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KOSOVO: IRREDENTIST RIPPLES SPREAD OUT
Zoltan Dujisin
IPS
March 21 2008
Italy
PRAGUE, Mar 21 (IPS) - While the world wonders whether Kosovo's
proclaimed independence will indeed constitute a precedent, its initial
effects on other frozen conflicts in Europe are beginning to be felt.
On Feb. 17 Kosovo, the disputed southern region of Serbia, made a
unilateral declaration of independence that was swiftly recognised
in the West but strongly opposed by Serbia and Russia.
Western leaders say Kosovo would not become a precedent, but
international law experts are sceptical, and say such standards play
an important role in shaping the international order.
But the possible independence of breakaway regions will probably
depend on the geopolitical considerations of superpowers and the
alliances between them and states facing irredentist movements,
rather than on increasingly disrespected international legislation.
There could be many precedent-setting elements. "The fact that Kosovo's
independence was unilaterally declared and internationally recognised,
the presence of NATO (North Atlantic Treaty Organisation) troops, the
elections organised by the international community, and the existence
of ethnic cleansing as a precondition are some of the many elements
of this precedent," Nicu Popescu, research fellow at the London office
of the European Council on Foreign Relations told IPS.
The first irredentist movement Kosovo's declared independence might
catapult is in the region's own backyard -- northern Kosovo is home to
40,000 Serbians who inhabit a territory mentally and institutionally
loyal to Serbia.
But Kosovo Serb leaders have so far excluded the possibility as it
would amount to recognising the independence of the remainder of
the region.
Claims of Kosovo as precedent are now being heard more widely.
In nearby Bosnia the People's Assembly of the Serbian Republika Srpska,
one of the two entities in which Bosnia has been divided since 1995
(the Croat-Muslim federation is the other), has said it will demand
secession once a majority of EU and UN members recognise Kosovo.
"The resolution has already caused political tensions in Bosnia
and Herzegovina," Aleksandar Miletic from the Institute for Recent
History of Serbia told IPS. "But Serbia cannot apply the Kosovo
precedent in the case of the Bosnian Serb entity because it cannot
recognise Kosovo."
Recent talks on constitutional changes in Bosnia saw Serbian
politicians pushing for people's right to self-determination to be
included in the constitution. However, Bosnia is still supervised by a
powerful foreign administration, and the demands of local politicians
could be simply an attempt at strengthening the Serbian position
vis-a-vis Croats and Bosniaks within the federation.
Moreover, many agree that any eventual unification of Republika Srpska
with Serbia depends more on domestic events than on developments
in Kosovo.
Russia, the most powerful opponent of Kosovo's independence, has
realised its growing power cannot yet match that of the West, but is
certain to use Kosovo as a foreign policy tool.
While saying it will not follow the West's example on Kosovo, Moscow
says it is now entitled to revise its attitude towards conflict
regions in its vicinity.
In a first reaction to Kosovo's independence, Russia has lifted
its economic blockade on the breakaway Georgian region of Abkhazia,
angering its Caucasian southern neighbour.
Georgia claims Moscow intends to economically annex its region, and
warned that it is prepared to use force to protect its territorial
integrity.
Georgia's muscular rhetoric has been telling of its inability
to defrost diplomacy, but its recent threats stem from fears that
Moscow could start exporting military equipment to Abkhazia with the
blockade lifted.
In early March, Abkhazia and South Ossetia, another Georgian breakaway
region, appealed to the world community to recognise their already
proclaimed independence, by making reference to Kosovo.
"The leaders of Abkhazia failed to make a convincing argument,
but it's also true they didn't really try that hard, which happened
because they fell between their wish to use Kosovo's independence and
the Russian opposition to it becoming a precedent," Popescu told IPS.
South Ossetia and Abkhazia are highly dependent on Moscow, but
while South Ossetians would prefer to join North Ossetia in Russia,
Abkhazians claim to have viability as a democratic, independent state.
Moscow has never admitted to the possibility of recognising either
Abkhazia oor South Ossetia, as this could isolate it internationally
and encourage domestic separatism. But an upgrading of its relations
with the pariah states is under way.
Due to Georgia's pro-Western orientation, lately expressed in its
wish to join NATO, Russia has tolerated the de facto existence of
the two republics and has kept peacekeeping forces in the area,
which Western observers say are contributing to the stand-off, and
impeding Georgia's accession to NATO.
Fearing for their autonomy, the two regions broke away from Georgia in
the early 1990s amid the Soviet Union collapse, provoking a military
conflict that caused thousands of deaths and displacement of people
on all sides.
Moldova, also home to the separatist region of Transnistria, has
brighter prospects. Disagreements between the two sides are not
irreconcilable as the division is not ethnically-based. While the
Transnistrian Soviet-type regime enjoys support from Moscow, Russia
could facilitate reunification if certain conditions are fulfilled.
The solution preferred by Russia would envision a co-federation in
which both sides have a right to veto important decisions, and Moldova
gives assurances it will not join NATO.
According to Popescu, the conflict resembling Kosovo the most is
taking place in the Nagorno-Karabakh region, disputed by Armenia and
Azerbaijan since 1988, and largely ignored by the West.
The Azeri region has an 80 percent Armenian population and a history
of human rights violations on both sides.
Armenia has hailed Kosovo's independence, though it stopped short
of admitting that it served as a precedent for Nagorno-Karabakh,
whereas Azerbaijan strongly condemned the Kosovan move.
Rhetoric between the sides has been belligerent, and their positions
intransigent, sparking fears that Azerbaijan might seek a military
solution before the independence of a region crossed by important
oil and gas pipelines becomes impossible to ignore.
"The situation is destabilising quickly, but not for reasons directly
connected to Kosovo," Popescu says. "Kosovo will rather be used as a
tool than a clear-cut precedent. Russia uses it in a moderate way to
put pressure on Georgia and Moldova, and very clearly to undermine the
credibility of the U.S. and EU states that have supported the move."
Most recently, Moscow has linked last week's disturbances in Tibet
in China to Kosovo's independence declaration. (END/2008)
Zoltan Dujisin
IPS
March 21 2008
Italy
PRAGUE, Mar 21 (IPS) - While the world wonders whether Kosovo's
proclaimed independence will indeed constitute a precedent, its initial
effects on other frozen conflicts in Europe are beginning to be felt.
On Feb. 17 Kosovo, the disputed southern region of Serbia, made a
unilateral declaration of independence that was swiftly recognised
in the West but strongly opposed by Serbia and Russia.
Western leaders say Kosovo would not become a precedent, but
international law experts are sceptical, and say such standards play
an important role in shaping the international order.
But the possible independence of breakaway regions will probably
depend on the geopolitical considerations of superpowers and the
alliances between them and states facing irredentist movements,
rather than on increasingly disrespected international legislation.
There could be many precedent-setting elements. "The fact that Kosovo's
independence was unilaterally declared and internationally recognised,
the presence of NATO (North Atlantic Treaty Organisation) troops, the
elections organised by the international community, and the existence
of ethnic cleansing as a precondition are some of the many elements
of this precedent," Nicu Popescu, research fellow at the London office
of the European Council on Foreign Relations told IPS.
The first irredentist movement Kosovo's declared independence might
catapult is in the region's own backyard -- northern Kosovo is home to
40,000 Serbians who inhabit a territory mentally and institutionally
loyal to Serbia.
But Kosovo Serb leaders have so far excluded the possibility as it
would amount to recognising the independence of the remainder of
the region.
Claims of Kosovo as precedent are now being heard more widely.
In nearby Bosnia the People's Assembly of the Serbian Republika Srpska,
one of the two entities in which Bosnia has been divided since 1995
(the Croat-Muslim federation is the other), has said it will demand
secession once a majority of EU and UN members recognise Kosovo.
"The resolution has already caused political tensions in Bosnia
and Herzegovina," Aleksandar Miletic from the Institute for Recent
History of Serbia told IPS. "But Serbia cannot apply the Kosovo
precedent in the case of the Bosnian Serb entity because it cannot
recognise Kosovo."
Recent talks on constitutional changes in Bosnia saw Serbian
politicians pushing for people's right to self-determination to be
included in the constitution. However, Bosnia is still supervised by a
powerful foreign administration, and the demands of local politicians
could be simply an attempt at strengthening the Serbian position
vis-a-vis Croats and Bosniaks within the federation.
Moreover, many agree that any eventual unification of Republika Srpska
with Serbia depends more on domestic events than on developments
in Kosovo.
Russia, the most powerful opponent of Kosovo's independence, has
realised its growing power cannot yet match that of the West, but is
certain to use Kosovo as a foreign policy tool.
While saying it will not follow the West's example on Kosovo, Moscow
says it is now entitled to revise its attitude towards conflict
regions in its vicinity.
In a first reaction to Kosovo's independence, Russia has lifted
its economic blockade on the breakaway Georgian region of Abkhazia,
angering its Caucasian southern neighbour.
Georgia claims Moscow intends to economically annex its region, and
warned that it is prepared to use force to protect its territorial
integrity.
Georgia's muscular rhetoric has been telling of its inability
to defrost diplomacy, but its recent threats stem from fears that
Moscow could start exporting military equipment to Abkhazia with the
blockade lifted.
In early March, Abkhazia and South Ossetia, another Georgian breakaway
region, appealed to the world community to recognise their already
proclaimed independence, by making reference to Kosovo.
"The leaders of Abkhazia failed to make a convincing argument,
but it's also true they didn't really try that hard, which happened
because they fell between their wish to use Kosovo's independence and
the Russian opposition to it becoming a precedent," Popescu told IPS.
South Ossetia and Abkhazia are highly dependent on Moscow, but
while South Ossetians would prefer to join North Ossetia in Russia,
Abkhazians claim to have viability as a democratic, independent state.
Moscow has never admitted to the possibility of recognising either
Abkhazia oor South Ossetia, as this could isolate it internationally
and encourage domestic separatism. But an upgrading of its relations
with the pariah states is under way.
Due to Georgia's pro-Western orientation, lately expressed in its
wish to join NATO, Russia has tolerated the de facto existence of
the two republics and has kept peacekeeping forces in the area,
which Western observers say are contributing to the stand-off, and
impeding Georgia's accession to NATO.
Fearing for their autonomy, the two regions broke away from Georgia in
the early 1990s amid the Soviet Union collapse, provoking a military
conflict that caused thousands of deaths and displacement of people
on all sides.
Moldova, also home to the separatist region of Transnistria, has
brighter prospects. Disagreements between the two sides are not
irreconcilable as the division is not ethnically-based. While the
Transnistrian Soviet-type regime enjoys support from Moscow, Russia
could facilitate reunification if certain conditions are fulfilled.
The solution preferred by Russia would envision a co-federation in
which both sides have a right to veto important decisions, and Moldova
gives assurances it will not join NATO.
According to Popescu, the conflict resembling Kosovo the most is
taking place in the Nagorno-Karabakh region, disputed by Armenia and
Azerbaijan since 1988, and largely ignored by the West.
The Azeri region has an 80 percent Armenian population and a history
of human rights violations on both sides.
Armenia has hailed Kosovo's independence, though it stopped short
of admitting that it served as a precedent for Nagorno-Karabakh,
whereas Azerbaijan strongly condemned the Kosovan move.
Rhetoric between the sides has been belligerent, and their positions
intransigent, sparking fears that Azerbaijan might seek a military
solution before the independence of a region crossed by important
oil and gas pipelines becomes impossible to ignore.
"The situation is destabilising quickly, but not for reasons directly
connected to Kosovo," Popescu says. "Kosovo will rather be used as a
tool than a clear-cut precedent. Russia uses it in a moderate way to
put pressure on Georgia and Moldova, and very clearly to undermine the
credibility of the U.S. and EU states that have supported the move."
Most recently, Moscow has linked last week's disturbances in Tibet
in China to Kosovo's independence declaration. (END/2008)