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GEORGIA'S DREAM IS SHATTERED, BUT IT ONLY HAS ITSELF TO BLAME
Christopher Langton
The National
Aug 13, 2008
United Arab Emirates
It happened finally. Mikheil Saakashvili's government in Georgia
decided to try and retake the separatist province of South Ossetia
by force. This was a massive miscalculation by Georgia. Russia was
looking for an excuse to stamp its authority on the South Caucasus
having become increasingly angered by the imminent Nato membership
of Georgia as well as growing western interest in the region. Russia
claims that it acted in response to the Georgian assault on the South
Ossetian capital, Tskhinvali, in order to protect its citizens in
the separatist region.
These citizens, who are actually Georgian nationals although ethnically
Ossetian, gained Russian citizenship when Moscow issued passports to
many of them whilst cynically upholding the notion of the territorial
integrity of Georgia. The issuing of Russian passports to citizens
of both South Ossetia and Abkhazia, the other separatist region, is
at odds with the principle of "territorial integrity" and indicates
the true Russian intention - to maintain a physical presence in the
South Caucasus. Moscow wants a bastion against Nato, but also acted
out of a machoistic sense of regaining pride lost when the Soviet
Union collapsed and former territories became independent.
None of the actors in this drama can claim to be right. Georgia acted
disproportionately and unnecessarily and is now worse off than it
was before, with a large number of internally displaced people to
add to those from previous conflicts. Its aspirations towards Nato
membership and a closer relationship with Europe are in doubt. (Despite
its criticism of Russia's role in the crisis, Nato members are likely
to view the irresponsible and ill-considered actions of Tbilisi with
dismay). Russia invaded the territory of a sovereign state and used
disproportionate and sometimes indiscriminate force - particularly
air power.
The US, which has the most influence over Saakashvili, could have at
least restrained Tbilisi's actions. Europe, too, has influence but
failed to use it. The West stood and watched as Tbilisi ratcheted
up its military activity and rhetoric, but failed to prevent the
crisis. Now it is the western partners of Georgia who most probably
will be called upon to rebuild the country once Russia has finished
its punitive actions.
Abkhaz and Russian forces are completing the tearing up of the
1994 Moscow Agreement which governs the peace process in Abkhazia by
removing Georgian forces from the Kodori Valley in Georgia's Svanetian
region. This will effectively re-establish Abkhazia as it was before
the break up of the Soviet Union.
Through its actions in South Ossetia, Georgia has lost any moral
position it had in relation to its two separatist regions; the
painstaking peace processes that started between 1992 and 1994 are in
tatters. In both regions there is a growing sense that their future
lies with or within Russia and not with Georgia and her partners.
The presence of 3,000 Russian troops in Abkhazia underwrites the
security of that territory and may lead the Abkhaz leadership to
request the withdrawal of the UN Observer Mission (UNOMIG). And the
Russian troops from the 58th Army who are now ensconced in South
Ossetia are likely to stay for the foreseeable future - as will the
Russian military contingent in Abkhazia.
What happens next? For Georgia the dream that followed the 2003
Rose Revolution of a united country within the western community has
been shattered. By any normal calculation, President Saakashvili's
unpredictable and emotional behaviour, which has damaged his country
irreparably, would lead to his removal. However, for the moment at
least it appears that the Georgian people support him as he vows to
continue the struggle against Russian domination.
For Russia there is an extension of influence into the energy corridor
of the West and an iron grip on the South Caucasus. Paradoxically, the
Russian war in Georgia is likely to have had the effect of reducing the
likelihood of conflict in Nagorno-Karabakh. It will have also secured
the region for the Winter Olympics in Sochi in 2014, by removing any
destabilising threat.
There will have to be a re-appraisal of Moscow's relationship with
Washington and Europe, of course. The architect of the Russian action
was former President Vladimir Putin, who has long wanted to be seen
as the strongman underwriting Russia's renewed great power status
against the US and its partners.
Given the virulent rhetoric of both Medvedev and Saakashvili towards
each other it is hard to see how there can possibly be a return to
the "status quo ante bellum" and a resumption of the peace processes
governing the two conflict zones in Georgia. There will most likely
be some kind of talks, possibly brokered by France along the lines
put forward by the French foreign minister, Bernard Kouchner.
However, having gone so far in achieving long sought after objectives,
Moscow is unlikely to continue to uphold the idea of "territorial
integrity" enshrined in the 1994 Moscow Agreement. President
Saakashvili, for his part, will continue to demand the return of the
territories as he has promised to the Georgian people.
With positions entrenched in this way there is likely to be a
long-lasting stalemate. Georgia has lost any ability it had to get back
South Ossetia and Abkhazia by force. These regions will most likely
become more independent - with or without international recognition -
and Russian dominance over them will strengthen, with the possibility
of South Ossetia uniting with North Ossetia in the Russian Federation.
Col Christopher Langton is Senior Fellow for Conflict & Defence
Diplomacy at the International Institute for Strategic Studies, London
From: Emil Lazarian | Ararat NewsPress
Christopher Langton
The National
Aug 13, 2008
United Arab Emirates
It happened finally. Mikheil Saakashvili's government in Georgia
decided to try and retake the separatist province of South Ossetia
by force. This was a massive miscalculation by Georgia. Russia was
looking for an excuse to stamp its authority on the South Caucasus
having become increasingly angered by the imminent Nato membership
of Georgia as well as growing western interest in the region. Russia
claims that it acted in response to the Georgian assault on the South
Ossetian capital, Tskhinvali, in order to protect its citizens in
the separatist region.
These citizens, who are actually Georgian nationals although ethnically
Ossetian, gained Russian citizenship when Moscow issued passports to
many of them whilst cynically upholding the notion of the territorial
integrity of Georgia. The issuing of Russian passports to citizens
of both South Ossetia and Abkhazia, the other separatist region, is
at odds with the principle of "territorial integrity" and indicates
the true Russian intention - to maintain a physical presence in the
South Caucasus. Moscow wants a bastion against Nato, but also acted
out of a machoistic sense of regaining pride lost when the Soviet
Union collapsed and former territories became independent.
None of the actors in this drama can claim to be right. Georgia acted
disproportionately and unnecessarily and is now worse off than it
was before, with a large number of internally displaced people to
add to those from previous conflicts. Its aspirations towards Nato
membership and a closer relationship with Europe are in doubt. (Despite
its criticism of Russia's role in the crisis, Nato members are likely
to view the irresponsible and ill-considered actions of Tbilisi with
dismay). Russia invaded the territory of a sovereign state and used
disproportionate and sometimes indiscriminate force - particularly
air power.
The US, which has the most influence over Saakashvili, could have at
least restrained Tbilisi's actions. Europe, too, has influence but
failed to use it. The West stood and watched as Tbilisi ratcheted
up its military activity and rhetoric, but failed to prevent the
crisis. Now it is the western partners of Georgia who most probably
will be called upon to rebuild the country once Russia has finished
its punitive actions.
Abkhaz and Russian forces are completing the tearing up of the
1994 Moscow Agreement which governs the peace process in Abkhazia by
removing Georgian forces from the Kodori Valley in Georgia's Svanetian
region. This will effectively re-establish Abkhazia as it was before
the break up of the Soviet Union.
Through its actions in South Ossetia, Georgia has lost any moral
position it had in relation to its two separatist regions; the
painstaking peace processes that started between 1992 and 1994 are in
tatters. In both regions there is a growing sense that their future
lies with or within Russia and not with Georgia and her partners.
The presence of 3,000 Russian troops in Abkhazia underwrites the
security of that territory and may lead the Abkhaz leadership to
request the withdrawal of the UN Observer Mission (UNOMIG). And the
Russian troops from the 58th Army who are now ensconced in South
Ossetia are likely to stay for the foreseeable future - as will the
Russian military contingent in Abkhazia.
What happens next? For Georgia the dream that followed the 2003
Rose Revolution of a united country within the western community has
been shattered. By any normal calculation, President Saakashvili's
unpredictable and emotional behaviour, which has damaged his country
irreparably, would lead to his removal. However, for the moment at
least it appears that the Georgian people support him as he vows to
continue the struggle against Russian domination.
For Russia there is an extension of influence into the energy corridor
of the West and an iron grip on the South Caucasus. Paradoxically, the
Russian war in Georgia is likely to have had the effect of reducing the
likelihood of conflict in Nagorno-Karabakh. It will have also secured
the region for the Winter Olympics in Sochi in 2014, by removing any
destabilising threat.
There will have to be a re-appraisal of Moscow's relationship with
Washington and Europe, of course. The architect of the Russian action
was former President Vladimir Putin, who has long wanted to be seen
as the strongman underwriting Russia's renewed great power status
against the US and its partners.
Given the virulent rhetoric of both Medvedev and Saakashvili towards
each other it is hard to see how there can possibly be a return to
the "status quo ante bellum" and a resumption of the peace processes
governing the two conflict zones in Georgia. There will most likely
be some kind of talks, possibly brokered by France along the lines
put forward by the French foreign minister, Bernard Kouchner.
However, having gone so far in achieving long sought after objectives,
Moscow is unlikely to continue to uphold the idea of "territorial
integrity" enshrined in the 1994 Moscow Agreement. President
Saakashvili, for his part, will continue to demand the return of the
territories as he has promised to the Georgian people.
With positions entrenched in this way there is likely to be a
long-lasting stalemate. Georgia has lost any ability it had to get back
South Ossetia and Abkhazia by force. These regions will most likely
become more independent - with or without international recognition -
and Russian dominance over them will strengthen, with the possibility
of South Ossetia uniting with North Ossetia in the Russian Federation.
Col Christopher Langton is Senior Fellow for Conflict & Defence
Diplomacy at the International Institute for Strategic Studies, London
From: Emil Lazarian | Ararat NewsPress