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Weekend Edition
July 5 / 6, 2008
An Indicator of National Reconciliation?
On Soccer and Politics in Lebanon
By KARIM MAKDISI
Amidst the torturous negotiations to form a `national' unity
government in Lebanon'and the rhetoric employed by both March 14 and
opposition members alike about building a strong `nation' to bind all
of Lebanon's communities'Lebanon's national soccer team recently
completed the last of six qualification round matches for the 2010
World Cup. The results have been nothing short of disastrous, with
consecutive `home' and `away' defeats to Saudi Arabia (1-4, 1-2),
Uzbekistan (0-1, 0-3), and Singapore (1-2, 0-2), and fourteen goals
conceded in the process. Far from being a trivial sporting matter, the
manner of Lebanon's defeats illustrates the Lebanese political class's
chronic lack of imagination and willful neglect of a genuine
nation-building project that could transcend sectarian or clientalist
considerations.
soccer and national projects have always gone hand-in-hand in the
modern period. The fascist Italian dictator, Benito Mussolini famously
used Italy's triumph in the second world cup of 1934 to bolster his
fascist project in Italy. Iran's memorable victory over the USA in the
1998 World Cup boosted not only Iranian nationalism but also third
world solidarity; while the shameful German-Austrian collaboration in
the 1982 World Cup (with the full knowledge of the political and
commercial interests) to deny a brilliant Algerian team from
progressing into the latter rounds recalled European colonial bullying
practices. India withdrew from the 1950 World Cup after their national
sensibilities were apparently slighted when their request to play with
bare feet was turned down by FIFA, the world soccer association. South
Korea's astonishing run to the world cup semi finals it co-hosted in
2002 expressed strong national solidarity, while the 2006 World Cup
showcased an attack-minded German team that clearly raised the
national morale and confidence of its German hosts. Indeed, soccer has
also been used to unite divided communities within a country as was
the case when France's 1998 World Cup triumph showcased a team
composed mostly of African and Arab origins, or when Spain's 2008
European Championship triumph brought together Castilians, Catalans
and even Basques under the banner of the Spanish flag.
soccer also tends to express certain collective traits or what might
be called `soccer culture.' Commentators and fans often conjure up,
albeit in admittedly stereotypical terms, national (or even regional)
characteristics such as Itay's cautious but effective catenaccio,
Germany's steely resolve, Holland's individualism, Spain's brittle
confidence, England's work ethic and inflated sense of self-worth,
Brazil's artistry, South Korea's collective spirit, Latin players'
flair and fiery temperament, and African players' power. Like all
clichés, of course, these descriptions in fact describe
particularly famous, or infamous, phases rather than unchangeable
realities. Brazil's decline on the world stage'measured in terms of
thrillingly uninhibited play, the only currency anyone really cares
about when discussing Brazil'depicts the flaws of such clichés,
as does Spain's recent victory in the European Championships where the
team's undoubted talent and spirit helped them beat their poor
confidence demons.
What of Lebanon's national `soccer culture' then? soccer is Lebanon's
national sport, with kids nation-wide utilizing what space is allowed
them within the concrete jungle that is now Lebanon to play, emulate
their heroes, and shout the iconic global soccer anthem: `g*****oaaal!'
Lebanese of all sects, classes and regions follow international soccer
tournaments passionately, and it is common for Lebanese to engage in
ritual bragging on the streets, obnoxiously honking cars, waving
flags, chanting as `their' team (usually European or Brazil) win an
important match. Yet soccer has never really been allowed to develop
by Lebanon's authorities that are ever mindful of protecting sectarian
identities and preventing a genuine national spirit from emerging. The
Lebanese soccer association remains highly politicized, and largely
discredited, while the league itself continues to be'inexplicably,
given the huge potential for development'non-professional and marked
by indiscipline and poor fitness. Moreover, star players'most recently
Rida Antar, Lebanon's most successful export who plays for FC Koln in
Germany'routinely turn their nose up at representing their country
with little or no negative consequences.
It is difficult then to identify Lebanese national soccer
characteristics beyond the traditional regional rivalries that have
been transformed into highly politicized sectarian ones. The teams
that play in Lebanon's top division are now generally identified by
overtly sectarian (and thus political) affiliation. Thus, al-Ansar is
a `Sunni' (read: Hariri) team, the new champions al-`Ahd are the
`Shia'a' (`Hizbullah') team, Homentmen are an Armenian team, Hikme a
Christian (Lebanese Forces) team, and al-Safa is a Druze (Jumblatt)
team. Some teams, most notably Nijme'a traditional powerhouse and one
of the most popular Lebanese teams'have indeed traditionally drawn
support from across the sectarian spectrum, but they are in real
danger of losing this national support given the highly charged
atmosphere that exists today. It is equally difficult to comprehend
why Lebanese soccer failed to evolve in national terms during the post
civil war period given both the commercial and nationalist appeal of
such a project. Like nearly all other national `civil society'
initiatives that failed during the 1990s, such as the environmental
and human rights movements, soccer's dangerous potential to unite
people was extinguished by its cooption by the sectarian elite and
indeed the largesse of former Prime Minister Rafiq Hariri who used
soccer not so much as a national unifier as much as a marketing tool
for his own controversial Reconstruction project.
The events of the past three years have produced two definitive
moments that further illustrate the Lebanese authorities' attitude and
explain why Lebanon's soccering future will remain bleak, just like
all national projects in Lebanon, so long as the existing political
class and system remains in place. The first was the Council of
Minister's decree in 2005 preventing fans from attending club matches,
meaning that such matches were held behind closed doors, a most
demoralizing punishment generally used by soccer associations
worldwide to sanction clubs in extreme cases of crowd trouble. The
explanation for this Council of Ministers' decision was that this was
a pre-emptive measure to avoid sectarian trouble-making among
Lebanon's partisan fans. Considering that the overtly sectarian nature
of the political discourse served by the political hacks and
politicians broadcast on television 24 hours a day was never seriously
addressed, this decision reinforced a clear philosophy of Lebanon's
ruling political class: `only we get to control and distribute
sectarian poison.' Perish the thought that the `Lebanese street' might
initiate or take control of its own destiny, or that this `street'
might actually behave in a more dignified manner than its
leaders. Such a scenario'genuine national unity, national
reconciliation outside of official control'is the biggest threat to
the established sectarian order in Lebanon. Even in light of the Doha
Agreement of 21 May, the Council of Minister's decree remains in
effect and there is no reason to think that it will be rescinded in
the near future.
The second illustrative moment occurred during the recent world cup
qualifying round matches against Saudi Arabia. It is customary
worldwide that group matches include `home' and `away' matches for the
teams drawn together. On 2 June, Lebanon played Saudi Arabia `away' in
Riyadh, performing fairly well until the closing stages when a clear
lack of fitness meant that the close 1-2 score became 1-4. For the
`home' game scheduled five days later (7 June), Lebanon naturally
should have played in Beirut. However, presumably due to the on-going
political and security problems, Lebanon agreed to play its `home'
again outside of Lebanon. Still, when a `home' team is compelled to
play abroad (this is normally the world federation's decision taken in
exceptional circumstances, as usually national federations fight quite
hard to retain their home advantage), it selects a neutral country to
play in, preferably one that would still give it some kind of
advantage in terms of support. So, Lebanon could have played in a
nearby venue with Lebanese expatriates such as Damascus, Amman or even
Cyprus.
As it happens, Lebanon's `home' game fixture was scheduled nearly
three weeks following the Doha Agreement and selection of Lebanese
President when there was a positive mood, so Lebanon could easily have
demanded to play its game'a crucial tie by then that would determine
if it had any chance of staying in the tournament'in Beirut. It is
easy to imagine the following scenario: the Doha accords produced a
positive national mood, the tents in downtown Beirut were lifted,
Lebanese flags waved everywhere, nationalist music broadcast, so why
not unite behind a national soccer team as a unifying event? Why not
at least play in Doha? No, the Lebanese authorities sanctioned what
this writer believes to be an unprecedented decision to play its
`home' game against Saudi Arabia in¦.Saudi Arabia. Much can be
said about the fact that Lebanon's parliamentary majority leader and
Prime Minister in waiting, Sa'ad Hariri, is a Saudi subject and that
Lebanon's political class on both sides of the political divide
panders to Saudi's petrodollars (the opposition did not protest this
unseemly episode). However, the most likely explanation for this
incredible decision'Lebanon was trounced 3-0, and in its final match
against Singapore, only ten players bothered to even show up for the
final practice match'is that Lebanon's authorities simply do not
care. They are unimaginative, incapable of thinking or planning for a
nation or national projects as their interests do not reside in such
endeavors.
I recently asked a long-term Nijme fan if he was unhappy about the
government's continued ban on spectators attending matches. He replied
that recent events, which have exacerbated sectarian tensions in
Lebanon, have made this question moot as they had removed the thin
line between soccer and politics, and thus made his support for Nijme
impossible for the time being. The fan is a Shi'ite, but a Hariri
person (a Sunni) owns Nijme, and alas the scars of Lebanon's on-going
cold civil war are clear. Rather than use Lebanon's national soccer
team to unite people and aid in the reconciliation of its communities,
Lebanon's authorities instead continue to neglect such potential while
its ruling class encourages further division amongst the country's
soccering communities that would preserve their power and their
stranglehold in formulating, and sustaining, Lebanon's fragile
sectarian identity.
For those who used the recent Doha agreement to manufacture euphoria
in the streets of Beirut and evoke empty promises of yet another `new'
dawn in Lebanon, let them instead lift their ban on soccer fans
watching live matches, de-politicize the soccer association,
professionalize the soccer league, and above all find creative ways to
unite the Lebanese behind a national team they can be proud of. For
the rest of us, we would be wise to keep a close eye on the fate of
Nijme soccer club and the evolution of its support base that may turn
out to be the best indicator of national reconciliation in the
country.
Karim Makdisi is an Assistant Professor of International Relations in
the Dept. of Political Studies and Public Administration at the
American University of Beirut. He can be reached at:
[email protected]
Weekend Edition
July 5 / 6, 2008
An Indicator of National Reconciliation?
On Soccer and Politics in Lebanon
By KARIM MAKDISI
Amidst the torturous negotiations to form a `national' unity
government in Lebanon'and the rhetoric employed by both March 14 and
opposition members alike about building a strong `nation' to bind all
of Lebanon's communities'Lebanon's national soccer team recently
completed the last of six qualification round matches for the 2010
World Cup. The results have been nothing short of disastrous, with
consecutive `home' and `away' defeats to Saudi Arabia (1-4, 1-2),
Uzbekistan (0-1, 0-3), and Singapore (1-2, 0-2), and fourteen goals
conceded in the process. Far from being a trivial sporting matter, the
manner of Lebanon's defeats illustrates the Lebanese political class's
chronic lack of imagination and willful neglect of a genuine
nation-building project that could transcend sectarian or clientalist
considerations.
soccer and national projects have always gone hand-in-hand in the
modern period. The fascist Italian dictator, Benito Mussolini famously
used Italy's triumph in the second world cup of 1934 to bolster his
fascist project in Italy. Iran's memorable victory over the USA in the
1998 World Cup boosted not only Iranian nationalism but also third
world solidarity; while the shameful German-Austrian collaboration in
the 1982 World Cup (with the full knowledge of the political and
commercial interests) to deny a brilliant Algerian team from
progressing into the latter rounds recalled European colonial bullying
practices. India withdrew from the 1950 World Cup after their national
sensibilities were apparently slighted when their request to play with
bare feet was turned down by FIFA, the world soccer association. South
Korea's astonishing run to the world cup semi finals it co-hosted in
2002 expressed strong national solidarity, while the 2006 World Cup
showcased an attack-minded German team that clearly raised the
national morale and confidence of its German hosts. Indeed, soccer has
also been used to unite divided communities within a country as was
the case when France's 1998 World Cup triumph showcased a team
composed mostly of African and Arab origins, or when Spain's 2008
European Championship triumph brought together Castilians, Catalans
and even Basques under the banner of the Spanish flag.
soccer also tends to express certain collective traits or what might
be called `soccer culture.' Commentators and fans often conjure up,
albeit in admittedly stereotypical terms, national (or even regional)
characteristics such as Itay's cautious but effective catenaccio,
Germany's steely resolve, Holland's individualism, Spain's brittle
confidence, England's work ethic and inflated sense of self-worth,
Brazil's artistry, South Korea's collective spirit, Latin players'
flair and fiery temperament, and African players' power. Like all
clichés, of course, these descriptions in fact describe
particularly famous, or infamous, phases rather than unchangeable
realities. Brazil's decline on the world stage'measured in terms of
thrillingly uninhibited play, the only currency anyone really cares
about when discussing Brazil'depicts the flaws of such clichés,
as does Spain's recent victory in the European Championships where the
team's undoubted talent and spirit helped them beat their poor
confidence demons.
What of Lebanon's national `soccer culture' then? soccer is Lebanon's
national sport, with kids nation-wide utilizing what space is allowed
them within the concrete jungle that is now Lebanon to play, emulate
their heroes, and shout the iconic global soccer anthem: `g*****oaaal!'
Lebanese of all sects, classes and regions follow international soccer
tournaments passionately, and it is common for Lebanese to engage in
ritual bragging on the streets, obnoxiously honking cars, waving
flags, chanting as `their' team (usually European or Brazil) win an
important match. Yet soccer has never really been allowed to develop
by Lebanon's authorities that are ever mindful of protecting sectarian
identities and preventing a genuine national spirit from emerging. The
Lebanese soccer association remains highly politicized, and largely
discredited, while the league itself continues to be'inexplicably,
given the huge potential for development'non-professional and marked
by indiscipline and poor fitness. Moreover, star players'most recently
Rida Antar, Lebanon's most successful export who plays for FC Koln in
Germany'routinely turn their nose up at representing their country
with little or no negative consequences.
It is difficult then to identify Lebanese national soccer
characteristics beyond the traditional regional rivalries that have
been transformed into highly politicized sectarian ones. The teams
that play in Lebanon's top division are now generally identified by
overtly sectarian (and thus political) affiliation. Thus, al-Ansar is
a `Sunni' (read: Hariri) team, the new champions al-`Ahd are the
`Shia'a' (`Hizbullah') team, Homentmen are an Armenian team, Hikme a
Christian (Lebanese Forces) team, and al-Safa is a Druze (Jumblatt)
team. Some teams, most notably Nijme'a traditional powerhouse and one
of the most popular Lebanese teams'have indeed traditionally drawn
support from across the sectarian spectrum, but they are in real
danger of losing this national support given the highly charged
atmosphere that exists today. It is equally difficult to comprehend
why Lebanese soccer failed to evolve in national terms during the post
civil war period given both the commercial and nationalist appeal of
such a project. Like nearly all other national `civil society'
initiatives that failed during the 1990s, such as the environmental
and human rights movements, soccer's dangerous potential to unite
people was extinguished by its cooption by the sectarian elite and
indeed the largesse of former Prime Minister Rafiq Hariri who used
soccer not so much as a national unifier as much as a marketing tool
for his own controversial Reconstruction project.
The events of the past three years have produced two definitive
moments that further illustrate the Lebanese authorities' attitude and
explain why Lebanon's soccering future will remain bleak, just like
all national projects in Lebanon, so long as the existing political
class and system remains in place. The first was the Council of
Minister's decree in 2005 preventing fans from attending club matches,
meaning that such matches were held behind closed doors, a most
demoralizing punishment generally used by soccer associations
worldwide to sanction clubs in extreme cases of crowd trouble. The
explanation for this Council of Ministers' decision was that this was
a pre-emptive measure to avoid sectarian trouble-making among
Lebanon's partisan fans. Considering that the overtly sectarian nature
of the political discourse served by the political hacks and
politicians broadcast on television 24 hours a day was never seriously
addressed, this decision reinforced a clear philosophy of Lebanon's
ruling political class: `only we get to control and distribute
sectarian poison.' Perish the thought that the `Lebanese street' might
initiate or take control of its own destiny, or that this `street'
might actually behave in a more dignified manner than its
leaders. Such a scenario'genuine national unity, national
reconciliation outside of official control'is the biggest threat to
the established sectarian order in Lebanon. Even in light of the Doha
Agreement of 21 May, the Council of Minister's decree remains in
effect and there is no reason to think that it will be rescinded in
the near future.
The second illustrative moment occurred during the recent world cup
qualifying round matches against Saudi Arabia. It is customary
worldwide that group matches include `home' and `away' matches for the
teams drawn together. On 2 June, Lebanon played Saudi Arabia `away' in
Riyadh, performing fairly well until the closing stages when a clear
lack of fitness meant that the close 1-2 score became 1-4. For the
`home' game scheduled five days later (7 June), Lebanon naturally
should have played in Beirut. However, presumably due to the on-going
political and security problems, Lebanon agreed to play its `home'
again outside of Lebanon. Still, when a `home' team is compelled to
play abroad (this is normally the world federation's decision taken in
exceptional circumstances, as usually national federations fight quite
hard to retain their home advantage), it selects a neutral country to
play in, preferably one that would still give it some kind of
advantage in terms of support. So, Lebanon could have played in a
nearby venue with Lebanese expatriates such as Damascus, Amman or even
Cyprus.
As it happens, Lebanon's `home' game fixture was scheduled nearly
three weeks following the Doha Agreement and selection of Lebanese
President when there was a positive mood, so Lebanon could easily have
demanded to play its game'a crucial tie by then that would determine
if it had any chance of staying in the tournament'in Beirut. It is
easy to imagine the following scenario: the Doha accords produced a
positive national mood, the tents in downtown Beirut were lifted,
Lebanese flags waved everywhere, nationalist music broadcast, so why
not unite behind a national soccer team as a unifying event? Why not
at least play in Doha? No, the Lebanese authorities sanctioned what
this writer believes to be an unprecedented decision to play its
`home' game against Saudi Arabia in¦.Saudi Arabia. Much can be
said about the fact that Lebanon's parliamentary majority leader and
Prime Minister in waiting, Sa'ad Hariri, is a Saudi subject and that
Lebanon's political class on both sides of the political divide
panders to Saudi's petrodollars (the opposition did not protest this
unseemly episode). However, the most likely explanation for this
incredible decision'Lebanon was trounced 3-0, and in its final match
against Singapore, only ten players bothered to even show up for the
final practice match'is that Lebanon's authorities simply do not
care. They are unimaginative, incapable of thinking or planning for a
nation or national projects as their interests do not reside in such
endeavors.
I recently asked a long-term Nijme fan if he was unhappy about the
government's continued ban on spectators attending matches. He replied
that recent events, which have exacerbated sectarian tensions in
Lebanon, have made this question moot as they had removed the thin
line between soccer and politics, and thus made his support for Nijme
impossible for the time being. The fan is a Shi'ite, but a Hariri
person (a Sunni) owns Nijme, and alas the scars of Lebanon's on-going
cold civil war are clear. Rather than use Lebanon's national soccer
team to unite people and aid in the reconciliation of its communities,
Lebanon's authorities instead continue to neglect such potential while
its ruling class encourages further division amongst the country's
soccering communities that would preserve their power and their
stranglehold in formulating, and sustaining, Lebanon's fragile
sectarian identity.
For those who used the recent Doha agreement to manufacture euphoria
in the streets of Beirut and evoke empty promises of yet another `new'
dawn in Lebanon, let them instead lift their ban on soccer fans
watching live matches, de-politicize the soccer association,
professionalize the soccer league, and above all find creative ways to
unite the Lebanese behind a national team they can be proud of. For
the rest of us, we would be wise to keep a close eye on the fate of
Nijme soccer club and the evolution of its support base that may turn
out to be the best indicator of national reconciliation in the
country.
Karim Makdisi is an Assistant Professor of International Relations in
the Dept. of Political Studies and Public Administration at the
American University of Beirut. He can be reached at:
[email protected]