged al-Qaeda fighters who supposedly have blended among Chechen
rebels hiding out in Georgia's remote Pankisi Gorge in the Caucasus
Mountains.
Thousands of Chechens are holed up in the rugged terrain after
fleeing Russia's brutal counterinsurgency war in the neighboring
Russian province of Chechnya. Most likely, among the refugees, are
fighters who launch attacks into Russia.
As militarily daunting as it will be for the U.S. troops and their
Georgian allies to locate, separate out and eliminate the alleged
al-Qaeda terrorists, the geopolitical challenge might be even trickier.
Two governments - Georgia and Russia - are facing off against each
other over the region's nationalist claims and counterclaims dating
back centuries. Both simultaneously are confronting restive ethnic
groups operating inside their own countries.
Follow this scenario for a moment: the Russian government of Vladimir
Putin has criticized the Georgian government of Eduard Schevardnadze
for giving safe haven to the Chechen rebels. Meanwhile, Schevardnadze's
Georgian government has blamed Putin's Russia for aiding and abetting
separatists from the Abkhazia and South Ossetia regions of Georgia.
While rebels in Chechnya want to break away from Russia,
rebels in Abkhazia and South Ossetia want to break away from
Georgia. Complicating matters further, the Chechen civil war has
been the scene of widespread human rights abuses on both sides,
while the Georgian region of Abkhazia has had its own ugly scenes of
ethnic cleansing.
A 'Crusade'
Into this maelstrom of regional and ethnic warfare now steps George
W. Bush and his "crusade" to "rid the world of evil." The Bush
administration wants U.S. troops to assist Georgian soldiers in
hunting down and killing al-Qaeda fighters holed up in Georgia's
lawless Pankisi Gorge.
This operation was initiated with almost no consultation with leaders
of the U.S. Congress or with key international players who have been
working to resolve the chronic civil wars in the Caucasus territory.
The Bush administration also has offered little detail about the
hazy accusations that the al-Qaeda operatives, who are allegedly
among the Chechen fighters, have links to the Sept. 11 attacks or
represent a terrorist movement with "global reach" - the new catch-all
justification for U.S. military interventions anywhere in the world,
from Yemen to the Philippines to Colombia.
Bush committed the troops to Georgia with little or no explanation
to the Russian Federation, the United Nations and the Organization
for Security and Cooperation in Europe. All three have been active
for years addressing Georgia's separatist struggles.
Though Putin announced belatedly that he did not object to the
U.S. intervention, Russian military officials have warned that the
presence of U.S. troops so close to Russia's southern border is
a provocation.
Many in Russia see the U.S. intervention in Georgia and the placement
of four permanent military bases in former Soviet Central Asian
states as encroachments on Russia's traditional sphere of influence,
comparable to Russia sending troops to intervene in a civil war
in Mexico.
The lack of consultation was particularly galling for Moscow because
Russia has long suspected that Georgia was collaborating with the
Chechens, letting them use the Pankisi Gorge to mount assaults on
Russian forces in Chechnya in exchange for the Chechens helping the
Georgians battle pro-Russian separatists in Abkhazia, in Georgia's
northwest corner.
Oil Motive
Some observers also see U.S. motives that go beyond exacting
retribution for the Sept. 11 terrorist attacks on the World Trade
Center and the Pentagon.
Bush is seen as wanting to pacify the territory around the oil-rich
Caspian Sea basin so pipelines can be laid to extract an estimated
$5 trillion in oil and natural gas to the West. One possible route
for a pipeline would be through Georgia, bypassing Russian territory.
Beyond the long-term risk of antagonizing and destabilizing
nuclear-armed Russia, Bush's move places American troops in the
morally ambiguous spot of picking out "evil-doers" in the midst of
a murky civil war where there is plenty of guilt to go around.
European leaders, in particular, have questioned the wisdom of
Bush's unilateralism. To effectively combat terrorism, they argue,
multinational cooperation is needed.
"You can't deal with the dark side of globalization - the terrorism,
the financing of terrorism, the crime, the drugs, the trafficking
of human beings, the relationship between environmental degradation
and poverty and security," said Chris Patten, the European Union's
external affairs commissioner, "unless you deal with them as a result
of multilateral engagement."
Historical Tensions
Yet, the risks of U.S. unilateralism are especially striking in
Georgia because of its complex history of regional tensions dating
back centuries.
Georgia has historically been at odds with Russia, which has used
its might to dominate the small republic for centuries. In the
early 1800s, the Russian Empire gradually annexed Georgia's entire
territory. Eastern Georgia became part of the Russian Empire in
1801, and western Georgia was incorporated in 1804. In the second
half of the 19th Century, "Russification" of Georgia intensified,
as did Georgian rebellions.
With the collapse of the Russian Empire in October 1917, Georgia formed
a short-lived government with the neighboring states of Armenia and
Azerbaijan. When that dissolved in May 1918, Georgia declared its
independence.
For almost three years, Georgia's moderate social democratic
government survived the revolutionary fervor sweeping the old Russian
Empire. Then, in February 1921, the Red Army invaded, making Georgia
part of the Transcaucasian Federal Soviet Socialist Republic.
Georgia remained part of the Soviet Union until its collapse in 1991,
when Georgia declared its independence and sought closer ties to
the West.
Georgian-Russian relations grew tense in fall 1993, when Russia coerced
Georgia into joining the Russia-dominated Commonwealth of Independent
States in exchange for Russian military help in quashing a comeback
by the ousted Georgian President Zviad Gamsakhurdia.
Since then, there have been flashes of hostility between Georgia
and Russia, including Russian threats to invade its tiny neighbor
to the south. Despite that history, Georgia has grudgingly accepted
Russian assistance as a political mediator between Georgia and its
separatist insurgents.
Russian Bias
Georgia tolerated Russian assistance as a facilitator for negotiations
and its military presence as peacekeepers. But many Georgians feel the
Russians have undercut Georgia and tacitly supported the sovereignty of
Georgia's Abkhazia and South Ossetia regions, along the Russian border.
These two regions have declared independence and have their own
governments, although they are not recognized by the international
community, which holds that the conflicts must be settled within the
framework of a united Georgia.
There is some evidence behind Georgia's suspicions. For instance,
Russia backed away from a commitment by the Commonwealth of Independent
States to allow citizens from member states to travel without visas.
Russia imposed a visa requirement for citizens of Georgia who wished
to enter Russia, while not requiring visas for residents of Georgia's
two unrecognized separatist regions, Abkhazia and South Ossetia.
The move gave implicit legitimacy to their claims of independence
and prompted a rebuke from the U.S. State Department, which said the
Russian action "runs directly counter to [Russia's] stated policy of
support for Georgia's sovereignty and territorial integrity."
The issue of Russian peacekeepers in Georgia also has been a source
of friction between Moscow and Tbilisi, the capital of Georgia.
A Russian force of peacekeepers was dispatched under the authority
of the Commonwealth of Independent States to prevent another outbreak
of civil war in Georgia and to protect the Abkhazian population from
Georgian incursions.
But many Georgians feel the peacekeepers have favored the separatists,
while doing little to protect the 300,000 ethnic Georgians who fled
or were expelled from Abkhazia and South Ossetia eight years ago.
Chechen 'Terrorists'
The peacekeeping issue between Georgia and Russia has been complicated
by Russia's accusations that Georgia is "harboring terrorists" from
Chechnya. Russia also alleged that the Chechens fight with Georgian
guerrilla formations against the Abkhaz separatists.
Georgia responded that any Chechens in Georgia were refugees who
fled the Russian military occupation of Chechnya. Georgia invited the
Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe in December 1999
to send monitors to watch the border between Georgia and Chechnya.
Soon after the Sept. 11 terrorist attacks, Moscow began accusing
Tbilisi of a double standard. While offering Washington assistance in
the U.S. war on terrorism, Georgia refused to cooperate with Moscow
over the Chechen rebels, or even to acknowledge their presence on
Georgian territory.
Russian politicians began threatening to send Russian troops into
Georgia to capture or kill Chechen "terrorists."
In late September 2001, some Georgian deputies confirmed that there
were Chechen fighters in Georgia's Pankisi Gorge. But Georgia continued
to snub Russian requests to coordinate military efforts to root out
the Chechens.
"Georgia will not allow any foreign state to use its territory for
military operations," said a Georgian Foreign Ministry official about
Russia's pressure.
More Resources
Meanwhile, President Shevardnadze began assuring Georgia's displaced
persons that they would be returning to their homes in Abkhazia
"very soon" because, Shevardnadze said, "we have more resources now
and more international support."
The resources and support could have been an allusion to the military
aid and training that Georgia was beginning to get from NATO and the
United States, including 10 fighter helicopters in October 2001. It
also could have been a reference to the upcoming deployment of
U.S. troops.
The Georgians also took a tougher line on the presence of Russian
peacekeepers, an issue that came to a head in October 2001 as new
violence broke out in Georgia.
Some Georgians suspected the trouble was partly instigated by the
Russian peacekeepers, whose departure was demanded by the Georgian
parliament and Shevardnadze. The peacekeepers have "proved incapable
to fulfill the obligations and keep the peace in the region," the
Georgian president said.
In an Oct. 11, 2001, resolution, the parliament said the Russian
peacekeepers "are not the facilitators of the conflict settlement
but rather its instigators."
The parliament added that "after deployment of Russian peacekeepers
... ethnic cleansing of Georgians has not been stopped. It is confirmed
that during this period more than 1,700 persons were killed in the
security zone, [and that the] peacekeeping forces committed numerous
crimes against the peaceful population."
The parliament asked the UN, the OSCE and "friendly countries [to]
deploy international peacekeeping forces in [the] conflict zone in
order to substitute [for the] peacekeeping forces of the Russian
Federation."
But "friendly countries" showed no eagerness to assume the burden of
peacekeeping in Georgia. Eventually, Tbilisi rethought its stance,
and decided to let the Russians stay, with a more limited mandate.
Also in October 2001 came reports that Russia was bombing
the Pankisi Gorge in apparent attempts to kill Chechen fighters
hiding out there. Russia denied that they were bombing Georgia, but
eyewitnesses said the planes came from Russian territory. The OSCE,
which monitors the border, confirmed that there were unidentified
jets coming from Russia.
These incidents made Georgian-Russian relations even worse. The
Georgian government vowed to shoot down any unidentified planes over
its territory.
Changed Attitudes
Considering that Georgia had long denied the presence of Chechen
rebels on its territory, it seems possible that Georgia made the
admission to avert a Russian invasion. Georgia also might have seen
an opportunity to gain the support of the United States, which was
looking for allies in its global war on terrorism.
It's possible, too, that Georgia hopes to use the U.S. military
assistance to subdue Abkhazia, expel the de facto government in
Abkhazia's capital, and return the 300,000 Georgian displaced persons
to the area.
Some international observers fear the Bush administration is being
lured into a regional conflict under the guise of chasing al-Qaeda
operatives, a pursuit that could complicate multilateral efforts for
a political settlement to Georgia's separatist disputes.
These negotiations have been stalemated for a long time, but there have
been renewed efforts by the international community in recent months to
get the opposing sides back to the bargaining table. U.S. intervention
now may fuel Russian fears of a Georgian invasion of Abkhazia.
"We think it could further aggravate the situation in the region,
which is difficult as it is," said Russian Foreign Minister Igor
Ivanov on Feb. 27, 2002.
Abkhazian separatist leaders already are signaling that they may seek
closer relations with Russia, while Russian officials have indicated
they might be forced to recognize the independence of Abkhazia.
The new developments seem certain to alter the balance of power in the
Caucasus region. Only a year ago, Georgian officials were assuring
Moscow that they were not seeking membership in NATO, but now they
want to join the U.S.-dominated military alliance as early as 2005
and are hosting American troops close to Russia's border.
Despite widespread concerns in Moscow, Putin said he supports the
American intervention because Russia's greatest concern is eliminating
the Chechen terrorist threat.
Hidden Objectives?
But if the real U.S. aim is to combat the al-Qaeda terrorists allegedly
hiding among the Chechens in Pankisi Gorge, it is puzzling why the
Bush administration left Moscow so much in the dark.
While some observers speculate that there may have been very high-level
consultations, official Moscow clearly was caught off-guard by the
U.S. announcement. "There have been no preliminary consultations with
Moscow," said the mass-circulation Komsomolskaya Pravda.
The reason for the secrecy may have more to do with ulterior American
motives. One of these hidden motives may be to establish a base
for launching attacks on Iraq, if Bush acts on his warning to oust
Saddam Hussein.
Bush also has demonstrated a deep interest in the oil and natural
gas of the Caspian basin, the world's largest known deposits of
fossil fuels.
Komsomolskaya Pravda argues that the U.S. actions "are episodes in
a giant battle for controlling the major deposits of Caspian oil and
gas, primarily, for routes to transport the Caspian oil."
Without doubt, Bush and his inner circle have long had their eyes on
the Caspian oil riches.
Former Secretary of State James Baker, who was Bush's point man for
stopping the Florida recount, represents a consortium of major oil
companies based in Azerbaijan.
After taking office in January 2001, Bush brushed aside calls for
U.S. diplomatic initiatives in Israel and other hot spots. But he
personally became engaged in negotiations to settle a border dispute
between Azerbaijan and Armenia over the Nagorno-Karabakh region.
These diplomatic initiatives were widely interpreted as part of
Bush's strategy to arrange new pipeline routes out of the Caspian
basin. Currently, Russian companies control all the routes for
Caspian oil.
Those early diplomatic initiatives predated the Sept. 11 terrorist
attacks. Since those attacks, however, the Bush administration has
enjoyed broad public support to take a variety of actions that it
deems justified in bringing those behind the mass murders to justice.
A byproduct of some military actions may be to position U.S. forces
to allow pipeline construction to proceed.
"The U.S. military presence will help ensure that a majority of
oil and gas from the Caspian basin will go westward," observed the
intelligence analysis service STRATFOR.
Russian fears about Bush's underlying strategy prompted a group of
retired Russian generals to brand Putin a western lackey and a traitor
to Russian interests.
"With your [Putin's] blessing, the United States has received military
bases in Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, Kyrgyzstan, and, maybe, Kazakhstan,"
the generals declared in a published broadside. "In the long run,
these bases are for dealing a strike on Russia, not bin Laden."
So far, Putin seems to have kept his active-duty generals in
line. Col. Gen. Yuri Baluyevsky, first deputy chief of the general
staff, told a news conference that he did not consider U.S. military
trainers in Georgia to be "American troops." [NYT, March 1, 2002]
But Bush's leap into the turbulence of Central Asia may bring a host
of unintended consequences. The wild terrain of the Pankisi Gorge -
and the hunt for elusive al-Qaeda fighters - may be just the first
of many dangers.