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THE CAUCASUS, SCO, CSTO, ENERGY AND THE NEW MULTIPOLARITY
by Guner Ozkan
Center for Research on Globalization
September 30, 2008
Canada
The Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) has conformed to the
Russian view that the conflict in South Ossetia is tantamount to
shaking, if not entirely changing, the global balance of power that
has orbited around US supremacy since the end of the Cold War.
So the SCO has seen the unipolar mentality of the US as a
source of conflict rather than a cure for the world's common
challenges. Stressing the necessity of a multipolar world for the
sake of international security, the SCO has supported the maintenance
of a strategic balance of power. The SCO has thus warned that the US
endeavor to create a global missile defense system, as in Poland and
the Czech Republic, is a futile attempt, as such efforts will neither
help uphold the strategic balance nor prevent the spread of weapons
of every kind, including nuclear.
So, along with demanding a multipolar international order, the SCO
reiterated that Russia has an exclusive right to shape the "near
abroad.'"
Rising value of the CSTO
Not surprisingly, Russia has received substantial political
backing from certain countries within the borders of the "near
abroad." Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan already
announced their endorsement of Russia within the context of the
SCO. More support has also come from members of the Collective Security
Treaty Organization (CSTO) -- an organization established in 2002 that
grew out of the Russian-led Collective Security Organization of 1993
and was meant to improve security relations between Russia, Armenia,
Belarus, Kyrgyzstan, Kazakhstan, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan. Like the
SCO, the heads of state of the CSTO at their summit on Sept. 5 in
Moscow endorsed Russia's role in the conflict region and condemned
Georgia's military action against South Ossetia and "double standards"
being pursued by the West on the issue. So, as well as showing that
it is not and cannot be isolated, Russia made a comparison between
the cases of Kosovo and South Ossetia by putting the term "double
standard" in the resolution of the CSTO summit.
Here again, Russia conveyed that diplomatic recognition of South
Ossetia and Abkhazia is a matter that should be decided by each member
of the CSTO in line with their own national interests. Belarusian
President Alexander Lukashenko has already announced his willingness
to recognize them as soon as parliament returns from summer break
at the end of September. After evaluating the changing political
and military dynamics in the region, and of course, seeing a green
light from Russia, Armenia may also prefer to recognize not only South
Ossetia and Abkhazia but also Nagorno-Karabakh in Azerbaijan. In fact,
perhaps encouraged by the Russian stance on the recognition of Abkhazia
and South Ossetia, Armenian President Serzh Sarksyan pointed out at the
summit that all members of the CSTO should adopt a unified position
on foreign policy, military and other issues. Certainly, Sarksyan
had in mind a united front in the CSTO toward the Armenian-populated
breakaway region of Nagorno-Karabakh in Azerbaijan, including possible
diplomatic recognition of it. True, Armenia and other CSTO members
have still not recognized South Ossetia and Abkhazia. However,
it will be very interesting to see what the same states do when
Abkhazia soon applies -- as Sergei Bagapsh, the Abkhazian leader,
has already announced he will do -- for membership in the CSTO and
the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS).
Energy pipelines for control over the 'near abroad'
Russia's success in challenging the West or exerting its control over
the "near abroad" is greatly dependent on where future Caspian oil
and gas pipelines are built: passing through Russian territory or not.
Energy pipelines are in fact equally important for both sides. The EU
and the US want to reduce their energy dependence on single and/or
unreliable sources (the Middle East and Russia). On the other hand,
Moscow strongly desires to preserve and increase the huge benefits
it is getting from energy exports as Russia is now earning nearly
two-thirds of its export revenues from oil and natural gas sales. Most
importantly, Russia is spending 30-40 percent of its budget on the
defense and security sectors. With all of this in mind, Putin made
a verbal deal with Islom Karimov, the Uzbek president, on Sept. 2
on another pipeline to carry around 30 billion cubic meters (bcm)
of natural gas per year from Uzbekistan to Russia with a link
to Turkmenistan. Russia has already transported a significant
amount of natural gas from the region via its pipeline system
and made another gas transportation deal (up to 80 bcm per year
for 25 years) with Turkmenistan in May 2007. On the other side,
Washington, Brussels and Ankara have also intensified their efforts
to realize the trans-Caspian pipeline from energy rich Turkmenistan,
with possible inclusion of Uzbek and Kazakh reserves, to Europe via
the Caspian seabed, South Caucasus and Turkey. The trans-Caspian
pipeline, which is currently seen as the most important component
of the Nabucco project -- a proposed pipeline to carry the Caspian,
Iraqi and other available natural gas yields to Central Europe via
Turkey -- has been under discussion since the mid-1990s. There is
no way that China will be left out of the pipeline equation in the
"near abroad." Of its various other energy projects in the region,
Beijing struck a gas agreement with Turkmenistan in April 2006 for a
Sino-Turkmen pipeline to be completed by 2009 to transport up to 30
bcm of natural gas annually for a 30-year period.
In the final analysis, in the "near abroad" theater, many actors are
still in the energy and security games that now have to be played under
the new power balances created by the conflict in Georgia. Surely,
any verbal political and security guarantees given by the US and
the EU to the vulnerable regional leaderships in the "near abroad"
come nowhere near to matching the military actions of the Russian
army. It is likely that international private investors and politically
unstable leaderships of the region have already begun to think twice
before making up their minds on the paths of future energy lines
and on establishing security and political relationships with the
external world. Naturally, political leaderships in the "near abroad"
have to lean toward the direction(s) posing little or no threat to
their rules. Even if some of them show a certain level of resistance
to Russia's pressure, it is unlikely they will turn their faces to
the West, but rather to the East, China and other alternatives in
that direction.
Assistant Professor Guner Ozkan is an expert on the Caucasus at the
Ankara-based International Strategic Research Organization (ISRO/USAK)
and a lecturer at Mugla University.
by Guner Ozkan
Center for Research on Globalization
September 30, 2008
Canada
The Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) has conformed to the
Russian view that the conflict in South Ossetia is tantamount to
shaking, if not entirely changing, the global balance of power that
has orbited around US supremacy since the end of the Cold War.
So the SCO has seen the unipolar mentality of the US as a
source of conflict rather than a cure for the world's common
challenges. Stressing the necessity of a multipolar world for the
sake of international security, the SCO has supported the maintenance
of a strategic balance of power. The SCO has thus warned that the US
endeavor to create a global missile defense system, as in Poland and
the Czech Republic, is a futile attempt, as such efforts will neither
help uphold the strategic balance nor prevent the spread of weapons
of every kind, including nuclear.
So, along with demanding a multipolar international order, the SCO
reiterated that Russia has an exclusive right to shape the "near
abroad.'"
Rising value of the CSTO
Not surprisingly, Russia has received substantial political
backing from certain countries within the borders of the "near
abroad." Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan already
announced their endorsement of Russia within the context of the
SCO. More support has also come from members of the Collective Security
Treaty Organization (CSTO) -- an organization established in 2002 that
grew out of the Russian-led Collective Security Organization of 1993
and was meant to improve security relations between Russia, Armenia,
Belarus, Kyrgyzstan, Kazakhstan, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan. Like the
SCO, the heads of state of the CSTO at their summit on Sept. 5 in
Moscow endorsed Russia's role in the conflict region and condemned
Georgia's military action against South Ossetia and "double standards"
being pursued by the West on the issue. So, as well as showing that
it is not and cannot be isolated, Russia made a comparison between
the cases of Kosovo and South Ossetia by putting the term "double
standard" in the resolution of the CSTO summit.
Here again, Russia conveyed that diplomatic recognition of South
Ossetia and Abkhazia is a matter that should be decided by each member
of the CSTO in line with their own national interests. Belarusian
President Alexander Lukashenko has already announced his willingness
to recognize them as soon as parliament returns from summer break
at the end of September. After evaluating the changing political
and military dynamics in the region, and of course, seeing a green
light from Russia, Armenia may also prefer to recognize not only South
Ossetia and Abkhazia but also Nagorno-Karabakh in Azerbaijan. In fact,
perhaps encouraged by the Russian stance on the recognition of Abkhazia
and South Ossetia, Armenian President Serzh Sarksyan pointed out at the
summit that all members of the CSTO should adopt a unified position
on foreign policy, military and other issues. Certainly, Sarksyan
had in mind a united front in the CSTO toward the Armenian-populated
breakaway region of Nagorno-Karabakh in Azerbaijan, including possible
diplomatic recognition of it. True, Armenia and other CSTO members
have still not recognized South Ossetia and Abkhazia. However,
it will be very interesting to see what the same states do when
Abkhazia soon applies -- as Sergei Bagapsh, the Abkhazian leader,
has already announced he will do -- for membership in the CSTO and
the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS).
Energy pipelines for control over the 'near abroad'
Russia's success in challenging the West or exerting its control over
the "near abroad" is greatly dependent on where future Caspian oil
and gas pipelines are built: passing through Russian territory or not.
Energy pipelines are in fact equally important for both sides. The EU
and the US want to reduce their energy dependence on single and/or
unreliable sources (the Middle East and Russia). On the other hand,
Moscow strongly desires to preserve and increase the huge benefits
it is getting from energy exports as Russia is now earning nearly
two-thirds of its export revenues from oil and natural gas sales. Most
importantly, Russia is spending 30-40 percent of its budget on the
defense and security sectors. With all of this in mind, Putin made
a verbal deal with Islom Karimov, the Uzbek president, on Sept. 2
on another pipeline to carry around 30 billion cubic meters (bcm)
of natural gas per year from Uzbekistan to Russia with a link
to Turkmenistan. Russia has already transported a significant
amount of natural gas from the region via its pipeline system
and made another gas transportation deal (up to 80 bcm per year
for 25 years) with Turkmenistan in May 2007. On the other side,
Washington, Brussels and Ankara have also intensified their efforts
to realize the trans-Caspian pipeline from energy rich Turkmenistan,
with possible inclusion of Uzbek and Kazakh reserves, to Europe via
the Caspian seabed, South Caucasus and Turkey. The trans-Caspian
pipeline, which is currently seen as the most important component
of the Nabucco project -- a proposed pipeline to carry the Caspian,
Iraqi and other available natural gas yields to Central Europe via
Turkey -- has been under discussion since the mid-1990s. There is
no way that China will be left out of the pipeline equation in the
"near abroad." Of its various other energy projects in the region,
Beijing struck a gas agreement with Turkmenistan in April 2006 for a
Sino-Turkmen pipeline to be completed by 2009 to transport up to 30
bcm of natural gas annually for a 30-year period.
In the final analysis, in the "near abroad" theater, many actors are
still in the energy and security games that now have to be played under
the new power balances created by the conflict in Georgia. Surely,
any verbal political and security guarantees given by the US and
the EU to the vulnerable regional leaderships in the "near abroad"
come nowhere near to matching the military actions of the Russian
army. It is likely that international private investors and politically
unstable leaderships of the region have already begun to think twice
before making up their minds on the paths of future energy lines
and on establishing security and political relationships with the
external world. Naturally, political leaderships in the "near abroad"
have to lean toward the direction(s) posing little or no threat to
their rules. Even if some of them show a certain level of resistance
to Russia's pressure, it is unlikely they will turn their faces to
the West, but rather to the East, China and other alternatives in
that direction.
Assistant Professor Guner Ozkan is an expert on the Caucasus at the
Ankara-based International Strategic Research Organization (ISRO/USAK)
and a lecturer at Mugla University.