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NO METHOD TO AOUN'S DESTRUCTIVENESS
Michael Young
Daily Star
June 19 2008
Lebanon
There is a scene in the film "Apocalypse Now" where two characters,
Captain Willard and Colonel Kurtz, are talking. Kurtz rules over a
mad, mini-kingdom in the heart of the jungle and the US Army wants
him assassinated. That's what Willard has come to do. Kurtz asks:
"Are my methods unsound?" Willard responds: "I don't see any method
at all, sir."
Much the same thing can be said about Michel Aoun's strategy in the
aftermath of Michel Sleiman's election as president last month. That
is unless the sum total of Aoun's method is to block the emergence
of a new government as revenge for not having been elected himself -
in other words to undermine the Doha Accord. And while the general is
at it, he seems impatient to undermine the Taif Accord as well, whose
death was, not coincidentally, announced a few days ago on Aoun's OTV
channel by Wiam Wahhab, one of Syria's megaphones in Lebanon. When
he's cornered, Aoun resorts to attacks against Sunni prerogatives to
rally the Christians, and it was Wahhab's message the general was
channeling on Tuesday when he declared: "It is unacceptable that
the executive branch also be granted supervisory authority [over
the public administration]; all the inspection agencies are under
[Prime Minister Fouad Siniora]."
However, this time the Christians are almost certain not to
bite. Aoun's method has been to pick a fight with all those who
threaten his standing among his coreligionists. The general fears,
quite legitimately, that Sleiman will pick up many of those Christians
who voted for Aoun's candidates in 2005. Aoun's impetuous plan,
however, may well bring about the very outcome that he is most trying
to avert.
By going after Michel Sleiman, but more specifically by trying to
curtail his ability to select ministers, Aoun has not only made
an enemy of the president, he has done so at a moment when Sleiman
is most popular and embodies much-wanted stability in the mind of
people. Aoun has also proven to the Christians that he is indifferent
to the prerogatives of the president, unless the president happens
to be Michel Aoun. In continuing to impede the formation of the
government, Aoun is also preventing the implementation of a state
project, which was allegedly his project until Sleiman was selected
in his place. For many Christians, as well as most Lebanese, this is
objectionable. Aoun's reputation will continue to wane if he remains
the main obstacle to post-Doha normalization.
When Aoun implied in his weekly press conference that the formation
of a new government would not take place until one month before
parliamentary elections, you could almost hear the Lebanese groan. Yet
the general, to our advantage, rarely hears the sounds of his own ruin.
Then there is the preparation for the parliamentary elections,
where Aoun's absence of method has been particularly conspicuous. If
Sleiman is Aoun's worst nightmare, if the president turns into a
major electoral player next year, then you would assume Aoun has a
strategy to guard against this. Traditionally, this situation has
led to alliances between Christian leaders who felt collectively
vulnerable when facing a strong president. However, Aoun has burned
his bridges with potential allies.
By opposing the appointment of Elias Murr as defense minister, for
example, Aoun has made his dispute with Michel Murr personal. Since
Michel Murr is the kingmaker in the Metn region, this is downright
foolish. Murr will ally himself with the Armenians, most probably
with Amin Gemayel, and is likely to include Sleiman's choices on his
list. But one thing he may not want to do is leave slots open for the
Aounists, which means they could be eliminated electorally from Metn.
Similarly, Aoun has no advantage in cutting himself off completely from
the Lebanese Forces, who are also wary of Sleiman's influence. But that
is precisely what he has done by allowing OTV to recently broadcast
a program on the killing of Tony Franjieh, an operation in which
Samir Geagea was involved. The aim was transparent: to keep alive the
animosity between Geagea and Suleiman Franjieh in the North. However,
by so doing, Aoun crossed a red line in his relationship with the
Lebanese Forces and now stands accused by Christians of unnecessarily
dividing the community by reopening old war files better kept shut.
In all probability Aoun will not be able to again win the large
bloc he now has in Parliament. In the Christian heartland of Jbeil,
Kisirwan, and Metn, he will at best win a handful of seats. Only in
Baabda might Aoun have a decisive advantage, thanks to Hizbullah's
electoral weight, but even there it is uncertain how the vast majority
of voters, who are Christians, will vote. If Sleiman plays his cards
right, if he can position himself as the patron of a state project
and grand conciliator, Aoun's amorphous base of support might dissolve
as quickly as it materialized in 2005.
Sleiman's best stratagem is to allow Aoun to hang himself. Rather
than enter into a collision with Aoun, at least for now, which would
mean a collision with Hizbullah and Amal, who are quietly backing
Aoun, the president should restate the principles of the Doha Accord,
continue in his endeavor to provide a constructive alternative to the
vacuum that Aoun offers, and build up his networks in the Christian
community. The decision to host an inter-communal dialogue in Baabda
was a smart idea, since success is guaranteed in such platitudinous
forums. It also bolsters Sleiman's image as a national leader,
whereas Aoun is looking pettier by the day.
The real question is what to do with Aoun's parliamentarians. It
may be time for Michel Murr and Sleiman to begin breaking apart
Aoun's bloc. Murr has considerable sway over most of the Metn
parliamentarians, who know they need to be on good terms with him in
order to be re-elected. Sleiman has already won over Walid Khoury in
Jbeil. In Kisirwan most of the Aoun parliamentarians are unsure about
their future, meaning they are more predisposed to advances from the
president, particularly if Maronite Patriarch Nasrallah Butros Sfeir
blesses such moves.
Rarely has a politician been as adept at transforming his victories
into defeats as Michel Aoun. Rarely has a man in a position
of responsibility been as incompetent in reading the mood around
him. The problem with Aoun's political self-immolation is that it is
taking too much of everyone's time. The general is drifting off into
a sea of inconsequence from where, very soon, most people may hope
he never returns.
From: Emil Lazarian | Ararat NewsPress
Michael Young
Daily Star
June 19 2008
Lebanon
There is a scene in the film "Apocalypse Now" where two characters,
Captain Willard and Colonel Kurtz, are talking. Kurtz rules over a
mad, mini-kingdom in the heart of the jungle and the US Army wants
him assassinated. That's what Willard has come to do. Kurtz asks:
"Are my methods unsound?" Willard responds: "I don't see any method
at all, sir."
Much the same thing can be said about Michel Aoun's strategy in the
aftermath of Michel Sleiman's election as president last month. That
is unless the sum total of Aoun's method is to block the emergence
of a new government as revenge for not having been elected himself -
in other words to undermine the Doha Accord. And while the general is
at it, he seems impatient to undermine the Taif Accord as well, whose
death was, not coincidentally, announced a few days ago on Aoun's OTV
channel by Wiam Wahhab, one of Syria's megaphones in Lebanon. When
he's cornered, Aoun resorts to attacks against Sunni prerogatives to
rally the Christians, and it was Wahhab's message the general was
channeling on Tuesday when he declared: "It is unacceptable that
the executive branch also be granted supervisory authority [over
the public administration]; all the inspection agencies are under
[Prime Minister Fouad Siniora]."
However, this time the Christians are almost certain not to
bite. Aoun's method has been to pick a fight with all those who
threaten his standing among his coreligionists. The general fears,
quite legitimately, that Sleiman will pick up many of those Christians
who voted for Aoun's candidates in 2005. Aoun's impetuous plan,
however, may well bring about the very outcome that he is most trying
to avert.
By going after Michel Sleiman, but more specifically by trying to
curtail his ability to select ministers, Aoun has not only made
an enemy of the president, he has done so at a moment when Sleiman
is most popular and embodies much-wanted stability in the mind of
people. Aoun has also proven to the Christians that he is indifferent
to the prerogatives of the president, unless the president happens
to be Michel Aoun. In continuing to impede the formation of the
government, Aoun is also preventing the implementation of a state
project, which was allegedly his project until Sleiman was selected
in his place. For many Christians, as well as most Lebanese, this is
objectionable. Aoun's reputation will continue to wane if he remains
the main obstacle to post-Doha normalization.
When Aoun implied in his weekly press conference that the formation
of a new government would not take place until one month before
parliamentary elections, you could almost hear the Lebanese groan. Yet
the general, to our advantage, rarely hears the sounds of his own ruin.
Then there is the preparation for the parliamentary elections,
where Aoun's absence of method has been particularly conspicuous. If
Sleiman is Aoun's worst nightmare, if the president turns into a
major electoral player next year, then you would assume Aoun has a
strategy to guard against this. Traditionally, this situation has
led to alliances between Christian leaders who felt collectively
vulnerable when facing a strong president. However, Aoun has burned
his bridges with potential allies.
By opposing the appointment of Elias Murr as defense minister, for
example, Aoun has made his dispute with Michel Murr personal. Since
Michel Murr is the kingmaker in the Metn region, this is downright
foolish. Murr will ally himself with the Armenians, most probably
with Amin Gemayel, and is likely to include Sleiman's choices on his
list. But one thing he may not want to do is leave slots open for the
Aounists, which means they could be eliminated electorally from Metn.
Similarly, Aoun has no advantage in cutting himself off completely from
the Lebanese Forces, who are also wary of Sleiman's influence. But that
is precisely what he has done by allowing OTV to recently broadcast
a program on the killing of Tony Franjieh, an operation in which
Samir Geagea was involved. The aim was transparent: to keep alive the
animosity between Geagea and Suleiman Franjieh in the North. However,
by so doing, Aoun crossed a red line in his relationship with the
Lebanese Forces and now stands accused by Christians of unnecessarily
dividing the community by reopening old war files better kept shut.
In all probability Aoun will not be able to again win the large
bloc he now has in Parliament. In the Christian heartland of Jbeil,
Kisirwan, and Metn, he will at best win a handful of seats. Only in
Baabda might Aoun have a decisive advantage, thanks to Hizbullah's
electoral weight, but even there it is uncertain how the vast majority
of voters, who are Christians, will vote. If Sleiman plays his cards
right, if he can position himself as the patron of a state project
and grand conciliator, Aoun's amorphous base of support might dissolve
as quickly as it materialized in 2005.
Sleiman's best stratagem is to allow Aoun to hang himself. Rather
than enter into a collision with Aoun, at least for now, which would
mean a collision with Hizbullah and Amal, who are quietly backing
Aoun, the president should restate the principles of the Doha Accord,
continue in his endeavor to provide a constructive alternative to the
vacuum that Aoun offers, and build up his networks in the Christian
community. The decision to host an inter-communal dialogue in Baabda
was a smart idea, since success is guaranteed in such platitudinous
forums. It also bolsters Sleiman's image as a national leader,
whereas Aoun is looking pettier by the day.
The real question is what to do with Aoun's parliamentarians. It
may be time for Michel Murr and Sleiman to begin breaking apart
Aoun's bloc. Murr has considerable sway over most of the Metn
parliamentarians, who know they need to be on good terms with him in
order to be re-elected. Sleiman has already won over Walid Khoury in
Jbeil. In Kisirwan most of the Aoun parliamentarians are unsure about
their future, meaning they are more predisposed to advances from the
president, particularly if Maronite Patriarch Nasrallah Butros Sfeir
blesses such moves.
Rarely has a politician been as adept at transforming his victories
into defeats as Michel Aoun. Rarely has a man in a position
of responsibility been as incompetent in reading the mood around
him. The problem with Aoun's political self-immolation is that it is
taking too much of everyone's time. The general is drifting off into
a sea of inconsequence from where, very soon, most people may hope
he never returns.
From: Emil Lazarian | Ararat NewsPress