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Saakashvili's Account of Events that Led to Conflict
Civil Georgia, Tbilisi / 25 Aug.'08 / 03:30
President Saakashvili said in his lengthy televised speech that it was
Russia and west's muted reaction to blame for the current crisis.
Saakashvili was speaking at a meeting with a group of lawmakers, including
from his ruling National Movement Party, as well as from the parliamentary
minority, late on August 24.
His speech, which lasted for over an hour and was aired live by the Georgian
television, was an attempt to explain to the Georgian audience what led to
the armed conflict with Russia.
For recent two weeks President Saakashvili was using western media
extensively appearing almost daily on the international TV networks to shape
public opinion abroad. His extensive televised speech at the meeting with
lawmakers was the first comprehensive attempt by Saakashvili to shape
opinion of the local audience, especially in the face of expected `tough
questions,' which some politicians, including ex-parliamentary speaker, Nino
Burjanadze, have warned to raise.
He started his speech by thanking lawmakers, including those from the
parliamentary minority, for demonstrating unity against the background of
the Russian occupation.
`It was the moment when lustration has happened,' he said. `There is no need
for law on lustration any more. Just look at what was said by whom
[referring to politicians' statements] and who was giving interviews to the
Russian media in recent days and everything will become clear.... Our unity is
a gallows for our enemy... We will overcome this misfortune if stay united.'
Saakashvili then started to recount major events in relationship with Russia
starting from very first days of his presidency in early 2004, when, as he
said, he tried to build constructive relations with Russia.
`From the very first day of my presidency I paid visit to Russia. I thought
it was a very good meeting with Putin and we had very frank talks. The first
thing what he asked me was to strengthen border.'
He said that Russians were especially concerned about the situation in
Pankisi gorge, a north-eastern mountainous area in Georgia close to the
Russian border, and about illegal cross-border movement at the Chechen
section of border.
`I want to acknowledge that we really helped Russians in this. We stopped
arms trafficking and [illegal] cross-border movements,' Saakashvili said.
`Se have created a serious factor through which they [Russia] managed to
establish order.' [Also on this matter:
http://www.civil.ge/eng/article.php?id=6258]
Saak ashvili then recalled 2004 events in Adjara, when ex-leader of the
Autonomous Republic, Aslan Abashidze, was forced to flee to Russia.
Saakashvili said that Russia and in particular then Foreign Minister, Igor
Ivanov, did not at all play a positive role.
`But despite of this fact, next day [after Abashidze fled overnight on May
6] I phoned President Putin - because of politeness - and thanked for
accepting developments in Adjara with understanding,' Saakashvili said.
`I remember that conversation very well; on my polite remarks, he responded
roughly: `Now remember, in Adjara we did not intervene, but you won't have
any gifts from us in South Ossetia and Abkhazia.' That's what he said to
me.'
After that, Saakashvili continued, `series of provocations' started in
breakaway South Ossetia leading up to the clashes in summer, 2004.
He said that since then Russia, which was in direct control of situation on
the ground in Tskhinvali, was preventing any attempt of direct talks with
the local community in South Ossetia.
`The first major blow for Georgia came in January, 2006 when power line and
gas pipelines were exploded,' Saakashvili said.
He said that in the course of 2006 the Russian intelligence `started getting
very active,' including through, as he said, financing `Giorgadze's groups,'
as well through staging series of terrorist acts including in the town of
Gori, when blast killed three policemen and injured 27 other people.
Saakashvili recalled that Georgia arrested, as he put it, the Russian
military intelligence operative, Roman Boiko, for masterminding the Gori
blast. `But Russians asked us to quietly release him [Boiko] and to forget
this incident... We handed him over to Russia hoping that Russia would have
appreciated it,' Saakashvili said. `Now I think it was a mistake.'
After that incident the Russian intelligence, Saakashvili said, further
boosted their activities in Georgia.
`And as a result we were forced to demonstratively arrest several of their
military intelligence operatives,' he said, adding that Russia had further
extended already existing economic embargo on Georgia after that incident.
`But they have failed to achieve their goal through this economic embargo;
people did not come out in the street and did not overthrow the government,'
Saakashvili said.
Then he recalled November, 2007 events, but spoke briefly about it saying
that he did not think that `every participant of those events were
cooperating' with Russia.
He, however, said that the Georgian authorities possessed the information
passed by `the western intelligence services' according to which, he said,
that just before the November events two Russian criminal bosses, one of
them Vyacheslav Ivankov, with nickname Yaponchik, `who has close links with
the Russian leadership,' were visiting Georgia and Armenia. `They were
discussing various scenarios of regime change in Georgia,' Saakashvili said.
A military intervention was the only option left for Russia to overthrow the
government in Georgia, after all the other scenarios have failed,
Saakashvili said.
`I suppose that Russia started thinking about the military intervention in
Georgia sometime in 2007,' he said. `[In July, 2007] Russia announced about
pulling out from the Conventional Forces in Europe Treaty limiting military
forces in [Europe] and in Caucasus.'
Up to 3,000 Russian armored vehicles of various types rolled into Georgia,
he said.
`We had only 200 tanks, because we had no right to have more according to
the treaty; Russia brushed off its commitments by withdrawing from the
treaty,' Saakashvili said.
He then once again criticized `western partners' for not paying enough
attention to this move by Russia.
`It was obvious that they would not need 3,000 tanks for Chechnya in 2007. I
was telling this to many western partners: just look what Russia is doing;
it is simply concentrating military hardware on the Georgian border. Was not
that a signal that something was being prepared?' he said.
Saakashvili then recalled then President Putin's visit to Dagestan in North
Caucasus in February, 2008 and remarks made there, when he instructed the
Russian authorities to reconstruct the road leading from Dagestan to Georgia's
Kakheti region. The only legal land road between Georgia and Russia is
closed down by Moscow since 2006.
`Should not have these remarks by Putin been a wakeup call for the world?'
Saakashvili asked. `These remarks were aired by the strictly censored
Russian television stations, meaning that he [Putin] wanted the world to
hear this.'
`But there was a zero reaction from the world,' he said.
He also slammed EU's reaction to the Russia's admission of violation of the
Georgian airspace in July.
`This admission by Russia was a clear sign that they were testing western
reaction,' Saakashvili said. `It took six days for EU to make a statement
about it and the statement was just saying: we call on the both sides to
refrain from provocations. It was in fact inviting Russia to do something
else, because [the EU statement] amounted to saying: we are not interfering
in this matter. That was very alarming reaction that led to what then
happened.'
Saakashvili also said that there was again international silence when the
Russian forces started military exercises in the North Caucasus practicing
in `peace enforcement in Georgia.'
`They [Russia] were saying it publicly deliberately to see what kind of
reaction it would have; but it was silence again; zero [international]
reaction,' Saakashvili said.
He also said that when he was warning western leaders about possible Russian
military intervention, they were, he said, `thinking that I was
exaggerating.'
In February, 2008 Saakashvili said, he had met with Putin and after the
meeting he had an impression that `Russia was threatening with war.'
Then there was a NATO summit in Bucharest in April, he said, `which made a
strategic mistake.'
`Instead of giving to us NATO membership action plan [MAP], they [NATO]
said: we are not giving MAP to Georgia because there are conflicts, but we
will get back to this issue in December,' Saakashvili said. `Saying this
amounted to telling Russia: do something before December, otherwise in
December Georgia may get MAP.'
He said that Georgia was limited in options. `Saying no to NATO would not
have given us any guarantee,' he said.
Saakashvili pointed out that he had explained to western leaders, including
to German Chancellor Angela Merkel and U.S. President George W. Bush, that
Russia's decision to repair railway in breakaway Abkhazia's Ochamchire
district only aimed at preparing for bringing in troops and military
hardware for intervention in Georgia.
He then confirmed for the first time reports about offering Russia to divide
Abkhazia into spheres of influence.
`I tried to somehow negotiate with Russia,' Saakashvili said. `I've sent a
letter to the Russian President [Dmitry Medvedev] telling him let's
negotiate: your peacekeepers are clearly delegitimized and let's agree on
the following: area up to Kodori rive, involving Gali and Ochamchire
districts [of Abkhazia] are almost empty and people are not living there;
let's return displaced persons on the first stage to those areas; move your
peacekeepers on the Kodori river and we are ready to sign a new agreement
through which the Georgia's territorial integrity will be protected, but
your interests will also be taken into account.'
`If Russia really wanted to avert war, they would have agreed on such a good
proposal for them; they in fact were getting through this proposal
protection of their economic interests and somehow legalizing their presence
[in Abkhazia] with our consent and on the other hand we also were
benefiting, because we would have launched return of people and economic
projects,' Saakashvili said.
The Russia's response, he continued, apparently written by the Foreign
Ministry, however, amounted `to making fun of us.'
`The response said that at this stage it was too early to speak about the
return of displaced persons to Abkhazia,' he said.
Saakashvili also said that his first meeting with Medvedev in June in St.
Petersburg was `very good.'
During the next meeting with Medvedev in Astana in July, however, he said,
the Russian President's `stance was totally changed.'
`It was clear that some other forces came into play,' he said. `He
[Medvedev] started to push for the new conditions, like immediately pull
back from upper Kodori gorge, the demand, which was totally impossible to
fulfill. So it was clear that they were not willing to negotiate. So I had
an impression after that meeting that he [Medvedev] knew something, which I
did not know... I had a gloomy mood after that meeting, because it was clear
that they [Russia] was preparing for something bad.'
Saakashvili pointed out that the Georgian authorities expected Russia's
attack from the Abkhaz direction, rather than from South Ossetia, `so major
forces' of the Georgian army were deployed in the west.
He said that as situation started to deteriorate on August 7, `we moved one
brigade [of the Georgian armed forces] closer to South Ossetia, and later
another [brigade] as well.'
`But our major forces were still deployed in the west; there was a brigade
at Senaki [military base] and we did not call back our brigade from Iraq,
because I was deeply convinced up to the last minute that Russia would not
have done such a large-scale provocation,' Saakashvili said.
`Although we were under fire from the 120mm mortar launchers I announced a
unilateral ceasefire; at that time we already had one killed soldiers in the
village of Avnevi and four others were wounded; [Georgian Defense Minister
Davit] Kezerashvili was begging me to let him open artillery fire, because,
he was telling me, otherwise he was not able to bring [wounded soldiers]
from [the village]. But my response was that we could not open fire whatever
happened,' Saakashvili said.
He said that the Georgian side tried to communicate with the Russian
authorities, but they were claiming as if they were no longer controlling
South Ossetian separatist authorities and their militiamen.
He said that information came late on August 7 that the Russian military
hardware was rolling through Roki Tunnel into South Ossetia. He said that
Georgia was observing existing agreements and had no heavy arms in the
Georgian-controlled areas of the breakaway region.
`So the only way to stop their [Russian forces and South Ossetian militias]
movement into the Georgian villages was to use medium-size artillery for
blowing up the bridge at Didi Gupta and for [closing] the road coming from
Roki Tunnel... So as soon as they [the Russian tanks] started to roll into
South Ossetia we started firing to the road [at Roki Tunnel]; at the same
time we were responding to the fire coming from the South Ossetian positions
including from the center of Tskhinvali, their government headquarters and
from their Defense Ministry,' he said.
Saakashvili also said that he `strictly ordered' not to fire in direction of
civilian population and `this order was fully observed.'
`We conducted our first flight [apparently by SU-25 warplanes available in
the Georgian army] at dawn [August 8] in direction of Java and Roki Tunnel
and our pilots informed us that whole area was full of the Russian
military,' he said and added that it was impossible for such large number
of the Russian army to concentrate in the area just overnight.
By saying this Saakashvili was apparently trying to counter the Russia's
claims that it has sent its troops into South Ossetia only after the
Georgian forces started to attack Tskhinvali.
`If someone thinks that it was Georgia, which triggered what had happened,
should better realize how it was possible to bring in such large army only
in hours; this is unreal,' Saakashvili said.
He has also claimed that Russian army's, as he put it, unnoticed
infiltration into South Ossetia before the conflict started was `a failure
of the international intelligence.'
`When we are asking our western partners: did not you see them coming, they
are responding that their satellites were directed mainly on Iraq and that
they could not fly over [Georgia], but it was impossible to see what was
happening on the ground because it was cloudy. So it was a serious failure
of the international intelligence; they would not have hidden this
information from us, if they knew it; but they also did not know it,' he
said.
He also said that the Georgian artillery had destroyed `large part of this
Russian military in Java during the early stage of the conflict.
`The 4th brigade and the military unit from Kojori have destroyed hundreds
of soldiers... and Gen. [Anatoly] Khrulev [a commander of Russia's 58th army]
was wounded. After that Putin arrived in Vladikavkaz, mobilizes entire
forces and Russia's entire forces moved towards Georgia... Russians conducted
200 combat flights' Saakashvili said.
`We managed to stop them on the first day, on the second day and on the
third day 500 more armored vehicles started moving into Georgia [from Roki
Tunnel],' he added.
He then justified withdrawal of the Georgian forces from South Ossetia and
adjacent areas saying that it would have been impossible to stop additional
500 units of the Russian armored vehicles and the Georgian troops were under
the risk of `destruction.'
`So we took that decision [to pull back]; this was the time when the world
started waking up,' Saakashvili said. `One hour after the President Bush's
statement [Russian] tanks stopped rolling [in direction of Tbilisi].'
He said that the Georgian soldiers `fought hard,' although acknowledged that
`there could have been some mistakes in planning.'
In the end of his speech, Saakashvili said that Russia's goal was `to
collapse the Georgia's economy; to trigger chaos and as a result to put an
end to the Georgian statehood.'
`Our goal is to overcome [the economic] crisis; it will take three or four
months; it won't be easy, but we will overcome this heavy crisis in three or
fourth months and in next year or year and a half Georgia's economy will
again start to grow rapidly,' Saakashvili said.
`The main thing what we have gained from everything that happened is that
our positions became very strong. If so far foreigners were telling us:
negotiate yourself [over the conflict settlement], we have no time for you;
now it has become the problem for the world,' he added.
Civil Georgia, Tbilisi / 25 Aug.'08 / 03:30
President Saakashvili said in his lengthy televised speech that it was
Russia and west's muted reaction to blame for the current crisis.
Saakashvili was speaking at a meeting with a group of lawmakers, including
from his ruling National Movement Party, as well as from the parliamentary
minority, late on August 24.
His speech, which lasted for over an hour and was aired live by the Georgian
television, was an attempt to explain to the Georgian audience what led to
the armed conflict with Russia.
For recent two weeks President Saakashvili was using western media
extensively appearing almost daily on the international TV networks to shape
public opinion abroad. His extensive televised speech at the meeting with
lawmakers was the first comprehensive attempt by Saakashvili to shape
opinion of the local audience, especially in the face of expected `tough
questions,' which some politicians, including ex-parliamentary speaker, Nino
Burjanadze, have warned to raise.
He started his speech by thanking lawmakers, including those from the
parliamentary minority, for demonstrating unity against the background of
the Russian occupation.
`It was the moment when lustration has happened,' he said. `There is no need
for law on lustration any more. Just look at what was said by whom
[referring to politicians' statements] and who was giving interviews to the
Russian media in recent days and everything will become clear.... Our unity is
a gallows for our enemy... We will overcome this misfortune if stay united.'
Saakashvili then started to recount major events in relationship with Russia
starting from very first days of his presidency in early 2004, when, as he
said, he tried to build constructive relations with Russia.
`From the very first day of my presidency I paid visit to Russia. I thought
it was a very good meeting with Putin and we had very frank talks. The first
thing what he asked me was to strengthen border.'
He said that Russians were especially concerned about the situation in
Pankisi gorge, a north-eastern mountainous area in Georgia close to the
Russian border, and about illegal cross-border movement at the Chechen
section of border.
`I want to acknowledge that we really helped Russians in this. We stopped
arms trafficking and [illegal] cross-border movements,' Saakashvili said.
`Se have created a serious factor through which they [Russia] managed to
establish order.' [Also on this matter:
http://www.civil.ge/eng/article.php?id=6258]
Saak ashvili then recalled 2004 events in Adjara, when ex-leader of the
Autonomous Republic, Aslan Abashidze, was forced to flee to Russia.
Saakashvili said that Russia and in particular then Foreign Minister, Igor
Ivanov, did not at all play a positive role.
`But despite of this fact, next day [after Abashidze fled overnight on May
6] I phoned President Putin - because of politeness - and thanked for
accepting developments in Adjara with understanding,' Saakashvili said.
`I remember that conversation very well; on my polite remarks, he responded
roughly: `Now remember, in Adjara we did not intervene, but you won't have
any gifts from us in South Ossetia and Abkhazia.' That's what he said to
me.'
After that, Saakashvili continued, `series of provocations' started in
breakaway South Ossetia leading up to the clashes in summer, 2004.
He said that since then Russia, which was in direct control of situation on
the ground in Tskhinvali, was preventing any attempt of direct talks with
the local community in South Ossetia.
`The first major blow for Georgia came in January, 2006 when power line and
gas pipelines were exploded,' Saakashvili said.
He said that in the course of 2006 the Russian intelligence `started getting
very active,' including through, as he said, financing `Giorgadze's groups,'
as well through staging series of terrorist acts including in the town of
Gori, when blast killed three policemen and injured 27 other people.
Saakashvili recalled that Georgia arrested, as he put it, the Russian
military intelligence operative, Roman Boiko, for masterminding the Gori
blast. `But Russians asked us to quietly release him [Boiko] and to forget
this incident... We handed him over to Russia hoping that Russia would have
appreciated it,' Saakashvili said. `Now I think it was a mistake.'
After that incident the Russian intelligence, Saakashvili said, further
boosted their activities in Georgia.
`And as a result we were forced to demonstratively arrest several of their
military intelligence operatives,' he said, adding that Russia had further
extended already existing economic embargo on Georgia after that incident.
`But they have failed to achieve their goal through this economic embargo;
people did not come out in the street and did not overthrow the government,'
Saakashvili said.
Then he recalled November, 2007 events, but spoke briefly about it saying
that he did not think that `every participant of those events were
cooperating' with Russia.
He, however, said that the Georgian authorities possessed the information
passed by `the western intelligence services' according to which, he said,
that just before the November events two Russian criminal bosses, one of
them Vyacheslav Ivankov, with nickname Yaponchik, `who has close links with
the Russian leadership,' were visiting Georgia and Armenia. `They were
discussing various scenarios of regime change in Georgia,' Saakashvili said.
A military intervention was the only option left for Russia to overthrow the
government in Georgia, after all the other scenarios have failed,
Saakashvili said.
`I suppose that Russia started thinking about the military intervention in
Georgia sometime in 2007,' he said. `[In July, 2007] Russia announced about
pulling out from the Conventional Forces in Europe Treaty limiting military
forces in [Europe] and in Caucasus.'
Up to 3,000 Russian armored vehicles of various types rolled into Georgia,
he said.
`We had only 200 tanks, because we had no right to have more according to
the treaty; Russia brushed off its commitments by withdrawing from the
treaty,' Saakashvili said.
He then once again criticized `western partners' for not paying enough
attention to this move by Russia.
`It was obvious that they would not need 3,000 tanks for Chechnya in 2007. I
was telling this to many western partners: just look what Russia is doing;
it is simply concentrating military hardware on the Georgian border. Was not
that a signal that something was being prepared?' he said.
Saakashvili then recalled then President Putin's visit to Dagestan in North
Caucasus in February, 2008 and remarks made there, when he instructed the
Russian authorities to reconstruct the road leading from Dagestan to Georgia's
Kakheti region. The only legal land road between Georgia and Russia is
closed down by Moscow since 2006.
`Should not have these remarks by Putin been a wakeup call for the world?'
Saakashvili asked. `These remarks were aired by the strictly censored
Russian television stations, meaning that he [Putin] wanted the world to
hear this.'
`But there was a zero reaction from the world,' he said.
He also slammed EU's reaction to the Russia's admission of violation of the
Georgian airspace in July.
`This admission by Russia was a clear sign that they were testing western
reaction,' Saakashvili said. `It took six days for EU to make a statement
about it and the statement was just saying: we call on the both sides to
refrain from provocations. It was in fact inviting Russia to do something
else, because [the EU statement] amounted to saying: we are not interfering
in this matter. That was very alarming reaction that led to what then
happened.'
Saakashvili also said that there was again international silence when the
Russian forces started military exercises in the North Caucasus practicing
in `peace enforcement in Georgia.'
`They [Russia] were saying it publicly deliberately to see what kind of
reaction it would have; but it was silence again; zero [international]
reaction,' Saakashvili said.
He also said that when he was warning western leaders about possible Russian
military intervention, they were, he said, `thinking that I was
exaggerating.'
In February, 2008 Saakashvili said, he had met with Putin and after the
meeting he had an impression that `Russia was threatening with war.'
Then there was a NATO summit in Bucharest in April, he said, `which made a
strategic mistake.'
`Instead of giving to us NATO membership action plan [MAP], they [NATO]
said: we are not giving MAP to Georgia because there are conflicts, but we
will get back to this issue in December,' Saakashvili said. `Saying this
amounted to telling Russia: do something before December, otherwise in
December Georgia may get MAP.'
He said that Georgia was limited in options. `Saying no to NATO would not
have given us any guarantee,' he said.
Saakashvili pointed out that he had explained to western leaders, including
to German Chancellor Angela Merkel and U.S. President George W. Bush, that
Russia's decision to repair railway in breakaway Abkhazia's Ochamchire
district only aimed at preparing for bringing in troops and military
hardware for intervention in Georgia.
He then confirmed for the first time reports about offering Russia to divide
Abkhazia into spheres of influence.
`I tried to somehow negotiate with Russia,' Saakashvili said. `I've sent a
letter to the Russian President [Dmitry Medvedev] telling him let's
negotiate: your peacekeepers are clearly delegitimized and let's agree on
the following: area up to Kodori rive, involving Gali and Ochamchire
districts [of Abkhazia] are almost empty and people are not living there;
let's return displaced persons on the first stage to those areas; move your
peacekeepers on the Kodori river and we are ready to sign a new agreement
through which the Georgia's territorial integrity will be protected, but
your interests will also be taken into account.'
`If Russia really wanted to avert war, they would have agreed on such a good
proposal for them; they in fact were getting through this proposal
protection of their economic interests and somehow legalizing their presence
[in Abkhazia] with our consent and on the other hand we also were
benefiting, because we would have launched return of people and economic
projects,' Saakashvili said.
The Russia's response, he continued, apparently written by the Foreign
Ministry, however, amounted `to making fun of us.'
`The response said that at this stage it was too early to speak about the
return of displaced persons to Abkhazia,' he said.
Saakashvili also said that his first meeting with Medvedev in June in St.
Petersburg was `very good.'
During the next meeting with Medvedev in Astana in July, however, he said,
the Russian President's `stance was totally changed.'
`It was clear that some other forces came into play,' he said. `He
[Medvedev] started to push for the new conditions, like immediately pull
back from upper Kodori gorge, the demand, which was totally impossible to
fulfill. So it was clear that they were not willing to negotiate. So I had
an impression after that meeting that he [Medvedev] knew something, which I
did not know... I had a gloomy mood after that meeting, because it was clear
that they [Russia] was preparing for something bad.'
Saakashvili pointed out that the Georgian authorities expected Russia's
attack from the Abkhaz direction, rather than from South Ossetia, `so major
forces' of the Georgian army were deployed in the west.
He said that as situation started to deteriorate on August 7, `we moved one
brigade [of the Georgian armed forces] closer to South Ossetia, and later
another [brigade] as well.'
`But our major forces were still deployed in the west; there was a brigade
at Senaki [military base] and we did not call back our brigade from Iraq,
because I was deeply convinced up to the last minute that Russia would not
have done such a large-scale provocation,' Saakashvili said.
`Although we were under fire from the 120mm mortar launchers I announced a
unilateral ceasefire; at that time we already had one killed soldiers in the
village of Avnevi and four others were wounded; [Georgian Defense Minister
Davit] Kezerashvili was begging me to let him open artillery fire, because,
he was telling me, otherwise he was not able to bring [wounded soldiers]
from [the village]. But my response was that we could not open fire whatever
happened,' Saakashvili said.
He said that the Georgian side tried to communicate with the Russian
authorities, but they were claiming as if they were no longer controlling
South Ossetian separatist authorities and their militiamen.
He said that information came late on August 7 that the Russian military
hardware was rolling through Roki Tunnel into South Ossetia. He said that
Georgia was observing existing agreements and had no heavy arms in the
Georgian-controlled areas of the breakaway region.
`So the only way to stop their [Russian forces and South Ossetian militias]
movement into the Georgian villages was to use medium-size artillery for
blowing up the bridge at Didi Gupta and for [closing] the road coming from
Roki Tunnel... So as soon as they [the Russian tanks] started to roll into
South Ossetia we started firing to the road [at Roki Tunnel]; at the same
time we were responding to the fire coming from the South Ossetian positions
including from the center of Tskhinvali, their government headquarters and
from their Defense Ministry,' he said.
Saakashvili also said that he `strictly ordered' not to fire in direction of
civilian population and `this order was fully observed.'
`We conducted our first flight [apparently by SU-25 warplanes available in
the Georgian army] at dawn [August 8] in direction of Java and Roki Tunnel
and our pilots informed us that whole area was full of the Russian
military,' he said and added that it was impossible for such large number
of the Russian army to concentrate in the area just overnight.
By saying this Saakashvili was apparently trying to counter the Russia's
claims that it has sent its troops into South Ossetia only after the
Georgian forces started to attack Tskhinvali.
`If someone thinks that it was Georgia, which triggered what had happened,
should better realize how it was possible to bring in such large army only
in hours; this is unreal,' Saakashvili said.
He has also claimed that Russian army's, as he put it, unnoticed
infiltration into South Ossetia before the conflict started was `a failure
of the international intelligence.'
`When we are asking our western partners: did not you see them coming, they
are responding that their satellites were directed mainly on Iraq and that
they could not fly over [Georgia], but it was impossible to see what was
happening on the ground because it was cloudy. So it was a serious failure
of the international intelligence; they would not have hidden this
information from us, if they knew it; but they also did not know it,' he
said.
He also said that the Georgian artillery had destroyed `large part of this
Russian military in Java during the early stage of the conflict.
`The 4th brigade and the military unit from Kojori have destroyed hundreds
of soldiers... and Gen. [Anatoly] Khrulev [a commander of Russia's 58th army]
was wounded. After that Putin arrived in Vladikavkaz, mobilizes entire
forces and Russia's entire forces moved towards Georgia... Russians conducted
200 combat flights' Saakashvili said.
`We managed to stop them on the first day, on the second day and on the
third day 500 more armored vehicles started moving into Georgia [from Roki
Tunnel],' he added.
He then justified withdrawal of the Georgian forces from South Ossetia and
adjacent areas saying that it would have been impossible to stop additional
500 units of the Russian armored vehicles and the Georgian troops were under
the risk of `destruction.'
`So we took that decision [to pull back]; this was the time when the world
started waking up,' Saakashvili said. `One hour after the President Bush's
statement [Russian] tanks stopped rolling [in direction of Tbilisi].'
He said that the Georgian soldiers `fought hard,' although acknowledged that
`there could have been some mistakes in planning.'
In the end of his speech, Saakashvili said that Russia's goal was `to
collapse the Georgia's economy; to trigger chaos and as a result to put an
end to the Georgian statehood.'
`Our goal is to overcome [the economic] crisis; it will take three or four
months; it won't be easy, but we will overcome this heavy crisis in three or
fourth months and in next year or year and a half Georgia's economy will
again start to grow rapidly,' Saakashvili said.
`The main thing what we have gained from everything that happened is that
our positions became very strong. If so far foreigners were telling us:
negotiate yourself [over the conflict settlement], we have no time for you;
now it has become the problem for the world,' he added.