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VLADIMIR KAZIMIROV: RENOUNCING MINSK GROUP CAN INCREASE TENSION
Noyan Tapan
March 24, 2008
YEREVAN, MARCH 24, NOYAN TAPAN. Ambassador Vladimir Kazimirov, who
in the middle of the 1990-s was the representative of Russia in the
negotiations on the Nagorno Karabakh settlement, at the request of
Noyan Tapan agency commented upon Azerbaijan's attempts to renounce
the mediation of the OSCE Minsk Group.
Q. How much juridically grounded is Azerbaijan's demand to dissolve
Minsk Group?
A. There are no exact, juridically fixed norms about it. Besides,
the OSCE system had no decision about creating Minsk Group, it even
has no mandate.
There is a kind of a draft of mandate of OSCE Minsk Conference on
Nagorno Karabakh adopted on March 24, 1992. The Minsk Group Co-chairs
and the Personal Representative of the OSCE Chairman-in-Office
have mandates, but Minsk Group itself does not have: it was formed
spontaneously, after a series of meetings held in Rome in summer of
1992. However, the order of Minsk Group's dissolution or renunciation
of its mediation is not registered in the existing mandates. It is
supposed that its necessity will disappear itself after the peaceful
political settlement of Nagorno Karabakh conflict.
The OSCE Budapest summit laid holding of negotiations on Karabakh
between the conflict sides (and not only between the recognized states)
not on Minsk Group, but on its Co-chairs. Since then Minsk Group has
been only used for consultations with the Co-chairs.
Intimidation with renunciation of OSCE's mediation, even development
of that demand in Azerbaijan is Baku's style of working familiar
long ago, with elements of obvious blackmail. None of the conflict
sides giving OSCE a consent of mediation is able to change that
without the agreement of the other side or to be more exact, the
other sides. Certain decisions of international structures would be
also necessary for changing the mediators.
Besides, it would not be so easy to find volunteers for working in the
direction of making the sides' positions closer. Experience teaches
something even to others. However, a new mediator cannot be thrusted
by one side: consent of all sides of the given conflict will be needed
in this case as well.
Q. What can replace the format of Minsk Group under the current
conditions?
As OSCE is as if responsible for the Nagorno Karabakh problem with
the consent of the UN Security Council.
A. The UN Security Council contented itself with the circumstance
that OSCE is engaged in the settlement of that conflict, supports its
peacekeeping activity and has never pretended to UN's being directly
engaged in that conflict. Moreover, after in 1993-94 Azerbaijan for
more than a year had not been fulfilling the requirements of its
four resolutions to stop military operations, and the Armenians had
not fulfilled the requirement to withdraw the occupied territories,
the UN Security Council, not wishing to permit discreditation of its
decisions, stopped adopting resolutions on Karabakh.
Daily exposing Armenians' not fulfilling the requirement to leave the
occupied territories, Baku in all possible ways keeps silent about
three facts: 1) who did not wish stopping of military operations and
led the case to the occupation of the territories of AR, and 2) there
is no essential requirement of the UN Security Council resolutions,
which has been fulfilled by Azerbaijan, except the forced conclusion
of truce. I suppose no stimulus for direct involvement of UN in that
settlement has appeared in the UN Security Council over the past years.
Q. If only stopping of negotiations on Karabakh proves to be the
result of Azerbaijan's efforts, what one can expect further?
A. Renunciation of one of the sides would mean only suspension of the
negotiations, which would be followed by searching for a way out of
the deep deadlock with unpredictable results.
Hypothetically three variants are possible: 1) resumption of the
negotiations by the former plan with considerable political costs
for the side-initiator of that renunciation; 2) agreement among
all sides of the conflict about a new mediator with approval of the
international structures; 3) long interval in the negotiations with
an excruciating search for a way out of the formed situation and
growth of tension. At that, influential states' and international
organizations' coming up with new initiatives excluding resumption
of military operations or stopping them is very probable. To break
is easier than to build. But one should think well before acting.
Noyan Tapan
March 24, 2008
YEREVAN, MARCH 24, NOYAN TAPAN. Ambassador Vladimir Kazimirov, who
in the middle of the 1990-s was the representative of Russia in the
negotiations on the Nagorno Karabakh settlement, at the request of
Noyan Tapan agency commented upon Azerbaijan's attempts to renounce
the mediation of the OSCE Minsk Group.
Q. How much juridically grounded is Azerbaijan's demand to dissolve
Minsk Group?
A. There are no exact, juridically fixed norms about it. Besides,
the OSCE system had no decision about creating Minsk Group, it even
has no mandate.
There is a kind of a draft of mandate of OSCE Minsk Conference on
Nagorno Karabakh adopted on March 24, 1992. The Minsk Group Co-chairs
and the Personal Representative of the OSCE Chairman-in-Office
have mandates, but Minsk Group itself does not have: it was formed
spontaneously, after a series of meetings held in Rome in summer of
1992. However, the order of Minsk Group's dissolution or renunciation
of its mediation is not registered in the existing mandates. It is
supposed that its necessity will disappear itself after the peaceful
political settlement of Nagorno Karabakh conflict.
The OSCE Budapest summit laid holding of negotiations on Karabakh
between the conflict sides (and not only between the recognized states)
not on Minsk Group, but on its Co-chairs. Since then Minsk Group has
been only used for consultations with the Co-chairs.
Intimidation with renunciation of OSCE's mediation, even development
of that demand in Azerbaijan is Baku's style of working familiar
long ago, with elements of obvious blackmail. None of the conflict
sides giving OSCE a consent of mediation is able to change that
without the agreement of the other side or to be more exact, the
other sides. Certain decisions of international structures would be
also necessary for changing the mediators.
Besides, it would not be so easy to find volunteers for working in the
direction of making the sides' positions closer. Experience teaches
something even to others. However, a new mediator cannot be thrusted
by one side: consent of all sides of the given conflict will be needed
in this case as well.
Q. What can replace the format of Minsk Group under the current
conditions?
As OSCE is as if responsible for the Nagorno Karabakh problem with
the consent of the UN Security Council.
A. The UN Security Council contented itself with the circumstance
that OSCE is engaged in the settlement of that conflict, supports its
peacekeeping activity and has never pretended to UN's being directly
engaged in that conflict. Moreover, after in 1993-94 Azerbaijan for
more than a year had not been fulfilling the requirements of its
four resolutions to stop military operations, and the Armenians had
not fulfilled the requirement to withdraw the occupied territories,
the UN Security Council, not wishing to permit discreditation of its
decisions, stopped adopting resolutions on Karabakh.
Daily exposing Armenians' not fulfilling the requirement to leave the
occupied territories, Baku in all possible ways keeps silent about
three facts: 1) who did not wish stopping of military operations and
led the case to the occupation of the territories of AR, and 2) there
is no essential requirement of the UN Security Council resolutions,
which has been fulfilled by Azerbaijan, except the forced conclusion
of truce. I suppose no stimulus for direct involvement of UN in that
settlement has appeared in the UN Security Council over the past years.
Q. If only stopping of negotiations on Karabakh proves to be the
result of Azerbaijan's efforts, what one can expect further?
A. Renunciation of one of the sides would mean only suspension of the
negotiations, which would be followed by searching for a way out of
the deep deadlock with unpredictable results.
Hypothetically three variants are possible: 1) resumption of the
negotiations by the former plan with considerable political costs
for the side-initiator of that renunciation; 2) agreement among
all sides of the conflict about a new mediator with approval of the
international structures; 3) long interval in the negotiations with
an excruciating search for a way out of the formed situation and
growth of tension. At that, influential states' and international
organizations' coming up with new initiatives excluding resumption
of military operations or stopping them is very probable. To break
is easier than to build. But one should think well before acting.