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A NEW PLAYER IN THE CAUCASUS
By Sergey Markedonov
Russia Profile
http://www.russiaprofile.org/page.php?page id=International&articleid=a1213634347
June 16 2008
Russia
Kazakhstan Aspires to Take on a Key Role on the Post-Soviet Arena
No sooner was Dmitry Medvedev's visit to Kazakhstan concluded and
mutual assurances of eternal friendship and strategic partnership
abated, than Nursultan Nazarbayev signed a law regarding assistance
in the transportation of Kazakh oil through the "Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan"
system. On April 24, the plenary session of the Kazakh Senate ratified
the "Treaty between the Republic of Kazakhstan and the Republic of
Azerbaijan on the support of and assistance in the transportation
of oil from Kazakhstan across the Caspian Sea and Azerbaijani
territory to international markets through the 'Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan'
system." This system is considered a "political pipeline," and Moscow
views participation in it almost as a challenge. Meanwhile, the project
also presupposes the enhancement of the Kuryk port, from which the
oil from Kazakh fields will be delivered to the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan
system via the Caspian Sea.
On April 24 and 25, the seventh consecutive Eurasian media forum was
held in Almaty, the southern capital of Kazakhstan. Traditionally,
this event, which brings together influential political analysts,
experts, and diplomats from around the world, has been a presentation
of Kazakhstan's "homework assignments" in both foreign and domestic
policy. The latest forum was no exception: one of the central themes
became Kazakhstan's chairmanship of the Organization for Security
and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) in 2010. This structure exercises
supervision over the settlement of conflicts in the Southern Caucasus.
An OSCE Mission has been present in South Ossetia since 1993. The
Nagorno-Karabakh conflict is also within the organization's "zone of
responsibility," since the Minsk Group of the OSCE handles mediation
between Yerevan and Baku.
Opening the forum, President Nursultan Nazarbayev addressed the topic
of resolving conflicts in the post-Soviet space: "All the existing
conflicts are still going on, and there are no less threats. There
are even new ones. The world is again faced with the problem of
separatism, which this time has caused a crisis for the system of
international law. Events in Kosovo and in Tibet have immediately
entered the arsenal of tools that is used in this global geopolitical
struggle." Thus Kazakhstan is clearly declaring that it is ready
to come to the OSCE not just as a mute actor with a reactive foreign
policy, but as a state that has its own perceptions of how to stabilize
the ethno-political situation in Eurasia.
This is not the first time that the president of Kazakhstan
has expressed such an interest. Even during the existence of the
Soviet Union, Nazarbayev offered mediation efforts in resolving the
Nagorno-Karabakh conflict. In September of 1991, the first Russian
President Boris Yeltsin, together with Nazarbayev visited the region of
the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict. Following the visit, a joint statement
by the leaders of Russia, Kazakhstan, Armenia and Azerbaijan was
signed on September 23, 1991 in Zheleznovodsk, with representatives
from the Nagorno-Karabakh Republic participating as observers. The
objectives of this "Zheleznovodsk communiqué" were stabilizing the
situation in the region, returning deported people to their places
of residence, releasing hostages, accommodating information gathering
groups of representatives from Russia and Kazakhstan in the conflict
zone, and ensuring that objective information about the situation is
available. In 1991, Nazarbayev's mediation mission did not succeed.
But even after the collapse of the Soviet Union, Kazakhstan aspired
(and still does) to take on the role of one of the integrators of the
post-Soviet arena. Such intentions have quite a pragmatic basis. The
favorite subject of Kazakhstan's foreign policy after 1991 is a
diversified course, sustaining stable relationships with the big
players (Russia, United States, the EU) as well as with individual
ex-Soviet states. Pragmatism is more important than ideology for such
a foreign policy. On the one hand, Kazakhstan constantly declares its
commitment to friendship and strategic partnership with Russia. On
the other hand, during the Istanbul OSCE Summit in late 1999,
Kazakh authorities documented their "interest" in participating in
the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan "political pipeline," the very existence of
which causes lasting heartburn for Staraya and Smolenskaya Squares. In
Astana, participation in the "Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan pipeline" is seen
as a manifestation of a multilateral foreign policy.
The Kazakh president himself has a very lukewarm view of "colored
revolutions" and social shocks in general, as a methodology for
transforming a society and a state. However, this does not prevent
Kazakhstan from actively permeating Georgia's domestic market
(including taking advantage of both the cooling of Russian-Georgian
relations and the emergence of free economic niches). During his visit
to Georgia in October of 2005, Nazarbayev said: "I compared reforms
in the economy with those that were implemented in Georgia during
the difficult years after the collapse of the Soviet Union. And I
am convinced, from the vantage point of Kazakhstan, that the reforms
presently being carried out by the Georgian government are correct."
According to Nazarbayev, "It is this period, the beginning of mass
privatization, and other active changes in the economy, that should
raise the interest level of all investors and facilitate their coming
to Georgia, their participation in tenders and in acquiring objects,
so as to make doing business here advantageous for both Georgia and for
the investors themselves." According to Gulnur Rakhmatulina, an expert
at the Kazakhstan Institute of Strategic Studies under the president
of the republic, "For Kazakhstan, cooperation with Georgia is likewise
very important, as it has enormous transit potential. Additionally,
bilateral cooperation on the TRASECA project seems very promising, as
well as on other major investment projects. Today, Kazakhstan's capital
is beginning to work actively in the Georgian economy. In particular,
banks from the republic are currently involved in the privatization
of objects of the Georgian communications and energy industries."
The year 2005 marked the intensification of relations between Tbilisi
and Astana. It was then that the Kazakh president clearly outlined
the Georgian direction as one of the priorities for Astana. In three
years, Kazakhstan has become the foremost investor in Georgia (having
surpassed Turkey and Britain), assuming powerful positions not only in
the banking sector, but also in the recreation industry of Adjara's
Black Sea coast. In 2006 alone, trade between the two countries grew
by 90 percent. In March of 2007, during Mikheil Saakashvili's visit
to Kazakhstan, the two presidents not only discussed a wide range
of economic issues, but also expressed interest in further deepening
Kazakh-Georgian relations and the desire to pursue political dialogue
at the highest level. At the final press conference, Saakashvili was
literally pronouncing toasts to the hospitable hosts: "I think that
relations between our countries serve as a model of relations in the
CIS. This is exactly how a new type of relations should be developed
in the conditions of independence."
This is the source of Tbilisi's interest in seeing Kazakhstan chair
the OSCE. Paradoxically, this is the point at which the interests
of Moscow and Tbilisi meet (albeit from absolutely opposite
directions). In 2006-2007, Russian diplomats ardently lobbied for
Kazakhstan's interests, as it is considered to be "our man" in
Eurasia (and, in the future, in the OSCE). However in Tbilisi they
believe otherwise. At one point in time, Saakashvili stated that he
doesn't believe that "Kazakhstan will just be the next chairman of the
organization. This will be a chairman of the OSCE that will be able to
turn the organization into an effective mechanism in our region. This
is because, frankly speaking, the OSCE has not yet been able to play
a special role in resolving existing conflicts." As an aside, Astana
and Tbilisi have a unifying theme in the problems of separatism and
territorial integrity. There never was, nor is there now, an "Abkhazia"
or an "Ossetia" on Kazakh territory. However, the ghost of separatism,
having emerged at the turn of the 1980s, has not yet fully vacated
the offices of Kazakh leaders. The trademark caution of Nazarbayev
and his team will also likely not work in favor of self-determination
of the de-facto nations. At the April 2008 Eurasian Media Forum,
Nazarbayev clearly identified separatism as a dangerous political
threat. In this regard, it is naïve to expect Astana to become a
wholehearted "agent of Russian influence" in the OSCE.
Kazakhstan is intensively developing relations with another
Transcaucasian republic that has problems with territorial integrity
- Azerbaijan. Besides the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan project, Kazakhstan
is working on another project that is important for Azerbaijan, the
Baku-Akhalkalaki-Tbilisi-Kars railroad, planning to export up to five
million tons of grain a year along this route. Thus, it is not in the
interests of Kazakhstan to destabilize the states that are relevant
to the economic and political ambitions of Astana.
In the nearest future, there will be another serious player on the
Caucasian geopolitical field. Today, this player prefers not catchy
political slogans, but real projects (investment and the development
of transport and energy services). Meanwhile, the economic quantity
will inevitably grow into a political quality. There is reason to
believe that such a dialectic transition will far from serve Russian
interests. Astana will work against separatism (largely measured for
its own interests), but it will also seek to play an independent
role (since Moscow has much less influence over Kazakhstan than
Ukraine). The most important thing for Russian diplomacy is to
appreciate the growing potential of Astana and to learn to take it
into account, in order to avoid subsequent emotional surprises and
disappointments from inflated expectations.
In regard to the Caucasus, Kazakhstan is exposing several important
truths that are still ignored in Moscow. The main axiom is that after
the collapse of the Soviet Union, ex-Soviet republics no longer harbor
feelings of "fraternal solidarity" and historic "gratefulness." There
are only nationalistic egoism and self-interest in the economy and
in politics. These interests (and not phantoms of Eurasian unity
or of the Soviet past) define a strategy for the newly independent
states. Therefore, in Georgia and Azerbaijan, Astana will do not what
is wanted in Moscow, but what the Kazakh national elite considers
beneficial for their country. And no arguments about the "Saakashvili
puppet" or the "militarization of Azerbaijan" will be taken into
account, if they do not fit with Kazakhstan's own motives.
Sergey Markedonov, PhD, is the head of the Interethnic Relations
Department at Moscow's Institute of Political and Military Analysis.
--Boundary_(ID_eE5UFvBWqGmGmMnxOMMZpw)- -
By Sergey Markedonov
Russia Profile
http://www.russiaprofile.org/page.php?page id=International&articleid=a1213634347
June 16 2008
Russia
Kazakhstan Aspires to Take on a Key Role on the Post-Soviet Arena
No sooner was Dmitry Medvedev's visit to Kazakhstan concluded and
mutual assurances of eternal friendship and strategic partnership
abated, than Nursultan Nazarbayev signed a law regarding assistance
in the transportation of Kazakh oil through the "Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan"
system. On April 24, the plenary session of the Kazakh Senate ratified
the "Treaty between the Republic of Kazakhstan and the Republic of
Azerbaijan on the support of and assistance in the transportation
of oil from Kazakhstan across the Caspian Sea and Azerbaijani
territory to international markets through the 'Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan'
system." This system is considered a "political pipeline," and Moscow
views participation in it almost as a challenge. Meanwhile, the project
also presupposes the enhancement of the Kuryk port, from which the
oil from Kazakh fields will be delivered to the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan
system via the Caspian Sea.
On April 24 and 25, the seventh consecutive Eurasian media forum was
held in Almaty, the southern capital of Kazakhstan. Traditionally,
this event, which brings together influential political analysts,
experts, and diplomats from around the world, has been a presentation
of Kazakhstan's "homework assignments" in both foreign and domestic
policy. The latest forum was no exception: one of the central themes
became Kazakhstan's chairmanship of the Organization for Security
and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) in 2010. This structure exercises
supervision over the settlement of conflicts in the Southern Caucasus.
An OSCE Mission has been present in South Ossetia since 1993. The
Nagorno-Karabakh conflict is also within the organization's "zone of
responsibility," since the Minsk Group of the OSCE handles mediation
between Yerevan and Baku.
Opening the forum, President Nursultan Nazarbayev addressed the topic
of resolving conflicts in the post-Soviet space: "All the existing
conflicts are still going on, and there are no less threats. There
are even new ones. The world is again faced with the problem of
separatism, which this time has caused a crisis for the system of
international law. Events in Kosovo and in Tibet have immediately
entered the arsenal of tools that is used in this global geopolitical
struggle." Thus Kazakhstan is clearly declaring that it is ready
to come to the OSCE not just as a mute actor with a reactive foreign
policy, but as a state that has its own perceptions of how to stabilize
the ethno-political situation in Eurasia.
This is not the first time that the president of Kazakhstan
has expressed such an interest. Even during the existence of the
Soviet Union, Nazarbayev offered mediation efforts in resolving the
Nagorno-Karabakh conflict. In September of 1991, the first Russian
President Boris Yeltsin, together with Nazarbayev visited the region of
the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict. Following the visit, a joint statement
by the leaders of Russia, Kazakhstan, Armenia and Azerbaijan was
signed on September 23, 1991 in Zheleznovodsk, with representatives
from the Nagorno-Karabakh Republic participating as observers. The
objectives of this "Zheleznovodsk communiqué" were stabilizing the
situation in the region, returning deported people to their places
of residence, releasing hostages, accommodating information gathering
groups of representatives from Russia and Kazakhstan in the conflict
zone, and ensuring that objective information about the situation is
available. In 1991, Nazarbayev's mediation mission did not succeed.
But even after the collapse of the Soviet Union, Kazakhstan aspired
(and still does) to take on the role of one of the integrators of the
post-Soviet arena. Such intentions have quite a pragmatic basis. The
favorite subject of Kazakhstan's foreign policy after 1991 is a
diversified course, sustaining stable relationships with the big
players (Russia, United States, the EU) as well as with individual
ex-Soviet states. Pragmatism is more important than ideology for such
a foreign policy. On the one hand, Kazakhstan constantly declares its
commitment to friendship and strategic partnership with Russia. On
the other hand, during the Istanbul OSCE Summit in late 1999,
Kazakh authorities documented their "interest" in participating in
the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan "political pipeline," the very existence of
which causes lasting heartburn for Staraya and Smolenskaya Squares. In
Astana, participation in the "Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan pipeline" is seen
as a manifestation of a multilateral foreign policy.
The Kazakh president himself has a very lukewarm view of "colored
revolutions" and social shocks in general, as a methodology for
transforming a society and a state. However, this does not prevent
Kazakhstan from actively permeating Georgia's domestic market
(including taking advantage of both the cooling of Russian-Georgian
relations and the emergence of free economic niches). During his visit
to Georgia in October of 2005, Nazarbayev said: "I compared reforms
in the economy with those that were implemented in Georgia during
the difficult years after the collapse of the Soviet Union. And I
am convinced, from the vantage point of Kazakhstan, that the reforms
presently being carried out by the Georgian government are correct."
According to Nazarbayev, "It is this period, the beginning of mass
privatization, and other active changes in the economy, that should
raise the interest level of all investors and facilitate their coming
to Georgia, their participation in tenders and in acquiring objects,
so as to make doing business here advantageous for both Georgia and for
the investors themselves." According to Gulnur Rakhmatulina, an expert
at the Kazakhstan Institute of Strategic Studies under the president
of the republic, "For Kazakhstan, cooperation with Georgia is likewise
very important, as it has enormous transit potential. Additionally,
bilateral cooperation on the TRASECA project seems very promising, as
well as on other major investment projects. Today, Kazakhstan's capital
is beginning to work actively in the Georgian economy. In particular,
banks from the republic are currently involved in the privatization
of objects of the Georgian communications and energy industries."
The year 2005 marked the intensification of relations between Tbilisi
and Astana. It was then that the Kazakh president clearly outlined
the Georgian direction as one of the priorities for Astana. In three
years, Kazakhstan has become the foremost investor in Georgia (having
surpassed Turkey and Britain), assuming powerful positions not only in
the banking sector, but also in the recreation industry of Adjara's
Black Sea coast. In 2006 alone, trade between the two countries grew
by 90 percent. In March of 2007, during Mikheil Saakashvili's visit
to Kazakhstan, the two presidents not only discussed a wide range
of economic issues, but also expressed interest in further deepening
Kazakh-Georgian relations and the desire to pursue political dialogue
at the highest level. At the final press conference, Saakashvili was
literally pronouncing toasts to the hospitable hosts: "I think that
relations between our countries serve as a model of relations in the
CIS. This is exactly how a new type of relations should be developed
in the conditions of independence."
This is the source of Tbilisi's interest in seeing Kazakhstan chair
the OSCE. Paradoxically, this is the point at which the interests
of Moscow and Tbilisi meet (albeit from absolutely opposite
directions). In 2006-2007, Russian diplomats ardently lobbied for
Kazakhstan's interests, as it is considered to be "our man" in
Eurasia (and, in the future, in the OSCE). However in Tbilisi they
believe otherwise. At one point in time, Saakashvili stated that he
doesn't believe that "Kazakhstan will just be the next chairman of the
organization. This will be a chairman of the OSCE that will be able to
turn the organization into an effective mechanism in our region. This
is because, frankly speaking, the OSCE has not yet been able to play
a special role in resolving existing conflicts." As an aside, Astana
and Tbilisi have a unifying theme in the problems of separatism and
territorial integrity. There never was, nor is there now, an "Abkhazia"
or an "Ossetia" on Kazakh territory. However, the ghost of separatism,
having emerged at the turn of the 1980s, has not yet fully vacated
the offices of Kazakh leaders. The trademark caution of Nazarbayev
and his team will also likely not work in favor of self-determination
of the de-facto nations. At the April 2008 Eurasian Media Forum,
Nazarbayev clearly identified separatism as a dangerous political
threat. In this regard, it is naïve to expect Astana to become a
wholehearted "agent of Russian influence" in the OSCE.
Kazakhstan is intensively developing relations with another
Transcaucasian republic that has problems with territorial integrity
- Azerbaijan. Besides the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan project, Kazakhstan
is working on another project that is important for Azerbaijan, the
Baku-Akhalkalaki-Tbilisi-Kars railroad, planning to export up to five
million tons of grain a year along this route. Thus, it is not in the
interests of Kazakhstan to destabilize the states that are relevant
to the economic and political ambitions of Astana.
In the nearest future, there will be another serious player on the
Caucasian geopolitical field. Today, this player prefers not catchy
political slogans, but real projects (investment and the development
of transport and energy services). Meanwhile, the economic quantity
will inevitably grow into a political quality. There is reason to
believe that such a dialectic transition will far from serve Russian
interests. Astana will work against separatism (largely measured for
its own interests), but it will also seek to play an independent
role (since Moscow has much less influence over Kazakhstan than
Ukraine). The most important thing for Russian diplomacy is to
appreciate the growing potential of Astana and to learn to take it
into account, in order to avoid subsequent emotional surprises and
disappointments from inflated expectations.
In regard to the Caucasus, Kazakhstan is exposing several important
truths that are still ignored in Moscow. The main axiom is that after
the collapse of the Soviet Union, ex-Soviet republics no longer harbor
feelings of "fraternal solidarity" and historic "gratefulness." There
are only nationalistic egoism and self-interest in the economy and
in politics. These interests (and not phantoms of Eurasian unity
or of the Soviet past) define a strategy for the newly independent
states. Therefore, in Georgia and Azerbaijan, Astana will do not what
is wanted in Moscow, but what the Kazakh national elite considers
beneficial for their country. And no arguments about the "Saakashvili
puppet" or the "militarization of Azerbaijan" will be taken into
account, if they do not fit with Kazakhstan's own motives.
Sergey Markedonov, PhD, is the head of the Interethnic Relations
Department at Moscow's Institute of Political and Military Analysis.
--Boundary_(ID_eE5UFvBWqGmGmMnxOMMZpw)- -