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SOLVING THE CRISIS IN THE CAUCASUS
Greg Bruno
Council on Foreign Relations
Aug 19 2008
NY
Intense fighting between Russia and Georgia erupted on August 7 after
years of antagonistic rhetoric (NYT). After routing Georgian troops
in the breakaway region of South Ossetia, Russian forces launched an
invasion into the rest of Georgia, occupying several towns.
A cease-fire negotiated by French President Nicholas Sarkozy called for
Russian and Georgian forces to return to pre-conflict positions. But
reports of violations by both sides have raised concern about ongoing
hostilities. Russian officials have said their actions are necessary
to protect peacekeepers and citizens in the breakaway regions of South
Ossetia and Abkhazia. President Bush has ordered the U.S. military to
deliver humanitarian supplies to the region, and demanded that Moscow
"keep its word and act to end the crisis." As global leaders scramble
to find a solution, CFR.org asked five regional experts what must
be done to end the violence and create a climate where lasting peace
can be nurtured.
The Ossetian war has entirely transformed the situation in Georgia. In
the short term, the six-point agreement negotiated by Russian President
Dmitri Medvedev and French President Nicholas Sarkozy, and accepted
by Tbilisi, forms the basis for the cease-fire. The old peacekeeping
formula cannot be revived. For the time being, Russian forces are
creating security belts around both South Ossetia and Abkhazia. The
only neutral presence in the region recognized by all sides can be
that of European monitors.
There lies a chance for Europe, and above all, the European Union, to
move forward with facilitating conflict resolution. The hardest issue
will be that of the final status of South Ossetia and Abkhazia. It
is crystal clear that they will not revert to Georgia. It is also
clear that no political leader in Georgia is ready to admit that. A
long process of negotiations and agonizing reflection lies ahead,
and it will only be completed when borders are finally recognized by
all parties, and confirmed by the international community.
At present, European countries are divided in their assessment of
the war and Russia's reaction. Moscow will seek to reach out to those
which, like France, Germany, Italy, and Spain, take a more moderate
line, and hopes to work with them on a broad security agenda for the
continent. Beyond conflict resolution in Georgia, it includes such
issues as the Ukrainian leadership's bid to join NATO [the North
Atlantic Treaty Organization] and the U.S. plans to deploy elements
of the ballistic missile defense system in Central Europe. With the
Georgian conflict finally erupted, the two issues are looming even
more prominently on the horizon.
Russia's relations with the United States have been
deteriorating. Moscow blames Washington for having trained and
equipped the Georgian military that has been responsible for killing
about two thousand Russian citizens in the nighttime shelling of the
South Ossetian capital. That, they point out, amounts to half the
casualties the United States suffered on 9/11.
Rajan Menon, Monroe J. Rathbone Professor of International Relations,
Lehigh University; Fellow, New America Foundation
Like it or not, the balance of forces decisively favors Russia
(IHT). Feel-good ultimatums from us will merely increase Russia's
intransigence. And lofty rhetoric with implied promises to Georgia
that we cannot keep will only erode our credibility, further weakening
Georgia's position. As to specific steps, we should:
Coordinate efforts with the EU to craft a strategy for ensuring that
a permanent cease-fire agreement provides for a demilitarized South
Ossetia. Russia won't allow Georgian troops back into the enclave
in any event, but with the alleged Georgian "threat" to its client
removed, there is an opening to push for the withdrawal of Russian
forces.
Work with the EU to persuade Russia and the South Ossetians to accept
neutral, third-party peacekeepers in South Ossetia. Those deployed
there since the early 1990s hail from these three countries. Georgia
has never seen them as neutral--and certainly won't after this
war. Given the current animosity between Washington and Moscow,
the U.S. (short on troops in any event) should let EU or UN forces
handle peacekeeping.
Join with the EU to mobilize an international fund to fund the return
of refugees and postwar economic reconstruction. Our contribution
should be earmarked for Georgia. Russia poses as South Ossetia's
patron; let it bear the costs.
Call for "confidence-building measures" (demilitarized zones, advanced
warnings for troop movements, etc.) to promote stability and advise
the Georgians during negotiations relating to them.
Provide Georgia the means for self-defense, principally air defense
and anti-tank missiles--but on condition that it will not initiate
war against South Ossetia.
Push for a new mediation framework on the final status of South Ossetia
and Abkhazia. The long-drawn efforts led by the OSCE [Organization
for Security and Cooperation in Europe] and the UN respectively are
stuck. If this is to change (a long shot), Russia must pledge not to
attack Georgia or to annex South Ossetia; Georgia must promise not to
reintroduce troops into South Ossetia or attack it; and South Ossetia
must commit to negotiating with Georgia in good faith about a loose
confederation (realistically, the best outcome Georgia can now hope
for). Gaining these compromises will prove tough, but joint U.S.-EU
incentives can help.
Ariel Cohen, Senior Research Fellow, the Heritage Foundation's Kathryn
and Shelby Cullom Davis Institute for International Studies
To restore order in the short term, the U.S. should make sure that
Russia signs and respects the cease-fire negotiated by French President
Nicolas Sarkozy. The U.S. should also continue pressure within the
United Nations Security Council and the General Assembly to achieve a
resolution that will voice full and unequivocal support for Georgian
territorial integrity, including Abkhazia and South Ossetia, and for
Russian troop withdrawal in accordance to the signed agreement.
Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice should also coordinate support
for condemning Russian aggression in Georgia among our European
allies. The U.S. should encourage OSCE and EU and the United Nations
to send international observers to Georgia in order to facilitate
withdrawal of the Russian forces. The U.S. and its European allies
should communicate to Moscow that its aggression will not stand
and cannot be accomplished without irreparable harm to Russia's
international standing for decades to come.
Longer term, the U.S. and Europe should lead the world in demanding
that Russia withdraw all its troops from all the territory of Georgia
and recognize Georgia's territorial integrity.
They should convey to Russia that its invasion of Georgia has forfeited
its membership in the G8 and may derail its aspirations to join the
World Trade Organization and to host the 2014 Winter Olympics in Sochi,
only twenty kilometers from Georgia.
Washington needs to push for other great powers to speak out,
including Germany, France, India, Brazil, Japan, Korea, Turkey,
and China. This support would "globalize" the condemnation.
In order to resolve the deeper roots of the crisis, the U.S. should
begin talks at a neutral forum such as the OSCE to finally settle
the South Ossetian and Abkhazian problems. This can be done by
granting these territories full autonomy within the Georgian state,
as Tbilisi has repeatedly suggested. This dialogue, propelled by
the U.S. and European leaderships through incentive packages and
security guarantees, could serve as the basis for a more comprehensive
resolution of other conflicts in the former Soviet zone, such as
Nagorno-Karabakh between Azerbaijan and Armenia.
Finally, the U.S. and its European allies should coordinate policies
of expanded security cooperation with the countries of the former
Soviet Union to avoid the recurrence of the current Caucasus war.
Charles A. Kupchan, senior fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations
and professor of international affairs at Georgetown University
It is too soon to tell whether the ongoing conflict in Georgia will
constitute a turning point in the evolution of the post-Cold War
world. From one perspective, Russia's invasion of Georgia demonstrates
that Moscow will not be the responsible stakeholder that many had
hoped for. Accordingly, the West must transition from a strategy of
cautiously engaging Russia to one of isolation and containment. From
another perspective, Russia's actions constitute a disproportionate
reaction to the escalation of fighting in South Ossetia, but not
a clear sign that Russia has again embraced the path of imperial
aggression.
Georgia and Russia both bear responsibility for the outbreak of
conflict. Since taking office, Georgian President Mikheil Saakashvili
has consistently embraced a blustery brand of nationalism, vowing to
"liberate" and "reclaim" the breakaway regions of South Ossetia and
Abkhazia. Moscow has been only too eager to take up the gauntlet
thrown down by Saakashvili. Russia has backed separatists in both
regions and, especially after the secession of Kosovo from Serbia,
taken a series of provocative actions that emboldened its Abkhaz and
South Ossetian allies.
Saakashvili's taunts aside, Russia's overreaction reveals a new and
worrying muscularity and is emblematic of its disaffection with
U.S. and European policy. From Moscow's perspective, a series of
developments--including the ongoing expansion of NATO, the prospective
deployment of a missile defense system in Central Europe, and the
separation of Kosovo from Serbia--demonstrated the West's disregard
for Russia's legitimate security interests. Now that the Kremlin is
flush with oil revenue and Russia's government is again in control of
the state, the conflict over Georgia serves as a proxy for Russia's
attempt to push back against the West and reassert its influence in
its periphery.
As it seeks to discern Russia's longer term intentions and determine
whether the current crisis represents the return of Russian imperialism
or more of a detour on the way to Russia's potential integration
into a cooperative international order, the West should focus on the
following questions.
â~@¢ Does Russia withdraw its troops from Georgia proper in a timely
fashion, or maintain its military presence in Georgia and seek to
turn the country into a satellite?
â~@¢ Does Russia readily allow international assistance to arrive
and permit international monitors and peacekeepers to deploy quickly,
or does Moscow appear intent on occupying Georgia or controlling it
through coercion?
â~@¢ Does Russia withdraw the bulk of its troops from Abkhazia and
South Ossetia and engage in good-faith negotiations over the political
status of both territories, or does it capitalize on its military
occupation to annex both regions?
â~@¢ Does Russia refrain from obstructing Georgia's own political and
economic choices about ties to the West, or does it compromise the
flow of oil and gas through Georgia, attempt to intimidate Tbilisi,
and seek to veto its strategic and economic ties to the West?
Alan Mendoza, Executive Director, The Henry Jackson Society: Project
for Democratic Geopolitics
Short-term order can only be restored by full compliance
with the cease-fire stipulations. Currently, Russia remains
disinclined to withdraw its forces from Georgia, let alone South
Ossetia. International pressure should be placed on Russia to
ensure that it downgrades its role to a 'peacekeeping' level,
notwithstanding the fallacy of its role as a dispassionate observer
through its military invasion. The withdrawal must be accompanied by
an international observer element to counter any Russian temptation
to backslide. Russian forces cannot remain in Georgia beyond South
Ossetia: This will only spark resentment and provide for conflict
perpetuation, not resolution.
The orchestration of an aggressive forward strategy in this conflict
by Moscow marks the evolution of Russian foreign policy to a highly
dangerous level. Russia has previously used political, economic,
and technological methods to punish those neighbouring states it
deems to have attempted to escape its influence, as Ukraine, Estonia
and Lithuania can all testify. The invasion of sovereign territory
is of a qualitatively different order, being an open breach of
international law and incapable of being defended on either preemptive
or preventative national security grounds. If Russia is now allowed
to claim a diplomatic victory, the military option will remain firmly
on its table and aggressive, expansionist Russian nationalism--the
real root cause of the conflict--will be emboldened.
In response, the West must show that violence will be punished, not
rewarded. The Russia-inclusive G8 should be sidelined in favour of
the G7, and Russian OECD [Organization for Economic Cooperation and
Development] and WTO entry stalled. EU members need to develop a joint
approach to alternative energy supply, rather than striking bilateral
deals. Crucially, there must be no delay in NATO's consideration of
Georgian and Ukrainian membership. It would be fitting if the issue
that underlay Russia's belligerence could be used to demonstrate the
futility of such aggression.
--Boundary_(ID_Sl3jagE4vVeSyEcKuCsHbg )--
Greg Bruno
Council on Foreign Relations
Aug 19 2008
NY
Intense fighting between Russia and Georgia erupted on August 7 after
years of antagonistic rhetoric (NYT). After routing Georgian troops
in the breakaway region of South Ossetia, Russian forces launched an
invasion into the rest of Georgia, occupying several towns.
A cease-fire negotiated by French President Nicholas Sarkozy called for
Russian and Georgian forces to return to pre-conflict positions. But
reports of violations by both sides have raised concern about ongoing
hostilities. Russian officials have said their actions are necessary
to protect peacekeepers and citizens in the breakaway regions of South
Ossetia and Abkhazia. President Bush has ordered the U.S. military to
deliver humanitarian supplies to the region, and demanded that Moscow
"keep its word and act to end the crisis." As global leaders scramble
to find a solution, CFR.org asked five regional experts what must
be done to end the violence and create a climate where lasting peace
can be nurtured.
The Ossetian war has entirely transformed the situation in Georgia. In
the short term, the six-point agreement negotiated by Russian President
Dmitri Medvedev and French President Nicholas Sarkozy, and accepted
by Tbilisi, forms the basis for the cease-fire. The old peacekeeping
formula cannot be revived. For the time being, Russian forces are
creating security belts around both South Ossetia and Abkhazia. The
only neutral presence in the region recognized by all sides can be
that of European monitors.
There lies a chance for Europe, and above all, the European Union, to
move forward with facilitating conflict resolution. The hardest issue
will be that of the final status of South Ossetia and Abkhazia. It
is crystal clear that they will not revert to Georgia. It is also
clear that no political leader in Georgia is ready to admit that. A
long process of negotiations and agonizing reflection lies ahead,
and it will only be completed when borders are finally recognized by
all parties, and confirmed by the international community.
At present, European countries are divided in their assessment of
the war and Russia's reaction. Moscow will seek to reach out to those
which, like France, Germany, Italy, and Spain, take a more moderate
line, and hopes to work with them on a broad security agenda for the
continent. Beyond conflict resolution in Georgia, it includes such
issues as the Ukrainian leadership's bid to join NATO [the North
Atlantic Treaty Organization] and the U.S. plans to deploy elements
of the ballistic missile defense system in Central Europe. With the
Georgian conflict finally erupted, the two issues are looming even
more prominently on the horizon.
Russia's relations with the United States have been
deteriorating. Moscow blames Washington for having trained and
equipped the Georgian military that has been responsible for killing
about two thousand Russian citizens in the nighttime shelling of the
South Ossetian capital. That, they point out, amounts to half the
casualties the United States suffered on 9/11.
Rajan Menon, Monroe J. Rathbone Professor of International Relations,
Lehigh University; Fellow, New America Foundation
Like it or not, the balance of forces decisively favors Russia
(IHT). Feel-good ultimatums from us will merely increase Russia's
intransigence. And lofty rhetoric with implied promises to Georgia
that we cannot keep will only erode our credibility, further weakening
Georgia's position. As to specific steps, we should:
Coordinate efforts with the EU to craft a strategy for ensuring that
a permanent cease-fire agreement provides for a demilitarized South
Ossetia. Russia won't allow Georgian troops back into the enclave
in any event, but with the alleged Georgian "threat" to its client
removed, there is an opening to push for the withdrawal of Russian
forces.
Work with the EU to persuade Russia and the South Ossetians to accept
neutral, third-party peacekeepers in South Ossetia. Those deployed
there since the early 1990s hail from these three countries. Georgia
has never seen them as neutral--and certainly won't after this
war. Given the current animosity between Washington and Moscow,
the U.S. (short on troops in any event) should let EU or UN forces
handle peacekeeping.
Join with the EU to mobilize an international fund to fund the return
of refugees and postwar economic reconstruction. Our contribution
should be earmarked for Georgia. Russia poses as South Ossetia's
patron; let it bear the costs.
Call for "confidence-building measures" (demilitarized zones, advanced
warnings for troop movements, etc.) to promote stability and advise
the Georgians during negotiations relating to them.
Provide Georgia the means for self-defense, principally air defense
and anti-tank missiles--but on condition that it will not initiate
war against South Ossetia.
Push for a new mediation framework on the final status of South Ossetia
and Abkhazia. The long-drawn efforts led by the OSCE [Organization
for Security and Cooperation in Europe] and the UN respectively are
stuck. If this is to change (a long shot), Russia must pledge not to
attack Georgia or to annex South Ossetia; Georgia must promise not to
reintroduce troops into South Ossetia or attack it; and South Ossetia
must commit to negotiating with Georgia in good faith about a loose
confederation (realistically, the best outcome Georgia can now hope
for). Gaining these compromises will prove tough, but joint U.S.-EU
incentives can help.
Ariel Cohen, Senior Research Fellow, the Heritage Foundation's Kathryn
and Shelby Cullom Davis Institute for International Studies
To restore order in the short term, the U.S. should make sure that
Russia signs and respects the cease-fire negotiated by French President
Nicolas Sarkozy. The U.S. should also continue pressure within the
United Nations Security Council and the General Assembly to achieve a
resolution that will voice full and unequivocal support for Georgian
territorial integrity, including Abkhazia and South Ossetia, and for
Russian troop withdrawal in accordance to the signed agreement.
Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice should also coordinate support
for condemning Russian aggression in Georgia among our European
allies. The U.S. should encourage OSCE and EU and the United Nations
to send international observers to Georgia in order to facilitate
withdrawal of the Russian forces. The U.S. and its European allies
should communicate to Moscow that its aggression will not stand
and cannot be accomplished without irreparable harm to Russia's
international standing for decades to come.
Longer term, the U.S. and Europe should lead the world in demanding
that Russia withdraw all its troops from all the territory of Georgia
and recognize Georgia's territorial integrity.
They should convey to Russia that its invasion of Georgia has forfeited
its membership in the G8 and may derail its aspirations to join the
World Trade Organization and to host the 2014 Winter Olympics in Sochi,
only twenty kilometers from Georgia.
Washington needs to push for other great powers to speak out,
including Germany, France, India, Brazil, Japan, Korea, Turkey,
and China. This support would "globalize" the condemnation.
In order to resolve the deeper roots of the crisis, the U.S. should
begin talks at a neutral forum such as the OSCE to finally settle
the South Ossetian and Abkhazian problems. This can be done by
granting these territories full autonomy within the Georgian state,
as Tbilisi has repeatedly suggested. This dialogue, propelled by
the U.S. and European leaderships through incentive packages and
security guarantees, could serve as the basis for a more comprehensive
resolution of other conflicts in the former Soviet zone, such as
Nagorno-Karabakh between Azerbaijan and Armenia.
Finally, the U.S. and its European allies should coordinate policies
of expanded security cooperation with the countries of the former
Soviet Union to avoid the recurrence of the current Caucasus war.
Charles A. Kupchan, senior fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations
and professor of international affairs at Georgetown University
It is too soon to tell whether the ongoing conflict in Georgia will
constitute a turning point in the evolution of the post-Cold War
world. From one perspective, Russia's invasion of Georgia demonstrates
that Moscow will not be the responsible stakeholder that many had
hoped for. Accordingly, the West must transition from a strategy of
cautiously engaging Russia to one of isolation and containment. From
another perspective, Russia's actions constitute a disproportionate
reaction to the escalation of fighting in South Ossetia, but not
a clear sign that Russia has again embraced the path of imperial
aggression.
Georgia and Russia both bear responsibility for the outbreak of
conflict. Since taking office, Georgian President Mikheil Saakashvili
has consistently embraced a blustery brand of nationalism, vowing to
"liberate" and "reclaim" the breakaway regions of South Ossetia and
Abkhazia. Moscow has been only too eager to take up the gauntlet
thrown down by Saakashvili. Russia has backed separatists in both
regions and, especially after the secession of Kosovo from Serbia,
taken a series of provocative actions that emboldened its Abkhaz and
South Ossetian allies.
Saakashvili's taunts aside, Russia's overreaction reveals a new and
worrying muscularity and is emblematic of its disaffection with
U.S. and European policy. From Moscow's perspective, a series of
developments--including the ongoing expansion of NATO, the prospective
deployment of a missile defense system in Central Europe, and the
separation of Kosovo from Serbia--demonstrated the West's disregard
for Russia's legitimate security interests. Now that the Kremlin is
flush with oil revenue and Russia's government is again in control of
the state, the conflict over Georgia serves as a proxy for Russia's
attempt to push back against the West and reassert its influence in
its periphery.
As it seeks to discern Russia's longer term intentions and determine
whether the current crisis represents the return of Russian imperialism
or more of a detour on the way to Russia's potential integration
into a cooperative international order, the West should focus on the
following questions.
â~@¢ Does Russia withdraw its troops from Georgia proper in a timely
fashion, or maintain its military presence in Georgia and seek to
turn the country into a satellite?
â~@¢ Does Russia readily allow international assistance to arrive
and permit international monitors and peacekeepers to deploy quickly,
or does Moscow appear intent on occupying Georgia or controlling it
through coercion?
â~@¢ Does Russia withdraw the bulk of its troops from Abkhazia and
South Ossetia and engage in good-faith negotiations over the political
status of both territories, or does it capitalize on its military
occupation to annex both regions?
â~@¢ Does Russia refrain from obstructing Georgia's own political and
economic choices about ties to the West, or does it compromise the
flow of oil and gas through Georgia, attempt to intimidate Tbilisi,
and seek to veto its strategic and economic ties to the West?
Alan Mendoza, Executive Director, The Henry Jackson Society: Project
for Democratic Geopolitics
Short-term order can only be restored by full compliance
with the cease-fire stipulations. Currently, Russia remains
disinclined to withdraw its forces from Georgia, let alone South
Ossetia. International pressure should be placed on Russia to
ensure that it downgrades its role to a 'peacekeeping' level,
notwithstanding the fallacy of its role as a dispassionate observer
through its military invasion. The withdrawal must be accompanied by
an international observer element to counter any Russian temptation
to backslide. Russian forces cannot remain in Georgia beyond South
Ossetia: This will only spark resentment and provide for conflict
perpetuation, not resolution.
The orchestration of an aggressive forward strategy in this conflict
by Moscow marks the evolution of Russian foreign policy to a highly
dangerous level. Russia has previously used political, economic,
and technological methods to punish those neighbouring states it
deems to have attempted to escape its influence, as Ukraine, Estonia
and Lithuania can all testify. The invasion of sovereign territory
is of a qualitatively different order, being an open breach of
international law and incapable of being defended on either preemptive
or preventative national security grounds. If Russia is now allowed
to claim a diplomatic victory, the military option will remain firmly
on its table and aggressive, expansionist Russian nationalism--the
real root cause of the conflict--will be emboldened.
In response, the West must show that violence will be punished, not
rewarded. The Russia-inclusive G8 should be sidelined in favour of
the G7, and Russian OECD [Organization for Economic Cooperation and
Development] and WTO entry stalled. EU members need to develop a joint
approach to alternative energy supply, rather than striking bilateral
deals. Crucially, there must be no delay in NATO's consideration of
Georgian and Ukrainian membership. It would be fitting if the issue
that underlay Russia's belligerence could be used to demonstrate the
futility of such aggression.
--Boundary_(ID_Sl3jagE4vVeSyEcKuCsHbg )--