STANISLAV BELKOVSKI: "I DO NOT RULE OUT THE MOST UNFAVORABLE SCRIPTS OF DEVELOPMENTS FOR RUSSIA, INCLUDING ITS COLLAPSE IN THE NEXT DECADES"
Today.Az
07 October 2008 [15:14]
Azerbaijan
Day.Az interview with famous Russian political scientist and founder
of the Institute of National Strategy Stanislav Belkovski.
- Mr.Belkovski, Russia is now sustaining a financial crisis. Don't you
think that we are dealing with transformation of the political distrust
to Russia into economic losses for it after the Russian-Georgian
military conflict in South Ossetia?
- I think that the Georgian-Ossetian conflict has become a catalyst
but not the reason of the crisis events in the Russian financial
market. Speaking sketchy, one of the main reasons of the discussed
Russian financial crisis was the US financial crisis, which led to the
massive outflow of the western capital from the Russian markets. But
if we go deeper into the details, we will see that the main cause of
the existing crisis lies in the dependence of the Russian development
on external factors, in this case, on the inflow of foreign capital
and world energy prices.
- Then which were the main consequences of the Russian-Georgian
conflict in South Ossetia for Russia?
- I think there were no negative consequences at all. Certainly,
we observed worsening of Russia's relations with the West, which,
however, did not grow into the break off ties between the sides or
any sanctions on our country. I have always supported the recognition
of independence of South Ossetia ad Abkhazia and I consider that this
step has strengthened our status of a regional player, though it did
not affect our global position in the world and it remained changeless.
- But was it right to recognize the independence of South Ossetia
and Abkhazia by Russia, which suppressed Chechnya's striving for
independence at the cost of bloodshed?
- I think it is a groundless comparison. The Kremlin had no strategic
lines for recognition of independence of South Ossetia and Abkhazia
and if Georgia had not started military actions on the night of
August 8, we would probably have not witnessed the recognition of
these formations in the next decades and perhaps it would have never
happened.
In the established situation Russia had no space for a political
maneuver and it was obliged to enter South Ossetia to avert the
complete expelling of Ossetians from there. Later on, Russia was
obliged to recognize independence of South Ossetia and Abkhazia,
otherwise, the further opportunities on the legal military presence
of Russia in these republics would have been ruled out. Moreover, we
should not forget that demonstration of weakness by powerful Russia
in this issue, would lead to destabilization in the Russian South
Caucasus, which always valued force.
- Your are distancing from the national interests of Russia,
while I prefer to view the Russian-Georgian war in the sense of
the international law. Was it right to openly ignore principles
of territorial integrity of the states by Russia, witnessed by the
world community in the result of Russia's military aggression against
Georgia with the further recognition of independence of South Ossetia
and Abkhazia?
- International law exists for registering political
resolutions. Moreover, it has been repeatedly changed throughout the
history. Speaking of the memory of our generation, we can remember
the collapse of the USSR and Yugoslavia, recognition of independence
of East Timor and Kosovo. In other words, it is not actual to speak
about the inviolability of borders after the collapse of several
states and appearance of new ones on the world map.
- Does it mean that you consider Russia's recognition of the so-called
"Nagorno Karabakh Republic" normal and expected?
- I suppose the recognition of the independence of "Nagorno Karabakh"
is not expected in the near future. As for the events in South Ossetia,
I would like to remind that recognition of its independence was not a
result of the strategic line of the Kremlin but a necessary reaction
to the external factor. In case with Nagorno Karabakh, the Kremlin
has no plans to recognize its independence. The preservation of the
quo status in the South Caucasus is more important for Russia.
- How how long may this quo status exist, if there is a polarization
of outlooks on the ways of the resolution of the Nagorno Karabakh
conflict due to Armenia's unwillingness to liberate the occupied
lands of our country?
- I am not so well familiarized with the Nagorno Karabakh conflict,
like in case with South Ossetia and, therefore, it is difficult for me
to give an unambiguous answer to this question. But I think, changes in
this status are possible if the United States display a will for it, as
they can encourage the South Caucasus countries for these changes. But
the United States and European Union are so busy with other questions,
especially, the global financial crisis that they will hardly deal
with changing the status in the Karabakh issue in the nearest future.
If speaking about the position of the Kremlin, Russia is not
interested in worsening relations either with Azerbaijan or with
Armenia, therefore, it can not occupy the open pro-Azerbaijani
position in the issue of Nagorno Karabakh. Therefore, I think,
the Kremlin hopes more for continuation of the negotiation process,
but not for the radical changes in the established quo status.
- We are speaking of the Kremlin's position, considering the current
balance of powers in the world. What do you think about the future
of Russia?
- The nearest future of Russia seems unclear to me for considering
the fact that the provisional start of the Russian civilization
dates to the 9th century, now Russia has neared the critical age
of 1200 years. It is supposed that at this age of historical turns a
civilization may either die or reborn for a new development. Everything
depends on whether the working political elite of Russia will be
able to resist the challenges of the global crisis. Now we see that
it is not. It takes decisions meeting its own interests, but not the
national interests for Russia. If in the end, the ruling elite of
Russia does not find reserves for internal mobilization, I do not
rule out the most unfavorable scripts of development for Russia,
including its collapse in the next decades. Naturally, I continue
hoping that the age of historical turns will end with Russia's revival,
appearance of a new ruling political elite but now its death.
- Which variant, revived or weak Russia, is more profitable for
Azerbaijan?
- I think that the neighborhood with weak Russia is not profitable for
Azerbaijan, because weak and even collapsed Russia will always be an
exporter of chaos and terrorism to Azerbaijan. At the same time only
powerful Russia can contribute to peace and stability in the South
Caucasus region.
Today.Az
07 October 2008 [15:14]
Azerbaijan
Day.Az interview with famous Russian political scientist and founder
of the Institute of National Strategy Stanislav Belkovski.
- Mr.Belkovski, Russia is now sustaining a financial crisis. Don't you
think that we are dealing with transformation of the political distrust
to Russia into economic losses for it after the Russian-Georgian
military conflict in South Ossetia?
- I think that the Georgian-Ossetian conflict has become a catalyst
but not the reason of the crisis events in the Russian financial
market. Speaking sketchy, one of the main reasons of the discussed
Russian financial crisis was the US financial crisis, which led to the
massive outflow of the western capital from the Russian markets. But
if we go deeper into the details, we will see that the main cause of
the existing crisis lies in the dependence of the Russian development
on external factors, in this case, on the inflow of foreign capital
and world energy prices.
- Then which were the main consequences of the Russian-Georgian
conflict in South Ossetia for Russia?
- I think there were no negative consequences at all. Certainly,
we observed worsening of Russia's relations with the West, which,
however, did not grow into the break off ties between the sides or
any sanctions on our country. I have always supported the recognition
of independence of South Ossetia ad Abkhazia and I consider that this
step has strengthened our status of a regional player, though it did
not affect our global position in the world and it remained changeless.
- But was it right to recognize the independence of South Ossetia
and Abkhazia by Russia, which suppressed Chechnya's striving for
independence at the cost of bloodshed?
- I think it is a groundless comparison. The Kremlin had no strategic
lines for recognition of independence of South Ossetia and Abkhazia
and if Georgia had not started military actions on the night of
August 8, we would probably have not witnessed the recognition of
these formations in the next decades and perhaps it would have never
happened.
In the established situation Russia had no space for a political
maneuver and it was obliged to enter South Ossetia to avert the
complete expelling of Ossetians from there. Later on, Russia was
obliged to recognize independence of South Ossetia and Abkhazia,
otherwise, the further opportunities on the legal military presence
of Russia in these republics would have been ruled out. Moreover, we
should not forget that demonstration of weakness by powerful Russia
in this issue, would lead to destabilization in the Russian South
Caucasus, which always valued force.
- Your are distancing from the national interests of Russia,
while I prefer to view the Russian-Georgian war in the sense of
the international law. Was it right to openly ignore principles
of territorial integrity of the states by Russia, witnessed by the
world community in the result of Russia's military aggression against
Georgia with the further recognition of independence of South Ossetia
and Abkhazia?
- International law exists for registering political
resolutions. Moreover, it has been repeatedly changed throughout the
history. Speaking of the memory of our generation, we can remember
the collapse of the USSR and Yugoslavia, recognition of independence
of East Timor and Kosovo. In other words, it is not actual to speak
about the inviolability of borders after the collapse of several
states and appearance of new ones on the world map.
- Does it mean that you consider Russia's recognition of the so-called
"Nagorno Karabakh Republic" normal and expected?
- I suppose the recognition of the independence of "Nagorno Karabakh"
is not expected in the near future. As for the events in South Ossetia,
I would like to remind that recognition of its independence was not a
result of the strategic line of the Kremlin but a necessary reaction
to the external factor. In case with Nagorno Karabakh, the Kremlin
has no plans to recognize its independence. The preservation of the
quo status in the South Caucasus is more important for Russia.
- How how long may this quo status exist, if there is a polarization
of outlooks on the ways of the resolution of the Nagorno Karabakh
conflict due to Armenia's unwillingness to liberate the occupied
lands of our country?
- I am not so well familiarized with the Nagorno Karabakh conflict,
like in case with South Ossetia and, therefore, it is difficult for me
to give an unambiguous answer to this question. But I think, changes in
this status are possible if the United States display a will for it, as
they can encourage the South Caucasus countries for these changes. But
the United States and European Union are so busy with other questions,
especially, the global financial crisis that they will hardly deal
with changing the status in the Karabakh issue in the nearest future.
If speaking about the position of the Kremlin, Russia is not
interested in worsening relations either with Azerbaijan or with
Armenia, therefore, it can not occupy the open pro-Azerbaijani
position in the issue of Nagorno Karabakh. Therefore, I think,
the Kremlin hopes more for continuation of the negotiation process,
but not for the radical changes in the established quo status.
- We are speaking of the Kremlin's position, considering the current
balance of powers in the world. What do you think about the future
of Russia?
- The nearest future of Russia seems unclear to me for considering
the fact that the provisional start of the Russian civilization
dates to the 9th century, now Russia has neared the critical age
of 1200 years. It is supposed that at this age of historical turns a
civilization may either die or reborn for a new development. Everything
depends on whether the working political elite of Russia will be
able to resist the challenges of the global crisis. Now we see that
it is not. It takes decisions meeting its own interests, but not the
national interests for Russia. If in the end, the ruling elite of
Russia does not find reserves for internal mobilization, I do not
rule out the most unfavorable scripts of development for Russia,
including its collapse in the next decades. Naturally, I continue
hoping that the age of historical turns will end with Russia's revival,
appearance of a new ruling political elite but now its death.
- Which variant, revived or weak Russia, is more profitable for
Azerbaijan?
- I think that the neighborhood with weak Russia is not profitable for
Azerbaijan, because weak and even collapsed Russia will always be an
exporter of chaos and terrorism to Azerbaijan. At the same time only
powerful Russia can contribute to peace and stability in the South
Caucasus region.