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IS THERE TIME FOR POLITICAL MANEUVERS? IT IS TIME TO DECIDE ON A STRATEGIC WAY
by Alpay Ahmad
Zerkalo
Sept 20 2008
Azerbaijan
Probably many people have paid attention to the fact that over
the recent two to three years each visits of a high-ranking
representative of the USA as well as visits of the Azerbaijani
president to Russia, the USA and Iran are analysed first of all in
the context of determining a strategic way of Azerbaijan: who will
Azerbaijan link its political future with? With the West, or Russia?
Azerbaijan on the horns of a dilemma
The visits of US Vice President Dick Cheney to our country as well
as Ilham Aliyev's working visit to Moscow at the invitation of the
Russian president were viewed by political experts as almost the
last chance of official Baku to decide on its choice. Bearing into
consideration Dmitriy Medvedev's telephone call to Ilham Aliyev on
the day of Cheney's visit to Baku and the Azerbaijani president's
subsequent visit to Russia, one can with overwhelming confidence say
that the situation is really tense and the Azerbaijani authorities
are under tough pressure from both sides.
Does the official Baku really need to depart from its traditional
balanced foreign policy? Or, is there time for manoeuvres? Our answer
to these questions boils down to proposal of two strategic ways. We
believe we have in store three to four years for manoeuvres after
which Azerbaijan has to decide upon its strategic step.
Why have three to four years been selected in the capacity of
determining a final strategic choice for Azerbaijan? Because, this
term will show how effective and productive are foreign policies
conducted by Georgia, Ukraine and Moldova.
We should within the limits of our opportunities clarify for ourselves
such a picture: what will Georgia and Ukraine obtain and lose as a
result of joining NATO? What will the permanently changing foreign
policy of Moldova lead? And if she completely stakes on Russia, what
will be its win and loss? Accession of any country to the North
Atlantic alliance is being viewed in the context of two values
(+ geopolitical benefit) and the strengthening of the democratic
institutions.
The country obtains a security guarantee against possible aggressions
and by becoming a member of this organization it completely makes
its choice in favour of democracy and civil society. A serious
deviation from a democratic way of development is fraught with
complication of the relations between a state choosing; imagine a
way of authoritarianism and a membership of the alliance.
Georgia's and Ukraine's accession to NATO last signal for Baku
Georgia has nothing to lose as she has already suffered from the
Russian aggression and the illegal recognition of its two regions:
she still hopes that by joining NATO, it will be able to win back
the occupied lands. For us, it is of great significance that what
policy NATO will pursue with regard to this issue. After the Russian
Federation recognized South Ossetia and Abkhazia as [independent]
states, a platform for the negotiations between Georgia and Russia for
determining a status of these regions has also disappeared. (Russia
will hardly revoke its decision as the West proposes her to do so)
It is important for us to follow Russia's further policy with regard to
Georgia since this country's access (most likely together with Ukraine)
to NATO will serve a last signal for official Baku. Ukraine has no
a problem of separatism, it strives to fully come out of Moscow's
sphere of influence by means of reducing maximum energy dependence
from Moscow and eliminating the military bases in the Black Sea. We
should say that Ukraine's accession to NATO by virtue of its huge
territory is interpreted by Russia with more serious threat than
Georgia's membership of the bloc.
Therefore, we shall soon witness the next phase of a political crisis
in this country as well as heavy talks on gas prices exported to
Ukraine. There is already information in the press that Russia is
distributing passports among Russians residing in the Crimea. Will
Ukraine be able to cope with these problems before joining NATO? The
readiness and ability of [Ukrainian President] Viktor Yushchenko to
overcome Russia's resistance on this issue will exactly be obvious
within three to four years.
Moldova's behaviour in the foreign policy, which has been
recently making reverences towards Russia, will also show how the
rapprochement between these countries will end. As known, after the
Russian aggression against Georgia, President Dmitriy Medvedev called
Moldavian President V. Voronin and expressed his readiness to intensify
the process of negotiations for the determination of a final status
of Dniester. Moscow even expressed its readiness to make corrections
to the so-called "Kozak plan" stipulating relations between Kishinev
and Tiraspol on principles of confederation rejected by Voronin under
duress from the West in 2005. This document should have been signed
between the conflicting sides in presence of then president of Russia,
Vladimir Putin.
One should diligently follow the events in this country. To what
extend will a new plan for the regulation of the Dniester conflict
meet Moldova's national interests? What will be a reaction of the
Moldavian authorities to this plan? How long will the next stage of
the negotiations continue and will official Moscow take a constructive
position with regard to the resolution of this problem? Will Moldova
abandon GUAM (the regional alliance of Georgia, Ukraine, Azerbaijan
and Moldova)?
Karabakh instead of gas acceptable
For the next three to four years Azerbaijan may adhere to the following
foreign policy line by continuing the export of its energy resources
through the existing oil pipelines, taking part in implementation of
the NABUCO project as well as developing relations with NATO (so far
without applying for a membership of the alliance).
Incidentally, Turkey's Caucasus Security and Stability Platform, though
formally approved by the Russian leadership, may for a certain period
be handful for Azerbaijan. Official Baku may take advantage of this
platform and delay its choice (as well as with a reply to the West)
in favour of NATO.
Undoubtedly, this requires kid-glove diplomacy, above all, the West
should not get an impression that its interests are ignored by our
government. (It seems to us that a certain interest shown by Russia
to this initiative is exactly connected with the fact that it lacks
an idea on the need for Azerbaijan and Georgia to join NATO)
Azerbaijan may refuse from NABUCO and accept the Russian proposal
on the purchase of Azerbaijani gas (at 300 dollars for 1,000 cu
m) provided only if Russia makes real efforts for determining a
status of Nagornyy Karabakh in the course of the settlement of the
Armenian-Azerbaijani Nagornyy Karabakh conflict, which to a certain
degree would meet the national interests of our country.
Otherwise, Azerbaijan should take a passive position on the regulation
of the conflict and make an emphasis on development of the energy
projects in the hope that with huge oil and gas revenues and changes
in the geopolitical situation in our favour we shall be able win back
the occupied lands.
The matter is that currently the Azerbaijani authorities are not
confident that thanks to Azerbaijan's membership of NATO, it can win
back the occupied lands. By entering the alliance, our country can
only obtain a security guarantee against a possible aggression from
Russia and Iran.
One cannot rule out a limited intervention of these countries,
if, for instance, our country decides to partake in the NABUCO
project. Actually, joining the alliance is the least harm for
Azerbaijan under the current conditions since as we said above, so far
there seems that the alliance is not ready to resolve this conflict.
In a nutshell, within the limits of the proposed time limit, we should
conduct intensive political dialogue (that is to say, bargaining)
with Russia, inform official Moscow of our proposals proceeding
from the national interests of the country and witness their real
implementation. Official Moscow should have the impression that she
may lose Azerbaijan for a long time (that is to say, our country may
finally relinquish its traditional foreign policy course in favour
of the West)
The [latest] invitation of the Azerbaijani president to Moscow was
caused by this circumstance; nevertheless, we should not fully trust
the intensification of the Russian diplomacy for the settlement of
the Armenian-Azerbaijani Nagornyy Karabakh conflict: pledges should
be followed by real steps.
There is no doubt that official Baku should simultaneously conduct
similar intensive dialogue with the West in order to understand
conditions and NATO to take part in the settlement of the problem of
the occupied lands.
Our second proposal boils down to the following. If now Azerbaijan
decides to join NATO, it should get a certain interim security
guarantee against possible aggression. For example, such a security
guarantee could be given by the USA, Britain, and Turkey (certainly,
if Ankara's Caucasus Security and Stability Platform loses its
significance as predicted by many experts) who have energy interests
here.
Such a guarantee would incorporate commitments of the sides in a
specific document to be signed by the sides. One should not rule
out that during Dick Cheney's visit to the region, these issues were
discussed with the presidents of Azerbaijan, Georgia and Ukraine.
P.S. Undoubtedly, one should not forget about the Iranian factor. If
the USA by the next presidential election decides to hit Iran, official
Baku has to make its choice hastily. What will it be? It is difficult
to answer this question now.
From: Emil Lazarian | Ararat NewsPress
by Alpay Ahmad
Zerkalo
Sept 20 2008
Azerbaijan
Probably many people have paid attention to the fact that over
the recent two to three years each visits of a high-ranking
representative of the USA as well as visits of the Azerbaijani
president to Russia, the USA and Iran are analysed first of all in
the context of determining a strategic way of Azerbaijan: who will
Azerbaijan link its political future with? With the West, or Russia?
Azerbaijan on the horns of a dilemma
The visits of US Vice President Dick Cheney to our country as well
as Ilham Aliyev's working visit to Moscow at the invitation of the
Russian president were viewed by political experts as almost the
last chance of official Baku to decide on its choice. Bearing into
consideration Dmitriy Medvedev's telephone call to Ilham Aliyev on
the day of Cheney's visit to Baku and the Azerbaijani president's
subsequent visit to Russia, one can with overwhelming confidence say
that the situation is really tense and the Azerbaijani authorities
are under tough pressure from both sides.
Does the official Baku really need to depart from its traditional
balanced foreign policy? Or, is there time for manoeuvres? Our answer
to these questions boils down to proposal of two strategic ways. We
believe we have in store three to four years for manoeuvres after
which Azerbaijan has to decide upon its strategic step.
Why have three to four years been selected in the capacity of
determining a final strategic choice for Azerbaijan? Because, this
term will show how effective and productive are foreign policies
conducted by Georgia, Ukraine and Moldova.
We should within the limits of our opportunities clarify for ourselves
such a picture: what will Georgia and Ukraine obtain and lose as a
result of joining NATO? What will the permanently changing foreign
policy of Moldova lead? And if she completely stakes on Russia, what
will be its win and loss? Accession of any country to the North
Atlantic alliance is being viewed in the context of two values
(+ geopolitical benefit) and the strengthening of the democratic
institutions.
The country obtains a security guarantee against possible aggressions
and by becoming a member of this organization it completely makes
its choice in favour of democracy and civil society. A serious
deviation from a democratic way of development is fraught with
complication of the relations between a state choosing; imagine a
way of authoritarianism and a membership of the alliance.
Georgia's and Ukraine's accession to NATO last signal for Baku
Georgia has nothing to lose as she has already suffered from the
Russian aggression and the illegal recognition of its two regions:
she still hopes that by joining NATO, it will be able to win back
the occupied lands. For us, it is of great significance that what
policy NATO will pursue with regard to this issue. After the Russian
Federation recognized South Ossetia and Abkhazia as [independent]
states, a platform for the negotiations between Georgia and Russia for
determining a status of these regions has also disappeared. (Russia
will hardly revoke its decision as the West proposes her to do so)
It is important for us to follow Russia's further policy with regard to
Georgia since this country's access (most likely together with Ukraine)
to NATO will serve a last signal for official Baku. Ukraine has no
a problem of separatism, it strives to fully come out of Moscow's
sphere of influence by means of reducing maximum energy dependence
from Moscow and eliminating the military bases in the Black Sea. We
should say that Ukraine's accession to NATO by virtue of its huge
territory is interpreted by Russia with more serious threat than
Georgia's membership of the bloc.
Therefore, we shall soon witness the next phase of a political crisis
in this country as well as heavy talks on gas prices exported to
Ukraine. There is already information in the press that Russia is
distributing passports among Russians residing in the Crimea. Will
Ukraine be able to cope with these problems before joining NATO? The
readiness and ability of [Ukrainian President] Viktor Yushchenko to
overcome Russia's resistance on this issue will exactly be obvious
within three to four years.
Moldova's behaviour in the foreign policy, which has been
recently making reverences towards Russia, will also show how the
rapprochement between these countries will end. As known, after the
Russian aggression against Georgia, President Dmitriy Medvedev called
Moldavian President V. Voronin and expressed his readiness to intensify
the process of negotiations for the determination of a final status
of Dniester. Moscow even expressed its readiness to make corrections
to the so-called "Kozak plan" stipulating relations between Kishinev
and Tiraspol on principles of confederation rejected by Voronin under
duress from the West in 2005. This document should have been signed
between the conflicting sides in presence of then president of Russia,
Vladimir Putin.
One should diligently follow the events in this country. To what
extend will a new plan for the regulation of the Dniester conflict
meet Moldova's national interests? What will be a reaction of the
Moldavian authorities to this plan? How long will the next stage of
the negotiations continue and will official Moscow take a constructive
position with regard to the resolution of this problem? Will Moldova
abandon GUAM (the regional alliance of Georgia, Ukraine, Azerbaijan
and Moldova)?
Karabakh instead of gas acceptable
For the next three to four years Azerbaijan may adhere to the following
foreign policy line by continuing the export of its energy resources
through the existing oil pipelines, taking part in implementation of
the NABUCO project as well as developing relations with NATO (so far
without applying for a membership of the alliance).
Incidentally, Turkey's Caucasus Security and Stability Platform, though
formally approved by the Russian leadership, may for a certain period
be handful for Azerbaijan. Official Baku may take advantage of this
platform and delay its choice (as well as with a reply to the West)
in favour of NATO.
Undoubtedly, this requires kid-glove diplomacy, above all, the West
should not get an impression that its interests are ignored by our
government. (It seems to us that a certain interest shown by Russia
to this initiative is exactly connected with the fact that it lacks
an idea on the need for Azerbaijan and Georgia to join NATO)
Azerbaijan may refuse from NABUCO and accept the Russian proposal
on the purchase of Azerbaijani gas (at 300 dollars for 1,000 cu
m) provided only if Russia makes real efforts for determining a
status of Nagornyy Karabakh in the course of the settlement of the
Armenian-Azerbaijani Nagornyy Karabakh conflict, which to a certain
degree would meet the national interests of our country.
Otherwise, Azerbaijan should take a passive position on the regulation
of the conflict and make an emphasis on development of the energy
projects in the hope that with huge oil and gas revenues and changes
in the geopolitical situation in our favour we shall be able win back
the occupied lands.
The matter is that currently the Azerbaijani authorities are not
confident that thanks to Azerbaijan's membership of NATO, it can win
back the occupied lands. By entering the alliance, our country can
only obtain a security guarantee against a possible aggression from
Russia and Iran.
One cannot rule out a limited intervention of these countries,
if, for instance, our country decides to partake in the NABUCO
project. Actually, joining the alliance is the least harm for
Azerbaijan under the current conditions since as we said above, so far
there seems that the alliance is not ready to resolve this conflict.
In a nutshell, within the limits of the proposed time limit, we should
conduct intensive political dialogue (that is to say, bargaining)
with Russia, inform official Moscow of our proposals proceeding
from the national interests of the country and witness their real
implementation. Official Moscow should have the impression that she
may lose Azerbaijan for a long time (that is to say, our country may
finally relinquish its traditional foreign policy course in favour
of the West)
The [latest] invitation of the Azerbaijani president to Moscow was
caused by this circumstance; nevertheless, we should not fully trust
the intensification of the Russian diplomacy for the settlement of
the Armenian-Azerbaijani Nagornyy Karabakh conflict: pledges should
be followed by real steps.
There is no doubt that official Baku should simultaneously conduct
similar intensive dialogue with the West in order to understand
conditions and NATO to take part in the settlement of the problem of
the occupied lands.
Our second proposal boils down to the following. If now Azerbaijan
decides to join NATO, it should get a certain interim security
guarantee against possible aggression. For example, such a security
guarantee could be given by the USA, Britain, and Turkey (certainly,
if Ankara's Caucasus Security and Stability Platform loses its
significance as predicted by many experts) who have energy interests
here.
Such a guarantee would incorporate commitments of the sides in a
specific document to be signed by the sides. One should not rule
out that during Dick Cheney's visit to the region, these issues were
discussed with the presidents of Azerbaijan, Georgia and Ukraine.
P.S. Undoubtedly, one should not forget about the Iranian factor. If
the USA by the next presidential election decides to hit Iran, official
Baku has to make its choice hastily. What will it be? It is difficult
to answer this question now.
From: Emil Lazarian | Ararat NewsPress